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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has increased in many countries, and it is a potential 
catalyst for development.  Yet all FDI is not equal.  This dissertation uses the case of Brazil 
since 1990 to demonstrate how host country political institutions can have an effect on the 
investment profiles of multinational firms.  Specifically, I argue that innovation-intensive and 
efficiency-oriented FDI is relatively uncommon in Brazil due in part to the characteristics of 
state institutions.  I develop theoretical frameworks of institutional coherence and firm 
incentive structures, and support my argument with original interviews and firm-level data 
from Brazil and other developing countries.  I concentrate on the automotive and information 
technology industries in Brazil, which are dominated by multinational firms.  I argue that 
increasingly integrated global value chains change the context for host country governments 
and industrial policy, but that states do retain influence over the production models pursued 
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Multinationals, modern enterprises that countries seek to attract, are viewed (in Brazil) with 
mistrust. If they were ruinous, as has been said, then São Paulo would be the poorest state in 
Brazil and Piauí would be the richest. 
 Roberto Campos, 1989 
Brazil has enriched itself, developed, but it maintains its subordination to the grand centers, 
to decisions negotiated outside the country. 
 Celso Furtado, 1999 
The modern international system is one of global production.  Advances in 
technology and changing comparative advantages have made it profitable for firms to 
produce goods and services in different locations around the world.  While geographic 
distance is still important and the mobility of firms is limited by various factors, global flows 
of investment have increased steadily in recent decades and in some cases dramatically.  
Developing countries increasingly participate in global production networks, whether 
through absorbing international capital, providing locational advantages for incoming 
multinational companies, or sending their own multinationals abroad.  According to the 
United Nations’ Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), global inflows of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) are expected to rise to between $1.3 and $1.5 trillion in 
2011, and perhaps approach $2 trillion in 2012.  Developing and transition economies are 
now responsible for almost half of global FDI flows, and are leading the recovery in FDI 
after the global economic crisis of 2008 (UNCTAD 2010). 
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The increase in FDI around the world has prompted much work within the subfields 
of comparative and international political economy.  Scholars have investigated questions 
about the relationships between types of political regimes in host countries and flows of FDI 
(Jensen 2003, 2006; Li and Resnick 2003; Oneal 1994; Kenyon and Naoi 2010).  Other 
cross-national studies have linked FDI variation to internal political characteristics of host 
countries, such as the number of veto players (Henisz 2000), or connected FDI flows to 
international political and economic agreements (Büthe and Milner 2008).  There are 
numerous other research avenues in the political economy of FDI, some less explored than 
others.  This research, much of it recent, has contributed greatly to our understanding of the 
political determinants and consequences of foreign investment.  Yet most of this cross-
national research on FDI has only considered aggregate stocks and flows.  FDI is often 
treated as a singular entity, ignoring the tremendous heterogeneity in investment models.  
This dissertation seeks to complicate the relationship between politics in developing 
countries and incoming FDI by asking how political institutions in developing countries 
affect specific types of incoming FDI, not only its amount.  There are numerous ways to 
subdivide FDI according to its unique characteristics, from vertical vs. horizontal FDI to 
market-seeking vs. efficiency-oriented vs. technology-intensive.  This work focuses 
specifically on the political determinants of efficiency-oriented and technology-intensive 
FDI, arguing that the institutions of the state and state policies matter for the composition of 
incoming FDI and the evolving investment models of individual firms. 
This work also addresses questions about the relationship between foreign investment 
and development.  In the comparative tradition, scholars have in the past considered the 
contribution foreign investment might make toward development.  This is especially true in 
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Latin America, where dependency theory provided rich theoretical ground for interpreting 
relationships among governments, foreign investors, and local capital (Evans 1979, Bennett 
and Sharpe 1979).  In the 1980s and 1990s, however, Latin American political economy 
became dominated by analysis of economic reform.  The investigation of bargaining 
relationships between firms and states has not received as much emphasis as it has in the 
past.  Yet the increase in foreign investment in Latin America, and the developing world 
more generally, continued throughout this period, placing large chunks of developing country 
economies in the hands of foreign investors.  The cumulative stock of FDI in developing 
countries represented 27.9 percent of GDP in 20091.  Foreign firms are responsible for 
increasing shares of manufacturing capacity and developing countries’ exports2
Foreign investment has quite clearly been more beneficial for some countries than 
others.  What explains this divergence?  This puzzle has been partially answered by 
.  Yet the 
development literature has not dealt adequately with the increasing importance of 
international production networks, instead focusing on older debates about the support of 
national champions or protectionism vs. free trade.  Put simply, the dramatic 
internationalization of production in the last thirty years creates a new context for 
development theory.  Theoretical perspectives on what global production networks mean for 
development strategy remain underdeveloped.  This dissertation therefore also analyzes how 
states interact with multinational firms and attempt to extract developmental benefits from 
foreign investment.  I identify key characteristics of state institutions that endow them with 
sufficient leverage to successfully integrate multinationals into their development strategies.  
                                                 
1Retreived from UNCTADstat (http://unctadstat.unctad.org) 
 
2As a sample, in 2000 foreign firms were responsible for an estimated 28 percent of Chile’s exports, 31 percent 
of Mexico’s exports, and an impressive 50 percent of China’s exports (UNCTAD 2002). 
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economists, who have outlined various determinants of ‘high quality’ FDI (Kumar 2002, 
Mutti 2003, Reuber et al. 1973, Pearce 1989).  Yet the political determinants of 
developmentally-catalytic FDI remain underspecified.  In this dissertation, I seek to 
understand how political settings in developing countries condition investment, both in the 
aggregate and at firm level.  To do this, I combine an in-depth study of the Brazilian state’s 
interactions with foreign investors with cross-national comparisons in Latin America and the 
larger developing world. 
The question of state efficacy in the context of international production networks is 
an important one, and ties in with larger debates about the effects of the global economy on 
state prerogatives.  One the one hand are scholars who suggest that global economic forces 
constrain the ability of governments to make independent decisions, and that firms or 
financial market participants will ‘punish’ unorthodox policy with disinvestment or other 
sanctions (Rodrik 1997, Strange 1996).  On the other hand are scholars who argue that 
international economic constraints are relatively insignificant, and that states retain 
significant policy autonomy with distinct policy options (Boix 1998, Garrett 1998).  With 
respect to FDI and development, the debate centers around whether state policies and 
institutions can condition the investment models pursued by multinational firms so that 
developmental goals may be realized.  In this work, I argue that states do retain significant 
‘policy space’ in their interactions with multinational firms. 
What, then, determines successful integration of FDI into a developing economy?  
Or, to put it differently, what are the political determinants of ‘high quality’ FDI?  To answer 
these questions, I adopt a comparative institutional approach.  In the 1980s, a group of social 
scientists launched a campaign to bring the analysis of state institutions back to the forefront 
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of political analysis (Evans et al. 1985).  This was done partly in response to neoclassical 
interpretations, which had reduced the ‘state’ to a venue in which societal groups pursued 
self-interested goals.  The institutionalists countered that the state existed as an autonomous 
entity with its own history and objectives, and that state institutions could have an 
independent effect on societal outcomes.  Or, as March and Olsen (1984, 738) explained the 
institutionalist argument:  
The bureaucratic agency, the legislative committee, and the appellate court are arenas 
for contending social forces, but they are also collections of standard operating 
procedures and structures that define and defend interests. They are political actors in 
their own right. 
 
The basic premise of the institutionalist argument was that the form and function of 
the state mattered.  Applied to development theory, institutionalists argued that the state 
could impede development or assist it, but to simply ignore the state as an actor would be a 
mistake3
                                                 
3As an example of an applied institutionalist argument, Rodrik et al. (2002) found that institutions (property 
rights, the rule of law) were more influential than geographic measures (climate, natural resources) or economic 
openness and trade in explaining rates of economic growth. 
. In this work, I adopt the institutionalist perspective and argue that the institutions 
of the Brazilian state have been influential in determining the qualities of incoming 
investment and also in conditioning the investment models of firms already in Brazil.  I use 
the simple definition of institutions applied by Hall and Taylor (1996, 938) in their 
discussion of historical institutionalists, who according to the authors “associate institutions 
with organizations and the rules or conventions promulgated by formal organization.”  North 
(1990; 1994) adopts a more expansive definition of institutions, defining institutions as 
formal rules (constitutions, laws and regulations) and informal constraints (norms, 
conventions, and codes of conduct).  While I recognize the contribution of informal 
institutions to a wide range of socio-economic outcomes, in this work I concentrate on formal 
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elements of institutions, including both state rules and regulations and the agencies through 
which these policies are channeled. 
This dissertation makes a number of significant improvements on previous research 
in both comparative and international political economy.  First, I demonstrate that domestic 
political institutions have an impact not only on the amount of incoming FDI but also its 
dominant characteristics.  I argue that multinational firms make investment decisions based 
in part on the characteristics of policies and institutions in host countries.  The distinction 
between policies and institutions is best characterized as a distinction between state strategies 
and capacities.  That is, policy relays information about the intentions of the state and the 
strategies to achieve those intentions, but the characteristics of state institutions help 
determine whether those intentions can be realized.  In other words, institutions channel state 
policy and condition its effectiveness.  Policies and institutions are engaged in constant 
interaction, and the interaction between them determines outcomes.  The best-designed 
policy may be ineffective if institutions responsible for its implementation do not function 
well.  Well-functioning institutions can put into place poorly-designed policy.  Both policies 
and institutions are important for investment outcomes, and both are considered in this 
dissertation.  Specifically, I argue that active, sectorally discriminating investment promotion 
policies are more likely to lead to spillover-intensive investment profiles.  On the institutional 
side, I argue that firms are more likely to adopt export-oriented and technology-intensive 
investment profiles when state institutions are consistent, coordinated, and closely networked 
with firms.  I test the links between domestic political institutions and the characteristics of 
FDI using an in-depth analysis of investment policy and investment promotion institutions in 
Brazil.  I make an additional contribution by connecting institutional characteristics with 
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FDI-linked development outcomes, such as innovation and trade balances.  The dissertation 
therefore introduces new ideas about the relationship between politics in developing 
countries and the characteristics of incoming FDI and the role of the state in an era of global 
production networks. 
The example of Brazil is mostly a negative one.  That is, despite attracting a great 
deal of FDI in the 1990s Brazil has not attracted much ‘high quality’ investment.  
Multinationals in Brazil do not, in general, use Brazil as an export platform with significant 
backward and forward linkages.  Nor do they display particularly innovative characteristics.  
This is important because proponents of FDI often argue that it can generate ‘spillovers’ in 
the domestic economy, therefore energizing development.  This work identifies instances of 
export-intensive and innovation-intensive investments in Brazil, with significant spillovers in 
the domestic economy.  However, these investments are the exception.  FDI in Brazil, as 
elsewhere in Latin America, has been largely market-seeking.  That is, firms invest in Brazil 
in order to sell to the domestic population.  Brazil has a large population, and a growing 
consumer class.  There are important benefits to be had from market-seeking FDI.  However, 
it is not as prized as other forms of investment, and may lead to detrimental outcomes such as 
negative trade balances or low value-added characteristics.  For these reasons and others, 
organizations such as the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) have long advocated other forms of investment for Latin America besides, or in 
addition to, market-seeking investment.  Brazil, despite its potential, has not moved far 
beyond a market-seeking FDI profile.  Other countries to which it is often compared, such as 




There are many potential explanations for this puzzling state of affairs.  In this work, 
I concentrate on policy and institutional explanations.  On the policy side, I argue that in the 
last twenty years Brazil has pursued largely passive investment promotion strategies.  That is, 
successive Brazilian administrations have failed to actively pursue FDI, preferring instead to 
dismantle barriers to investment and allow it to enter the country.  I also argue that Brazilian 
administrations have not distinguished among more or less desirable forms of investment, 
contributing to the market-seeking FDI profile.  This changed after 2004, when Brazil 
adopted a set of industrial policies that did display a more discriminating approach to FDI.  
This change is an important source of temporal variation within the Brazilian case study, and 
allows me to demonstrate linkages between varying policies and investment profiles of firms. 
With regard to domestic institutions, I argue that the attributes of institutions charged 
with investment promotion in Brazil contributed to a diffuse approach to investment.  These 
‘institutional attributes’ have less to do with the institutions’ internal rules or regulations, and 
more to do with the activities of institutions in relation to firms.  I argue that the proliferation 
of investment promotion bodies within the Brazilian bureaucracy created coordination 
problems, and that institutions were often inconsistent in their approach to FDI.  Political 
support for these institutions was sporadic until the revival of industrial policy during the 
Lula administration.  Importantly, institutional characteristics have proven difficult to 
change.  Some of these characteristics, such as a lack of consistency, diluted the effects of 
more active investment agendas during the Lula administration.  Finally, institutions were not 
well integrated with international production networks.  The distance between firms and 
political institutions in Brazil contributed to low efficacy for those same institutions. 
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There are important exceptions to these broad patterns.  There are a few institutions 
within the sprawling Brazilian bureaucracy that demonstrate the characteristics which lead to 
leverage on investment models.  These institutions have a much greater likelihood of 
extracting spillovers from FDI.  These so-called ‘pockets of efficiency’ (Geddes 1990, Evans 
1995) often display all of the characteristics outlined above, such as high levels of 
coordination and close networks with firms.  In addition, they also display other 
characteristics, such as insulation from political interference and stable funding, which allow 
them to more effectively incentivize FDI.  Just as with temporal variation in policy, 
institutional variation allows me to draw out contrasts and connect institutional 
characteristics with investment outcomes. 
The dissertation proceeds as follows.  In chapter two, I introduce the theoretical 
framework.  I draw together diverse strands of literature, integrating important ideas about 
investment from the dependency tradition and newer work in international political economy.  
In this chapter I also assert the superiority of comparative institutionalist approaches over 
neoclassical interpretations of the state, which denied the possibility of developmentally 
catalytic policymaking autonomous from societal groups.  I allude to the debate over East 
Asian industrialization and the role of state institutions.  I also argue that the explosion of 
FDI in the developing world since the 1980s necessitates new theoretical constructs 
concerning both bargaining relationships between states and firms and the role of foreign 
investment in domestic development processes.  I then assemble a model of multinational 
incentive structures, and argue that state incentives and domestic political institutions have a 
not-insignificant impact on the models of investment chosen by multinational firms.  I 
distinguish among different types of policies countries may pursue, and their potential 
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effectiveness.  I then outline the institutional characteristics which may give states greater 
leverage over the investment models of firms.  The chapter concludes with a justification of 
the methods employed, and a preliminary discussion of the industrial sectors under 
consideration in Brazil. 
Chapter three traces the historical development of investment policy in Brazil, 
beginning in the 1950s but concentrating on the reform period after 1990.  This chapter 
identifies those institutions in Brazil charged with investment promotion, and singles out 
those which function as pockets of efficiency.  This chapter also elaborates on the 
determinants of institutional efficacy, and explains how investment promotion policies are 
channeled through multiple institutions to the detriment of a fully integrated vision for the 
role FDI plays in development.  The chapter then moves in chronological order, explaining 
the development of FDI policy.  Special attention is paid to the Cardoso administration’s 
efforts to attract investment after the introduction of the inflation-taming Real.  I also analyze 
the development of the short-lived investment promotion agency Investe Brasil, and the 
abortive attempts at public-private partnerships in infrastructure projects.  This chapter 
concludes with a discussion of industrial policy changes during the Lula administration, and 
increasing evidence of active, targeted policy for FDI. 
Chapters four and five deal with investment outcomes among firms, and the 
connections between those outcomes and policy and institutional characteristics.  As such, 
these chapters rely on original interview data with multinational firm representatives in the 
information technology and automotive sectors.  I complement firm interviews with data 
from government ministries in Brazil and other sources, along with government and non-
governmental organization reports.  Chapter four deals with the innovative activities of 
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multinational firms in Brazil, and chapter five considers modes of insertion in global 
production networks.  In chapter four, I argue that multinational auto assemblers and auto 
parts manufacturers in Brazil do not participate in substantial design activity or innovation in 
Brazil.  Firms in the IT industry, despite receiving some incentives for innovation, have not 
conducted significant R&D activities in Brazil.  I argue that characteristics of investment 
promotion institutions, such as an excessive focus on manufacturing rather than intangible 
goods, contribute to this state of affairs.  In chapter five, I extend the analysis to the exporting 
activities of multinational firms.  I examine the commercial balance of firms, and find that 
despite increasing their export activity, multinationals are in general heavily import-
dependent and therefore do not generate significant foreign exchange.  I contrast the 
experience of the auto sector, where temporary export incentives for assemblers in the 1990s 
generated exports in the context of Mercosul, with the IT sector, where efforts to develop 
significant export activity have not been successful.  In both chapters four and five, I use the 
automotive and IT industries as examples of sectors where multinationals are dominant, and 
potential exists for domestic spillovers from foreign investment. 
Chapter six extends the analysis of investment profiles beyond Brazil.  In this chapter, 
I use firm-level data from surveys of enterprises conducted by the World Bank in developing 
countries around the world to investigate the links between domestic institutions and 
investment profiles.  In country-level and firm-level analyses, I demonstrate that evaluations 
of institutional efficacy have an impact on both the export and innovative choices of 
multinational firms.  More specifically, I argue that higher assessments of institutional 
quality, whether by firms themselves or by outside observers, are associated with greater 
R&D and export incidence and intensity.  I develop and test these hypotheses using a series 
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of econometric models.  I then apply ideas of institutional efficacy and firm profiles to three 
other cases in Latin America: Chile, Costa Rica, and Mexico.  For each of these cases, I 
explain how the characteristics of domestic institutions differ from those in Brazil, and how 
these variations are connected to investment profiles.  Chapter seven concludes with a 
summary of the primary contributions of the project and suggestions about possible future 
research agendas. 
In sum, this study utilizes a broad range of methodological tools to analyze the 
relationship between state policy and institutions and the activities of multinational 
enterprises in Brazil and other developing countries.  I argue that institutions do matter for 
investment outcomes, and that firms make investment decisions at least partly based on 
policy realities in host countries and the degree of institutional coherence.  The analysis 
focuses on investment policy, and broader industrial policies, in the specific case of Brazil.  
However, the implications of the analysis are applicable in many developing and transition 
economies.  The dissertation addresses important questions about the limits of state agency in 
an era of international production, the evolving role of the state in conditioning development, 





States, Multinationals, and Investment Models 
2.1 Introduction 
In early 2005, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva spoke in Porto Alegre to 
thousands of delegates who had gathered there for the World Social Forum, an annual 
conference of activists and left-leaning political groups from around the world.  Lula had 
been elected in 2002 as Brazil’s first working-class president, and his life’s trajectory 
epitomized the hopes of organizations within the forum that had tirelessly campaigned for 
reductions in global poverty and inequality.  There was little doubt that Lula would be the 
star of the show – he had received top billing and his speech on confronting poverty was 
greeted with raucous cheers by his own PT supporters in attendance.  Yet almost as soon as 
he began his speech, a group of about fifty activists began to heckle the President.  It quickly 
became apparent that this group of attendees was unhappy with Lula’s first few years in 
office.  Specifically, they objected to his closeness to Washington and his willingness to toe 
the Wall Street line in matters of social spending and macroeconomic policy.  Lula handled 
the protesters with a measured response:  “One day, they’ll mature and we’ll be waiting with 
open arms to welcome them,” he said of the hecklers, whom he portrayed as “sons and 
daughters of the workers’ party who rebelled.”4
                                                 




Lula’s magnanimity aside, the protesters tapped into a deeper concern among those 
on the left in Latin America.  Lula’s conversion from leftist union leader to pragmatic and 
accommodating centrist has been well documented, but a debate on the causes of that 
conversion is perhaps inevitable.  Certainly there was political calculation; it is perhaps no 
accident that Lula’s previous three campaigns for the presidency joined more heterodox 
economic policy with electoral defeat.  But among the more nervous and conspiracy-minded, 
Lula’s more moderate program was interpreted as a result of economic forces beyond the 
president’s control5.  Indeed, the general drift of Brazilian economic policy since the 1980s 
had been towards more liberal economic policy.  Was this movement a result of conscious 
policy choice?  Or were leaders in Latin America confronting the collective and immovable 
will of international economic actors?  In the words of Bolivian President Evo Morales, were 
presidents in Latin America destined hereafter to be “prisoners of neoliberal laws?”6
 This work addresses one facet of the relationship between international economic 
actors and government policy in the developing world.  It is founded on the central question 
that motivates much recent work in comparative and international political economy: in a 
world where production is increasingly multinational and interconnected, can government 
have an impact on industrial models and therefore, development?  I examine one element of 
this larger question by considering the impact of state policies and institutions on the 
investment profiles of multinational firms in Brazil.  The central question considered is this: 
do policy and institutional environments in host countries have an impact on the investment 
 
                                                 
5Lula’s election in 2002 followed a concerted effort to portray the candidate as friendly to international financial 
organizations and investors.  The reactions of various markets to the prospect of a Lula presidency and its 
eventual confirmation have generated some scholarly interest. For an interpretation of international bond 
markets’ reactions to the 2002 Brazilian election, see Hardie (2006). 
 
6This statement was issued during an interview with BBC News (Mason 2006). 
15 
 
models of foreign firms?  In other words, do firms take into account host country policy and 
institutions when deciding what types of activities are to be located in that country, and do 
they change investment models in response to state characteristics?  I argue that state policies 
and institutions, while certainly not the only factors determining the investment profiles of 
incoming investment, nonetheless have a significant impact on both the composition of 
incoming investment and the investment profiles of individual firms through time.  I argue 
that active, sectorally discriminating investment promotion policies are more likely to lead to 
innovation- and export-intensive investments.  I also argue that the qualities of domestic 
institutions charged with investment promotion matter to firms, and that firms are more likely 
to adopt innovation- and export-intensive investments when state institutions display certain 
characteristics, such as consistency through time and inter-institutional coordination.  I argue 
that Brazil has largely displayed passive, general policy approaches to FDI since the 1990s, 
but since 2004 Brazil has shifted to a more active, discriminating approach.  Brazil’s 
institutions have not in general displayed the characteristics conducive to spillover-intensive 
FDI, though there are isolated ‘pockets of efficiency’ within the state apparatus. 
This chapter provides the theoretical and methodological foundation for the analysis 
that follows in chapters 3 through 6.  In the next section, I situate the research question of this 
work within larger debates that have occupied development theorists for years, such as 
dependency theory, neoclassical interpretations of development, and institutionalist 
perspectives.  These are the big questions of state agency in development, and it is important 
to acknowledge the precedents of established theoretical frameworks even when the focus of 
this work is narrower.  Section 2.3 argues that the dramatic increase in foreign investment in 
the developing world changes the context of institutionalist arguments.  Relationships 
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between multinational firms and host country governments have assumed greater importance 
for questions of development and state agency, and this is not always recognized in existing 
literature.  I argue that the bargaining perspective on firm-state interaction is especially useful 
as an analytic tool.  In section 2.4, I elaborate on the theoretical framework used to interpret 
this bargaining relationship.  I outline the incentive structure facing multinational firms, and 
how states can influence firm investment models to extract developmental spillovers.  Also in 
this section, I lay out the attributes that endow state institutions with leverage in their 
bargaining relationships with firms.  In section 2.5 I justify the case selection of this work, 
and in section 2.6 I elaborate on the methodological approach adopted here. 
2.2 States and Foreign Investment: Theoretical Perspectives 
In concentrating on the interactions among multinational enterprises and various state 
bodies in Brazil through the last thirty years, I show not only the boundaries of state efficacy 
in industrial transformation but also how the calculus of multinational production changes the 
incentives and tools available to both firms and states.  On the one hand, this is new territory.  
The development literature has not come to grips with the profound impact multinational 
production has had on the nature of state development strategies in the semi-periphery.  Too 
often, this literature remains locked in well-traveled debates about the merits of infant 
industry protection or privatization.  Studies of the political determinants and consequences 
of FDI in the developing world have multiplied within the subfield of international political 
economy, but the link with development theory and the comparative tradition is often weak.  
Many of these IPE studies adopt a cross-national perspective and do not investigate the 
intricacies of investment policy within countries.  On the other hand, this study is deeply 
intertwined with some very old debates on the role of the state in economic development.  It 
17 
 
is imperative to begin with these debates, consider more recent contributions, and finally to 
explain where this work fits in the established theoretic framework.   
Many of the debates about the relationship between foreign capital and development 
fall within the general framework of three important and overlapping dichotomies7.  Two of 
these are more normative and the third is more positive in nature.  The first normative debate 
concerns the contribution that international capital should make to domestic development.  
This debate in Latin America has a long intellectual lineage, most perfectly captured by the 
modernization and dependency approaches to development.  Modernization theories 
suggested that Latin American countries could develop quickly by embracing international 
capital and could, under certain conditions, move through stages of development in quick 
succession or even skip some stages altogether8.  Dependency theorists, in contrast, argued 
that an international division of labor had developed over a long period of time whereby 
international economic actors conspired quite naturally to keep Latin America in a perpetual 
state of underdevelopment (dos Santos 1970, Hymer 1979, Cardoso and Faletto 1978).  
While earlier dependistas argued that international capital played the primary role, later more 
sophisticated analyses acknowledged the role of domestic capital and admitted some 
conditional and contextual benefits to foreign capital penetration9
                                                 
7Stallings (1990) and Shapiro (1994) identify different dichotomies, which overlap to a degree with the ones 
presented here. 
.  However, the dependency 
school in its broadest sense discounted the benefits from international economic integration 
and formed part of the theoretic justification for the continuation of many of the Import 
 
8Modernization proponents also considered democratic and economic development to be mutually reinforcing. 
See Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1978) for an overview of both approaches and contrasts. 
 
9See Evans (1979), also Cardoso and Faletto (1978). Both concentrated on the role of domestic elites in 




Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies so common to Latin America from the 1930s until 
the 1980s10
2.2.1 The neoclassical approach 
.  Modernization, in contrast, extolled the benefits of international economic 
integration: access to new technologies, employment, entry into foreign markets, and 
advantages from trade.  In terms of academic impact, both paradigms remain influential 
today in highly modified forms. 
A second, more positive dichotomy concerns the ability of the state to effect change 
independent of societal forces.  Though this debate has in some ways appeared constantly in 
Latin American development analyses (not to mention politics), it achieved a special level of 
prominence in the 1980s.  Neoclassical interpretations conceived of the state as an abstract 
entity, not particularly worthy of investigation and in practice little more than a central locale 
for the collection of societal interests.  The state in this guise was especially susceptible to 
rent-seeking activity and sub-optimal development outcomes11.  Bureaucrats were rapacious 
and self-serving, and would divert any resources to benefit their societal benefactors and 
selves.  Development policy was no exception.  Neoclassical theorists, and their normative 
counterparts espousing neoliberal policy, believed that state interference in a functioning 
market necessarily indicated an attempt to subvert global gains for local privileges12
                                                 
10Shapiro (1994, 11) points out that later dependency theorists criticized the Prebisch/ECLA focus on the 
divisions between center and periphery without also accounting for the internal class divisions within 
developing countries.  Dependency theorists also pointed out the role of foreign capital in promoting 
dependency, complaining especially when ECLA promoted ISI as a means to attract capital goods from abroad 
for further industrialization. 
.  By 
reducing societal interaction to an accumulation of individual utility maximizers, the state 
 
11Rent-seeking is here defined as returns on resources which are higher than opportunity costs or market returns 
on the same resource. 
 
12Some of the more notable examples of neoclassical economic frameworks include Mancur Olson’s (1982) 
collective action framework, which contended that free riders will subvert the agendas of any but the smallest 
societal groups, and Deepak Lal’s (1983) Poverty of ‘Development Economics’ . 
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became little more than a venue for the pursuit of specific privileges.  While neoclassical 
theorists accepted this venue role as the normal vocation of a flawed bureaucracy, neoliberals 
turned this interpretation into a direct attack on the state itself.  The state, in other words, was 
captive to distributional coalitions and prone to failure.   
The neoclassical approach enjoyed particular currency among international financial 
organizations in the 1980s, and provided a seemingly persuasive explanation for the failure 
of Latin American governments of that decade to provide economic growth in the face of 
spiraling inflation and ballooning debts.  In retrospect, the neoclassical approach was too 
quick to blame a large number of societal ills on bureaucratic failure (as opposed to market 
failure).  It also explained away or ignored the developmental successes of the same 
government strategies during the initial ISI period.  However, the logic of neoclassical 
interpretations of Latin American development failures seemed elegant and sound.  The 
neoclassical approach even exhibited a strange symbiotic relationship with early dependency 
paradigms, at least in Latin America, in that both were pessimistic about the ability of states 
in the region to independently move development forward (if for entirely different reasons). 
2.2.2. The state-centric approach 
In the 1980s, the neoclassical political economy literature became ever more strident 
in its attacks on development economists’ faith in government agency.  The captive nature of 
the state to distributional coalitions meant not only that states could not impact development 
trajectories, but that any attempt would have deleterious consequences for the society as a 
whole.  Yet almost as soon as this movement reached its peak, it generated a set of ideas that 




A comparative institutional approach turns the neo-utilitarian image of the state on its 
head.  It is the scarcity of bureaucracy that undermines development, not its 
prevalence. 
.  The state-centric school challenged the neoclassical theorists’ efforts to explain 
away the state and sought to bring the analysis of the state back to the forefront of academic 
discourse.  Hailing mostly from the social sciences, these theorists claimed that effective 
institution building was the key variable that set countries with high growth rates apart from 
those with low growth rates.  Often referred to as ‘institutionalists’, these theorists 
recognized the ability of poor institutions to wreck an economy, but also insisted that state 
agency did exist and that effective bureaucracy could also exist, independent of societal 
pressures.  While not denying the existence of rent-seeking behavior, state-centric theorists 
observed that this behavior might be overcome with effective institutions.  Poorly 
functioning institutions might torpedo an economy, but if designed well they could also move 
it forward.  Thus the principle explanation for development failure turned from rent-seeking 
behavior of individuals to poorly designed and implemented policy.  Or, as Evans (1995, 40) 
explained it: 
 
The proponents of this state-centric interpretation of economic growth are a diverse 
group, and vary in their policy prescriptions for developing countries.  They do, however, 
share a belief that market forces alone cannot entirely explain developmental outcomes.  In 
this respect, they follow in the tradition of Alexander Gerschenkron.  Gerschenkron 
emphasized the capacity of the state as a key explanatory variable for economic success in 
late developing countries.  In his influential examination of European late developing 
economies, Gerschenkron (1962) claimed that when domestic capital does not have the 
ability to contribute a market framework on its own (either from a lack of domestic sources 
                                                 
13See Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985), also Gereffi and Wyman (1990), Evans (1995).  
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or the unwillingness of international capital), the state must act as a risk-taking entrepreneur 
itself.  However, the state is not necessarily capable of filling this role either.  Even if it can 
act as the primary mover of development, an increasingly powerful state in a late developing 
country may also move a country towards authoritarianism (as was the case in Russia).  
There are no guarantees that states will be able to provide the kind of framework that will 
encourage growth.  Because of this, a comparative analysis of the strength and efficacy of 
institutions becomes necessary.  Gerschenkron remained doubtful that non-state actors would 
be able to bring about industrial upgrading in late developers without the assistance of an 
active state.  For developing countries, there is simply too much to do, sometimes even for 
markets and states acting in concert. 
The final normative dichotomy that underlies much of the debate on international 
capital concerns the role that the state ought to take in a modern developing economy.  
Whereas the debate between neoclassical theorists and state-centric theorists raged over 
whether a state could act as an independent agent of development, the third dichotomy 
between neoliberals and those recommending more interventionist methods revolves around 
whether a state should act as an agent of change.  Naturally there are strong connections 
between the neoclassical and neoliberal poles of these two dichotomies, and while the 
association between interventionist theorists and state-centric theorists is less strong it bears 
stating again that these three dichotomies are interrelated.  Neoliberals telegraph into policy 
the neoclassical theorists’ lack of faith in the state as anything other than an opportunity for 
rents, arguing that most attempts at state intervention are wrongheaded.  Neoliberalism is at 
once evangelistic in its faith in the market to advance development and pessimistic in its 
discounting of the bureaucratic impulse for public good.  Those advocating intervention often 
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propose a strong role for the state in development policy.  This often takes the form of 
industrial policy, which can act as a coordination mechanism for production14
The three dichotomies outlined here have shaped the debate on international capital 
and the role of the state for decades.  The normative debates about the desirability of foreign 
capital and state-led development, when interlaced with the positive debate on the 
independence of state action, have informed heated arguments on how to best achieve 
development.  I will return to these debates before moving on to the core of the arguments 
concerning multinational enterprises, but we must first consider a region of the world where 
these debates have assumed added importance for recent development theorists and for Latin 
America. 
.  At its 
extreme, interventionist thought interprets economic development as simply a matter of 
political will.  If policies can benefit an industry, they should be implemented.  Growth rates 
and other economic outcomes can be explained simply by examining and evaluating the 
activities of state institutions.  Similarly, neoliberal designs promote the absence of state 
interference as the most likely precondition for development.  The popularity of neoliberal 
policy prescriptions, reinforced by the popularity of neoclassical theory among international 
financial institutions and governments after the Latin American debt crisis, is truly 
noteworthy.  Though these models have come under serious attack from state-centric 
theorists and other sources, they do represent the dominant paradigm in the 1980s and still 
hold influence in the region today. 
                                                 
14There have been a number of new theoretic developments in the political economy of industrial policy in 
recent years, and these have resurrected the idea of industrial policy as a tool to promote growth in specific 
sectors of developing countries’ economies (see Chang 1994; Schrank and Kurtz 2005).  Investment promotion 
policy may be viewed as a sub-category of overall industrial policy. 
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2.2.3 The East Asian comparison 
Scholars of all stripes have been attracted to analysis of East Asian industrializing 
countries, either in isolation or in contrast with Latin America.  This happened for a number 
of reasons.  First, East Asian states offered comparative institutionalists the chance to focus 
on a number of domestic organizations within these countries that appeared to have been 
remarkably successful in formulating development strategy.  Second, scholars were 
interested in discovering how countries in the region had managed to combine high growth 
rates with export promotion and import restrictions.  The state’s role in providing credit to 
potential winning industries, encouraging domestic savings, subsidizing competitive exports, 
protecting vulnerable domestic markets, and attracting or developing technology pointed to a 
potential confluence of good policy and efficient institutions.  Finally, the example of East 
Asia encouraged scholars to look beyond debates on competing state agency claims and 
consider how development policy success can also depend on structural conditions15
Of course, both neoclassical and state-centric theorists had differing interpretations of 
what lay behind such success.  The World Bank and other international financial 
organizations initially attempted to link the neoliberal approach to development with the 
experience of East Asia, arguing that the countries of the region had succeeded in ‘getting the 
prices right’ at an early stage.  This interpretation of the region’s success came under a great 
deal of criticism on a number of fronts.  Amsden’s (1989) classic case study of South Korea, 
approaching the topic from a comparative institutional perspective, shows an industrial 
policy quite at odds with the conventional wisdom of the period.  She attributed South 
. 
                                                 
15Some scholars have suggested that East Asia’s lack of natural resources compelled it to find another form of 
comparative advantage, and invest heavily in exploiting that potential niche (Sheehan 2002). Pempel (2002) 
claims that labor as a class was not as entrenched in East Asia as in Latin America, and that the power of 
agricultural workers was much diminished by the time an industrial strategy for development hit full stride.   
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Korean success to the qualitatively superior subsidization policies enacted and strategic use 
of state export promotion.  These arguments are echoed in Wade’s (1990) study of Taiwan, 
which demonstrated a mutually beneficial relationship between sheltered domestic industry 
and state institutions.  Haggard’s (1990) investigation was more sympathetic to neoclassical 
interpretations, arguing that legislatures were not particularly powerful in East Asia, and 
political decision makers were therefore insulated from direct rent-seeking political pressures 
from below.  However, he attempted to reconcile the two approaches and devoted significant 
energies towards analyzing the successes of domestic institutions. 
Comparative work attempted to explain the reasons for East Asia’s success and Latin 
America’s failure, coming to a variety of conclusions.  Rodrik (2000) emphasized that the 
domestic institutions of conflict management, especially industrial conflict management, 
were too fragile in Latin America and thus constituted a real weakness for development 
strategy in the region.  Gereffi and Wyman (1990) proposed five phases of industrialization: 
commodity export, primary ISI, secondary ISI, primary Export Oriented Industrialization 
(EOI), and secondary EOI.  They claimed that the regions’ paths began to diverge when 
Latin America chose secondary ISI while East Asia instead opted for primary EOI.  These 
works demonstrated that comparisons were possible, even while acknowledging cross-
regional differences in economic structure and history16
By the early 1990s, the World Bank had ceded some ground to the institutionalist 
perspective, admitting that selective government intervention could in some contexts 
generate rapid industrial growth.  However, the controversies over the root causes of the East 
Asian successes continue.  These debates matter a great deal for analyses of Latin American 
.   
                                                 
16Gereffi and Wyman (1990) pointed out that cross-national analysis was justified as there were many important 
differences within these regions, and not just between them. 
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development, as they inform policy prescriptions for states at intermediate levels of 
development.  Institutionalist interpretations of development, for example, would recommend 
that states in Latin American concentrate on strengthening those portions of the state 
apparatus deemed essential to development.  Strengthening the rule of law, reforming 
regressive tax systems, strengthening property rights, and various other reforms are often 
mentioned as institutional fixes that can move development forward.  Neoclassical 
interpretations of East Asian success stories sometimes touch on these reforms, but they often 
encourage policymakers to adopt a different set of priorities, mostly aimed at eliminating 
price distortions.  The two perspectives draw quite different lessons from the East Asian 
experience. 
2.2.4 The inadequacy of neoclassical theory 
The neoclassical political economy literature has contributed greatly to our 
understanding of development processes.  Its most important contribution has been to force 
analysts to confront the state’s potential for rent-distribution.  Many development economists 
before the neoclassical assault were overly confident in the state, not only in its ability to 
bring about change but also in its good intentions.  Neoclassical political economists forced 
groups within the academic community to examine the source of state power and the interests 
of individual actors within the state apparatus.  This was undoubtedly a positive 
development, although perhaps in shifting the focus back to the state neoclassical economists 
inadvertently provided ammunition for the institutionalist criticisms that would come17
Neoclassical political economists and their more strident neoliberal acolytes, despite 
their many contributions, have followed some flimsy theoretic constructs.  These have by 
.  
                                                 
17Evans (1995) and Shapiro (1994) both make the point that neoclassical political economy has moved the focus 
of the debate from imperfect markets to imperfect states, thus laying the groundwork for later institutionalist 
discoveries of well-functioning states. 
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now become a familiar series of complaints, but they bear repeating.  In denying the ability 
of the state to promote economic advancement for an entire society (as opposed to select 
groups within that society), neoclassical theorists deny the possibility that bureaucracies can 
be insulated from societal demands or have institutional histories that instill them with 
bureaucratic cultures.  In democratic systems, representation at its most base becomes a 
means to translate constituent interests into rents.  Representatives are not conditioned by the 
norms of the chambers in which they work, according to neoclassical theory.  In authoritarian 
systems, the constituency may be smaller but the same principle applies.  There is no room 
for institutional culture or institutional evolution in this theoretic framework.  In denying the 
possibility of evolving bureaucratic norms, the neoclassical paradigm erred on the side of 
theoretical purity. 
Neoliberal application of neoclassical theory is therefore strangely ahistorical and 
impracticable.  Neoclassical economic theory often translates into universalistic claims about 
desirable policy, without consideration of context, structure, or cross-national variation in 
market governance.  This is problematic because there are no real-world examples of 
societies where development is governed by market forces alone.  In contrast, every society 
on earth is governed by an imperfect state.  The utility-maximizing behavior of elites forms a 
conundrum from which neoclassical theorists cannot escape.  Even if bureaucrats were to 
remove themselves from the picture, the skeletal state left behind would never be completely 
without opportunities for rents.  This harkens back to Weber’s point that markets must be 
constructed, they do not arise spontaneously.  Yet the construction of a state along 
neoclassical lines also carries with it some paradoxes.  According to the neoliberal 
prescription, an autonomous group of policymakers must disregard rent-seeking pressures 
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and implement policies that benefit society as a whole while depriving rent-seeking groups of 
influence.  After reform is launched, it is argued, economic incentives will increase the 
influence of larger consumer groups, who profit from the neoliberal order.  This will allow 
the state to gradually diminish its influence, and its size.  However, this process requires a 
number of strong assumptions.  First, it assumes that the ‘strong’ state institutions in the first 
step will be able to disregard rent-seeking pressures.  Secondly, it assumes that the state will 
then be willing to relinquish its special decision-making powers after new interests become 
influential18.  Finally, the model assumes that the newly empowered interests do not also 
have rent-seeking proclivities19
The historical record has not consistently aided the neoclassical cause.  Although 
there are some instances of societies with relatively small and impotent states functioning 
well and developing quickly, there are also a number of bureaucratic behemoths which have 
managed to pull off stunning growth rates for extended periods of time.  Brazil during the 
period from 1968 to 1973 hardly exhibited a wallflower state, and yet the country 
consistently hovered near double-digit growth rates.  Brazil has not equaled that performance 
in years since.  Perhaps the high water mark of ISI is too far removed, and the pains of the 
debt crisis are too fresh, for analysts to properly emphasize what these episodes mean for 
contemporary political economy.  However, it is important to consider the long track record 
of state strategy in developing economies, and not just its retreat since the 1980s. 
. 
                                                 
18Kahler (1990) has noted that the implementation of even a close-to-perfect neoliberal state requires that 
bureaucrats with special privileges give up those privileges willingly and content themselves to be individual 
maximizers with no special access to scarce resources. 
 
19This notion has been challenged, particularly in Latin America, with the revelation that many groups benefited 
by neoliberal reform can also engage in rent-seeking (Schamis 1999; Haggard and Maxfield 1996). 
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Finally, and perhaps most problematic, the role of change in developing economies is 
not adequately addressed in the neoclassical framework.  Neoclassical theory works very 
well in explaining how unfettered markets can produce optimal outcomes in situations of 
perfect information.  However, in developing countries full information is rarely the case.  
Moreover, it is not clear that markets will escort developing countries into the best positions 
in an international division of labor.  The principle of comparative advantage provides 
compelling rationales for developing states to do what international markets demand.  
However the incentive for change in the pursuit of long-term gains, if temporarily painful or 
inefficient, is suppressed in the neoclassical framework20
By now it should be apparent that this work advocates and adopts an institutionalist 
framework to explain how the Brazilian state has impacted, and failed to impact, the presence 
and activities of multinational enterprises operating within its borders.  While societal forces 
and the activities of rent-seeking groups are important determinants of investment policy and 
industrial policy in general, they do not account for the full complexity of the relationship 
between the Brazilian state and multinational enterprise.  To do this, the role of Brazilian 
political institutions must be considered. Institutions are the lenses through which political 
action are refracted to produce interpretable outcomes.  Political economists interested in 
complete interpretations of development trajectories therefore ignore institutions at their 
peril.   
.   
The adoption of an institutionalist framework should not be interpreted as discounting 
the possibility of poorly planned and implemented development policies.  It would be the 
                                                 
20As Srinivasan (1985) pointed out, the long-run benefits of changes may not be apparent for developing states 
and therefore economies may end up taking the best advantages of sub-optimal stages of development. That is, 
neoliberal principles may lead states to confine themselves to doing the best they can with what they have, 
instead of seeking alternate pathways. Innovation often demands more than a market framework, and states 
have sometimes filled the gap. 
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height of irresponsibility to suggest that the Brazilian state has committed an error in 
dismantling parts of its often redundant and counterproductive state apparatus over the last 
twenty years.  It would be equally foolish to examine successful state initiatives without 
acknowledging the numbers of missteps along the way.  As the rest of this work will show, 
the Brazilian state has had more failure than success in its attempts to wrest benefits from 
international investment.  However, the absence of state success does not always indicate the 
absence of the possibility of success, or deny the state its ability to influence international 
capital.  The positive dichotomy on the question of state agency should err on the side of the 
institutionalists.  On the other two more normative questions, the answer must be more 
subtle.  There is no use in attempting to decide whether state involvement in development 
strategy is universally appropriate or not, just as there is no use in trying to decide whether 
Foreign Direct Investment is universally beneficial for the host country.  The answers to 
these questions are inevitably context-driven.  The debate has happily moved from questions 
of ‘more’ or ‘less’ state or foreign capital in the economy to more interesting questions of 
‘when’ and ‘how’. 
One further caveat is needed before proceeding.  Referring to ‘the state’ as a 
monolithic entity with singular goals and unity of purpose is of course problematic.  Indeed, 
one of the singular contributions of neoclassical political economy is to remind us that the 
state is made up of a huge number of cross-cutting and competing interests.  More pluralist-
oriented theorists will find fault in many of my claims about what ‘the state’ wants and is 
able to achieve.  However, there is value in considering the state as a latent construct, in the 
sense that it is broadly responsible for economic management and, if democratic, ultimately 
answerable to its population.  Moreover, ‘the state’ functions as a kind of shorthand to 
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account for governmental priorities, without referring to the competing interests that were 
involved in determining those priorities.  However, it is necessary to acknowledge the many 
interests at work within an expansive bureaucracy.  This analysis will endeavor when 
possible to separate those portions of ‘the state’ that have been successful in achieving their 
goals from those which have not, and what interests in society are served by different parts of 
the state bureaucracy.  It is a delicate exercise to consider both the whole of the state and its 
parts, but necessary for a more complete understanding of state capacity. 
2.3 Multinational Production and the New Context 
As recently as a decade ago, debates about the role of state in jump-starting 
development centered on what sorts of things the state could do to encourage the emergence 
or advancement of national firms.  In Latin America, the enduring legacy of Import-
Substitution Industrialization had conditioned a generation of scholars and policymakers to 
believe that infant industry protection could generate substantial rewards in the long run by 
encouraging the emergence of entrenched domestic industrial groups.  Before the debt crises 
of the 1980s, a number of countries in the region had developed sophisticated and diversified 
economies, almost always behind walls of protective tariffs, selective subsidies, and other 
means of support for priority sectors.  Though most of these industries did not make the 
transition from domestic maturation to full international competitiveness, the emergence of 
these industries did constitute a validation of sorts for those who argued that development 
policy should primarily concentrate on channeling resources to strategic domestic industry.  
International capital, when it was considered by economic planners, was looked on primarily 
as a source of capital goods or financing21
                                                 
21ECLAC was among the organizations that encouraged this perspective in the 1970s and into the 1980s. 
.  There were sectors of the economy where 
multinational firms dominated, but even in these sectors there were often strong supporting 
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networks of local firms.  In the inflationary environment of the 1980s and early 1990s, 
multinationals were reluctant to pursue new investments in the region.  Those multinationals 
already in country were content to maintain their operations at survival levels, and did not 
commit large amounts of new resources (ECLAC 2005, 17).  For development theorists, the 
most important questions therefore continued to revolve around how to allow resources to 
reach productive domestic firms. 
How things have changed.  The past decade and a half has witnessed a veritable 
invasion of Foreign Direct Investment into Latin America.  Satisfied with the region’s 
continued macroeconomic stability, firms have established new operations in growing 
markets and have infused existing operations with new capital.  Latin America’s own 
multinationals have also been expanding abroad, snapping up partners in other countries in 
the region and also in the developed world.  This explosion of cross-border investment has 
had profound impacts on the region’s economies.   
In Brazil, the privatizations of the 1990s put a number of enormous and lucrative 
sectors of the economy into foreign hands.  Privatizations occurred in every sector of the 
economy, with some of the largest occurring in the telecommunications and energy 
industries.  Brazil’s struggling steel firms were sold in the period from 1990 to 1994.  In 
1998, Telebrás was broken up and sold off.  The privatization of the energy sector proceeded 
more slowly.  In addition, a number of new foreign automobile manufacturers entered Brazil 
in this decade, challenging the supremacy of the ‘big four’22
The reasons for this dramatic increase are well known.  The Brazilian government 
had conquered runaway inflation and therefore provided a much more stable investment 
.  As figure 2.1 shows, the share 
of capital formation accounted for by foreign firms skyrocketed. 
                                                 
22Fiat, Volkswagen, GM, and Ford 
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climate.  Beginning with the 1994 Plano Real, Brazil’s domestic currency was progressively 
tied to a series of international benchmarks.  Save for a brief but substantial devaluation 
episode in 1998 and 1999, the value of the currency has proven remarkably stable.  The 
reform programs of the 1980s and 1990s had also involved a number of other measures 
generally viewed favorably by international firms, such as the 1995 amendment to the 
constitution which allowed foreign investment in sectors of the economy which had 
previously been off limits.  Though the pace of reform in Brazil was slower and more 
piecemeal than in other countries, its overall tenor was decidedly pro-market and pro-
investment.  The combination of a stable currency and steadily growing domestic market 
proved irresistible to international business.   
Figure 2.1 Foreign Direct Investment in Brazil, 1980-2006 
 


































































2.3.1 Multinational production and state agency 
This influx of foreign investment has profound implications for development theory 
and strategy, and forms the empirical justification for this project.  Multinationals control a 
large and increasing share of the Brazilian economy, and yet the theoretic implications of this 
increase for industrial policy have not been adequately addressed.  In his study of the 
Brazilian informatics industry in Embedded Autonomy, Peter Evans notes the dramatic 
increase in foreign participation in Brazilian informatics during the early 1990s.  Because his 
study is more concerned with the 1980s and Brazil’s efforts to create a domestic computer 
industry, Evans is not able to dwell on the consequences of these developments23
My contention is that the internationalization of domestic industry in Brazil does alter 
the development discourse in fundamental ways.  It stands to reason that states cannot have 
as much influence over international firms as they have over domestic firms.  States do not 
participate in international business networks in the same way that they are enmeshed in 
domestic societal groups, and therefore may have less room to maneuver than when dealing 
with domestic firms.  This idea is reflected in popular notions about the effects of 
globalization; that somehow states are limited by international investment competition.  
.  However, 
he does ask whether increased penetration of domestic economies by foreign firms will 
correspond with a decrease in ‘embeddedness’ of states in their national economies (ch. 8).  
In other words, does the internationalization of production result in a loss of influence for 
states attempting to encourage economic development?  The importance of this question is 
obvious. 
                                                 
23Evans (1995) does point out, however, that the emergence of a domestic informatics industry, nurtured by the 
state, did endow domestic informatics firms with bargaining leverage in their interactions with multinationals. 




However, it is also true that states are far from powerless in dealing with international 
production networks.  States are able to condition the behavior of multinational firms within 
their borders, sometimes in profound ways.  The institutionalist impulse, so important to 
assessing the ability of states to effect development, is still applicable in the age of 
multinational production.  The nature of state agency is quite altered, but it has not 
disappeared altogether.  After all, states are the ultimate arbiters of what transpires inside 
their borders. 
There are a number of ways in which the role of the state has irrevocably changed.  
Except in a few cases of natural resource extraction, the state has removed itself from direct 
control of domestic industry24
The changing structure of international production also has implications for the 
boundaries of state agency.  The economic reform processes of the 1980s, together with the 
dramatic increase in investment, have resulted in a variety of changes for multinationals’ 
organizational models in Latin America.  Tariffs have been lowered, local content 
requirements dropped, and employment regulations have been loosened.  Decreases in 
transport costs have led some firms to adopt global production strategies, in which 
production tasks are distributed among countries based on their comparative advantages and 
factor endowments.  These changes have moved firms to consider a variety of investment 
models to best take advantage of local conditions.  In decades past, multinational firms often 
.  In the context of multinational production, the state (again 
with a few exceptions) has not inserted itself as a replacement or competitor to private firms.  
The trend has been in the opposite direction: a retreat of the state from direct control over 
productive capacity. 
                                                 
24Minor (1994) notes the demise of expropriation as a tool of developing country policy.  From its height in the 
1970s, the rate of nationalization has declined precipitously. 
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chose between flexible models of organization that reproduced assembly lines in each 
country of operation and other models that integrated production across geographic 
boundaries. According to this simple dichotomy, horizontal models of production enabled 
firms to duplicate the same activities in many countries, thereby gaining access to local 
markets.  These models were often reinforced by local content requirements, which 
encouraged firms to locate production close to target markets.  The alternative end of the 
spectrum is vertical production, in which firms locate separate stages of production in 
different geographic areas.  This simple dichotomy has since been greatly expanded to 
incorporate the growing complexity of organizational models for firms seeking to take 
advantage of production in developing countries.  Global value chain (GVC) analysis, a 
growing body of research, attempts to come to terms with the growing complexity of 
international production models. The GVC literature has developed broad analytic categories 
that convey the relative power enjoyed by individual firms in different sectors, such as buyer-
driven chains and producer-driven chains25
In Brazil, the evidence of increasing transnational linkages within industries and firms 
is undeniable.  In its two recent censuses of multinational firms operating in Brazil, the 
central bank found that the percentage of imports accounted for by multinational corporations 
had risen from 39% in 1995 to 57% in 2000.  Multinationals’ share of exports increased from 
.  As multinational firms expand their production 
networks, the taxonomy required to analyze their behavior is becoming more detailed.  This 
growing complexity has important implications for industrial policy in developing countries 
and for the institutions charged with implementing those policies. 
                                                 
25Where a small number of firms exert great power over their supplier base, as is the case in the automotive 
sector, a producer-driven value chain model exists.  Buyer-driven chains rely on less direct control over 
suppliers.  Global supermarket networks (such as those of Wal-Mart) are good examples of buyer-driven chains 
(Gereffi et al. 2005, Sturgeon et al. 2008) 
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47% to 60% in that same period.  There is considerable evidence that much of this trade 
activity is taking place intra-industry and intra-firm.  Baumann’s (1993) preliminary study 
suggested that by 1988 up to 20% of Brazilian trade with North America was within-
industry.  In the two central bank reports, intra-firm imports grew to $ 18 billion in 2000 
from $ 8 billion in 1995, and intra-firm exports grew from$ 21 billion from $ 9 billion 
(Franco 2003).  These numbers indicate increasing connections between firm affiliates in 
Brazil and their worldwide production networks. 
As intra-industry and intra-firm trade increases and multinationals grow larger, 
institutional variation among states will impact not only where firms decide to locate 
investments but also where firms decide to locate specific activities within their global value 
chains.  The largest multinationals increasingly face decisions about where to locate different 
productive processes in order to best take advantage of local conditions, which include the 
state institutional framework.  This poses a new set of questions for development theorists.  
Dependency theorists for years worried about countries being locked into an international 
division of labor.  The expansion and global rationalization of multinational enterprise 
renews this concern, but in the current context the organizational complexities of large firms 
assume greater importance. 
All of these developments raise serious problems for traditional ways of looking at 
the role of the state in economic development.  The rising tide of multinational production 
has changed the context for states.  Some options are no longer available to interventionist 
states.  Developing country governments rarely nationalize industries, and the barriers 
(technological and otherwise) of entry into the international marketplace sometimes make 
promotion of national champions unrealistic.  It is also increasingly difficult for even the 
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best-funded state agencies to determine how firms will react to interventionist policy.  
However, there are a number of ways in which states do retain agency in the new context.  
There is no guarantee that this agency will be used effectively, but it does exist in modified 
form. 
The reluctance of development theorists to come to terms with international 
production is in some ways understandable.  The global imperatives of multinationals add 
another layer of complexity to the analysis of state-firm relations.  Moreover, FDI has long 
been viewed with suspicion by those theorists operating within the dependency tradition.  
The state-centric school in the 1980s often concentrated on state efforts (and failures) to 
develop domestic industry in lieu of foreign penetration.  Yet the growing influence of 
multinational investment in developing countries should not be ignored, nor should its 
implications for state agency. 
2.3.2 The bargaining perspective on firm-state relations 
In order to understand the nature of state agency in the context of international 
production networks, it is useful to consider the body of work that interprets multinational-
state interaction as a bargaining relationship.  Especially influential in the field of 
international political economy, this literature conceives of the interaction between firms and 
their hosts as a potentially beneficial game, in which both sides have benefits to offer the 
other. Of primary concern is the degree to which different endowments of technology, 
mobility, and proprietary knowledge across sectors and countries can interact to produce 
different outcomes in firm influence26
                                                 
26Vernon (1971) and Moran (1975) emphasized the lack of bargaining power for firms in natural resource 
industries. Also see Kobrin (1987) for a consideration of bargaining outcomes across sectors. 
.  Bargaining relationships can be conflictual but also 
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can involve benefits for domestic and foreign parties27.  In this literature, both states and 
firms are equipped with various qualities that attract one to the other.  The motivations that 
draw firms toward international production are by now well established28
For host countries, the potential benefits of multinational enterprise are also well 
known, if sometimes controversial
.  Advantages in 
organization, access to natural resources and finance, labor cost advantages, and economies 
of scale have all been cited as factors that offset the cost of overseas production for firms.  
These advantages were more formally documented in Dunning’s (1980) Ownership, 
Location, and Internalization (OLI) framework, which proved to be a durable model for 
explaining business organization.  This framework illuminated the ways in which optimal 
patterns of firm organization could translate into profits even in an environment of high 
transaction costs and inimical policy, which developing countries often exhibited. 
29
                                                 
27See Bennet and Sharpe (1979) for an investigation of conflicts between the Mexican state and transnational 
automobile corporations.  Evans (1979) showed that interactions among states, domestic firms, and 
multinationals could realize benefits for all parties involved. 
.  Multinationals can provide developing countries with 
technological upgrading through backward and forward linkages with local firms.  
Multinationals often exhibit novel management structures, and can transfer organizational 
know-how.  They can boost productivity, lead to exports, and generate a set of spillovers that 
can positively affect host economies.  These qualities, when coupled with the benefits 
enjoyed by firms through multinational expansion, can lead to positive-sum outcomes for 
both firms and states. 
 
28The dependency school drew heavily on theories of market imperfections to explain the entrance of 
multinationals in Latin America, and other authors emphasized the strategic advantages multinationals had over 
domestic firms (Kindleberger 1969, Hymer 1976).   
 
29See the Moran, Graham, and Blomström (2005) edited volume for a recent and comprehensive treatise that 
investigates whether FDI promotes economic development. 
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The bargaining perspective is essential in order to properly interpret the role of the 
state in the era of multinational production.  In contrast with earlier decades, where the 
emphasis of development theorists was on infant industry protection and the timing of 
liberalization, the increasing participation of multinationals in developing countries requires 
a wider perspective.  The boundaries of state action are now limited not only by what is 
achievable domestically, but also by what multinationals can be made to accept. 
There are reasons to hesitate before pressing on.  One may legitimately ask whether 
the motivations and behavior of multinational firms are really so different from national 
firms.  After all, both types are both profit-seeking enterprises.  The only difference is the 
ultimate source of control.  Does this really necessitate a new analytic framework?  Should 
the developmental state not have the same set of tools in dealing with both multinational and 
domestic firms? These are important questions, and to be sure there are no guarantees that 
specific domestic firms will be easier to control than their multinational counterparts.  
However, the element of multinationality does introduce new dimensions to the debates on 
state involvement in development strategy.  In particular, multinationals are more able to 
threaten exit (dependent on sector and the nature of the investment), and they increasingly 
have global investment perspectives.  This complicates state strategy, and may lead to a 
decrease in state efficacy.  International competition for FDI is often cited as a constraint on 
state initiative, and this is especially true in sectors where firms are highly mobile. 
This element of multinationality also requires some important considerations about 
the degree to which firms may be manipulated by host country governments.  Because these 
firms are tied to foreign governments, their operations are also governed by international 
treaties.  The reduction in Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) agreed to in the 
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Uruguay Round of the GATT/WTO had an impact on what host countries could and could 
not require of international firms.  Trade-Related Investment Measures are trade-affecting 
conditions on foreign investors imposed by host governments, most often to encourage 
investment that furthers national priorities.  Some of these measures were deemed 
inconsistent with articles III (national treatment) and XI (prohibition of quantitative 
restrictions) of the GATT.  In practice, this means that host country governments cannot 
force firms to meet domestic content requirements, for example.  Brazil was a signatory to 
the Uruguay Round, and has been phasing out most of its TRIMs.  Does this mean that 
countries are forbidden by their WTO commitments from influencing the production models 
of multinational firms?  In practice, no.  The agreement is limited in scope.  States are not 
always prevented from imposing export requirements as a condition of investment.  They are 
not prohibited from insisting that a foreign investor must use recent technology or must 
conduct a specific level or type of R&D locally (Low and Subramanian 1995).  Brazil was 
already phasing out its domestic content requirements when the Uruguay Round was 
completed, and some of the more controversial aspects of TRIM removal are still being 
debated.  In short, developing country governments still have ample opportunities to 
condition the investment models of firms. 
Another possible complaint concerns the novelty of FDI, particularly in Latin 
America.  Foreign investment in the region is not particularly new.  Firms from the 
developed countries have been establishing operations in the regions for decades, even 
centuries.  From the British railroad companies of the early 1900s through United Fruit’s 
misadventures in Central America, this is not a region that has struggled to attract the 
attention of foreign capital.  However, there are new qualities to this most recent wave of 
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multinational activity.  First and foremost, the transition from models of development that 
emphasized protective barriers to ones that emphasize openness has generated massive 
dislocations in domestic economies of the region.  The transition, in some cases rapid and/or 
painful, has left governments groping for new policy frameworks and development models.  
Second, the communications revolution of the last twenty years, along with advances in 
productive technology and transportation, has integrated worldwide business in ways 
unimaginable only a few decades ago.  These connections and massive investment flows 
make traditional development models less relevant. 
2.4 Theoretical Foundations: Institutions and Multinational Incentives 
If we imagine the bargaining relationship between multinational firms and states as a 
continuum, we could imagine two ideal points.  One point would be the ideal set of 
circumstances for the multinational considering investment.  This point would connote a 
generous set of incentives for the firm, perhaps including tax exemptions and reliable 
infrastructure.  A location with a highly skilled and quiescent workforce might be desired.  
The firm would look for proximity to hungry markets.  If engaging in exports to third 
countries, the firm would hope for a liberal trade regime.  Every attribute of that ideal point 
would be designed to increase profit and ease operations.  What would the point on the 
continuum that represents state interests indicate?  This work concentrates on two potential 
benefits of multinational production, often prized by host countries: innovation and export 
activity.  On the innovation side, the state would emphasize technology transfer, moving 
innovations from the multinational to partnered domestic firms so as to bring about industrial 
upgrading.  The state would also emphasize export production, encouraging the multinational 
to contribute to the Balance of Payments.  Even if we assume clear intentions from both state 
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and firm, it is not difficult to see that these ideal points may be quite distant from one 
another.  Firms are designed to increase profits – we should not expect them to do otherwise.  
Potential development of the host country, while perhaps a happy benefit of investment, is 
not a motivating factor for multinational enterprise.  Large multinational firms operating 
truly global value chains prioritize ‘globally rational’ models that take advantage of 
comparative advantages and factor endowments in different locations.  Yet the productive 
activities the multinational desires for a country are not guaranteed to be those activities most 
conducive to development.  States, especially democratic states, are beholden to a different 
and more diverse set of interests.  In contrast to the multinational, states are concerned only 
with the contribution firms can make to local development (or rent production in the case of 
predatory states).  An ideal equilibrium for a developmental state would extract from the 
multinational just enough concessions for the firm to go through with the investment, while 
providing maximum benefits to development objectives.  The contrast between the globally 
rational strategies of firms and locally rational strategies of states inevitably produces 
divergence and conflict.  Neither the state nor the firm is able to get everything it desires, so 
what determines whether the firm invests or not, and what form that investment takes? 
2.4.1 Multinational incentive structures and state policy 
There are a large number of factors that determine the investment activity of 
multinational firms in developing countries, many of which are outside the control of the host 
country government.  Because of this, isolating those institutional and policy variables which 
influence the character of multinational investment is a challenging task.  One of the primary 
concerns of this work is to delineate the boundaries and character of state agency in an 
environment of high multinational penetration.  Therefore it is important to first acknowledge 
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the incentive structure facing multinationals, which includes host country policies and 
institutions.  In this work I endeavor to separate policy (state strategy) from institutions 
(capacity), though this separation is relaxed somewhat in chapter six.  In this subsection I 
consider policy, and in the next I consider institutions. 
Figure 2.2 is a graphical representation of the general incentive structure facing 
multinational firms.  The first two categories of investment incentives cannot be influenced 
directly by potential host countries.  There are a number of internal firm characteristics that 
determine whether multinational production makes sense30
The third category of the multinational incentive structure encompasses a great deal.  
There are a number of host country structural characteristics that are largely beyond state 
control – geography, population, etc.  Yet these variables often have a profound impact on 
capital flows to developing countries.  Brazil has developed a sophisticated and diversified 
multinational base whereas FDI in Honduras is largely confined to agricultural and textile 
production.  However, there are a number of structural incentives at least partly under the 
.  Obviously, the sector of the 
economy imposes limitations – barbershops cannot engage in sophisticated multinational 
production (though services are increasingly governed by multinational management 
structures).  Firms that do not have the capacity to expand abroad must wait until they have 
accumulated enough capital to do so.  The international economic environment is also largely 
beyond the control of potential host countries, though larger countries like Brazil can have 
some impact on this investment incentive.  Firms typically scale back investments abroad 
during worldwide downturns, though selective investments may occur if local markets in the 
host country are growing enough to offset potential losses. 
                                                 




control of states.  Class structure, democratic development, and other qualities can affect the 
investment decisions of multinationals.  These characteristics are ingrained in societies, 
though not permanent.  They are often slow to change, and therefore should be distinguished 
from more malleable policy or institutional capacity.  Much work in comparative political 
economy analyzes the role that these kinds of internal arrangements can have on the 
development of capitalist systems.  In its broadest sense, the study of complementarities 
among different historical/structural characteristics within states and their corresponding 
capitalist models harkens back to a wide body of literature on the relationship between 
capitalism and democracy31
More recently, a new body of work has appeared, primarily in the field of 
international political economy, which considers the impact of political and social 
characteristics on the character of multinational investment.  Much of this new research is 
cross-national in nature and attempts to discern the domestic institutional and policy 
determinants of FDI flows
.  Though little of this literature concentrated on FDI, it does 
serve to emphasize the larger point that structural characteristics internal to developing 
countries do have a great deal of influence on the course of development. 
32
                                                 
31Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992) examine the impact of class structure on variations in 
capitalism and democracy.  Przeworski et. al. (2000) resurrect old modernization debates to ask whether 
democratization and capitalism are mutually reinforcing. 
.  Scholars have considered various potential determinants of 
FDI, from democracy (Jensen 2003, Li and Resnick 2003, Oneal 1994) to federalism (Jensen 
2006). Others have investigated those FDI determinants specific to Latin America (Tuman 
and Emmert 2004; Biglaiser and DeRouen 2006).  These works share a common objective: to 
link changes in overall investment levels with structural variation across countries.  These 
 




‘structural’ variables and the policy and institutional variables that are the primary concern of 
this work sometimes overlap.  However, the primary distinction for the purposes of this 
investigation is between larger state-societal arrangements and the manifestations of state 
agency, as revealed through policy and conditioned through existing state institutions.  This 
work focuses not on aggregate levels of foreign investment but instead on the specific 
investment models pursued by firms and how those models are conditioned by the state.  
Moreover, the institutions considered in this predominantly case-study investigation are the 
specific state bodies that serve as intermediaries between firms and state policymakers. 
The two remaining categories of the multinational incentive structure displayed in 
Figure 2.2 are more proximate concerns of this work, and therefore receive the most theoretic 
elaboration and empirical attention.  Direct policy in particular is the primary venue of 
investigation.  Firms may respond to everything from legislation on intellectual property 
rights to changes in exchange rate regimes to tariff reductions on inputs.  Therefore it is 
useful to analytically separate types of investment policy.  A common distinction in policy 
circles is between direct and indirect measures, though the exact terminology may vary.  This 
refers to those measures which are specifically designed to change the behavior of firms in 
country or attract new entrants (direct) and those policies that are designed for other purposes 
but may have concomitant impact on multinational investment (indirect).  The stabilization 
of the domestic currency in Brazil in 1994 is an example of indirect policy.  Though the 
objectives of this initiative went far beyond the bounds of international investment, it had a 














Direct policy is most important for this work, because it allows us to test questions of 
state agency.  Direct policy is that which is designed specifically to influence the volume and 
character of FDI.  There are a variety of tools available to states interested in affecting 
investment.  Potential host countries may create Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs), 
which have been shown to influence aggregate investment flows under certain conditions33
                                                 
33Morisset (2003) found that greater investment promotion is associated with higher FDI flows, in addition to 
the influence of a country’s investment climate and market size.  However, the effectiveness of the agency 
depends on the context in which it operates. 
.  
States might also ease restrictions on foreign capital, which are still in place in much of Latin 
America.  This brings us to a further distinction within direct policy.  State direct action may 
involve committing resources to investment attraction (active), or may involve reducing 
barriers to entry (passive).  Until recently in Brazil, most changes have been passive in 
nature, as the old ISI model was dismantled.  However, Brazil and other developing countries 
have increasingly been devoting resources to the active recruitment of FDI, as evidenced by 
the increasing number of IPAs worldwide.  An example of direct, active policy would be an 
Multinational Incentive Structure 
Internal Firm Characteristics 
International Economic Environment 
Host Country Structural Characteristics: Geography, Market Size… 
Host Country Indirect Policy: Policy with Attendant Effect on FDI 
Host Country Direct Policy: Policy Designed to Influence FDI 
Passive: Lowering Barriers to Entry 
Active: Resources to Attract FDI 




initiative designed to increase linkages between multinational auto parts firms and academic 
institutions in the host country, in order to encourage technological spillovers.  Changes in 
corporate tax rates specifically for multinationals should also be considered active and direct. 
The last distinction relates to the scope of the active, direct measure: sectoral policy 
privileges a certain sector or sectors, while general active policy is policy designed to 
encourage investment across the board.  The most appropriate analogy here is to the carnival 
barker, whose indiscriminate entreaties encourage all within earshot to enter.  The sectoral, or 
‘discriminating’ investment promotion attempts to discern among types of investment, and 
devote the most resources to attracting the investments that are considered most beneficial 
for state goals.  Of course these are ideal types; states in the real world employ a broad mix 
of strategies to influence firm behavior.  As we shall see in Brazil’s case, however, there are 
times when certain strategies are dominant over others, due to a number of institutional and 
political factors.  Brazil has, up until recently, very rarely employed discriminating active 
direct policies to influence investment. 
This is a partial taxonomy of host country policy, and because the scope of this work 
is limited to the domestic determinants of FDI policy there are doubtless more complex ways 
of characterizing multinational incentive structures.  In particular, the international forces 
operating on multinationals remain under-elaborated here.  Moreover, the boundaries 
between the different categories are not always distinct (are labor regimes structural or 
policy-based?).  However, the theoretic distinctions among different types of state strategy 
allow some important insights.  It is interesting to note the inter-relationships among different 
incentives.  Institutions such as ECLAC have advocated distinctions similar to the 
active/passive dichotomy for some years now. 
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There are some other essential caveats to this construct that must be elaborated before 
proceeding.  First and most important, all the components of the incentive structure are acting 
on multinationals at the same time.  Some may be favorable for investment to take place 
while others may not.  It then becomes quite difficult to assess the impact of policy on 
investment flows.  An incentive that works in a low-inflation environment might not 
otherwise, even though the incentive itself is unchanged.  The host of factors that potentially 
influence an investment decision include the variables that can reveal state agency, but are 
not limited to them.  As Shapiro (1997, 77) explained in her study of export-promotion 
policies in Brazil: 
It is difficult to disentangle the impact of structural shifts from macroeconomic 
phenomena and export promotion policies must be understood within the context of 
the overall policy environment and the dynamics of the domestic economy. 
 
The same point can apply to FDI.  Timing plays a role; indirect or direct policy must 
have appropriate international and other conditions in order to have an effect on FDI.  Strong 
policy may overcome countervailing pressures from outside, but it may also fail.  Along 
these lines, it is also important to note that indirect policies do not necessarily have less of an 
impact on firm behavior than direct policies.  Indeed, the opposite may well be true34
Another necessary clarification concerns internal firm characteristics, the first of our 
five categories in the multinational incentive structure.  This is not to be confused with firm 
.  
However, there is often a demonstrable impact of direct policy on FDI, especially when 
channeled through effective institutions. 
                                                 
34In various surveys of multinationals, targeted investment promotion policies were often ranked below 
exchange rate policies, general tariff policies, and other indirect measures in terms of importance to individual 
firms (Blonigen 2005).  However, even when controlling for indirect policy and macroeconomic factors, 
targeted policies do seem to influence investment flows at the firm level (Loree and Guisinger 1995).  As 
detailed in chapters four and five in this study, respondent firms often noted that while indirect policies had 
significant impact on investment decisions, direct policies such as export financing could be very influential. 
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preferences over policy in potential host countries.  It is difficult to make universalistic 
claims about firm preferences beyond the motive for profit.  This profit-maximizing strategy, 
while reasonable, does not reveal the kind of policy regime desired by multinationals.  It is 
often assumed that firms desire neoliberal-style economic policy frameworks, but this is not 
true in all contexts.  Economists have long noted that FDI often serves as a substitute for 
trade in developing markets, and this ‘tariff-jumping’ FDI is often a fierce defender of 
subsidies and distortions (Blonigen 2005; Bennett and Sharpe 1979).  Though not at today’s 
aggregate levels, large amounts of pre-debt crisis FDI were partly the result of firms’ desires 
to get around restrictive tariff policies in the era of ISI.  Firms that set up operations during 
this wave of investment did not display uniformly neoliberal policy preferences.  Moran 
(1974) and others have noted the desire of multinationals for continued protection in 
situations where liberalization would generate competition in the domestic market.  Just as 
we should not assume developmental preferences on the part of state institutions (as opposed 
to rent-seeking), we should not assume uniform preferences on the part of multinational 
firms. 
2.4.2 Credible leverage: institutions and bargaining 
The previous section provided a typology for host country policy in relation to 
multinational firms.  However, in order for policy to be influential it must be channeled 
through effective state bodies.  These organizations are referred to in this work as 
institutions.  It is important to highlight this distinction between policies and institutions, 
which can best be thought of as a distinction between state strategy and capacity.  As noted in 
the introduction, much of the current institutionalist work in economics and political science 
defines institutions broadly, encompassing laws, rules, formal organizations, and informal 
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norms and conventions (North 1990; 1994).  In chapters three through five in this work, I use 
a more limited definition of institutions, which involves only the formal organizations of the 
state and disregards informal norms.  I concentrate in particular on those institutions charged 
with investment promotion.  I also separate formal state policy (strategy) from formal 
institutions (capacity), in order to distinguish the effects of one from the effects of the other 
and emphasize their interaction.  I point out, for example, policies in Brazil which, while 
well-designed, were undercut by institutional characteristics, such as a lack of inter-
institutional coordination in the governance of the PITCE industrial policy during the Lula 
administration.  The distinction allows me to analytically separate the impact of institutional 
characteristics from the design of the investment policies.  As an example, I argue that more 
active, direct, and sectorally discriminating policies during the Lula administration were 
more effective when channeled through institutional ‘pockets of efficiency’ such as the 
BNDES.  The interaction between policies and institutions is important, as the gap between 
policy design and implementation is often large in developing countries.  In chapter six, 
which considers the influence of institutions on firm investment profiles in a cross-national 
setting, I briefly expand the definition of institutions to include policy, as part of the ‘rules of 
the game’ firms must face.  This is helpful in the cross-national setting, for comparisons 
across states. 
 Having outlined a typology for the incentive structure confronting multinationals, it 
seems apparent that there are opportunities for the host country to condition multinational 
investment activities, under the right conditions.  However, opportunity does not necessarily 
bring efficacy.  Therefore, it is also necessary to ask what qualities in host countries enable 
them to effectively utilize policy to align multinational and developmental goals.  Is it 
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possible for states to be ‘developmental’ when integrating into international production 
networks?  This work answers in the affirmative, but only when institutions demonstrate a 
certain set of attributes.  These attributes refer to the broad characteristics of institutions, as 
revealed through their composition, organizational patterns, objectives, and rules, and their 
behavior over time.  The same state may not demonstrate these qualities at different points in 
time, and some bodies within the state apparatus may demonstrate these qualities more than 
others. 
To elaborate, it is useful to return to the concept of a continuum.  Recall that points 
represent the ideal investment profiles for states and firms.  The challenge for a 
developmental state, then, is to move the actual contract of investment towards its ideal point 
as far as possible, while still convincing the multinational that the investment is worthwhile.  
It is not necessary for state and firm goals to be antagonistic, only different.  The space 
between the ideal point for the firm and the point at which the firm no longer invests can be 
quite large, but that will depend partially on the investment incentive structure35
To answer this question it is useful to turn to Putnam’s (1988) logic of two-level 
games.  Putnam originally promoted this theoretic construct for use in analyzing international 
diplomacy, but it has some applicability here as well.  The purpose of two-level games was to 
allow researchers to distinguish between a leader’s activities on the international scene and 
his or her political support at home
.  So what 
are the characteristics of a state that is able to maneuver multinationals towards these points? 
36
                                                 
35For countries with as large a market as Brazil (a structural characteristic in the elaborated incentive structure), 
the increase in incentives connoted by the large market size often leaves the state with a great deal of room 
between a firm’s ideal point and the point at which it deserts the market.  In other words, a firm may desperately 
want to sell its product to Brazil’s growing consumer class, and may therefore be willing to accept a number of 
host country priorities as a condition of investment. 
.  Putnam argued that leaders or other state 
 
36Putnam was quite opposed to treating states as unitary actors, and so here I use leaders as opposed to states. 
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representatives conducting international negotiations in effect sat at two separate chessboards 
simultaneously.  They must satisfy their partners in international negotiation while also 
satisfying domestic constituents.  This leads to a wide variety of strategies based on this 
interplay between domestic and foreign, with each game affecting the outcome of the other.  
According to Putnam, the domestic and international are intricately interrelated and so should 
be analyzed jointly. 
Putnam’s logic is loosely applicable to the question of state bargaining with 
multinationals.  On the first level, states must contend with the firm and its global 
imperatives.  States must anticipate firm requirements while also remaining aware of the 
firm’s room for maneuver.  At the second level, the state must be able to provide adequate 
assurances to the firm about its domestic political environment.  That is, the state must 
demonstrate credible leverage to the multinational.  If the state cannot demonstrate this 
leverage or demonstrates it weakly, the firm has no incentive to take the state’s requests 
seriously.  It may invest with a contract closer to its ideal point, or it may use the occasion to 
consider other investment models. 
There are a number of qualities which can increase a state’s credible leverage when 
conditioning the behavior of multinationals.  However, I concentrate in this work on three 
key elements that increase institutional efficacy and therefore state capacity.  First is 
institutional coordination.  This not only refers to the state’s ability to convey its preferences 
to the multinational, but also to its ability to enforce the conditions of the bargain.  There are 
two main kind of coordination: inter-institutional coordination and intra-institutional 
coordination.  Inter-institutional coordination refers to coordination between state bodies, and 
has been particularly difficult to achieve in Brazil.  Is cooperation among federal and state 
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bodies strong and free of redundancies or contradictions?  Do different agencies and 
ministries within the government work well with one another, or do they work at cross-
purposes?  Are agencies connected to the executive and do they represent well the overall 
industrial policy goals of the government?  These are all questions which address inter-
institutional coordination.  The second kind of coordination is intra-institutional 
coordination: is the agency or ministry in question able to deliver on the indirect and direct 
policy measures deployed in the investment promotion framework?  Can the state guarantee 
a duty-free zone for exports, for example?  Are the institutions designed to promote 
spillovers agile and responsive?  Both elements of institutional coordination will help 
determine whether firm strategies will change to accommodate state goals. 
The second element that increases state credible leverage is consistency.  Whereas 
coordination is approached from synchronic analysis, consistency is diachronic.  Instead of 
asking how institutions relate to one another or display internal organization, the element of 
consistency is only identifiable in a temporal context.  Simply put, the lack of institutional 
consistency over time will undermine the state’s leverage on foreign firms.  If institutional 
frameworks do not hold up through successive administrations, firm investment profiles will 
naturally revert back to forms more ideal to the firms.  As this study will show, this has been 
a particular problem in Brazil.  Brazilian administrations have undermined the consistency of 
state institutions by constantly shifting institutional priorities, adding more institutions, and 
dismantling other institutions altogether.  Schneider (1991) notes that bureaucratic personnel 
in Brazil move among different state organizations and the private sector, undermining 
staffing consistency.  Samuels (2003) notes that new administrations make large numbers of 
political appointees, further undermining institutional consistency through time.  The truly 
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powerful institutions often vary from administration to administration, making it difficult for 
firms to understand how to best interact with the government.  Firms engaging in FDI prize 
stability, as the investment necessarily involves a long time horizon.  Institutional 
inconsistency is perceived negatively by firms, and results in a reluctance to commit to more 
complex and potentially risky activities, such as local innovation. 
The third vital institutional characteristic has to do with the closeness of connections 
between firms and state bodies.  Evans (1995) referred to the ‘embedded autonomy’ of states 
pursuing developmental goals, meaning that states had to be simultaneously well connected 
to domestic groups (to channel societal demands and enforce policy) and able to act 
independently (to avoid rent-seeking).  State institutions must be ‘embedded’ in a similar 
way with multinational firms.  Institutions must have close working relationships with firms, 
firms and institutions must be familiar and comfortable with one another.  Because Evans 
was primarily concerned with domestic societal interests and their ‘embededness’, perhaps a 
better term here would be whether or not institutions are networked with multinational firms.  
State institutions must be close to firms in order for spillovers to be realized.   
In Brazil’s case, this element of networking has often been absent from investment-
promoting institutions.  Multinationals often have close connections to individual lawmakers 
in Brazil, but this translates into personalistic connections at the expense of broad, strategic 
implementation of investment promotion policy.  Institutions do not typically have close 
relationships with firms.  For an institution to be networked with a multinational firm, the 
state institution must have in-depth knowledge of the firm’s operations.  The firm, on the 
other hand, must be familiar with the institution’s goals and operating procedures, its 
mandate and responsiveness.  Both the institution and the firm must understand the potential 
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benefits the other party can bring to the bargaining table.  In short, state institutions and firms 
must be familiar with one another.  This has often not been the case in Brazil.  The lack of 
connections between state-supported institutions of higher education and multinational firms 
(detailed in chapter four) is just one example of this lack of networking between institutions 
and firms. 
2.4.3 Societal bases of support for investment promotion 
The three elements I identify here increase institutional leverage and, when coupled 
with well-designed policy, can impact the investment models of multinational firms.  
However, we must acknowledge the societal bases of support for state policies and 
institutions.  Any policy designed to influence the investment behavior of multinationals 
must of course be supported by a societal group (almost always parties) or coalition.  Though 
all of Brazil’s major political parties have supported investment promotion to some degree, I 
argue that Brazil’s particular patterns of representation have often contributed to fleeting 
political support for efficient institutions. 
By acknowledging and accommodating political support for policies and institutions 
in this analysis, I am allowing a hint of the neoclassical perspective.  After all, if state 
leverage depends on societal coalitions are we not back to removing the state altogether from 
the new development framework?  This is a legitimate concern, but does not constitute a real 
threat to the institutionalist framework I have outlined.  It would be inappropriate to 
investigate the foundations of state investment policy without acknowledging the importance 
of societal forces.  However, it is also important to recognize the differences between 
traditional neoclassical interpretations of development and interpretations of the bargaining 
framework between states and multinationals.  While patterns of domestic political support 
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certainly play a role in increasing or decreasing a state’s leverage on multinationals, it seems 
likely that these societal coalitions hold less influence on multinational firms than they have 
displayed with domestic firms in decades past.  In other words, the element of 
‘multinationality’ creates a level of remove between societies and firms that increases the 
importance of state institutions.  It is easy to imagine, for example, that domestic labor 
groups might be less influential in negotiations with multinational firms than they would be 
with domestic firms, ceteris paribus.  This does not mean societal groups are powerless.  
However, the level of remove from societal interests that multinational production brings 
does mean that scholars must pay closer attention to the character of state institutions charged 
with firm relations.  Institutions function as intermediaries between societal interests and 
multinational firms. 
The framework outlined in this section combines multinational incentive structures 
with institutional attributes to explain investment outcomes.  The heavy penetration of 
multinational enterprises into developing countries has somewhat limited the choices 
available to states.  However, there remain significant opportunities for states to influence the 
nature of investment within their borders.  Variations in state strategy and capacity explain 
divergent outcomes in these efforts.  State conditioning of multinational behavior may 
generate distortions and losses, but it may also generate increasing returns and a virtuous 
cycle of benefits for both firm and host country.  This work determines where the state has 
demonstrated both beneficial and detrimental behavior in a specific environment.  The state 
has the ability to act as an impetus to industrial upgrading and development, even in the 
context of multinational production.  Whether it does so depends on the multitude of factors 
outlined in this chapter.  When the multinational incentive structure endows firms with 
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substantial interest in a country, and the elements of credible leverage align to fortify the 
state’s position, investment policy can generate benefits for both the investing firm and host 
country. 
2.5 Case Selection 
The state’s capacity for both derailing and encouraging development in a world of 
international production networks requires analysis that is at once cognizant of investment 
policy history and current economic imperatives.  This work therefore combines a thorough 
examination of the evolution of FDI policy with an elaboration of differences in capacity and 
efficacy across state bodies and corresponding investment profiles.  It is at once a case study 
and a large-n empirical analysis of individual firm responses to state initiative.  The picture 
that emerges is that of a complex set of pressures acting on bureaucrats, who themselves are 
dealing with a rapidly changing economic circumstances.  If allowed, the study might easily 
have careened far beyond the boundaries of what is feasible.  Therefore, it is important to 
acknowledge the limitations of the work and its prospects for generalizations. 
2.5.1 Why Brazil? 
Whenever an analyst chooses to concentrate on one country as a base for much larger 
arguments about the nature of development and state agency, he or she inevitably faces tough 
questions about the uniqueness of results derived from the study.  The debate over the value 
of case-oriented is detailed in section 6.6.  It is important to note here, however, that focusing 
on a single case does not preclude a researcher from engaging in important and 
methodologically sophisticated analysis.  When the case considered is as large as a country, 
countless opportunities exist for theory building and empirical testing within the selected 
case.  Moreover, as Lieberman (2005) has suggested, case studies can serve as important 
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complements to large-n research.  In this kind of ‘nested analysis’, statistical analyses of 
many cases can serve to provide additional tests for hypotheses generated from small-n 
research, and small-n research can be used to evaluate statistical relationships.  Chapter six in 
this study expands the analysis of institutional impacts on firm profiles beyond Brazil in this 
manner.  In previous chapters, changes in Brazilian institutions cross-sectionally and through 
time provide variation within the case study, and reinforce the conclusions of chapter six in a 
specific context. 
Brazil displays a number of attributes that make it an ideal laboratory for testing state-
multinational interaction.  Its size and economic importance have endowed it with an 
enduring attraction for foreign firms.  Multinational enterprises from the developed world 
(principally from North America) have been operating in the country perpetually since the 
early 20th century and some even before that.  With over 180 million inhabitants, Brazil’s 
importance as a destination for consumer goods makes it especially attractive for market-
seeking FDI.  Yet it is also a developing country with a sophisticated industrial base, part of 
what has been called the semi-periphery.  Beginning in the 1930s under the first Vargas 
regime, Brazil began a series of steps that would move the country from an economic model 
that emphasized primary products to the diversified industrial production model in place 
today.  Following World War II, Brazilian administrations have pursued a variety of policies 
towards foreign investment.  The Kubitschek administration viewed foreign investment as 
essential to the success of the Programa de Metas development plan, but Goulart’s flirtations 
with nationalization alienated foreign investors.  More recently, the Cardoso administration 
adopted a largely passive approach to FDI, removing barriers to investment but not actively 
recruiting particular types of investment.  Lula, in contrast, resurrected an activist industrial 
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policy and established a number of target sectors for priority investments, though his efforts 
were somewhat undercut by the characteristics of investment promotion bodies in Brazil. 
These changes are detailed in the next chapter.  The variation in investment policy through 
time in Brazil constitutes an important motivation for the study. 
Another important source of variation concerns the nature of the Brazilian state itself.  
Throughout this chapter I have referred to ‘the state’ in the singular, as if the state displayed 
monolithic preferences.  I hope to show that this is not the case, and that the use of this 
abstraction is just that, an abstraction.  The state, as conceived in this way, is the revealed 
collective will of the government apparatus, whether determined by a combination of 
interests or one particular interest that is able to suppress dissenters.  However, this 
abstraction hides a great deal of variation in state capacity and efficacy.  Because the 
Brazilian state is so extensive, there are ample opportunities to analyze where institutions 
within the state display the qualities outlined above and are therefore able or unable to 
influence firm investment models.  A number of studies have pointed to the relative 
weakness of state bodies, especially with concerning their interactions with domestic 
industry37
                                                 
37See Ben Ross Schneider’s (2004) work, also Kingstone (1999). 
.  However, as Geddes (1990) pointed out, there have also been ‘pockets of 
efficiency’ in the state apparatus.  Evans (1995) echoed this conclusion, characterizing the 
Brazilian state as neither wholly ‘developmental’ nor wholly ‘predatory’, but displaying 
elements of each at different times and locations.  The instances of well-conceived and 
executed policy channeled through efficient institutions provide contrast with the often 
ineffective, counterproductive, and/or weakly organized institutions.  The breadth of the 
Brazilian bureaucracy allows a comparative analysis of state agency. 
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Brazil exhibits additional beneficial qualities for this analysis.  The liberalization 
process begun in the 1980s, so rapid and dislocating in other Latin American countries, has 
proceeded in a more gradual fashion in Brazil.  Though there have been instances of dramatic 
reform attempts (most notably those of Collor in the early 1990s), change in the Brazilian 
economic model has mostly come piecemeal.  Pinheiro, Bonelli, and Schneider (2004) have 
termed this ‘pragmatic’ reform, characterized by tentative liberalization and gradual, 
cumulative movements towards loosening restrictions.  This allows a more stable 
environment to test ideas of state agency than in other countries, such as Argentina. 
2.5.2 Why exporting and innovative activity? 
Chapters four and five of this work are organized thematically to address two vital 
and potentially developmental attributes of multinational production in the developing world.  
Rather than focus on more abstract ideas about investment profiles, the concentration on the 
export and innovative activities of multinationals gives tangible and quantifiable dimensions 
to ideas about positive spillovers from multinational production.  Proponents of FDI cite 
access to cutting edge technology as one of the most positive externalities of multinational 
investment.  They argue that domestic firms and governments who partner with 
multinationals will have increased access to the latest innovations, and the multinationals will 
embed their technological activities in the host country.  This potentially creates backward 
and forward linkages with domestic economies, generating a virtual cycle that leads to 
technological upgrading and development.  Innovation-intensive FDI can strengthen the 
competitiveness of domestic firms in developing countries through the formation of 
innovative clusters, and may keep highly-educated workers from emigrating.  Opponents of 
FDI claim just the opposite: that multinationals have no incentive to transfer technology and 
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do only the minimal amount when required.  The local innovative effort of multinationals 
serves as a good proxy for this hypothesized spillover effect.  Moreover, the relationship 
between state incentives and innovative activity can be investigated empirically, through 
surveys of firms operating in country and through interviews with both firms and 
governmental representatives. 
Export activity is another area where multinationals are hypothesized to have a 
positive effect on host countries.  Exports from multinationals contribute to the balance of 
payments, and indicate Brazil’s appeal is not solely based on the size of its market but also 
on a particular worker skill set or productive efficiency.  Export-intensive multinationals can 
increase the competitiveness of partner firms in world markets, and may lead developing 
countries away from dependence on primary products and towards a more diversified 
manufacturing base.  The benefits of Export Oriented Industrialization in East Asia have 
been well documented, though this export dynamism was not often the responsibility of 
multinationals.  Many countries, including Brazil, have set up Export Processing Zones 
(EPZs) in the hopes that cheaper export platforms will lure multinationals and create jobs.  
Exports have been a consistent objective for successive Brazilian administrations, especially 
in the sectors considered in this work.  In Brazil’s case, the policy tools employed by the 
state to move multinationals to export have only periodically brought results, as the analysis 
will show. 
2.5.3 Why information technology (IT) and automotive? 
This analysis forgoes an economy-wide approach to FDI and instead concentrates on 
two sectors vital to the Brazilian economy and marked by a high degree of multinational 
penetration.  The Brazilian automotive industry in 2009 brought in US$62.2 billion in net 
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revenue and was responsible for 19.8 percent of the country’s industrial GDP (ANFAVEA 
2010, 40).  This is an enormous impact on the domestic economy.  Multinationals have a 
long history of automobile production in Brazil – the state made the decision in the 1950s not 
to pursue an independent automobile capability after limited and frustrating experiments with 
domestic firms.  However, successive governments did require that foreign auto firms 
establish production within Brazil and imposed heavy domestic content requirements.  These 
requirements were only relaxed in the 1990s.  The 1990s also witnessed an influx of new 
investment in the auto sector as a variety of companies sought access to the Brazilian market.  
The developed domestic auto parts sector has demonstrated a rapid rate of 
internationalization, and the advent of Mercosul has compelled many companies to rework 
their production models to take advantage of regional markets.  In this state of flux, the role 
of the state in conditioning the investment profiles of multinationals has been critical.  A 
number of initiatives have been successful in terms of state industrial priorities, such as the 
automotive regime (RA) of the mid-1990s.  However, there have also been instances of 
poorly implemented policy as well. 
The Information Technology sector is an intriguing contrast in a number of ways.  As 
Evans (1995) noted, the ability of the state to direct the development of multinational IT 
firms has diminished considerably since the 1980s.  The technological frontier is often too far 
away to make state-led development of indigenous firms a viable strategy, and the 
internationalization of Brazil’s domestic IT firms since the 1990s has put the industry almost 
exclusively in foreign hands.  However, the IT sector, more than any other, is responsible 
today for generating the entrepreneurial and technological advances that are so central to 
development.  The Brazilian state has made a number of attempts, especially in the last ten 
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years, to influence the behavior of firms operating in this sector.  The state has had precious 
few successes in incentivizing domestic spillovers from foreign investment in this sector. 
The two industries considered in this work are important to the Brazilian economy, by 
virtue of their size and potential for developmental spillovers.  However, the Brazilian 
economy is of course much broader than this.  I have deliberately avoided inclusion of 
primary products (mining, agriculture, etc.), which is subject to very different dynamics.  
While multinationals are active in these primary sectors and in many cases are highly export-
intensive, the institutionalist argument I put forward would have to be heavily modified in 
the context of natural resources.  As I argue in chapter six, it is less likely that firms in 
natural resource industries would be as influenced by varying institutional configurations as 
manufacturing and service firms.  Moreover, there is a substantial literature on the 
relationships among natural resources, foreign firms, and politics in developing countries 
(Moran 1974, Kobrin 1987, Karl 1997).  This literature emphasizes the ways in which natural 
resource investments are different from other kinds of investment, both in their political 
determinants and ramifications.  While this does limit the generalizability of the 
institutionalist argument I put forward, it is more important to acknowledge the distinct 
characteristics of natural resource investments. 
2.5.4 The importance of firm-level analysis 
In order to quantitatively demonstrate the relationship between state agency and 
patterns of international investment, the analysis also adopts and advocates a firm-level 
approach.  One of the most interesting features of older and more recent scholarship on 
multinational corporations has been the relative neglect of national policymaking as a 
variable that influences individual firm behavior.  Researchers have lamented this lack of 
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firm-level analysis (Haggard 1989, Jensen 2006), albeit while acknowledging data collection 
problems due to confidentiality concerns of individual firms.  In considering patterns of 
investment behavior among firms and links to investment policy in specific contexts, specific 
hypotheses can be drawn out that might not have been available at the level of aggregate FDI 
stock or flows.  Moreover, the yearly measures on flows of FDI limit researchers to the study 
of changes in entering investment patterns, and therefore often lead scholars to neglect 
analysis of investment already in country.  This criticism is especially important in Brazil, 
where many of the most important multinationals have been in the country for decades. 
Concentrating on firm-level analysis allows the construction of investment profiles.  
In the context of this work, this refers to patterns of innovation intensity and export 
propensity that emerge among multinationals in the examined sectors.  Theoretically, a 
state’s investment policy, backed up by credible leverage, can induce a multinational to alter 
its individual investment contract.  This may take the form of putting resources into local 
innovative activity, developing partnerships with local universities, and so on.  If these 
incentives are offered in a consistent manner and are reinforced by other elements in firms’ 
incentive structures, an investment profile may emerge among firms in that sector and a 
virtuous cycle of upgrading may take place. 
It is also important to clarify the distinctions among types of FDI.  The emphasis on 
firm-level analysis allows a distinction that studies of aggregate flows and stocks of FDI 
rarely acknowledge.  There is a common distinction in policy circles among market-seeking, 
export-oriented (or efficiency-oriented), natural resource-seeking and sometimes technology-
seeking investment. All types of FDI can have important direct and knock-on benefits for 
recipient countries under the right conditions.  However, it is more common in academic 
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analyses and official reports to distinguish among types of FDI, if in no other way than to 
refer to ‘high quality’ and ‘low quality’ FDI.  The Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC/CEPAL) has long advocated this distinction among types of 
FDI, and privileges export-oriented (as generating current account benefits) and technology-
intensive (as generating technological spillovers) over the more common (in Latin America) 
market-seeking or natural-resource seeking FDI.  This analysis allows for these distinctions.  
While I do not discount the potential contributions of purely market-seeking FDI, this work 
explicitly endorses the idea that efficiency-oriented and technology-intensive foreign 
investment is better for developing countries.  I make numerous distinctions, both empirical 
and theoretical, between high-quality and low-quality FDI.  Indeed, this variation in FDI 
characteristics provides the analysis with its primary dependent variables. 
2.6 Methodological Approach 
 Researchers in political science, and especially in the subfield of comparative politics, 
inevitably feel stuck in the tug of war between long-established qualitative and quantitative 
research traditions.  Often this feels like a zero-sum game, whereby a researcher is forced to 
side with one tradition over the other and subsequently question the legitimacy of the spurned 
side.  Of course this is not the case, and there is a long tradition of efforts to bridge the 
quantitative-qualitative divide.  This study is primarily a case study of Brazilian policy and 
institutions, and how these variables condition investment models of multinational 
corporations.  As such, much of the research contained herein should be described as 
qualitative.  However, this dissertation is also firmly multi-method, and appropriates 
quantitative tools where needed.  This is done not to accommodate methodological partisans, 
but simply because qualitative and quantitative methods have differing strengths and are 
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appropriate at different levels of the present analysis.  As pointed out by Coppedge (1999) 
and Collier, Brady, and Seawright (2004), small-n quantitative analysis can help develop 
complex, multidimensional ‘thick’ ideas and theories, which can then be used to describe and 
interpret causation on a limited scale.  Large-n analyses are better for forming generalizations 
and testing hypotheses, but are ‘thin’ in the sense that they do not often account for context 
or theoretical nuance. 
 There have been a number of forays into the methodological neutral ground between 
quantitative and qualitative research, suggesting that the two traditions are not as far apart as 
they may occasionally appear.  Lijphart (1971) proposed the idea that case study-constructed 
theories could be evaluated with subsequent large-n econometric tests.  This idea, however, 
was subsequently used by quantitative-inclined analysts to suggest that qualitative work often 
took place in an exploratory fashion before more rigorous and defensible quantitative 
methods were employed to ‘verify’ qualitative ideas.  King, Keohane, and Verba’s (1994) 
seminal work Designing Social Inquiry furthered this impression, and more generally sought 
to impose quantitative standards on longstanding qualitative methods.  More recently, 
however, a number of scholars have suggested that qualitative work can be both hypothesis-
generating and hypothesis testing.  Likewise, quantitative work can be used to test theories 
and suggest alterations to existing theories38.  The division of labor is not strict, and both 
large-n and small-n analysis can work in a symbiotic fashion, moving disciplines to more 
accurate models39
                                                 
38A good example of this approach is Lieberman’s (2005) “nested analysis”, in which small-n analyses are used 
to test regression findings.  In this way, qualitative work focused on a small number of cases can be used to 
build more accurate models. 
. 
 
39McKeown (2004, 158) refers to a “folk Bayesian” approach along these lines, whereby researchers would 
move back and forth between theory and data, constantly revising prior beliefs in light of theory refinements 
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 This dissertation is methodologically diverse.  Chapter 3 is primarily an historical 
institutional analysis of the development of investment policy in Brazil and how that policy is 
refracted through domestic government bodies.  Chapters 4 and 5 are qualitative 
investigations of the determinants of specific investments outcomes in Brazil, namely 
innovation and export intensity among multinationals.  Chapter 6 extends the analysis of state 
institutions and investment outcomes to a broad set of developing countries, and brings in a 
quantitative component.  Nevertheless, this dissertation is on balance a qualitative case study 
of Brazil.  As such, it inevitably must confront difficult questions about generalizability of 
findings, selection bias, etc.  However, the case study tradition in general remains strong 
today in the face of significant criticisms40
 The analysis of single cases can do more than generate hypotheses, however.  Case 
studies also have the added advantage of identifying specific and often complex causal 
mechanisms that large-n studies might miss altogether.  This is especially true if these causal 
.  The case study presents several advantages in 
general terms, which lend themselves well to this work’s central research questions.  First, 
the first chapters of this work do not aim for theoretic breadth as much as depth and full 
accounting of the pressures acting on multinational firms in Brazil.  Given that these 
pressures are diverse and variable, case-oriented research allows the elaboration of many 
causal pathways in a complex society.  A large-n study would only allow a few tests.  One of 
the great strengths of case-oriented research is its theory-building abilities in the face of 
multiple causal avenues. 
                                                                                                                                                       
and changes in data analysis.  McKeown argues that such practices are not contemplated in KKV’s 
methodological recommendations. 
 
40Gerring (2004) points out that despite the suspicion attached to case studies in some corners of the discipline, 
the case study method is widespread.  Moreover, it has led to some of the seminal works in the field of political 
science (Allison 1971; Lijphart 1968, to name a couple). 
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processes take place over a long period of time, or involve a significant number of diverse 
social actors.  The generalizability of these causal processes may be limited, but in many 
ways that is beside the point.  As McKeown (2004) argues, what matters is that a causal 
mechanism has been identified, and the researcher has an analytic framework that may then 
be subject to tests of validity. 
 There have been many recent advances in qualitative research, and a number of new 
ways to use case-oriented research within that context.  A number of new treatises on 
qualitative methodology have recently appeared, all of which absorb the lessons of KKV but 
also avoid some of its evangelism (Brady and Collier 2004; Gerring 2007; Goertz 2006).  In 
addition to these manuals, other ideas which are easily applied to case-oriented research have 
gained traction, such as analysis of critical historical junctures (Collier and Collier 1991) and 
path dependency (Pierson 2004).  The qualitative tool most often employed by this 
dissertation is what Brady, Collier, and Seawright (2006, 355) refer to as ‘causal process 
observation’, or CPO.  The authors define a CPO as “an insight or piece of data that provides 
information about context, process, or mechanism and that contributes distinctive leverage to 
causal inference.”  This analytic tool couples the quantitative emphasis on observation with 
the idea of causal inference.  In this work, interview responses and data from Brazilian 
government institutions allow me to make causal inferences about the impact of institutions 
on firm investment decisions.  CPO is an intentionally broad term, and it encompasses much 
of existing qualitative research.  Brady et al. (2006) argue that CPO can be used in 
combination with quantitative analysis.  Large-n studies can supplement the causal processes 
identified through qualitative research, in order to situate the findings in a larger comparative 
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perspective.  This is exactly the approach adopted in this study, as the insights from 
qualitative chapters are applied in chapter 6 in a wider context. 
 Before moving on, it is important to address two charges often leveled at case studies 
such as this.  The first concerns the problem of selection bias.  Many researchers suggest that 
small-n qualitative studies select on the dependent variable, and therefore miss variation 
essential for correct causal inference.  In the case of this study, Brazil’s receipt of massive 
FDI flows in the 1990s was part of the rationale for the work.  However, expansion of the 
cases considered in this study would make explanatory variables (in this case, the unique 
characteristics of Brazil’s institutions) no longer applicable.  The complex causal inferences 
qualitative research often produces lose their persuasive power when other cases are added.  
Moreover, as George and Bennett (2005, 21) argue, key variables and interrelations can be 
missed: 
Unless statistical researchers do their own archival work, interviews, or face-to-face 
surveys with open-ended questions in order to measure the values of the variables in 




This is essentially a question of scope, but specific knowledge-intensive qualitative 
research is valuable for inference, even when cases are selected because of crucial levels of 
some phenomenon. 
 The second potential objection is related to the first.  Many academics have qualms 
about using a sole case as the basis for analysis.  Conventional wisdom (and intuition) holds 
that the study of a single case can do little more than generate hypotheses.  However, single 
cases can also test hypotheses and explain outcomes.  As Rueschemeyer (2003, 315) points 
out, detailed case analyses “often entail the generation, testing, revising, and retesting of 
                                                 
41Quoted in Mahoney (2007, 126) 
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explanatory provisions within the same complex material.”  That is, theory and evidence 
work in continuous dialogue in individual cases.  Moreover, both Rueschemeyer (2003) and 
Gerring (2004) make the crucial point that individual cases should not be confused with 
single observations.  This is a common mistake among those opposed to individual country 
case studies.  When the analysis does take place within a single country (or whatever the case 
unit is), there is often tremendous variation within that case at lower levels of analysis.  In the 
case of this study, there are numerous sources of variation, many of which are integrated into 
the explanation.  Variations in government effectiveness through time, institutional 
coherence and consistency, variations in firm profiles, variations in economic sectors: these 
all play roles in the many-layered theoretical arguments presented here.  It is therefore quite 
misleading to suggest single case studies display insufficient variation.  Indeed, they may 
have more in common with large-n studies than is commonly realized. 
2.6.1 Research methods and timeline 
 Having identified the broader methodological context for this study, I now turn to the 
specific methods employed in data collection and analysis.  The objective of this work is to 
explain the impact of Brazilian policies and institutions on the investment models pursued by 
multinational firms.  In order to effectively analyze the complex relationships between firms 
and host governments, I pursued various primary and secondary sources.  In the first half of 
2008, I conducted field research in São Paulo, Brazil.  This field research consisted of 
interviews with local government officials, ministry representatives, business journalists, 
nongovernmental organization representatives, and others.  During this time, I also accessed 
secondary sources in Brazilian newspapers and libraries, and retrieved or downloaded data 
from a select few governmental agencies.   
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I returned to Brazil in the summer of 2009, and conducted interviews with 
government officials in Brasília.  In all, I conducted interviews with 51 individuals outside 
my firm interviews.  I also participated in four site visits to multinational manufacturing 
plants, though these were of limited value.  When I was not in Brazil, in 2008 and 2009 I 
conducted interviews with representatives of 27 multinational corporations active in the 
Brazilian market, by telephone and through email exchange of questionnaires, bringing the 
total number of personal interviews to 78.  I attempted whenever possible to speak personally 
to firm representatives.  The questions asked of firm and government representatives varied 
based on what I knew about the interviewees and their positions, but there were standard 
elements to the firm interviews.  These included requests to identify the laws most and 
agencies most influential in their investment decisions, and questions about the evolution of 
their investment models.  My interview data and secondary sources were supplemented with 
analysis of data provided by government ministries in Brazil, newspaper accounts, and 








Investment Policy and Domestic Institutions: Historical Perspectives 
3.1 Introduction 
  In the past twenty-five years, Brazil has moved from a model of development which 
imposed restrictions on multinational firms to one in which international investment is sought 
in a variety of sectors.  Yet unlike in other countries in Latin America, this transformation did 
not occur rapidly.  Rather, investment policy reform in Brazil has proceeded in fits and starts.  
Even today, the investment promotion policy framework in Brazil is complicated by legacies 
of past policies which emphasized exclusion of foreign capital in certain sectors.  Brazil has 
at times exhibited isolated periods of active and discriminating investment promotion.  At the 
same time, many administrations have conveyed a more ambivalent and even at times 
contradictory approach to foreign investment.  In this chapter I analyze the evolution of 
Brazilian policy towards FDI, and the larger reform process that has gradually reshaped the 
country’s industrial policies.  I also examine how successive investment policies have been 
channeled through and conditioned by state institutions.  Chapters four and five deal 
primarily with investment outcomes.  While I do acknowledge the importance of societal 
pressures on investment policy throughout this chapter, the influence of state institutions is, 
in this interpretation, paramount.  The size and complexity of the Brazilian state apparatus 
allows a cross-institutional perspective.  Some institutions within the state apparatus 
demonstrate consistent and coordinated approaches to FDI, others do not.  The perspective 
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adopted in this chapter also brings an important temporal dimension to the analysis.  Changes 
in institutions and policy priorities through successive administrations illuminate specific 
causal pathways.  The analysis, through temporal and cross-sectional variation, demonstrates 
the importance of state institutions for the evolution of overall investment policy efficacy. 
 This chapter proceeds in three stages.  First, I apply the theoretical framework 
outlined in chapter two to the characteristics of Brazilian investment promotion policy and 
institutions.  I argue that investment promotion policy has often been passive and/or general, 
while institutions have demonstrated many of the characteristics that contribute to low state 
leverage, such as inconsistency and a lack of coordination.  In recent years, I argue that an 
emerging active, discriminating approach to foreign investment has been partially undercut 
by institutional characteristics.  I also argue, however, that a select few institutional islands of 
efficacy have emerged, and I detail their determinants.  In section 3.3, I provide an historical 
overview of the development of Brazilian FDI policy and investment-promoting state 
institutions.  This section focuses on the entire period following re-democratization (1985 – 
present), and in particular on the Cardoso and Lula administrations (1995-2011).  In this 
section I emphasize the institutional constraints to the effectiveness of an active, 
discriminating investment policy and broader industrial policies.  For each time period 
analyzed, I first describe the evolution of investment policy.  I then consider institutional 
attributes for each period and connect those attributes to investment outcomes.  In section 
3.4, I restate theoretical arguments, and also consider alternate explanations for investment 
outcomes and policy evolution.  This section considers in more depth the role of societal 
forces and their contribution to the evolution of investment policy.  Section 3.5 concludes. 
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3.2 Institutions and Brazilian Investment Promotion Policy 
 Successive Brazilian administrations have pursued largely general and often passive 
approaches to FDI since the mid-1980s.  This pattern did change during the Lula 
administration, when the government began to more vigorously pursue innovation-intensive 
investments and strengthen incentives designed to increase spillovers from FDI.  However, 
even during this more active, discriminating phase of investment promotion policy, 
policymakers were limited by the characteristics of Brazilian institutions.  If we think of 
institutions as the lenses through which policy is refracted, then an analysis of their effects 
becomes possible.  In this section, I demonstrate that institutions have consistently displayed 
characteristics which reduce the potential leverage of the state on multinational firms.  
However, I also note the few cases where institutions have been able to escape these 
dynamics, and why. 
3.2.1 The institutionalist argument applied to Brazil 
What are the most important institutional characteristics that help explain the 
outcomes of investment policy outlined in this chapter?  Characteristics of the Brazilian state 
have reinforced generally passive and indiscriminate investment promotion policies.  There 
are a number of distinct causal mechanisms that run through all the time periods considered 
and consistently reduce state leverage on multinationals.  Table 3.1 identifies these 
institutional mechanisms that have consistently influenced investment.  
75 
 
Table 3.1 Elements of fragmentation in Brazilian investment policy 
 Causes Impact on Investment Policy 
Lack of coordination Difficulty in hiring and firing state 
employees, additive initiatives of past 
administrations, bodies not linked 
directly to the executive, complicated 
oversight structures 
Interpretation of industrial policy 
varies by institution, different 
target sectors, different methods 
of attraction,  lack of 
incorporation into overall 
industrial strategy  
 
Inconsistency Political appointees (lack of institutional 
autonomy) and high turnover in most 
institutions; policy implementation often 
occurs before regulatory framework is 
in place 
Creates confusion and reticence 
among potential investors; 
creates obstacles to realization of 
developmental spillovers from 
investments 
Lack of state-firm 
networks 
Legacies of ISI; delayed response to 
internationalization of production 
Separation of academic and for-
profit spheres, reducing 
innovative spillovers; 
personalistic approach to 
investment 
 
One of the most important barriers to the implementation of a targeted, active 
investment promotion policy has been the sheer number of state agencies focused on 
investment promotion.  Table 3.2 lists the wide variety of institutions with at least some 
investment promotion mandate.  This creates a great deal of redundancy and impairs inter-
institutional coordination42
                                                 
42Complaints about the number of institutional venues for investment promotion were extremely common 
during interviews conducted in São Paulo in 2008 and Brasília in 2009.  Representatives of the MDIC, APEX, 
the MCT, the MRE and the BNDES all made variations on this same point.  One respondent at the BNDES 
pointed out that every ministry seems to have its own investment promotion division.  Each organization has its 
own “niche”, with just enough differentiation from the other institutions to claim legitimacy.  At the same time, 
there is enough overlap in goals that each organization can claim to represent the government in investment 
negotiations (Interview, Victor Burns, BNDES, Brasília, May 2009).  A representative of RENAI, within the 
MDIC, echoed this point.  He claimed that coordination of the diverse investment promotion organs was 
difficult to accomplish in large countries such as Brazil, particularly ones with strong federal systems 
(Interview, General Coordinator of Investments, RENAI, Brasília, June 2009). 
.  In January 2005, the UN conference on trade and development 
released the results of a review of investment policy in Brazil (UNCTAD 2005b).  While the 
results of this survey were positive about Brazil’s investment potential, the organization 




report claimed that many state agencies were not in a position to assume demanding 
investment promotion tasks.  Moreover, the report called for a federal investment promotion 
agency that is capable of enforcing cooperation among other bodies: 
A clear-cut division of tasks between the different actors is needed and can be 
developed so as to avoid duplication of efforts and maximize efficiency in investment 
promotion (UNCTAD 2005b, 94) 
 
As it stands now, there are a number of organizations which seek to influence FDI, 
and a corresponding high level of overlap and territorial behavior.  Many of these 
organizations are focused more generally on economic development, and only partially focus 
on FDI attraction.  Moreover, the institutional character of these different bodies can 
occasionally put them at cross-purposes.  Some ministries or agencies may adopt target 
sectors for investment promotion, while others target different sectors.  In addition to 
agencies like the Brazilian Industrial Development Agency (ABDI) and The Association for 
the Promotion of Exports (APEX), there are the investment promotion efforts of Itamaraty 
(the Ministry of External Relations).  The Ministry for Development, Industry, and Trade 
(MDIC) launched in 2003 its own investment information site, RENAI.  This body is 
integrated with ABDI, and has a somewhat distinct mission focused on information and 
research sharing.  However, its linkages with other ministries and agencies are still 
underdeveloped43
                                                 
43According to representatives from the organization, there was some concern within RENAI about the lack of 
cooperation with other bodies, such as the MRE and BNDES (Interview, General Coordinator of Investments, 
RENAI, Brasília, June 2009). 
.  The Casa Civil has established a Commission on Incentives for Private 
Productive Investments.  Agencies such as APEX have the potential to serve as ‘one stop 
shops’ for investment promotion, but this has not been the case.  In addition to the federal 
bodies, just over half of the states in Brazil have their own investment promotion bodies, 
which vary greatly in resources and linkages to federal organizations (Gregory and Arraes de 
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Oliveira 2005).  Strong federalism and enduring influence for state governors make it likely 
that federally diffuse investment promotion policy will continue.  Finally, autonomous and 
relatively well functioning institutions like the Banco Nacional de Desinvolvimento 
(BNDES) and the Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos (FINEP) often attract the attention of 
firms, which can undermine other bodies. 
Brazilian state institutions are ‘sticky’, in the sense that they tend to hang around long 
past their prime period of effectiveness, which tends to occur shortly after their creation.  
Institutions are often dependent on the support of particular administrations, and after those 
administrations leave office the institution is left behind to ossify into a venue for rent 
seeking or become a simple make-work shop.  Schneider (1991) has documented the 
tendency of Brazilian administrations to carry out their development agendas through the 
addition of institutions, rather than the reform of existing institutions.  This both expands the 
state and creates a rococo bureaucratic structure, where effective implementation becomes 
quite difficult.  This dynamic is clearly evident in the investment promotion policy 
framework.  Even the more recent efforts of the Lula administration to formulate a cohesive 
and discriminating investment policy framework based on innovation and integrated into 
overall industrial policy relied on this strategy of institutional addition. 
Schneider’s (1991, 2004) consideration of bureaucratic careers in Brazil demonstrates 
that many state functionaries change jobs frequently and move often between the private 
sector and government.  This is a factor in another obstacle to the effective implementation of 
active, targeted investment policy: inconsistency.  These kinds of careers not only prohibit 
the development of cohesive bureaucratic units with well-defined goals, they also reinforce 
individual connections between firms and bureaucrats.  While Schneider argues that 
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personalism can under certain circumstances be beneficial for accomplishing the goals of 
organizations, it is less likely to lead to a unified policy approach across organizations.  The 
high turnover within state institutions is particularly pronounced during periods of political 
transition, and this can lead to a dramatic reduction in programmatic policy.  New 
administrations make a large number of political appointees, and this can negatively impact 
bureaucratic independence and continuity44
Inconsistency is a particular problem for investment policy because foreign investors 
place such a premium on the predictability of the institutional environment in host 
countries
.  Moreover, the autonomy of these organizations 
is reduced as they are more likely to see their success as linked to the success of individual 
administrations.  This makes the realization of more long-term goals more difficult.  The 
Brazilian state has had a number of problems with consistency, as evidenced by the histories 
of such organizations as Investe Brasil and Itamaraty’s investment promotion division, 
detailed in this chapter. 
45
                                                 
44Samuels (2003, 16) cites a 1996 study which claimed that the Brazilian president had the power to make 
19,600 political appointments, whereas the US president makes less than 5,000. 
.  Foreign firms want to know that they will face the same requirements and enjoy 
the same incentives over an extended period of time.  Many firm respondents in interviews 
conducted for this study indicated that consistency was perhaps even more important than the 
generosity of incentives in determining the likelihood of investment and the flexibility of 
their own investment models.  In the cross-national regressions in chapter six, policy 
 
45Policy and institutional consistency often appear as some of the most important investment determinants in 
surveys of multinational firms, such as the World Bank’s Doing Business Abroad series.  Similarly, recent 
academic works argue consistency matters.  Büthe and Milner (2008) argue that bilateral investment treaties 
serve as a signaling mechanism for foreign investors, assuring them of policy stability.  Many of the debates 
about political regime types and foreign investment (Jensen 2003; Li and Resnick 2003; Oneal 1994) revolve 




predictability emerges as a strong predictor of innovation and export activity among 
multinational firms in developing countries. 
Another impediment to an active, discriminating investment policy is the lack of 
established state-firm networks.  The Brazilian state is simply not tightly enmeshed in 
international production networks, and this presents problems for the implementation of 
investment policy46.  As one interview respondent put it, investment promotion institutions 
and multinational firms “do not know how to talk to one another”47
                                                 
46Goldstein and Schneider (2004) note that during the economic transformation of the 1990s, foreign ownership 
expanded in a variety of sectors at the expense of family and government ownership.  However, family 
ownership remained strong among some of the largest Brazilian firms. It follows quite naturally that the state 
would be less embedded with these new multinational arrivals. 
.  Much of this has to do 
with the legacies of ISI: despite the tripé model of industrial development, the ISI model had 
the net effect of distancing state institutions from international production networks.  The 
Brazilian computer industry, for example, operated in protected isolation during the ‘market 
reserve’ period of the 1980s, and Brazilian firms found that they could not compete on the 
international marketplace once liberalization was underway.  While the state and domestic 
computer firms had a close relationship based on the cooperative effort to create a domestic 
IT industry (Nelson 1995), the lack of connections between the state and firms in the 
multinational IT firms was harmful for international competitiveness.  Institutional 
representatives attempting to exert leverage on a foreign firm in Brazil often have difficulty 
understanding what the firm needs or wants, or how a particular regulation will impact their 
production model. 
 




Table 3.2 Current federal agencies with investment promotion mandates 
 Brief Description Ministry Affiliation FDI Mandate 
Agência Brasileira de 
Promoção de Exportações 
e Investimentos (APEX) 
Promotion of Brazilian 
exports, focusing on 
small and medium-size 
companies, represents 
Brazil at world trade 
forums 
MDIC Has investment 
promotion division, 
focused on encouraging 
Brazilian exports 
Conselho Nacional de 
Desenvolvimento 
Industrial (CNDI) 
Part of PDP industrial 
policy: council of high-
level ministerial 
officials and private 
sector representatives 
MDIC Propose investment 
projects to President 
Agencia Brasileira de 
Desenvolvimento 
Industrial (ABDI) 
Flagship institution for 
PDP industrial policy; 
coordination of various 
development initiatives 
MDIC Attract investments 
from abroad and 
integrates them into 
industrial policy 
(PITCE/PDP) 
Rede Nacional de 
Informações sobre 
Investimento (RENAI) 
Created to disseminate 
information about 
potential productive 
investments in Brazil 
MDIC Provide information on 
investment regulations 
and opportunities to 
firms 
Banco Nacional do 
Desinvolvimento 
(BNDES) 
Main financing agent 
for development 
projects in Brazil 
MDIC (nominal) Has lent to foreign 
firms since 1991, has 
specific funding lines 
for innovation and 
export 





MCT Lends to multinational 
firms on the condition 
they demonstrate 
innovation in Brazil 
Programa Nacional de 
Capacitação de Recursos 
Humanos para o 
Desenvolvimento 
Tecnológico (RHAE) 
Awards financing to 
educated individuals 
who move to the 
private sector, 
particularly small and 
medium enterprises 
MCT (through CNPq) Encourages migration 
of Brazilian academics 




Sistema de Promoção de 
Investimentos (SIPRI) 
Works through Setores 
de Promoção 
Comercial (SECOMs) 
abroad to attract FDI to 
Brazil 




especially those with 
the potential for 
technology transfer 




Mainwaring (1997, 1999) has noted the weaknesses of Brazilian political parties and 
the lack of programmatic connection with constituents, stemming partly from open list 
proportional representation.  The absence of strong parties (with the exception of the PT) is 
not conducive to either a sustained investment promotion strategy or strong institutions.  
Individual bureaucrats and high ranking officials (including presidents) within 
administrations often resort to personalistic execution of policy when they cannot discipline 
fractious parties or assemble durable coalitions.  In the context of investment policy, this 
often means that negotiations occur between a firm and an individual, not between firms and 
institutions (networking).  The individual, whether he or she is the Finance Minister or the 
head of another state agency, can bypass the larger goals of the investment or industrial 
policy or instead concentrate on the needs of his or her particular organization.  This also 
reinforces rent-seeking tendencies.  Even in the institutions that accompanied Lula’s 
industrial policy initiatives, personalistic relationships between policymakers and firms 
remained48
This distance between firms and state institutions is perhaps best illustrated in state 
attempts to encourage innovation among multinationals during the Lula administration.  
While previous administrations have made some effort to encourage innovative activity 
among multinational firms in Brazil, innovation was the main focus of Lula’s industrial 
policies.  This corresponds with a more selective approach to FDI, as the administration 
prioritized (and incentivized) investments with the potential to lead to innovative spillovers.  
However, this focus was hampered by the lack of strong connections between academic 
. 
                                                 
48One former head of the Central Bank characterized the Lula administration’s attitude toward foreign investors 
as the personalization of economic agents, almost at the firm level, at the expense of broad policy (Interview, 




institutions and firms in Brazil (both national and foreign).  Traditionally, the academic and 
private sector have operated in different orbits.  Academic research with practical or 
commercial application has been rarer in Brazil than in other developing countries, as chapter 
four demonstrates.  Researchers at state universities often operate in isolation from the 
private sector, and patent policy is underdeveloped.  There are some signs this is changing, 
particularly in the context of the new industrial policies49.  However, these types of linkages 
between the private sector and academia have been few and far between in Brazil, with some 
notable exceptions50
The lack of contact between universities and the private sector is part of a larger 
dynamic whereby public-private interaction is limited to very specific circumstances.  The 
fragmentation of the bureaucratic structure makes it difficult to mount large initiatives and 
policy frameworks that require coordination across institutions.  Whereas individuals may be 
well connected with multinationals, institutions are not.  Furthermore, when initiatives are 
well-designed the lack of firm-state connections makes it difficult to communicate them to 
firms that might be affected or even benefit.  In a recent evaluation of new innovation 
incentives conducted by the National Association of Innovative Firms (ANPEI 2009), less 
than half of the firms surveyed used innovation incentives for which they were eligible.  The 
study suggested a number of reasons why this was the case, including a lack of awareness of 
the incentives themselves, a lack of potential advantages from incentives, a lack of awareness 
.   
                                                 
49Two recent legal frameworks outlined in this chapter, the Lei do Bem and the Lei de Inovação, contain 
incentives for increasing academic partnership with domestic and foreign firms. 
 
50The University of Campinas in São Paulo state has been particularly successful at establishing R&D links with 
private capital.  The university now operates 250 partnership agreements with companies such as Bayer, 
Motorola, and Compaq  (UNCTAD 2005b). 
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of potential advantages from the incentives, and an inability to fulfill the requirements of the 
incentives51
To conclude, it is important to point out that these impediments to institutional 
efficacy do not have isolated impacts on firm investment profiles; they complement one 
another and often demonstrate an additive effect.  That is, the lack of state-firm networks 
may be compounded by institutional inconsistency.  These three characteristics of Brazilian 
institutions decrease state leverage on firm investment models.  The presence of any one of 
the three institutional weaknesses identified in this section can torpedo investment promotion 
policy, though they do tend to appear in groups. 
. 
3.2.2 Pockets of efficiency and their determinants 
While the characteristics outlined above have undermined state leverage on 
multinational firms since the 1980s, there are a number of Brazilian institutions that have 
managed to escape the pull of rent-seeking and emerge as autonomous agents.  These 
institutions also typically avoid the three characteristics outlined above.  While some of these 
institutions have a broader mandate than foreign investment promotion, it is important to 
acknowledge these institutional successes and examine how they occurred.  Barbara Geddes 
(1990; 1994) argued that beginning in the 1950s, administration officials frustrated with 
institutional roadblocks within the Brazilian bureaucracy made a conscious decision to 
establish institutions outside the traditional bureaucracy yet connected to the executive.  
These institutions were created by executive decree on an ad hoc basis, and had no linkages 
                                                 
51This survey was carried out for 38 firms of various size and in a number of different sectors.  All firms were 
eligible for incentives, and were asked if they had taken advantage of any of nine specific initiatives in the past 
three years.  The survey noted that larger multinational firms were more likely to be able to take advantage of 
the incentives, as many of them had the firm infrastructure to comply with governmental requirements. 
However, the survey also noted that many of these larger firms had many alternate incentives available outside 
Brazil, and that Brazilian incentives often suffered in comparison (ANPEI 2009, 79-82). 
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to either the legislature or traditional bureaucracy.  These ‘pockets of efficiency’ eventually 
became meritocratically staffed.  Geddes holds up the BNDES as the prime example of such 
an institution.  Though the BNDES started out with limited resources and was dependent on 
the executive branch, it quickly established itself as an authority on Brazilian economic 
analysis.  While it was not particularly influential and largely used for patronage purposes 
during the Vargas presidency, the BNDES became one of the driving institutions behind 
Kubitschek’s Plano de Metas industrial policy.  Kubitschek was able to secure a constant 
source of funding for the body, not requiring yearly congressional approval52
Though Geddes was primarily concerned with institutions as they related to 
development plans, her logic can be applied to institutions charged with investment 
promotion as well.  What then, determines whether an institution becomes a ‘pocket of 
efficiency’, when so many others display the characteristics outlined in the previous section?  
First, as Geddes points out, the institutions must have consistent political and financial 
support.  Secondly, pockets of efficiency in Brazil tend to operate autonomously.  Though 
they may be connected to one ministry or another, they typically have little oversight from 
congress or other parts of the bureaucracy.  Third, pockets of efficiency only emerge with 
time.  They develop reputations for independence and apolitical operation.  They develop an 
espirit de corps based on results-based promotion and clearly defined responsibilities.  
.  The BNDES, 
along with the similarly insulated and now defunct grupos executivos, became effective 
agents for industrial policy, though they subsequently backslid into patronage during the 
Goulart administration.   
                                                 
52According to Geddes (1994, 63), Kubitschek accomplished this through imposing surtaxes on various 
industries, such as petroleum imports, railway fares, maritime freight, etc.  These revenues went straight to the 
BNDES, and were never included in the federal budget. Therefore they did not require congressional approval. 
Kubitschek also persuaded congress to extend the surtaxes on individuals and corporations for an additional ten 
years, in order to finance his development projects. 
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Fourth, and this refers specifically to institutions charged with investment promotion, they 
are perceived to have a high degree of competence and expertise by foreign firms.  If this is 
the case, their leverage on firm activity can be quite substantial.   
In the investment promotion framework, there are a number of institutions which can 
be identified as pockets of efficiency.  The BNDES continues to operate with great 
effectiveness.  Since 1991, it has lent to multinational firms in Brazil in pursuit of 
developmental goals53.  In interviews conducted for this study, firms consistently identified 
the BNDES as a responsive institution.  Moreover, the BNDES demonstrates all the 
characteristics outlined above.  Another institution which is quite influential with foreign 
firms, particularly in the IT sector, is FINEP.  FINEP is an institutional outgrowth of the 
BNDES, though now it operates within the Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT).  
FINEP has built up a reputation over the last decade of competence and independence from 
patronage politics.  Though its budget is much smaller than that of the BNDES, the 
institution has been able to operate independently and secure continuous (and increasing) 
funding54
Both the BNDES and FINEP, the primary examples of pockets of efficiency in 
investment promotion, display the characteristics outlined above.  While the BNDES and 
FINEP operate under the nominal supervision of the MDIC and MCT, respectively, they are 
effectively independent.  Both have substantial funding commitments, and FINEP’s has 
grown considerably over the past ten years.  Most importantly, both are regarded positively 
.  Section 3.3.5 details the evolution of FINEP and the ingredients of its success. 
                                                 
53In 2008, the BNDES disbursed US$49.8 billion to Brazilian and multinational firms. 74 percent of these 
disbursements, or roughly US$37.1 billion, went to large firms, many of which were multinationals (BNDES 
2009). 
 




by multinational firms.  In the 27 firm interviews conducted for this study, these institutions 
emerged most often as the ones with positive evaluations, as chapters four and five 
demonstrate. 
Besides BNDES and FINEP, there are few other institutions which operate as pockets 
of efficiency.  It is too early to tell whether the ABDI, the institutional focal point for Lula’s 
renewed industrial policy created in 2005, will emerge with a similar institutional ethos.  
Much will depend on the actions of the Rousseff administration.  But these kinds of 
institutions have been the exception in the Brazilian state apparatus.  They are much more 
likely to extract developmental benefits from multinational firms than other parts of the 
bureaucracy, as they operate on clearly defined principles and avoid rent-seeking. 
3.3 Brazilian Investment Policy: An Historical Perspective 
 The recovery from the debt crisis of the 1980s, the taming of inflation, and the 
gradual dismantling of the Import Substitution Industrialization model in Brazil resulted in a 
massive inflow of foreign investment in the 1990s.  However, it would be wrong to infer that 
FDI did not occupy a prominent place in the Brazilian economy before the 1980s.  Indeed, 
when viewing the postwar period as a whole, the contraction of foreign investment in the 
1980s is an aberration.  Foreign firms have long been an important part of Brazil’s economic 
model.  In the 1950s, the relative lack of domestic capital led successive administrations to 
seek out foreign investment as a means to pursue ambitious development schemes.  These 
investments were typically constrained by ISI tools such as domestic content requirements 
and tariffs.  Brazil nevertheless realized investment in a large variety of sectors as part of 
successive industrial policies. 
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3.3.1 The role of foreign capital in the era of import substitution 
The política de portas abertas, or ‘open doors policy’ that accompanied Juscelino 
Kubitschek’s Programa de Metas development plan contained a number of incentives for 
foreign investment.  These incentives resulted in a large influx of FDI in the second half of 
the 1950s.  Tariffs on imports of industrial goods remained in place, as they had since the 
Estado Novo of the Vargas era.  However, the Kubitschek administration offered numerous 
subsidies and tax exemptions for foreign firms if they would set up productive capacity 
within Brazil.  The Superintendência da Moeda e do Crédito (SUMOC)’s Instruction 113, 
which predated Kubitschek from the last year of the Café Filho presidency, implemented 
attractive tax exemptions on profit remission and subsidized imports of capital goods 
(Geddes 1994, 71-72).  These incentives had a strong effect on the participation of foreign 
capital in the country.  FDI stock, which until 1950 had totaled only US$307.1 million, 
surged to $956.3 million by 1960 (Zanatta 2006, 118).  Many of these new investments were 
in effect ‘tariff-hopping’ investments made by manufacturers (such as foreign auto 
companies) hoping to access the growing Brazilian consumer market, and willing to accept 
partnerships with Brazilian firms.  The industrial policy in place at the time called for foreign 
capital, but as a means to the end of increasing the efficiency and output of domestic 
industry.  Consequently, the investments were almost always met with numerous domestic 
content requirements and other restrictions.  FDI in the Kubitschek era was an integral part of 
industrial policy, but it was used most often as a source of capital goods that were not 
accessible elsewhere. 
Foreign investment in Brazil decreased in the early 1960s, as the country grappled 
with political uncertainty during the Quadros and Goulart administrations.  Representing 
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political constituencies more hostile to foreign investment, Goulart had less interest in 
continuing the more centrist policies of Kubitschek’s Social Democratic Party (PSD).  
Goulart spent much of his administration preoccupied with the powerful opposition National 
Democratic Union (UDN), as the succession crisis prompted by Quadros’s unexpected 
resignation had deepened political polarization.  Even after the military coup of 1964, 
investment did not return immediately to Brazil.  Firms were initially reluctant to make new 
investments in a country demonstrating such political instability.  Inflation was not brought 
under control until 1968; this added to investment disincentives for most of the decade. 
Goulart had initially taken numerous steps to assure foreign investors in Brazil of his 
benign intentions, even making a conciliatory speech in Washington in 1961. But the 
circumstances of his ascension to power, and the delicate constitutional maneuvering that 
allowed the restoration of presidential democracy in 1963 did little to assure investors.  
Moreover, Goulart sent conflicting signals about Brazil’s investment environment during his 
term.  Goulart’s speech in March 1964, which promised eventual nationalization of oil 
refineries in Brazil, was met with particular opposition by international business55
 Beyond these political developments, however, there were other causes of changing 
investment patterns and investment policy evolution from the 1950s to the 1960s.  In 
particular, the differences in institutional strength and consistency between the Kubitschek 
era and the Goulart period provide solid explanatory leverage for patterns of policy and 
investment.  Geddes (1994) proposes that the contrast between Kubitschek and Goulart 
depended also on the different approaches the two took towards developmental institutions.  
. 
                                                 
55By this time, Goulart had come under increasing pressure from the Brazilian workers party (PTB) to move 
decisively to the left.  Despite having assembled a multiparty coalition, Goulart could not manage the diverse 




In this interpretation, Kubitschek was able to pursue developmental policies without regard 
to sectoral opposition (or perhaps using the power of persuasion to change that opposition) 
through the creation of meritocratically-staffed organizations autonomous from the state 
bureaucracy.  Goulart, constrained by the need to maintain a fragile coalition, was more 
willing to use these institutions to reward cronies with positions of power and therefore 
reinforce patronage.  Kubitschek insulated developmental agencies from clientelistic 
pressures, whereas Goulart reinforced patronage networks and ultimately undermined the 
possibility of an autonomous industrial policy56
To reduce the causes of the Kubitschek and Goulart administrations’ policies towards 
foreign investment to a simple centrist versus leftist dichotomy would be a mistake.  
Certainly there were elements of Goulart’s party that did not support the Kubitschek 
administration’s incentives programs for FDI, or remained overtly hostile to foreign firms.  
Kubitschek’s electoral alliance of the PSD and PTB also allowed the administration to 
neutralize the far left.  However, the approach to institutions adopted by both administrations 
also had an effect, both on the nature of investment policy and resulting patterns of foreign 
investment.  Kubitschek resurrected many of the corporatist institutions of the Vargas era and 
.  This logic is easily extended to the 
institutional determinants of investment I have outlined.  The lack of party support in effect 
compelled Goulart to use the BNDES and other organizations as patronage networks.  This 
also undermined institutional consistency, as previously insulated pockets of efficiency were 
redirected by Goulart. 
                                                 
56Geddes acknowledges that Kubitschek’s expansion of the bureaucracy allowed opportunities for later 
clientelistic networks to emerge, but maintains that Kubitschek was more successful in diluting patronage 
networks with meritocratic and independent appointments.  Part of the explanation for the economic stagnation 
during Goulart’s term, therefore, lies in “his attempt to return previously insulated sectors of the bureaucracy to 




infused them with cash and técnicos57
 The two decades between the mid-1960s and mid-1980s represent a period of 
authoritarian regression and gradual democratization in Brazil.  Opposition political parties 
were outlawed during this period, save for the military’s token acknowledgment of the 
Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB).  This organization became much more important 
during the redemocratization project of the 1980s, but the absence of real political parties 
during this time poses some different questions regarding the role of the state in encouraging 
investment.  Successive military administrations were sympathetic to the needs of foreign 
investors, and foreign capital played a large part in the Brazilian ‘economic miracle’ of 1968 
to 1973.  However, foreign investment in Brazil was tightly controlled by the military 
regime.  Especially in the late 1970s, the military used foreign investment as a source of 
technology and capital goods.  However, the emphasis was placed on the development of 
.  Institutions like the BNDES provided loans on 
favorable terms to foreign investors, as part of a coherent industrial policy that emphasized 
foreign capital.  While older systems of patronage did not disappear, they were accompanied 
by a new set of autonomous institutions which worked in coordinated fashion and neutralized 
rent-seeking activity.  By the time Goulart assumed the presidency, however, many of the 
pockets of efficiency had been moving towards patronage politics.  Goulart actively 
encouraged this trend.  Even if Goulart had maintained an emphasis on attracting foreign 
investment, the economic and political instability at the time made it unlikely that high 
investment rates would continue. 
                                                 
57Benevides (1979) argues that the successes of the Kubitschek era were largely due to development plans 
channeled through existing, insulated organizations such as the BNDES and SUMOC, and the sectoral and 
executive working groups set up by the administration.  Many of these organizations were able to avoid 
clientelistic demands or subdue them. 
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domestic firms, with the state and multinationals providing the other two parts of what Evans 
(1979) has termed the developmental tripé. 
 Upon assuming power, the military regime in 1964 and 1965 modified Law 4131, 
originally adopted in 1962 and known as the profit remittance law. This change reduced 
restrictions on reinvestments of profits obtained by foreign firms in Brazil and allowed both 
domestic firms (and eventually domestic banks) to borrow directly from foreign banks, 
making foreign borrowing and investment much more accessible.  The law also contained 
incentives for technology transfer, such as favorable tax treatment for royalties and technical 
assistance fees (French 1982, 149).  FDI did increase dramatically following the tumult of the 
early 60s, moving from $1.81 billion in stock at the end of 1965 to $8.02 billion at the end of 
1974 (Nonnenberg 2003, 7)58
 The second half of the 1970s witnessed a dramatic shift, both in the military’s 
approach to multinational firms and in its overall industrial policy.  The second national 
development plan (II PND) was a hugely ambitious effort to develop strategic sectors of 
Brazil’s economy.  This was the era of the projetos faraônicos (projects of the pharaohs), 
grandiose and highly visible projects such as the Rio-Niteroi bridge and a number of 
hydroelectric dams.  These massive public works were directed by the state, and some were 
undertaken in partnership with multinational firms.  Despite somewhat favorable relations 
between the military and multinational firms, however, the Geisel administration placed 
more emphasis on the development of domestic industrial capacity.  Brazilian firms had 
access to special drawing rights, such as Fundo 157.  Foreign investment was courted in 
.   
                                                 
58However, Law 4131 made it easy for even multinationals to borrow from banks inside and outside Brazil 
(most commonly directly from Euromarkets), as opposed to simply increasing transfers from the parent 
company.  Thus, it is likely that the already high FDI figures do not truly represent the enormous productive 




some sectors and avoided or outright limited in others59
 The joint venture model involving a three-way collaboration among the state, 
subsidized Brazilian companies, and foreign firms was widespread during this period.  
Typically, state bodies would coordinate the partnership and provide a focal point for 
negotiation with foreign firms.  Multinationals could draw funds from the BNDES and its 
subsidiary bodies, even given that institution’s then strong focus on domestic firms.  The 
military regime focused on and tightly controlled ownership equity among the partners, 
rarely allowing majority control for foreign firms in priority sectors.  It was assumed that 
majority ownership for domestic firms and/or the state would translate into more 
developmental benefits, such as upgrading to non-traditional products.  The transfer of 
technology was particularly emphasized, and domestic content requirements were a common 
feature of investment deals struck during this period.  Therefore, in considering the dramatic 
expansion of FDI in the 1970s it should be emphasized that the policy regime governing 
investment was far from permissive.  The II PND emphasized foreign capital as an essential 
ingredient, but one that had to be managed selectively by state organs. 
.  The use of FDI was to be strategic, 
and especially discouraged in areas of the economy where it might reduce autonomous 
security capabilities. 
 The failure of the ISI model in the early 1980s is a topic too large to address in this 
context, but it is quite evident that the industrial policies pursued by the Brazilian state in the 
late 1970s were unsustainable in the long run, and particularly in the face of increasing 
interest rates for national debt and the economic crisis of the early 1980s.  This is true even in 
                                                 
59Nonnenberg (2003, 8), working from the 1975 development plan, observes that investments were incentivized 
in minerals mining, electronics, communications, and hotels.  They were discouraged or prohibited in energy, 
petroleum, ports, railroads, maritime navigation, and steel (among others).  When multinationals were allowed 
to invest, they were admitted in such a fashion as to promote an “equilibrium” among private national 
companies, multinationals, and the state. 
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the narrower category of FDI, where substitution of capital goods for manufactured imports 
continued balance of payments problems.  There were a number of institutional and political 
factors that exacerbated the problems of the investment policy contained in II PND.  The 
institutions which had worked well as independent entities in the Kubitschek era, such as the 
BNDES, were more beholden to interest group manipulation during the military period.  
While opposition politicians were not an immediate threat, the military did not grant 
independence to institutions charged with the attraction of foreign investment.  Moreover, a 
number of institutions such as the National Development Council (CDI) developed 
clientelistic tendencies and served as vehicles for personalistic connections between military 
administration staffers and firms, in keeping with other models of bureaucratic 
authoritarianism.  The eventual president of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 
characterized the relationships between business leaders and members of the authoritarian 
government as ‘bureaucratic rings’, within which highly personalized and diffuse bargaining 
would take place between individuals60.  There were no centralized institutions dedicated to 
investment promotion, just as there were no economy-wide noncorporatist peak 
organizations for business.  Suzigan and Furtado (1996, 14-15) identify two key institutional 
faults of the II PND, in addition to its economic shortcomings61
                                                 
60Cited in Schneider (2004, 108). 
.  Regulatory intervention 
from state bodies was excessive, encouraging informal market reserves and eliminating 
competition on price.  Also harmful was a lack of inter-institutional coordination and 
sequencing of policies, which resulted in a spread of rent-seeking activities among firms both 
 
61The economic policy problems that accumulated in the late 1970s, as described by Suzigan and Furtado, were 
excessive protectionism with no phasing out period to encourage competition, lack of emphasis on exporting, 
de-emphasis on innovation in relation to production, and over-generous subsidies to firms. 
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national and foreign.  Even the military, it appears, had difficulty enforcing coordination 
among institutions. 
3.3.2 Crisis and attempts at reform, 1980-1990 
 In the 1980s, foreign investment in Brazil contracted significantly, as the debt crisis 
scaled back firm ambitions in the entire region.  Large and heavily indebted quasi-state 
enterprises had become locked in a self-perpetuating cycle with domestic supplier firms, 
whereby increasing foreign debt financed expansion of domestic demand and production.  As 
the supply of foreign capital threatened to dry up in 1979, the military government was 
forced to raise interest rates in order to attract capital and perpetuate the borrowing.  Rising 
public sector debt set in motion a variety of policy measures that put Brazil through the worst 
recession in postwar history.  The government cut public spending programs dramatically to 
free up funds to service the debt, while at the same time engineering a series of devaluations 
to the cruzeiro to increase the supply of foreign exchange through more competitive exports.  
This did little to resume lending, and by mid-1982, foreign credit was almost completely 
unavailable.  The government was forced to raise interest rates yet again to find funds in 
domestic financial markets. 
The recession also had immediate political impact.  Though the transition to 
democracy had begun in earnest during the Geisel administration, the economic crisis and 
poor management by the military regime greatly hastened the transition and emboldened pro-
democratic movements.  As Frieden (1987) notes, the military regime had lost not only the 
support of workers, but of domestic business leaders as well62
                                                 
62Frieden (1987, 119) points to a survey of businessmen in 1980 that asked them to rate the performance of the 
country’s then chief economic policymaker, Antônio Delfim Netto. The responses were 69 percent “excellent” 
or “good”, and 5 percent “bad” or “awful” (the rest were “OK”).  By 1983, those same percentages had changed 
to 12 percent positive and 60 percent negative. 
.  The landslide victories of the 
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democratic opposition in the 1982 legislative elections pointed to a broad coalition in favor 
of democratization, which came two years and four months later in March 1985.   
The economic crisis had a profound impact on policy towards foreign investment as 
well, though the political transition made a unified approach to FDI more difficult.  The debt 
crisis and its aftermath set in motion a chain of events that would gradually lead to the 
dismantling of the ISI model in Brazil.  Partly because the military regime had become 
associated with an unsustainable economic model, an interventionist industrial policy known 
as such would not reappear until the Lula administration.  In the immediate aftermath of the 
crisis and political transition, the democratically elected Sarney administration was much 
more concerned with stabilizing the economy and ending inflation than putting in place a 
sustainable investment promotion policy framework, and little consensus existed on what 
role foreign investment should play in the new economic model63
The military government had entered into an agreement with the International 
Monetary Fund in 1982, and the IMF leaned on the Sarney administration to reduce 
restrictions on foreign investment.  However, the administration elected to pursue a 
heterodox economic policy that froze prices, moved public funds away from the large 
industrial projects favored by the military regime, and prioritized fighting inflation.  The 
short-lived cruzado currency plan was initially successful, but the administration’s reluctance 
to make timely adjustments and excessive demand renewed inflation by 1986.  The renewal 
of democracy in Brazil did not, therefore, induce a new confidence among international 
.  The 1988 constitution, a 
detailed document with respect to business regulation, did little to allay fears of 
expropriation.  The constitution contained provisions which barred foreign firms from 
investing in many of the potentially most lucrative sectors of the economy.   
                                                 
63Sarney was the vice presidential candidate for Tancredo Neves, who died before he could assume office.   
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investors.  Instead, firms remained reluctant to invest in a country where inflation remained a 
stubborn problem.  Indeed, it would take another decade after the democratic transition for 
FDI to rebound in earnest. 
With regard to domestic institutions, the 1980s presented several problems for 
attracting FDI.  Of course, the economic crisis presented a severe disincentive for investment, 
and the political transition created a great deal of uncertainty for prospective investors.  The 
flow of FDI to Brazil slowed to a trickle during the 1980s, as one would expect.  In terms of 
the institutional characteristics outlined in table 3.1, we can identify a lack of institutional 
consistency as a prominent feature of the decade, for obvious reasons.  The crumbling 
political support for the military regime in the first half of the decade also certainly played a 
role in low investment rates.  If institutions had displayed consistent, coordinated, and 
networked characteristics during the 1980s, it is highly unlikely that these institutional 
characteristics would have overcome the economic climate to attract new investments.  
However, the absence of these qualities certainly did not help. 
3.3.3 Reform and stagnation, 1990-1994 
 The long duration of the economic crisis and ineffective government attempts to 
control inflation provided the perfect political environment for Fernando Collor de Mello.  
Hailing from the remote northeastern state of Alagoas, and with little support in established 
political parties, Collor mounted an overwhelming television-based campaign for the 
presidency in 1989.  His campaign was directed against the record of Sarney, the corporatist 
state apparatus, and indeed the Brazilian party system.  The party he formed in 1989, the 
National Reconstruction Party (PRN), was a glorified electoral vehicle.  Once in power in 
1990, Collor governed through a rough mix of authoritative decrees and patronage.  
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Members of the established party groups initially worked with Collor, especially the 
Democratic Social Party (PDS) and the Liberal Front Party (PFL).  However, the coalition 
was unstable and the PFL eventually broke with Collor in the hopes of restraining his 
initiatives.  This and pervasive corruption led to Collor’s eventual impeachment in December 
199264
 Despite the short duration of the Collor presidency and its inability to stop inflation 
long-term, the period was a consequential one for investment policy and economic reform in 
general.  Collor pursued an unusual mix of populist rhetoric and neoliberal reform, with some 
important heterodox exceptions
. 
65.  In direct confrontation with previous development 
models, he pursued trade and investment liberalization in a number of sectors.  The 
administration also encouraged the emergence of new business associations such as the 
National Thinking of Entrepreneurial Bases (PNBE) and the more developmentalist Institute 
of Studies for Industrial Development (IEDI), which challenged the dominance of long-
standing corporatist institutions such as the Foundation of Industry for the State of São Paulo 
(FIESP)66
 Though there was little new FDI during this time, the Collor years did establish a 
foundation for later privatization and liberalization efforts during the Cardoso administration.  
The Collor administration (and the Franco placeholder administration after Collor’s 
.  The overall thrust of policy change was to modernize the economy, privatize 
state-owned enterprises, and expose domestic firms to international competition.  
Unsurprisingly, this generated a great deal of resistance among import-competing 
manufacturers and state-supported industry. 
                                                 
64See Weyland (1993) for an in-depth investigation of the political determinants of Collor’s rise and fall. 
 
65Collor’s wage freeze in 1991 was naturally unpopular and contradicted campaign pledges. 
  
66Interview, Emerson Kapaz (former head of PNBE), Sâo Paulo March 2008 
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impeachment) attempted to negotiate agreements for the mutual protection and promotion of 
investments (APPRIs).  These agreements were not ratified by the legislature, but they 
signified an attempt to break with previous restrictions on foreign capital.  More significant 
still was the agreement in March 1991 that created Mercosul.  The agreement moved a 
number of multinational firms operating in Brazil to begin rationalizing their production 
models to best take advantage of the larger market.  Although the inflationary environment 
meant that this agreement was followed by only a modest increase in FDI, the eventual 
currency stabilization in 1994 would complement Mercosul and both would provide 
powerful indirect incentives toward investment. 
 The Collor period also witnessed an assault on some longstanding ISI institutions.  
The administration successfully ended the market reserve policy in the informatics sector, 
which is discussed more extensively in chapter four.  This policy had kept many 
multinational IT companies from investing in Brazil, and had supported a number of 
indigenous hardware and software firms.  The administration also put in place a number of 
general policies more favorable to international firms, some of which are outlined in Canuto 
(1993): 
- Authorization in 1991 that multinationals could send more royalties to their central 
offices, and that taxes on these remittances would be lowered 
- Central bank registration for capital dividends resulting from FDI remittances 
- BNDES funding for foreign firms after 1991 
- Reduction in the power of the national industrial property institute (INPI), which had 




In terms of direct investment promotion, the Collor administration increased the 
resources of Itamaraty (the Ministry of External Relations or MRE) to recruit new investors.  
Itamaraty, also operating with funding from the Inter-American Development Bank, began 
fortifying trade promotion bureaus (SECOMs) at Brazilian embassies worldwide, which 
would function as ‘antennae’ for possible foreign investments.  The model operated under the 
assumption that interested firms would first establish contact with these organizations in their 
home countries, at which point Itamaraty could become involved and direct the investment67
Collor’s tenure marked a clear attempted departure from the industrial policy of the 
military regime.  Intent on circumventing old corporatist institutions and establishing a new 
.  
This conception of investment promotion bodies as ‘marriage agencies’ would be duplicated 
in subsequent administrations, with varying results.  The SECOMs remain operational today, 
though they vary greatly in terms of resources.  Itamaraty eventually complemented the 
SECOM structure with the Investment Promotion and Technology Transfer System for 
Companies (SIPRI) within the trade promotion department.  This body serves as an 
information point for foreign companies, and now operates a web portal at BrazilTradeNet.  
However, it has limited funding and a small staff.  Moreover, the technology transfer system 
has not been explicitly linked to a set of policies to realize that goal among multinational 
firms.  This is an excellent example of an investment promotion body that was set up within 
an institution and once its political sponsor had disappeared, evolved into an ineffective 
body.  This demonstrates the principle of inconsistency and adds to the problem of 
coordination, as these SECOMs are an additional location for idiosyncratic investment 
promotion policy. 
                                                 




economic model based on the (selective) use of neoliberal principles, Collor attempted 
dramatic reform and accomplished some of his objectives.  Collor worked closely with the 
BNDES to begin the national program of “destatization”, known as the PND, in 1990.  This 
was the first sustained, organized attempt to privatize state owned and quasi-state enterprises 
since the debt crisis.  The program bore some fruit, particularly in the steel sector (Montero 
1998).  Collor was able to convince a number of business leaders and even some labor 
groups that privatization would improve the industrial competitiveness of Brazilian steel, and 
set strict parameters for the privatization process so as to avoid injuring these groups’ 
interests.  The BNDES became a particularly influential institutional architect of the PND, a 
role that it continued during the much larger privatization episodes of the Cardoso 
administration.  The PND outlasted the Collor government and continued into the Franco 
administration. 
Collor succeeded in challenging stagnant developmental models.  However, there 
were numerous institutional factors that limited the transformation.  Given the lack of a party 
support base or coalition, Collor ran into strong political headwinds upon assuming office.  
Even supposed political allies, such as the PFL, eventually abandoned him (Weyland 1993).  
He had made little effort to create a center-right party or coalition while in office.  This lack 
of party support aided an already authoritarian style and necessarily encouraged the liberal 
use of patronage.  This in turn reinforced personalistic connections between business leaders 
and state bodies, which hampered the emergence of a coherent investment policy framework.  
It also made corruption more likely, which ultimately proved to be the administration’s 
undoing.  The lack of political support, in other words, severely undercut institutional 
coherence in investment promotion.  It is true that Collor’s efforts to introduce a new 
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economic model and encourage investment were handicapped by persistent inflation, which 
did not respond in the long-term to the administration’s wage freezes or other austerity 
measures.  However, macroeconomic patterns were not the only things holding back 
investment in Brazil.  Institutional characteristics were also important during this period. 
3.3.4 The return of FDI, 1994-2002  
 Itamar Franco, Collor’s vice president, formally assumed office at the end of 1992 
after Collor’s impeachment.  Franco did not share Collor’s enthusiasm for neoliberal reform.  
However, Franco spent much of his brief term in office contending with hyperinflation that 
reached 2,400 percent in 1993.  Franco’s finance minister, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 
assembled an economic team which finally succeeded in stopping inflation in 1994 through 
the introduction of a new currency, the Real68
                                                 
68For an overview of the Plano Real, see Franco (1995), particularly chapter 2, and Sachs and Zini Jr. (1996).  
.  The importance of a stable currency from 
1994 on in Brazil is difficult to over-estimate, both in terms of its political impact and its 
effect on FDI.  Table 3.3 demonstrates the marked increase in FDI flows after 1994 
compared to the previous period.  It dramatically changed the political fortunes of Cardoso, 




Table 3.3 Brazilian inward FDI flows, 1985-2009 (millions US$) 
 
Source: Central bank of Brazil (www.bancocentral.gov.br) 
 
Both of Cardoso’s terms in office were extremely consequential in terms of economic 
reform69
                                                 
69Cardoso was permitted to run again after a constitutional amendment was passed in his first term allowing 
reelection. 
.  Cardoso continued many of the neoliberal reforms begun by Collor, and it is not an 
exaggeration to characterize these reforms as a redirection of the Brazilian economic model.  
While the process was gradual and done in a largely pragmatic fashion, it resulted in a 
substantial dilution of state involvement in economic activity.  The role of foreign investment 
increased dramatically, especially as a result of the privatization program pursued in the late 
1990s.  Indeed, many of the reforms pursued by Cardoso were regarded favorably by foreign 
 
 










1985 1909.5 -491.1 1418.4 1357.1 61.3 0.67 
1986 1284.2 -967 317.2 343.7 -26.5 0.12 
1987 1673.8 -504.7 1169.1 1225.1 -56 0.41 
1988 3344 -539 2805.0 2969.8 -164.8 0.92 
1989 1896.7 -766.8 1129.9 1266.4 -136.5 0.27 
1990 1388.3 -399.5 988.8 901 87.8 0.21 
1991 1402.4 -300.2 1102.2 971.8 130.4 0.27 
1992 2619.9 -558.9 2061.0 1579.8 481.2 0.53 
1993 2357.3 -1066.4 1290.9 713.3 577.6 0.3 
1994 3221.7 -1071.8 2149.9 1971.6 178.3 0.4 
1995 6369.8 -1964.7 4405.1 4238.8 166.3 0.57 
1996 12033.7 -1242 10791.7 9893.2 898.5 1.28 
1997 22081.1 -3088.2 18992.9 16817 2175.9 2.18 
1998 34982.2 -6126.6 28855.6 25478.8 3376.9 3.42 
1999 36254.5 -7676.1 28578.4 29983 -1404.6 4.87 
2000 40290.5 -7511.3 32779.2 30016.3 2762.9 5.08 
2001 30016.8 -7559.5 22457.4 18765 3692.3 4.06 
2002 26460 -9869.8 16590.2 17118.1 -527.8 3.29 
2003 19237.9 -9094.4 10143.5 9320.2 823.3 1.83 
2004 25800.6 -7654.7 18145.9 18570.3 -424.4 2.73 
2005 30061.9 -14995.6 15066.3 15044.9 21.4 1.71 
2006 32399.5 -13577.3 18822.2 15372.6 3449.6 1.76 
2007 50232.7 -15647.8 34584.9 26074.4 8510.5 2.59 
2008 71835.7 -26777.5 45058.2 30064 14994.1 2.75 
2009 53506.8 -27558.2 25948.6 19906.4 6042.2 1.65 
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firms, and the administration in turn viewed increased investment as a positive 
development70
 Cardoso was more successful in his economic reform efforts than Collor had been for 
a number of different reasons.  Cardoso’s party, the Brazilian Social Democratic Party 
(PSDB) had evolved from the PMDB in the years after democratization, and had developed a 
large electoral base concurrent with Cardoso’s ascension.  Cardoso enjoyed a dominant party 
coalition in congress.  During most of his first term, his coalition controlled 70 percent of the 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 80 percent of the Senate.  In his second term, his 
coalition controlled between 63 and 74 percent in the Chamber and a similar proportion in 
the Senate (Samuels and Mainwaring 2004, 110).  Cardoso proved to be a skilled negotiator, 
and was able to hold the coalition together despite endemic problems with party discipline in 
Brazil.  The Real’s success generated a great deal of political capital, and strong economic 
performance even in the face of the Mexican peso crisis added momentum to the 
administration’s reforming zeal. 
.  However, I shall argue in this section that the investment policy framework 
in Brazil during this period was not active or discriminating, but rather passive and 
unincorporated into a coherent vision for the role of FDI in economic development.  The 
investment environment in Brazil became much more favorable in the 1990s, but FDI was 
not pursued in a way that prioritized spillovers or moved production toward higher value-
added activity.  Partly as a result, foreign investments in Brazil during this period generally 
adopted a largely market-oriented posture.  The explanations for this lack of coordinated and 
consistent investment policy lie primarily in the Brazilian institutional framework, though 
other factors played a role as well. 
                                                 
70Kingstone (1999) notes that multinational support for Cardoso’s reforms does vary by sector, but on the whole 
foreign firms were more supportive of liberalizing reforms than domestic firms. 
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 Early in his first term, Cardoso prioritized the continuing privatization of state owned 
enterprises.  A number of the largest state-owned or quasi-state enterprises had become 
liabilities, and there was significant pressure from the business community to allow foreign 
investors access to these corporations.  The detailed 1988 constitution distinguished among 
Brazilian companies funded by national capital and those which were foreign owned.  This 
distinction also set up a discriminatory regime whereby foreign investment was severely 
restricted, if not prohibited, in sectors such as mining and telecommunications.  The Cardoso 
administration pushed through constitutional amendments doing away with this distinction 
over a few months in 1995.  The debate over these amendments was an absolute “war”, 
according to a high representative of the Ministry of Science and Technology involved in the 
negotiations71.  Many of the old hard-line nationalist guard, including those firms which had 
benefited from state largesse, lobbied for opposition to the amendment in congress.  Cardoso 
did have to offer compromises to parties within the governing coalition and without72.  The 
PT and PDT were firmly opposed to privatization, particularly of the state-owned oil 
company Petrobrás (Kingstone 1999).  The administration reached a compromise whereby 
the oil and gas sectors would be “flexibilized”, meaning the companies would be kept in state 
hands but would also be open to joint ventures with multinationals73
                                                 
71Interview, Brasília, June 2009. 
.  
 
72Power (1998) attributes Cardoso’s success in these constitutional amendments to the coalition management 
style of the president and also to changing attitudes about liberalization, particularly in parties such as the 
PSDB. 
 

















Agriculture, livestock, and mining  2.2  2.3  1.8  6.8 
Petroleum  0.2  1.0  0.7  3.4 
Metallic minerals  1.4  0.6  0.7  2.5 
Others  0.6  0.7  0.4  0.9 
Manufacturing  66.9  33.7  18.0  40.3 
Food and beverages  6.8  4.5  2.6  10.6 
Chemicals  12.8  5.9  3.0  7.4 
Non-metallic mineral products  2.1  1.1  1.1  0.7 
Office machinery and computer hardware  1.1  0.3  0.6  0.2 
Electrical machines, apparatus and materials  2.6  1.0  0.7  1.7 
Pulp, paper and paper products  3.9  1.5  0.1  1.2 
Basic metallurgy  7.2  2.4  0.4  2.4 
Machinery and equipment  5.6  3.2  1.3  1.8 
Electronics and communications equipment  1.9  2.1  1.5  3.1 
Motor vehicles, tow-trucks, and chassis  11.6 6.2  3.9  7.1 
Other  11.3 5.5  2.8  4.1 
Services  30.9 64.0  80.2  52.9 
Electricity, gas, and hot water  0.0  6.9  14.9  6.7 
Commerce 6.9  9.9  9.9  7.2 
Business services  11.9  10.7  20.3  4.6 
Private pensions and insurance  0.4  0.5  0.7  1.4 
Information technology and related activities  0.3  2.5  1.3  1.6 
Transport and related activities  0.5  0.5  0.7  1.1 
Postal and telecommunications services  1.0  18.2  18.1  19.6 
Financial intermediation  3.9  10.4  13.6  5.8 
Other  6.0  4.4  0.7  4.9 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC 2004), on the basis of 
information provided by the Central Bank of Brazil (1995 and 2000 census).  Flows are estimated by ECLAC. 
 
Soon after the amendments passed, the privatizations of the telecommunications and 
energy sectors resulted in massive inflows of FDI into the service sector of the Brazilian 
economy.  The auction of Telebrás in 1998 was the largest in the world up to that point, and 
netted the government roughly US$ 22 billion (Kingstone 2003).  Though the amendments 
did not totally remove restrictions on foreign capital, they did allow a significant influx of 
FDI in the latter half of the 1990s, mostly directed towards services74
                                                 
74The privatizations of the state-owned enterprises enabled by these investments were quite varied in terms of 
success.  Analysts have contrasted the relatively painless privatization of the telecommunications sector 
(Kingstone 2003) with the ad hoc privatization of the electricity sector (Gall 2002). 
.  Table 3.4 illustrates 




before and after the privatization period.  The percentage of FDI stock accounted for by the 
service sector increased from 31 percent in 1995 to 60 percent in 2000.  This reflects the 
privatization of a number of large state owned service companies.  Many of these 
privatizations were done by companies in countries outside the traditional sources of FDI for 
Brazil.  Spanish and Dutch consortia were particularly active in the service sector, and 
carried out a number of the larger privatizations.  This is reflected in table 3.5, which 
compares the stock of FDI by country of origin both before and after the wave of 
privatizations.  The 1995 distribution of capital stock largely conforms to the postwar pattern, 
but by 2000 new sources of FDI were more apparent.  The constitutional amendments did 
nothing to directly or selectively incentivize FDI, opting instead to specify the sectors of the 
economy where restrictions would remain. 
The Cardoso administration also brought about a significant redistribution of 
investment away from the traditional industrial centers in the southeast of the country, 
through policies both purposeful and inadvertent.  The program on new export poles 
attempted to encourage exports in 14 less developed states, but was quickly supplanted in 
terms of importance to investors by the budgetary conflict between the federal government 
and the states, and the resulting ‘fiscal war’.  As part of the lead up to the Plano Real, 
Cardoso as finance minister had established the Social Emergency Fund, which transferred 
revenues guaranteed to states by the 1988 constitution back to the federal government.  The 
Constitution had transferred about a quarter of the federal government’s revenues to the 
states without any corresponding spending limits, which had greatly contributed to long 
running fiscal deficits (Samuels and Mainwaring 2004).  Because governors enjoyed political 
advantage through increased spending and a great deal of influence in the executive, Sarney 
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and Collor had been unwilling to challenge this arrangement.  The Social Emergency Fund 
effectively reversed this funding arrangement, and thought it was unpopular in congress 
Cardoso successfully argued that it was essential to the Plano Real and restoring fiscal 
responsibility.  Once these funds were back in the federal government’s hands, the 
administration forced through a package of spending cuts amounting to US$6 billion.  
Cardoso also placed a great deal of emphasis on reforming the federal tax system, and 
increasing the capability of the government to crack down on tax dodgers.  This initiative 
returned mixed results, but it did increase the federal tax burden and tax compliance in 
unison. 
The states, meanwhile, had to contend with greatly reduced spending capabilities.  
The currency stability and accompanying high interest rates compounded the problem for 
states as they could no longer disguise ballooning deficits in an inflationary environment.  
Faced with an increasing federal tax burden and desperate for additional funds, states 
engaged in intense competition for FDI in the 1990s, especially in the automotive sector75.  
There is a substantial literature both on the Brazilian experience of state competition for 
investment and larger debates about how competition may generate local gains versus 
country-wide losses76
                                                 
75As a representative and well-known anecdote, Ford relocated a plant from Rio Grande do Sul to Bahia after a 
new PT government in Rio Grande do Sul attempted to renegotiate the terms of investment.  Bahia offered Ford 
a package of incentives which reinstated some of the elements of the national automotive regime and credits 
from the BNDES.  The package was certainly more generous than the initial deal offered by Rio Grande do Sul, 
and was accepted by Ford (Zanatta et al. 2006). 
.  These debates are beyond the scope of this work, but serve as an 
important reminder of the positive and negative externalities involved in investment 
bargaining in a strong federal system.  The Cardoso administration initially encouraged this 
kind of interstate competition, viewing it as a corollary of economic liberalization.  However, 
 
76For a consideration of the specific fiscal war in Brazil and its impact on investment, see Christiansen, Oman, 
and Charlton (2003), and Rodríguez-Pose and Arbix (2001). 
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it became apparent in the late 1990s that many of these firms were attaining incentive 
packages that could not be sustained and were often unnecessary, and the administration did 
eventually put in place safeguards against a recurrence of inter-state competition. 
There are a number of ways in which political institutions contributed to and/or failed 
to stop these kinds of bidding wars.  The power of individual governors in Brazil has long 
been noted, and even with the fiscal centralization undertaken by Cardoso there were 
important limits to the federal government’s ability to constrain individual states.  Rodríguez-
Pose and Arbix (2001) note that the National Fiscal Policy Council (Confaz), the 
organization most likely to constrain these sub-national bidding wars, was hampered by a 
weak mandate and unanimity requirement.  To this we can add the lack of a federal 
investment coordination body.  
The Cardoso administration also took steps to remove bureaucratic obstacles to 
foreign investment.  In 2000, the central bank began to record foreign capital flows 
electronically, and dropped the requirement that all foreign exchange transactions receive 
prior authorization from the government.  However, the electronic registration of all foreign 
currency operations remained mandatory.  Brazil is still the only Latin American country 
where such detailed information on capital flows is sent to the central bank77
                                                 
77Interview, Central Bank Department of Financial System Surveillance and Information Management 
(DESIG), Brasília, June 2009 
.  The 
administration also shifted the priorities of the BNDES, moving it away from its focus on 
indigenous capital and incorporating the needs of foreign investors as a natural correlate to 
the constitutional amendments.  The BNDES continued the role it had pursued during the 
Collor administration, when it functioned as the coordinator of privatization efforts.  The 




investment policy bank, though this effort was not carried through by the Lula 
administration78
Table 3.5 FDI stocks by geographic origin, 1995 and 2000 
.  The BNDES was used as an essential venue for the privatization program 
and as a funding source for potential foreign investors.  Its reputation for professionalism and 
resistance to clientelistic pressures made it an attractive location for general investment 
promotion and funding. 
Country 1995 Stock (US$ 
million) 
Percent of total 2000 Stock (US$ 
million) 
Percent of total 
     
     
United States 10852.2 25.52 24500.1 23.78 
Germany 5828.0 13.70 5110.2 4.96 
Switzerland 2815.3 6.62 2252.0 2.18 
Japan 2658.5 6.25 2468.1 2.39 
France 2031.5 4.78 6930.8 6.72 
Canada 1819.0 4.28 2028.2 1.96 
United Kingdom 1792.6 4.21 1487.9 1.44 
British Virgin Islands 1735.6 4.08 3196.5 3.10 
Netherlands 1534.5 3.61 11055.3 10.73 
Italy 1258.6 2.96 2507.1 2.43 
Cayman Islands 891.7 2.10 6224.8 6.04 
Uruguay 874.1 2.06 2106.6 2.04 
Bermuda 853.1 2.01 1940.0 1.88 
Panama 677.4 1.59 1580.4 1.53 
Sweden 567.2 1.33 1578.4 1.53 
Belgium 558.2 1.31 656.6 0.63 
Bahamas  509.7 1.20 944.0 0.91 
Luxembourg 408.0 0.96 1034.1 1.00 
Argentina 393.6 0.93 757.7 0.73 
Spain 251.0 0.59 12253.0 11.89 
Portugal 106.6 0.25 4512.1 4.38 
South Korea 3.8 0.01 179.6 0.17 
Other countries 4109.7 9.66 7711 7.48 
Total 42530.0 100.00 103014.5 100.00 
Source: Central bank of Brazil, data from the census of foreign capital, 1995 and 2000.  Tax havens such as the 
Cayman Islands may be overrepresented in central bank data, as FDI from these locations does not represent the 
ultimate beneficiary owner.  See Annex 2 in Bonelli (1999) for a discussion of this data collection problem. 
 
                                                 




Taken together, the various initiatives of the Cardoso government provided a 
hospitable environment for FDI.  Certainly in contrast with the previous decade, foreign 
firms dramatically increased their presence in various sectors of the Brazilian economy.  
Table 3.6 demonstrates that foreign firms assumed larger roles in a number of different 
sectors over the course of the 1990s, especially in contrast with the pre-Real period.  Yet 
even considering the dramatic increase in FDI, it is difficult to find signs of direct, targeted 
investment promotion during the Cardoso years.  FDI attraction, while viewed as desirable 
by the administration, was not integrated into a coherent industrial policy designed to take 
advantage of the resources of foreign firms.  Instead, FDI was allowed into Brazil through 
the gradual passive dismantling of the ISI policy framework.  Discriminatory treatment of 
foreign investment was barred, but the government did not develop a set of policies designed 
to maximize the developmental benefits of the FDI boom.  This is due to a number of factors.  
In the early years of the Cardoso administration, the government’s priorities lay firmly in the 
establishment of macroeconomic stability and consequently the defense of the new currency.  
Personal interviews corroborated the notion that the administration was most interested in 
privatization and shoring up the domestic currency.  As one respondent put it:  
There was no coordinated policy with respect to how to use FDI.  Policies towards 
firms evolved gradually.  The government was much more focused on the 
competitive auction of state firms79
 
. 
Policies that emerged related to foreign investment largely focused on dismantling 
old barriers to the participation of foreign capital and selling state assets to international 
investors.  The privatizations that occurred were most often in service sectors of the 
economy, and these did little to increase exports or promote spillovers with local firms. 
                                                 
79Phone interview, Dr. Eduardo Costa, FINEP Director of Innovation, Rio de Janeiro, May 2008 
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The lack of government support for direct, targeted measures is apparent in the brief 
history of the investment promotion agency Investe Brasil.  This institution was operational 
from 2002 to 2004, but its roots extend to the late 1990s.  Conceived as a ‘one stop shop’ for 
foreign investors seeking information on Brazil, the body functioned with a small staff for its 
brief tenure.  The dissolution of Investe Brasil runs counter to worldwide trends in 
investment promotion.  The World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies 
(WAIPA), established in 1995, now counts over 100 members.  Cross-national studies have 
indicated that independent and well-supported investment promotion agencies are associated 
with higher inflows of investment (Morriset 2003).  Investe Brasil included in its mandate the 
specific targeting of investments which would be most beneficial to technological upgrading 
and promotion of exports, and its closure sent signals of discontinuity and reinforced 
negative perceptions of the regulatory environment in Brazil (Gregory and Arraes de Oliveira 
2005).  The most proximate cause for its closure was a conflict over the funding 
arrangement, though the larger issue of transition between administrations certainly played a 
part.  During its tenure, the agency attracted an estimated $1.4 billion in investment projects.  
However, Investe Brasil represented an attempt at unified, targeted investment promotion 
policy of quite short duration. 
The Cardoso government founded Investe Brasil as a partnership between the public 
and private sectors, based on the notion that an investment promotion agency had to be agile 
and integrate the views of the private sector.  As such, the agency received funding from the 
budgets of three different governmental ministries and 31 private groups.  This funding 
arrangement, while innovative, quickly ran into coordination problems.  Other ministries and 
many of the leftist parties were uncomfortable with the idea of public monies being directed 
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toward an agency with private backing and whose actions would benefit foreign investors.  
The staff at Investe Brasil, never numbering more than 30, was predominantly from the 
private sector and did not have established personal connections with the ministries.  The 
TCU, an organization within the government charged with oversight of spending, mounted 
an investigation of the funding arrangement in 2002 and 2003, and the Cardoso and Lula 
governments followed the lead of the TCU.  Eventually funding for the project dried up 
altogether, and Investe Brasil was disbanded80
Table 3.6 Estimates of participation of foreign firms in total sales, in select sectors (percentages) 
. 
  1993 1997 2000 
Food  31.94  56.66  57.70 
Beverages  9.06  14.54  15.34 
Clothes and textiles  2.83  15.05  23.25 
Construction 1.26  3.02  4.69 
Petroleum distribution  65.97  73.96  69.66 
Electronics 32.48  48.02  77.36 
Pharmaceuticals 77.62  84.06  85.43 
Tobacco 100 100 100 
Health  94.07  88.48  86.12 
Construction material  30.77  33.67  35.35 
Transport material  87.67  92.93  88.64 
Machinery 61.77  41.03  75.33 
Minerals 20.66  14.27  7.77 
Paper and cellulose  18.05  17.55  14.75 
Plastics  69.15  82.03  69.21 
Chemicals, petrochemicals  42.81  49.74  53.31 
Transport services   2.84  6.52 
Public services  41.33  64.62 
Steel and other metals  18.24  23.71  32.71 
Computing  92.09  91.39  90.96 
Telecommunications    63.05 
Source: Nonnenberg (2003) from Revista Exame, various years.  
 
The reasons for the failure of Investe Brasil reveal a great deal about the way in 
which political institutions can affect the emergence of a coherent investment promotion 
policy framework.  The directorate of IB spent much of its first year of existence attempting 
to manage the various state-level investment promotion agencies which had developed in the 
wake of the federal fiscal crisis and subsequent rush for FDI.  These state investment 
                                                 
80Phone Interview, former institutional director of Investe Brasil, Brasília, February 2008. 
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promotion agencies differed greatly in their resources and connections with the federal 
government.  But coordination problems also existed at the federal level, considering the 
large number of agencies in different ministries with some investment promotion mandate.  
The institutional proliferation was difficult for IB, and resulted in less attention devoted to 
actual investment promotion. 
The turnover within these various organizations was another complicating factor for 
the IB mandate.  Schneider (1991) has noted the peripatetic nature of Brazilian bureaucrats’ 
careers, with individuals constantly moving among different posts at the federal and state 
level Long term posts are rare, which makes the development of long term objectives and an 
organizational ethos more difficult.  Although this itinerancy has some benefits, it also 
creates complications for agencies trying to establish consistency.  The agencies that IB 
attempted to coordinate were afflicted with this dynamic, and former directors of IB 
expressed frustrations in interviews that they were not able to establish long term 
relationships with representatives of the other investment promotion bodies within the 
bureaucracy.  This was especially the case during the transition from the Cardoso 
administration to the Lula administration.  A former director of Investe Brasil revealed that 
of 95 people within the loosely-organized investment promotion network of the federal 
government, 93 changed with the arrival of the Lula administration.  She charged that the 
organization’s closure was partly a result of this “discontinuity”81
 Investe Brasil also encountered difficulties in attempting to establish a comprehensive 
approach to investment policy.  The agency functioned as another information portal, and 
was not able to bring legislators or ministry officials to prioritize broad investment targeting 
. 
                                                 




policy.  That is, most investments were negotiated through personalistic connections between 
individual legislators or bureaucrats and firms.  In the context of FDI, this often meant that 
firm investment decisions would be negotiated with bureaucrats based on personal 
relationships and/or positions of power, and not necessarily on familiarity with governmental 
objectives or even the most appropriate concessions82
 Finally, the funding arrangement for IB was a point of particular contention among 
other bodies, with many of the other organizations becoming suspicious of the private 
sector’s participation.  Other investment promotion agencies in Latin America rely heavily 
on private funding and have demonstrated a high level of support and continuity
.  However, the established connections 
between individuals and firms made it difficult for IB to coordinate a larger investment 
promotion strategy, let alone one that would prioritize those sectors or activities most likely 
to lead to developmental spillovers. 
83.  However, 
the participation of the private sector and the ambiguity surrounding the funding for IB 
prompted conflict within the Brazilian bureaucracy84
                                                 
82When negotiations took place with the largest multinational firms, bureaucratic agencies would often be 
ignored altogether.  Instead, the negotiations would take place between firm representatives and top level 
administration officials, such as the Minister of the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Trade (MDIC) or 
the Finance Minister (Interview, Central Bank Department of Financial System Surveillance and Information 
Management, Brasília, June 2009). 
.  Whether IB would have continued if it 
had been wholly state supported is difficult to know, but it is certain that the public-private 
partnership embodied in the institution could not be maintained without conflict.  This theme 
resurfaced in the Lula administration’s aborted attempts at public private partnerships in 
infrastructure projects after 2002. 
 
83See Chapter 6, particularly the discussion of CORFO in Chile and CINDE in Costa Rica. 
 
84The MDIC believed that the mandate of Investe Brasil should best be transferred to the export promotion 




 Investe Brasil represented an attempt at direct, active, and mildly discriminating 
investment promotion.  Its elimination was lamented at the time in the Brazilian press, and 
runs counter to worldwide trends85
 Through the stabilization and privatization programs of the late 1990s, the Cardoso 
administration adopted a largely passive approach to foreign investment.  Sector-specific 
incentive programs were associated with the old industrial programs that Collor and 
eventually Cardoso sought to transcend.  Indeed, industrial policy as a whole (and selective 
investment promotion as a subset of industrial policy) was frowned upon during this period.  
As one Central Bank interviewee put it, “industrial policy” in the late 1990s was 
inappropriate language, subject to scolding
.  The character of Brazilian state institutions provides an 
accurate explanation for its demise.  The uncoordinated and often personalistic connections 
among foreign firms and state representatives are resistant to the imposition of an 
overarching strategy for FDI promotion, and to any institution which embodies this strategy. 
86
 There were a few exceptions to this general pattern.  Perhaps the most consequential, 
in terms of its impact on the investment behavior of multinationals and the performance of 
the Brazilian economy, was the package of regulatory reforms since 1995 that came to be 
known as the Brazilian automotive regime.  These reforms generated a number of special 
.  The economic model in place at the time 
discouraged targeting of specific sectors or industries, viewing such intervention as 
counterproductive to stabilization and growth. 
                                                 
85A prominent Brazilian economist, Roberto Teixeira da Costa, expressed dismay at the abandonment of Investe 
Brasil in an economic opinion column in the Folha de São Paulo (Teixeira da Costa 2004).  In another 
newspaper account, a number of administrators complained that none of the investment projects underway 
when Investe Brasil was closed were pursued, and that the efforts of the organization were basically “thrown in 
the trash” (Mello 2005). 
 





incentives for automobile manufacturers, were profoundly illiberal in nature, and played a 
role in the dramatic increases in investment in both auto assembly and the 
internationalization of the Brazilian auto parts sector87.  Between 1994 and 2003, 23 new 
automotive assembly plants opened in Brazil.  Automotive investment accounted for roughly 
twenty percent of all incoming FDI for the same period (ECLAC 2004, 94).  As a result of 
these new automotive investments, the automotive sector increased from 7.8 percent of 
industrial GDP in 1990 to 12.1 percent by 1997 (Rodriguez-Pose and Arbix 2001, 140).  
After a period of import dominance in the early 1990s, by 1994 manufacturers began to 
increase automobile exports, mostly in the context of Mercosul.  In 1995, the implementation 
of the automotive regime brought a combination of tariff barriers and subsidies to automobile 
manufacturers, in order to encourage domestic production.  The plan also exempted exports 
from paying social contributions taxes, such as the PIS and Cofins taxes (Doctor 2007)88
 The automotive regime of the Cardoso administration does bear the signs of a 
targeted investment promotion policy.  As such, it may seem at first glance that this episode 
contradicts earlier statements about the passive nature of investment policies during this 
period.  Indeed, the administration wished to force multinationals to invest directly by 
increasing import tariffs (Arbix and Martin 2010, 16).  However, it would be a mistake to 
characterize this particular initiative as a coordinated attempt to derive developmental 
benefits from FDI.  There were many other factors at play in this particular instance.  Indeed, 
.  
However, the plan contained no incentives for domestic innovation among multinational 
firms. 
                                                 
87The special incentives generated some conflict with the World Trade Organization and with Argentina, 
Brazil’s automotive partner in Mercosul.  See De Negri (1999) for a discussion of these controversies and their 
resolution. 
 
88These taxes have a statutory rate of 9.3 percent of value added (www.doingbusiness.org). 
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there is much about this period that suggests the automotive regime was not a result of 
autonomous investment promotion, but rather complicated bargaining within the 
bureaucracy, the immediate concerns of rising trade deficits, and perhaps rent-seeking 
behavior among firms. 
 The automotive regime did not materialize spontaneously from within the Cardoso 
administration.  Collor in 1990 proposed a gradual reduction of tariffs on imported 
automobiles, which had greatly benefited manufacturers in the 1980s, in order to stimulate 
competition and modernize the industry.  Tariffs would be reduced from 85 percent to 30 
percent by 1994 (Laplane and Sarti 2002).  This generated a significant backlash from 
domestic auto producers, who feared the dramatic liberalization and elimination of state 
support would mean the end of the industry.  Collor in response helped organize a number of 
sectoral chambers in 1991 and 1992, which were not limited to autos but functioned as a 
rough approximation of a tripartite bargaining system (Doctor 2009).  Even the PT, quite 
hostile to Collor’s liberalization program, agreed to participate along with the largest 
autoworker unions.  The sectoral chambers resulted in significantly reduced tax rates, which 
in turn lowered the price for vehicles sold domestically and stimulated demand.  In effect, the 
sectoral chambers allowed the automotive firms to campaign for state support to adapt to the 
pressures of liberalization, and therefore lend their support.  This pressure continued during 
the Franco administration, when automakers already in country successfully lobbied for a 
reduction in tax rates as part of the carro popular program (discussed more extensively in 
chapter five). 
 A similar dynamic occurred during the negotiations for the automotive regime.  
Reductions in tariffs in 1994 (some went as low as 20 percent) were met with hostility by the 
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automobile industry, which successfully pressured the government to restore them to 70 
percent in 1995 (Tavares de Araújo 1998, 17).  This was one of the factors which persuaded 
a number of new multinational manufacturers to establish direct productive capacity in Brazil 
in lieu of importing.  Yet it seems unlikely that this result was the government’s only goal89
 There were also powerful indirect incentives at work in this instance.  The growth of 
FDI-linked exports in the automotive sector perhaps owes less to direct subsidy of export 
than it does to the powerful regional incentive of Mercosul membership.  The automotive 
industries of Argentina and Brazil tightly integrated over the course of the 1990s, despite the 
occasional flare-ups over subsidies and other trade distortions.  Argentina is the main 
destination of car exports from Brazil, attracting 33 percent of all units exported in 2006 
(ANFAVEA 2007).  The export performance has been impressive since 1995, but the 
sporadic outward orientation of multinational automotive manufacturers has largely been a 
result of regional trade integration.  As such, Mercosul represents a powerful but indirect 
investment promotion tool. 
.  
It is also certain that the drastic trade imbalances provoked by liberalization of the sector, 
along with the instability brought by the Mexican peso crisis, contributed to support for the 
RA. 
 The Cardoso administration’s automotive regime was an exception to the generally 
neoliberal-oriented reform program put in place in the latter half of the 1990s.  It did 
incentivize FDI, and generated strong pressures for outward orientation among multinational 
                                                 
89Gómez Mera (2007) attributes the emergence of the automotive regime to intra-bureaucratic bargaining.  
Specifically, she argues that the more developmentalist bodies within the bureaucracy, represented by the 
ministry of planning and the ministry of trade, industry, and tourism, were able to extract concessions from the 
administration.  The finance ministry and central bank, more neoliberal in orientation, were willing to accept 
some of the more interventionist policies as long as they did not threaten the stability of the real, which was 
their ultimate priority.  In this interpretation, the interventionist automotive regime does not appear as an 
attempt to increase FDI and move it toward export activities, but rather as an attempt to shield developed 
industries from some of the more painful aspects of economic adjustment. 
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automakers.  However, the initiative does not constitute an example of coordinated 
investment promotion designed to generate FDI spillovers.  It did not directly incentivize 
innovation among multinationals.  The policy initiative can be better interpreted as a 
compromise measure designed to protect industries which otherwise might have suffered 
under the stabilization and structural reform measures. 
 The lack of discriminating, active FDI strategy can be better illustrated in the fate of 
domestic auto parts producers in Brazil in the 1990s, discussed extensively in chapter five.  
The 1990s witnessed a dramatic denationalization of the auto parts industry in Brazil.  
Domestic auto parts makers had enjoyed productive relationships with multinational 
assemblers since the 1950s, and government protection stemming from strict domestic 
content laws.  When these laws were dropped as part of the larger liberalization process, 
domestic companies were bought by larger multinational parts manufacturers such as Dana 
and Visteon beginning in 1990.  The phenomenon of follow-sourcing, whereby new 
manufacturers bring parts suppliers with them as they make new investments, meant that 
Brazilian suppliers would either be incorporated into existing companies or go out of 
business.  The move toward modular production also reinforced the bargaining strength of 
the multinational supplier firms, which had more experience with these models of 
production.  Not surprisingly, many supplier firms resisted the liberalization program, and 
resented the protection extended to multinational assemblers90
 This denationalization had important ramifications for the auto parts industry in 
Brazil.  The innovative activities of supplier firms were downgraded, or relocated to the 
.  The automotive regime did 
little to protect national supplier firms, and most of the upper-tier suppliers were bought out 
by multinational parts suppliers. 
                                                 
90Interview, directorate of Sindipeças (Brazilian auto parts association), São Paulo, February 2008. 
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home country of the parent firm (Zilbovicius et al. 2002; Salerno et al. 1998).  The number of 
suppliers was reduced as smaller suppliers were consolidated in the new multinational 
modular plants.  Nationally-owned suppliers that managed to survive the consolidation were 
moved to lower levels of the supply chain.  Local innovation and linkages with domestic 
producers, which had been cornerstones of the automotive industry since the 1950s, 
diminished significantly. 
It might be tempting to infer from the massive influx of FDI during the second half of 
the 1990s that the Cardoso administration had put in place an effective investment promotion 
policy framework.  However, as the preceding section has demonstrated, this would be 
inaccurate.  Foreign investors poured into Brazil for many reasons: a stable domestic 
currency, the domestic market of Brazil and the regional market of Mercosul, the relaxation 
of domestic content requirements and restrictions on foreign capital, the political stability 
after the Collor debacle, etc.  But the reform effort led by the Cardoso administration was 
largely passive towards FDI.  That is, where the government did develop policy toward FDI, 
it consisted mainly of tearing down barriers to investment.  This passive investment 
promotion generated a great deal of inward investment, but the administration did not devote 
significant energies toward maximizing the benefits of that investment.  Indeed, there were 
significant elements of the industrial policy (or more accurately, the lack thereof) which 
failed to deal with the unanticipated negative consequences of foreign penetration. 
From a more charitable perspective, the priorities of the administration certainly were 
elsewhere.  In the early years of the Cardoso administration, officials were focused like lasers 
on the stability of the domestic currency.  Given the repeated failed attempts at curbing 
hyperinflation, this is understandable.  To the degree that FDI was considered, the massive 
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inflows were seen as a vote of confidence in the administration and in the Real.  The fiscal 
imbalances resulting from the strong federalism of the Brazilian system were unsustainable, 
and the administration devoted significant energies to the resolution of that conflict as well.  
It is fair to say that economic reform priorities lay elsewhere. 
Cardoso was able to push through some potentially controversial elements of reform, 
such as the privatization of Telebrás, with relative ease through careful negotiation and 
coalition politics (Kingstone 2003).  The constitutional amendments of 1995, which allowed 
FDI in diverse sectors, are also testament to the success of Cardoso’s negotiating strategy.  
However, there were a number of institutional impediments to the implementation of an 
effective investment promotion policy framework, and these worked against the limited 
active, discriminating policies promoted by the Cardoso administration.  The story of Investe 
Brasil, which spans the Cardoso and Lula administrations, demonstrates well the problems of 
institutional consistency.  There were also inter- and intra-institutional coordination 
problems, particularly the organization’s unwieldy oversight structure and the difficulties 
encountered in managing the investment promotion efforts of Brazilian states.  Investe Brasil, 
despite its proclaimed objective to serve as a ‘one stop shop’, had to compete with various 
other organs for the attention of multinationals.  Coordination problems are also evident in 
the sub-optimal outcomes realized during the state-level bidding wars for multinational 
automotive investments in the 1990s.  The Cardoso administration was at first unable and 
unwilling to manage investment incentives of individual states.  Finally, there were instances 
of networking problems resulting from the disconnect between multinational representatives 
and state bodies.  Investe Brasil, staffed as it was by representatives of the private sector, was 
viewed with suspicion by the TCU and other state bodies.  The strong ties between 
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multinational automakers and the state, nurtured over decades, contributed to the temporary 
export success of the automotive regime.  However, this was the exception.  In most sectors, 
networks between state representatives and multinational firms were quite weak. 
3.3.5 Investment policy under Lula: the return of industrial policy 
 While the transformation of Brazil’s economic model under Cardoso was indeed 
substantial, it is important not to overstate the degree to which political actors desired an 
outright removal of the state from economic governance.  The groups within the 
administration that managed to push through modest neoliberal reforms did so against strong 
headwinds created by long historical legacies.  The economic crises of the 1980s and early 
1990s certainly created windows of opportunity, but a wholesale rejection of what had been a 
highly interventionist state ever since Vargas’s Estado Novo was never really in the cards.  
The neoliberal reform period of the 1990s represents a significant rejection of state-led 
industrialization.  However, the resurgence of industrial policy in the Lula administration 
demonstrates that the state retains its long-standing role as a source of influence on private 
enterprise in Brazil, both domestic and foreign owned. 
Lula reinvigorated industrial policy and integrated FDI into a more explicit focus on 
innovation.  Active, discriminating policies towards investment were more common than 
they had been in the 1990s.  A handful of new laws directly incentivized the innovative 
efforts of multinationals, and provided support to exports as well.  On the institutional side, 
Lula expanded support for pockets of efficiency such as the BNDES and FINEP, while also 
adding new institutions that have the potential to serve as focal points for coordinated, 
consistent state-firm bargaining.  However, some institutional characteristics hampered the 
implementation of reinvigorated industrial policies, and Lula administration’s approach to 
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FDI was very much a process of trial and error.  Nevertheless, active, sectorally-
discriminating investment policies, channeled through pockets of efficiency, have begun to 
support greater innovative activity and export activity in limited sectors.  It is unclear 
whether these patterns will continue, and the institutional context still poses many obstacles 
for new investment policies. 
The general contours of Lula’s industrial policy were outlined in two overarching 
policy packages, announced in 2003 and 2008 respectively: the Política Industrial, 
Tecnológica e de Comércio Exterior/Policy for Industry, Technology and Foreign Trade 
(PITCE) and the Plano de Desenvolvimento da Produção/Production Development Plan 
(PDP).  These development plans contain some elements similar to the industrial plans of the 
1950s and 1960s, including emphasis on the competitiveness of Brazilian industry.  
However, in many ways these plans break with past models of industrial policy, particularly 
in their focus on innovation.  They represent a return to state interventionism while at the 
same time acknowledging the impact of a changed economic environment and the parameters 
set by neoliberal reforms.  Though they are not perfect exemplars of what Schrank and Kurtz 
(2005) have called “open economy industrial policy”, they do contain enough elements to 
qualify. 
As another distinguishing characteristic from some of Brazil’s previous industrial 
policies, the PITCE and PDP did not display an antagonistic orientation toward FDI.  As part 
of the emphasis on export competitiveness and innovation, the Lula administration adopted a 
policy stance that, for the most part, encouraged FDI.  The industrial policies adopted by the 
administration were primarily directed toward increasing the international competitiveness of 
Brazilian firms.  However, FDI was treated as an important ingredient in successful industrial 
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development.  The PITCE and PDP placed much more emphasis on innovation, and some 
measures were put in place that encouraged the transfer of technology from multinationals to 
domestic partner firms.  On the whole, however, the incorporation of FDI into the economic 
model pursued by the Lula administration was incomplete.  I argue that this has less to do 
with the nature of investment promotion policy, which was more active and discriminating 
than Cardoso’s, and more to do with the conditioning influence of institutions.  Despite the 
pronounced focus on targeting potential spillovers contained in Lula’s industrial policies, 
those same policies were often undercut by institutional problems.  At the same time, the 
presence of an activist industrial policy has allowed FDI to be better integrated into overall 
development strategy than during the Cardoso years. 
The resurgence of industrial policy in Brazil and the administration’s accompanying 
attitudes towards foreign investment had roots in the popular and governmental reactions to 
the neoliberal models of the 1990s.  The new approach attempted to incorporate the 
successes of neoliberal stabilization in Brazil, including more fiscal discipline, currency 
stability, privatization, commercial opening and viability, while at the same time attempting 
to correct some of the severe imbalances generated by neoliberal reform.  Principle among 
these were the increases in poverty, inequality, and the processes of deindustrialization that 
had accompanied neoliberal models of capitalism and generated strong resentments among 
populations in Latin America91
                                                 
91For summaries of different models of capitalism pursued in various Latin American countries and their 
evolution, see Huber (2002), also Garreton et al. (2003). 
.  The Lula administration pursued this agenda by enacting a 
number of social programs designed to make growth more inclusive, including the popular 
Bolsa Família targeted conditional cash transfer program, while at the same time not 
threatening the economic openness and stability enjoyed by the country since the mid-1990s.  
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This has required a governmental strategy predicated on the idea of a middle way between 
the old developmentalist models of the 1970s and the neoliberal minimal state of the 1990s, 
or what Arbix and Martin (2010) call an inclusionary state activism without statism. 
Table 3.7 Net inflows of FDI, by destination sector, 2003-2008 
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6909  8485 12915 12702 16073 17449 12422 
Percent of 
Total Net FDI 
53.54 41.86 59.69 55.94 46.85 39.24 49.52 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC 2009, 50), on the basis of 
information provided by the Central Bank of Brazil. Author elaboration. 
 
The character of the administration’s development program depended on the more 
mundane considerations of political support in congress.  While Cardoso assembled a diverse 
coalition to support his reform agenda and relied on decree powers occasionally, Lula had to 
contend with elements within his own party that favored a return to economic nationalism 
and protectionism.  The PT had demonstrated hostility toward the privatization programs of 
the Collor and Cardoso years, and was ambivalent at best about the benefits of neoliberal 
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reform in general92.  Lula was able to mount a relatively effective and moderate industrial 
policy in part because of its appeal to those elements of the left concerned with the 
competitiveness of Brazilian firms93.  However, Lula’s strong personal popularity in Brazil 
also added authority to his industrial policies and other initiatives94
While the industrial policies of the Lula administration present a ramping up of state 
activism, it is perhaps somewhat unfair to draw a distinct dividing line between Cardoso and 
Lula.  As Doctor (2009) notes, by the end of the 1990s the Cardoso administration had begun 
to turn its attention to support of innovation in Brazil.  While never embodied in an industrial 
policy per se, the Cardoso administration did begin laying the groundwork for an eventual 
industrial policy.  The Ministry of Development, Industry, and Trade (MDIC) was created in 
1999, and eventually became a focal point for Lula’s industrial policies and investment 
promotion framework.  Additionally, the sectoral funds, located within the structure of the 
Ministry for Science and Technology (MCT), were also initiated during the last months of 
Cardoso’s second term and expanded during the Lula administration.  These funds directly 
supported innovative activity and public-private research collaboration, and are discussed 
more extensively in chapter four.  
.  To the degree that these 
new industrial policies represented breaks from both neoliberal and developmentalist 
templates, they testify to the ability of the administration to appeal to a more centrist 
coalition in congress and to the broad authority conferred on Lula by his popularity. 
                                                 
92During the Lula administration, the PT periodically rebelled against certain reforms that were judged to be a 
step too far.  For example, in 2006 the PT greeted coolly a proposal to increase the operational autonomy of the 
central bank, fearing it would dilute job creation (“Crescimento bem contido” 2006). 
 
93Interview, PT Deputy, Brasília, June 2009. 
 
94This was true even after the elections of 2006 in which the incumbent PT failed to gain seats in congress, as it 
had in every previous election since democratization (Hunter and Power 2007).   
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The Policy for Industry, Technology, and Foreign Trade (PITCE) represented a break 
with industrial policies of the past.  As Doctor (2009) notes, the PITCE avoided targeting 
specific firms for state support, or ‘picking winners’.  However, at the same time the PITCE 
did specifically target four industries as priorities: the software, semiconductors, capital 
goods, and pharmaceutical industries.  These were industries where the administration 
believed Brazil had a chance to develop non-traditional exports and increase the innovative 
capabilities of Brazilian firms.  The PITCE focused heavily on innovation among small and 
medium enterprises, mostly Brazilian-owned.  Indeed, the policy itself referenced Brazilian 
firms as its priority targets (Koeller and Gordon 2010, 30).  However, as part of its focus on 
innovation, the policy provided incentives for multinational firms operating in Brazil to 
invest in R&D, and set target sectors95
During the Lula administration the Brazilian government also expanded the role of 
FINEP, an organization which had once been under the aegis of the BNDES but had been 
moved to work within the framework of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT).  
FINEP provides grants and loans to both Brazilian universities and private corporations, 
without distinction based on country of origin.  FINEP had existed since 1967, but its 
resources were greatly expanded under the Lula administration
.  The policy also encouraged partnerships between 
federal universities and domestic and foreign owned firms, in the hopes that this would lead 
to the spread of innovative activity.   
96
                                                 
95In addition to the four sectors mentioned above, there were three other sectoral options for future 
development: biotechnology, nanotechnology, and biomass/renewable energies. 
.  The mechanisms through 
which FINEP incentivizes innovation are detailed in chapter four.  FINEP enjoys a reputation 
 
96While Cardoso sought funding for FINEP, it did not arrive until after 2002.  Funding for FINEP increased 
tenfold between the Cardoso and Lula administrations (Phone interview, Dr. Eduardo Costa, FINEP Director of 




similar to that of the BNDES, in that it is considered one of the few organizations in the 
Brazilian bureaucracy that ‘does development lending right’.  It has an extensive set of 
requirements for pre-loan approval and after-loan follow up, reducing the potential for rent 
seeking and fortifying results-based evaluation.  While its resources are much smaller than 
the BNDES, it has established itself as another ‘pocket of efficiency’ in the institutional 
framework.  Moreover, because of its emphasis on innovation, it can be labeled as one of the 
few institutions that have adopted and carried out an active, discriminating investment 
promotion approach. 
In addition to strengthening FINEP, the PITCE was accompanied by two important 
legislative initiatives: the Lei de Inovação (or ‘Innovation Law’ 10,973/2004) and the Lei do 
Bem (or ‘Law of the Public Good’ 11,196/2005).  The first of these two laws expanded 
federal support for innovative activities among both Brazilian and foreign firms through 
targeting a number of goals through subsidies and other incentives, as outlined in Zanatta 
(2006, 125-126): 
- Strategic alliances between science and technology institutions and the private sector 
- Connecting federal research bodies with the private sector, especially in the development 
of infrastructure 
- Generating interaction between the private sector and public research bodies in a way 
that facilitates the transfer of technology in both directions 
- Stimulus to a ‘culture of innovation’ by way of a new intellectual property regime in 
public research institutions 
- Authorization for mutual funds within companies whose principal activities would be in 
support of innovation 
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The innovation law was particularly important in that it encouraged public research 
institutions to cooperate with private companies, and allowed the sharing of lab space and the 
possibility of remuneration for public research institutions engaged in these cooperative 
relationships.  The law also guaranteed industrial property rights to innovations that proved 
to have commercial viability, even if researchers did not originally register their innovative 
activities as patents per se. 
The Lei do Bem added a number of concrete tax and other incentives to the general 
parameters of the innovation law, focusing in particular on the IT sector.  Some of the more 
consequential components of this law for multinational companies are as follows (Zanatta 
2006, 130): 
- Reduction in the tax on industrialized products (IPI) for the purchase of machines and 
equipment used in research and development97
- Accelerated depreciation and amortization of these capital goods 
 
- Reduction or elimination of income taxes for firms engaged in activities that result in 
contractual technology transfers or the registry of patents 
- Other tax reductions for contracting domestic research personnel with masters or 
doctoral degrees 
These laws reinforced the innovation focus of the PITCE framework, which had been 
missing from earlier industrial policies.  The laws allow for the benefits from the 
commercialization of intellectual property to be shared among researchers, public scientific 
and technological institutions and private firms.  These legal changes were accompanied by a 
new set of institutions that would carry out the mandate of the PITCE.  At the end of 2004, 
the federal government created two organs, the the Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
                                                 
97The IPI is similar to VAT, and has a statutory tax rate of 20% on value added (www.doingbusiness.org) 
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Industrial / National Industrial Development Council (CNDI) and the ABDI.  CNDI 
functioned as a council of high representatives from governmental bodies and civil society, 
recommending initiatives to the president and responsible for the overall direction of 
industrial policy.  The CNDI was directly linked to the executive, a move that was intended 
to bring policy coherence and efficacy.  Thirteen ministerial representatives and a 
representative of the BNDES formed the governmental contingent, and another fourteen 
representatives of business and labor unions provide the other half of the institutional 
structure. 
The ABDI functioned as the body charged with the day-to-day articulation of 
industrial policy and as the institutional focal point for the Lula administration’s 
implementation of the PITCE.  The institution is funded through an arrangement known as 
Sistema S, which allows public funds from industry to be directed to what is legally a private 
entity.  ABDI is supported by ten ministries and governed by their representatives, though it 
is most closely connected to the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Trade (MDIC).  The 
agency has served as a focal point for the Lula administration’s emphasis on cooperation 
through Mercosul and the expansion of south-south investment98
The final cog on the institutional wheel created by the Lula administration has the 
most direct mandate for investment promotion.  APEX has existed since 1998, as part of the 
Brazilian support system for micro and small enterprises (SEBRAE).  In 2003, APEX left 
SEBRAE and came under the umbrella of MDIC.  The mission of APEX was fundamentally 
.  While the CNDI is 
officially charged with the formulation of industrial policy, the subordinate ABDI remains 
the most important body for its articulation. 
                                                 




transformed in that year, as the agency was folded into the larger industrial policy 
framework.  As such, APEX was reorganized and developed an investment promotion 
division.  This division serves as the most direct successor to Investe Brasil, as it is charged 
with the active attraction of foreign investment to Brazil.  It is unclear, however, how much 
support the investment promotion body has within the industrial policy framework.  APEX is 
not as powerful or autonomous an institution as the BNDES or FINEP, and though it displays 
signs of sectoral targeting and active promotion of investment, as a body it is much more 
heavily focused on Brazilian export promotion than attraction of FDI99.  Interviews at APEX 
revealed a similar institutional emphasis on ‘match-making’ encountered at other investment 
promotion agencies within the bureaucracy, suggesting redundancy100
Perhaps because the PITCE represented the first comprehensive attempt at industrial 
policy since the 1970s, it suffered from numerous initial setbacks.  Principal among these 
were the lack of full policy articulation on the part of the government, and an institutional 
complexity which severely hampered its initial coherence.  The initial period of PITCE 
exhibited a good deal of intra-bureaucratic competition for influence over the direction of the 
new program.  Arbix and Martin (2010) have characterized the early stages of the new 
.  Finally, it seems 
clear that within APEX, the international competitiveness of Brazilian firms receives more 
attention than does the policy regime for incoming foreign investment.  APEX, while the 
focal point for FDI promotion in the current institutional alignment, does not have the 
singular focus or support within the overall industrial policy framework often found in 
investment promotion agencies in other countries. 
                                                 
99One indication of this is that five years after the establishment of the investment promotion division within 
APEX, the agency’s role as an investment promotion body was “less well known” (“Brasil entra no radar dos 
investimentos tecnológicos” 2010).  
 
100Interviews, APEX Directorate, Brasília, June 2009. 
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industrial policy as a process of trial and error for the administration.  The existing 
institutional complexity and patterns of redundancy contributed to this dynamic.  Although 
the MDIC was the primary locus of influence for the implementation of the PITCE, and 
ABDI its new institutional executor, there were a number of other ministries and 
organizations that were formally included in its directorate.  Some of these organizations 
were at the same level or above as that of ABDI within the state hierarchy.  The Council of 
Economic and Social Development, the Chamber of Political Economy (under the influence 
of the Finance Ministry), the Chamber of the Politics of Economic Development (within the 
Casa Civil, one of the most powerful bodies in the executive), and the Council Manager of 
the PPP programs all had leadership positions within the framework of the PITCE.  
Moreover, ABDI must work closely with relatively autonomous funding organizations such 
as the BNDES and FINEP, which have substantial resources and an independent, largely 
efficient, agenda (Suzigan and Furtado 2006).  The Lula administration had difficulty 
elaborating the concrete proposals contained within the larger PITCE framework, as the 
goals (often based on narrow interests) of each organization had to be accommodated.  Some 
organizations struck out on their own.  The Casa Civil created the commission of incentives 
for productive private investments in the country, which attempted to bring together fourteen 
ministries and other organizations (with Casa Civil at the helm) and met exactly once101
In spite of the establishment of action lines and of the choice of strategic sectors and 
activities bearing future perspectives, which could contribute to the restructuring of 
.  
While the new policy was ambitious in scope, and demonstrated a selective approach to 
foreign investment founded on the idea of innovation, it did not initially enjoy institutional 
coherence.  As Koeller and Gordon (2010, 32) explain: 
                                                 




the Brazilian production sector, PITCE did not set a governance structure or specific 
mechanisms for its own operation…The overlapping of policies and the fact that 
these mechanisms were under the coordination of other institutions, not the MDIC, 
and thus answered also to other political priorities, hindered the implementation, the 
analysis and the monitoring of PITCE.  
 
Besides the difficulties inherent in moving the entire state apparatus towards a new 
industrial policy, other challenges threatened to derail the PITCE during Lula’s first term.  
The administration saw a role for foreign investment in the development of Brazil’s 
infrastructure, and launched a program within the PITCE framework known as the Public 
Private Partnerships (PPPs).  These PPPs were modeled on similar initiatives in other 
countries, but most specifically the programs of the same name in the United Kingdom 
during the 1990s (Brito and Silveira 2005).  Eventually 23 projects were proposed around 
Brazil.  The projects were designed to correct long-standing deficiencies in infrastructure by 
asking multinational firms to participate in those projects more traditionally reserved for state 
bodies (such as toll roads).  These initiatives were presented as a kind of ‘salvation’ for 
Brazil’s enduring infrastructure problems.  The PPPs in Brazil represented a real attempt on 
the part of the government to target specific locations in dire need of investment, but the 
initiatives have been unsuccessful at attracting investment.  There were two important 
reasons for this.  The lack of experience with this type of targeted policy led the government 
to neglect aspects of the sometimes quite complex contracts involved in a public-private 
partnership.  Specifically, there was no framework immediately put in place to guarantee 
government funding to interested foreign firms over the long term102
                                                 
102Interview, Alexandre Silva, Director of the American Chamber of Commerce in São Paulo, São Paulo, 
February 2008. 
.  Moreover, there was 




projects, and there were a number of court challenges to initial PPPs103
Secondly, the lack of networks between the state and multinationals, especially on 
infrastructure projects, contributed to the slow start for the PPP program.  As one respondent 
put it: 
.  This lack of inter-
institutional coordination made potential investors quite nervous about the PPPs. 
The Lula government at first did not know how to enter into a dialogue with the 




The administration did not enjoy ready contacts with international capital, as many of 
its most senior members had been relatively antagonistic to foreign firms in the past.  When 
policy coherence was stymied by the institutional complexities, the administration sometimes 
turned to personalistic ties between administration officials and corporations.  However, 
these kinds of ties took time to develop, especially as the PT had not controlled the executive 
before. 
The PITCE represents an attempt at open economy industrial policy which was 
initially undermined by characteristics of Brazilian institutions.  However, the administration 
continued to support the broad goals of the PITCE (especially the focus on innovation) even 
as its realization proved elusive.  In May 2008, the government effectively replaced the 
PITCE with the Production Development Plan, or PDP.  This more expansive and 
simultaneously more focused industrial policy was largely developed within the Casa Civil.  
The PDP was intended to correct some of the coordination problems that had plagued the 
                                                 
103According to a 2007 article in Folha de São Paulo, the PPPs were gradually being cancelled by the 
government or turned over to complete private financing. According to this article, a number of the projects 
were waiting to be cleared by the TCU court, which was investigating the legality of private participation 
(Medina 2007). 
 
104Interview, Glauco Arbix, São Paulo March 2008. 
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PITCE, especially interministerial conflict between the MCT and the MDIC.  It included a 
focus on defined goals in terms of innovation, investment, and export expansion, which had 
also been missing from the more general PITCE (see table 3.8).  It retained the emphasis on 
priority sectors, but also began to address some of the larger manufacturing bases of the 
Brazilian economy105.  The PDP was much more expansive, and incorporated such industrial 
behemoths as the automobile sector106
While it is still too early to judge the long-term success of the PDP in attracting non-
traditional forms of investment and reinvigorating innovation in Brazil, the reincarnation of 
the PITCE has generated a good deal of hope that this industrial policy will serve as a 
catalyst for new investment.  The Lula administration continually adapted its industrial 
policies, and the role for foreign investment within these policies, after 2002.  Coordination 
increased somewhat after the initial stages the PITCE.  The more recent policies were more 
goal-oriented and broad in their approach to FDI and the broader themes of innovation and 
export.  The reinvigoration of industrial policy under the Lula administration brought with it 
.  The PDP continued the tools used by the PITCE to 
incentivize innovation, including accelerated depreciation of innovation-intensive capital 
goods and subsidies for hiring qualified personnel.  The main funding lines for these 
programs, totaling more than R$6 billion, were often channeled through the BNDES and 
FINEP, as these institutions had demonstrated clear competence in their relationships with 
multinationals. 
                                                 
105This was perhaps in response to the criticism that the PITCE had targeted industries, such as semiconductors, 
which were too underdeveloped in the Brazilian economy to affect its overall growth in any meaningful way, 
even if they were to expand (Suzigan and Furtado 2006). 
 
106The strategic emphasis areas of the PDP also included: information and communication technologies, 
nanotechnologies, biotechnology, the defense industry, nuclear energy and the health industry. Interview, 




a more selective, active, and possibly developmentally beneficial approach to FDI.  The 
emergence of sectoral targeting in the current decade is certainly a sign of this evolution.   
Table 3.8 Macro goals of the Production Development Plan, 2008 




Expansion of Fixed 
Investment 
(Investment/GDP) 
21 percent or 
R$720 billion 
17.6 percent or 
R$450 billion 




Elevation in private 
expenditures in R&D 
(Private R&D/GDP) 
0.65 percent or 
R$18.2 billion 
0.51 percent or 
R$11.2 billion* 









1.25 percent or 
US$208.8 billion 
1.18 percent or 
US$160.6 billion 





Micro and Small 
Enterprises (number 






10 percent** 9,871 exporting 
MSEs (2009) 
* 2005 position 
** Growth between 2007 and 2010, not annual 
Sources: Koeller and Gordon (2010), ABDI (2009) 
 
Despite these changes, Brazilian institutions constrained the administration’s ability 
to effectively implement an active, discriminating industrial policy for international 
investment.  This section has illuminated the ways in which this process took place.  The 
PITCE is an excellent example.  Problems with inter-ministerial coordination threatened to 
derail the project from the beginning.  The two flagship institutions for implementation of the 
PDP, the ABDI and CNDI, are both responsible to a large set of ministries, with the CNDI 
perhaps less so.  They are not autonomous organizations in the tradition of the BNDES.  
Therefore there are reasons to be cautious about their possibilities for success.  The 
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institutions created during the Lula administration may follow the precedent established by 
previous executives: new institutions are established to house specific initiatives, and then 
lose influence once their political sponsors are out of office.  The ABDI may become simply 
another bureaucratic appendage.  Other parts of the institutional web are already 
demonstrating these characteristics.  APEX has not been particularly effective at stimulating 
investment, despite its redesign. 
Coordination problems are not the only institutional characteristics that threaten the 
PDP.  The problems with the PPPs outlined above are indicative of networking problems 
between state bodies and multinational firms.  Institutional representatives were unable to 
convince multinational firms to participate in infrastructure projects.  Part of this was due to a 
general lack of dialogue experience on the part of the government.  Established network 
connections between state bureaucrats and multinational firms are essential.  These 
connections need not lead to rent-seeking behavior; they can greatly facilitate investment 
promotion and subsequent spillovers. 
3.4 Institutions and Brazilian Investment Policy 
One of the fundamental contradictions of the Brazilian state is that it is 
simultaneously powerful and weak.  Brazil has one of the most expansive bureaucracies in 
the developing world.  Foreign firms operating in Brazil often complain about extensive 
regulation, endless forms, and requirements for the approval of this ministry or that agency.  
This is the well-known Custo Brasil, or Brazil Cost, which increases the complexity of doing 
business and is said to provide a disincentive for investment.  The requirements of 
compliance with an almost byzantine network of institutions do indeed make life difficult for 
firms.  The state superstructure also allows more opportunities for rent-seeking by particular 
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groups and even corruption.  However, the image of the all-powerful Brazilian state is 
misleading.  Despite its size, individual state institutions tend to exert relatively little power.  
Many of them are used as vehicles for political patronage.  As administrations come and go, 
they tend to create new institutions whose efficacy depends crucially on the support of the 
administration.  After the administration leaves office, however, the institution remains 
behind and often ossifies into little more than a make-work shop.  This is what Evans (1995) 
and Schneider (1991) refer to as bureaucratic modernization by ‘addition’ rather than 
‘transformation’.  What results is an expansive array of institutions, only a few of which have 
real power.  These bodies can confuse potential investors and investment promotion 
initiatives, or even work at cross-purposes to other institutions. 
The analysis of the development and characteristics of both investment promotion 
policy and institutions presented in this chapter provides a powerful explanation for the 
investment profiles of firms, examined in more detail in chapters four and five.  This work 
promotes the advantages of institutionalist perspectives.  Brazilian institutions vary over time 
and in cross-section, and this variation has implications for state leverage on firms.  
However, there are alternate explanations for the development of investment policy over 
time.  The next subsection considers two alternate explanations for the evolution of 
investment policy, and their weaknesses. 
3.4.1 Alternate perspectives and institutionalist critiques 
In addition to the literature on the institutional constraints to effective investment 
policy (and industrial policy more broadly) in Latin America, an alternate interpretation has 
emphasized the role of ideology and policy diffusion based on ideological similarities107
                                                 
107Among the works emphasizing ideological diffusion in economic policy reform in a wider Latin American 




Successive Brazilian administrations did not display the ideological cohesiveness in favor of 
neoliberal reform found elsewhere in Latin America.  This has moved Brazil towards 
pragmatic reform (Pinheiro et al. 2004), characterized by piecemeal liberalization and 
gradual, cumulative movements towards loosening restrictions on multinational firms.  Brazil 
did not experience a sharp break with import substitution, and some analysts have pointed to 
the ambivalence of politicians from all parties as the main determinant108
There is certainly something to this argument.  Ideological consensus on the merits of 
foreign investment is difficult to achieve within Brazil’s parties, let alone among them.  The 
PT has long displayed a deeply ambivalent attitude towards international capital, 
notwithstanding the recent conversion of some of its leaders
.  As applied to 
investment promotion, the ideological argument would suggest that the ambivalence of major 
parties to FDI has led to indirect and unfocused international investment policy.  
109
                                                 
108There have been instances of rapid neoliberal legislation, most notable during the Collor administration 
(1990-1992).  However, these flurries of activity have not been common and have generally not been 
sustainable. 
.  Even the more centrist 
PSDB of Cardoso did not display a cohesive approach to international investment.  The only 
major party that could reasonably be called a party of business is the Liberal Front, now 
known as the Democratas.  However, this party has not enjoyed the success of the PSDB or 
PT.  It also suffered from association with the party of the military regime (from which it 
evolved) during the 1980s and 1990s.  The Liberal Front also often failed to present an 
ideologically cohesive platform, and often functioned as a pure clientelist party, especially in 
its stronghold in the northeast of the country.  The PFL sometimes defended economic 
nationalism in the name of patronage, even when it contradicted neoliberal reform programs.  
 
109An interviewee suggested that the failure of the PPPs was due in part to the reluctance of PT leadership at the 
federal and state level to actively recruit foreign companies for infrastructure improvements (Phone interview, 
Carlos Pio, University of Brasília economist, Brasília, March 2008). 
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The lack of a unified ideological approach to international investment within parties has 
perhaps made a consistent policy platform more difficult. 
While this work does not argue in favor of an ideological approach to examining 
investment policy, it should be noted that the ideological ambivalence to international 
investment within and among Brazilian political parties and the institutional weakness of the 
Brazilian state structure for purposes of investment promotion are likely mutually 
reinforcing.  Encarnation and Wells Jr. (1985) argue that the more ambivalent a particular 
government’s attitude is towards FDI, the more likely the negotiating pattern will be diffuse 
and uncoordinated.  Similarly, Nelson (2005) identifies an ideological consensus among 
parties as one of the three factors that endow governments with the ability to attract non-
traditional FDI.  However, ideological ambivalence on its own is not satisfactory as an 
explanation for the lack of coordinated investment policy in Brazil.  Attempts at creating 
such a policy framework have failed during governments that favored neoliberal reform and 
they have failed during governments that advocated a return to a strong interventionist 
industrial policy.  While ideological cohesiveness can reinforce a strong institutional 
environment, it will not overcome a fragmented one such as found in Brazil. 
As another alternative to the institutional perspective advanced in this work, we could 
interpret the investment policy framework developed in Brazil solely as the result of societal 
interests.  The neoclassical approach adopts this framework, and at its extreme disregards the 
form and function, not to mention the historical development, of the state.  I have attempted 
in this chapter to emphasize points where interest group lobbying has an impact on 
investment policy.  For example, the automotive sectoral chambers of the mid-1990s won 
concessions from the state in the form of illiberal policy and protection.  This initiative also 
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had an impact on patterns of investment.  The high tariffs implemented prompted a number 
of multinational auto firms to set up shop in Brazil, proving that discriminating investment 
policy and rent-seeking can cohabitate.  Yet there are a number of reasons why an interest-
based approach cannot fully account for the evolution of investment policy in Brazil. 
Contemporary scholarship on the linkages between businesses groups and the state in 
Brazil emphasizes the role of domestic business organizations in forming policy.  Much of 
this work has pointed to the lack of effective business organization in Brazil, especially in 
comparison to other Latin American countries.  Ben Ross Schneider’s (1997, 2004) work has 
highlighted the diffuse and non-institutionalized relations between business and government 
in Brazil.  Schneider has emphasized the lack of an economy-wide peak organization for 
business, brought on by the lack of a sustained threat from the left and from the 
mismanagement of corporatist institutions created under the Vargas regime110
Kingstone (1999) has characterized businesses in Brazil largely as ‘takers’ of 
government policy, and emphasized personalistic and narrow connections between 
bureaucrats and businesses, which in turn contributes to non-programmatic lobbying by 
businesses.  This perspective has been reinforced by revelations about the extreme 
.  In contrast 
with other Latin American countries, Brazil never developed institutionalized collective 
channels for business politics in the post-corporatist era.  Thus, even if business preferences 
regarding FDI policy were homogenous (doubtful), the lack of effective channels for 
business representation makes their policy expression less likely. 
                                                 
110The most likely source of business influence, the Fundação das Industrias do Estado de São Paulo (FIESP) 
has been characterized as a venue for pragmatic problem solving rather than an ideologically coherent lobby for 
business interests.  FIESP has not emerged as a national mouthpiece for business in the era of democratization, 
and has been consistently undermined by other institutions seeking to promote a policy platform for business.  
None of these other institutions were successful in the long run (see Schneider 2004, ch. 4).  Interviews 
conducted during 2008 and 2009 revealed consistent firm complaints about the number of small institutions 




concentration of campaign finance in Brazil (Samuels 2001).  Diniz and Boschi (1993) have 
characterized the relationship between politics and business as jogos dos interesses, or 
lobbying for personal gain, rather than a system for collective lobbying efforts dedicated 
towards policy goals.  This further discounts the idea that investment policy could be wholly 
the result of interest group lobbying. 
Of course, business associations are not the only groups capable of mobilizing for 
specific policies.  Could the evolution of Brazilian policy toward FDI be a result of lobbying 
by other interest groups?  Labor movements in Brazil have become quite powerful, especially 
since the late 1970s.  The alliance between the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) and 
the PT has been particularly strong, despite some recent splits.  The Confederação Geral dos 
Trabalhadores (CGT) has also been particularly influential in Brazilian politics.  These 
modern labor movements have often been categorized as a ‘new unionism’, in the sense that 
these groups have succeeded in challenging the corporatist organizations for worker 
representation set up during the Vargas era.  These modern workers organizations have 
instead wielded significant power in a comparatively autonomous context, and have 
sometimes used corporatist frameworks to their organizational advantage111
The impact of these important interest groups on industrial policy is impossible to 
deny.  Yet when we extend the interest group approach to the question of investment policy, 
the picture becomes more complicated.  There are certainly instances where labor groups 
have been particularly influential in determining the presence or absence of a targeted 
investment policy.  The CUT was an important actor in the negotiations that led up to the 
sectoral chambers in 1991 and 1992, and during the implementation of the automotive 
. 
                                                 
111For different interpretations on the evolution of corporatist labor representation and the subsequent formation 
of new unionization patterns during the democratization process, see French (1992) and Seidman (1994). 
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regime in 1995.  In both cases, the CUT pressed for interventionist policies which in the 
latter case resulted in an influx of FDI.  However, while acknowledging the strength of 
Brazilian labor groups in policy formation, it is difficult to apply this societal perspective to 
investment policy.  This is partly because the interests of these groups are often quite 
heterogeneous, and dependent on sector.  The autoworkers unions in Brazil have often 
pursued policies that prioritize foreign investment, as the choice of investment over imports 
will be more beneficial for Brazilian workers.  However, other organizations such as 
Sindipeças (a corporatist holdover) were opposed to FDI in the 1990s and unable to prevent 
the influx of FDI in the auto parts sector from hollowing out indigenous production and 
innovation.  It is difficult to generalize, therefore, that investment policy is largely a result of 
labor group bargaining.  The interests of organized labor in Brazil in this regard can be quite 
diverse, and cross-cutting. 
The interest-based approach to explaining the evolution of investment policy has 
some merit.  It is acknowledged periodically in this narrative.  However, the institutional 
perspective attributes influence to the form and function of the state, and I have argued that 
this perspective generates more explanatory power for the analysis of investment policy in 
Brazil.  FDI can be a source of contention among societal groups, and as it is now occupying 
a large portion of the Brazilian economy, this will probably continue.  However, FDI by its 
very nature is often removed from many domestic societal groups.  The state serves as an 
intermediary between societal groups and foreign investors.  As such, the characteristics of 




 In this chapter I have examined the evolution of FDI policy in Brazil in the postwar 
period, concentrating on the Cardoso and Lula administrations.  I have emphasized the 
institutional barriers to the implementation of an active, discriminating approach to FDI, 
which in turn can impact the investment models of foreign firms.  While other possible 
explanations exist, I find the institutional perspective most convincing in explaining the 
evolution of Brazilian investment policy.  My investigation takes into account temporal and 
institutional variation, and reinforces the idea that consistency within institutions and 
coordination across institutions can have a strong impact on investment policy and patterns 
of FDI.  Original interview data and consideration of investment data provided by state 
agencies within Brazil further corroborate the importance of the institutional perspective. 
 While there have been some important instances of active, sectorally discriminating 
investment promotion policy, particularly during the Lula administration and within pockets 
of efficiency, the dominant trend has been one of passive and general investment policy, 
channeled through weak institutions.  The attributes of these institutions which impact 
investment are the multiplicity of bureaucratic organs and resulting coordination problems, 
inconsistency, and a lack of public-private networks.  These characteristics had repercussions 
on the investment profiles of firms operating in Brazil.  In the next two chapters, I argue that 
firms have adopted largely market-oriented approaches to investment in Brazil.  These 
investments, while valuable, offer fewer of the developmental spillovers so often sought by 
developing country governments.  In particular, the exporting and innovative activities of 





The Institutional Basis for Innovative FDI 
I believe Mexico should dedicate 100% of its oil revenues to developing human capital and 
technological development. None of us politicians should be able to touch that money. 
    Vicente Fox 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the 1960s and 1970s, and especially during the period of the economic miracle 
from 1968 to 1973, Brazil attracted numerous foreign firms to capital-intensive industries.  
These firms came to Brazil partly because of its enormous growth potential (corroborated by 
then-high growth rates), but they were also persuaded to establish local production because 
of Brazil’s high tariffs, which had been installed as part of the ISI strategy.  And while 
multinationals did enjoy initial commercial success in Brazil, their local innovative efforts 
were limited.  Local innovations of multinational firms mostly adapted existing foreign 
technologies to local conditions.  The increased presence of multinational firms in Brazil did 
not, therefore, contribute to technological spillovers and development in the way proponents 
of FDI had hoped.  This lack of innovative spillovers was added to the list of criticisms of the 
ISI strategy. 
 In Latin America, development models predicated on government support for rapid 
development based on ISI were replaced in the 1980s by a new orthodoxy emphasizing 
outward orientation and minimal governmental involvement, though the pace in 
implementation of this orthodoxy varied.  Among the central conceits of this new model 
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were elimination of price distortions, liberalization of imports, international export 
competitiveness, privatization of state owned enterprises, and the encouragement of FDI in 
diverse sectors112
This chapter continues the central argument of this dissertation that the characteristics 
of domestic political institutions are an important determinant of the investment profiles of 
multinational firms.  This chapter considers the innovative activities of multinationals in 
Brazil, the development of policies targeting innovation, and the institutions which represent 
the primary sources of state leverage on firm activities.  The subsequent chapter considers the 
ways in which multinationals integrate into international markets through imports and 
exports.  As both innovation and exporting offer potential benefits to countries that host 
foreign investors, these activities have often been targeted by host country governments.  
However, these benefits do not automatically arrive with investment.  They are more likely 
with specific characteristics of state policy and institutions.   
.  However, the new orthodoxy as applied in Latin America also neglected a 
number of important dimensions of successful development, some of which had been integral 
to the East Asian cases of rapid development.  This is particularly true in the case of 
innovation, and the role of state institutions and foreign capital in facilitating learning.  The 
new orthodoxy, put simply, overestimated the ability of market mechanisms to facilitate 
industrial upgrading in developing countries.  The new model also neglected the 
developmental role of political institutions in developing countries.  As Bruton (1998, 926) 
explained at the time: “Recognition of the deep-seated difficulties of the international transfer 
of technical and other knowledge, of the role of…history and institutions, and of the fact that 
effective implementation of policies is as important as the choice of policies – these are all 
missing (from the new orthodoxy).” 
                                                 
112These reforms and others were often referred to as ‘Washington consensus’ reforms (Williamson 1990). 
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In the case of Brazil, the varying innovative patterns of foreign investment can be 
partly explained by policy.  Between 1990 and 2004, Brazilian administrations pursued 
largely passive, general policy approaches to FDI.  Governments did not directly incentivize 
innovation among multinationals in the automotive industry until very recently.  In the IT 
sector, the informatics law, originally designed to preserve design competencies among 
national firms, was increasingly utilized by foreign firms in the 1990s and especially the last 
decade.  After 2004, this law was accompanied by other legal frameworks that directly 
incentivized innovation.  These new policies have proven decisive for the innovation 
activities of a growing number of firms.  Large multinational IT firms, such as Dell, 
Ericsson, Motorola, and SAP, have established R&D centers in Brazil in recent years, partly 
in response to innovation incentives under the new industrial policies.  These policies are 
beginning to bear fruit and generate innovative activity, especially given recent revisions to 
existing industrial policy.  Even with these successes, however, the Lula administration often 
encountered some obstacles in the implementation of new industrial policies.   
For most of the period under consideration, Brazilian investment promotion 
institutions displayed one or more of the characteristics outlined in chapter two which 
undermine effective investment promotion.  Namely, they were uncoordinated, inconsistent, 
and disconnected from firm networks.  Since 2004, some of these characteristics have been 
diluted, leading to more effective state leverage.  Moreover, a select few institutions have 
demonstrated a consistent ability (even before 2004) to incentivize innovation, and the 
resources of these pockets of efficiency have been expanded by new industrial policy 
frameworks.  The most prominent institution to demonstrate these characteristics, the 
Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos (FINEP), has succeeded in both attracting innovative 
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firms to Brazil and in incentivizing innovation among multinationals already in country.  The 
BNDES has also recently expanded its funding lines for innovation, and enjoys high levels of 
intra-institutional coordination, consistency, and strong connections with firms.  While 
innovation is still rare among multinationals in Brazil, the interactive effect of more active, 
discriminating policies and pockets of institutional efficiency should continue.  As the 
surveys, data, and reports in this chapter demonstrate, firms are increasingly likely to commit 
resources to innovation in Brazil and cite these institutions and policies as motivating factors. 
The chapter proceeds as follows.  In the introduction, I first offer a working definition 
of innovative activity, and consider how innovative activities among multinational firms can 
spill over to benefit the process of development in the host country.  I then integrate existing 
theories of technology transfer from international investment and the roles of institutions, 
paying special attention to the growing global value chain literature.  In section 4.3, I trace 
the development of innovation policies in Brazil and their application to FDI, the 
contemporary institutions charged with implementing these policies, and the broad empirical 
patterns which result.  Section 4.4 introduces the firm-level analysis of innovation activities 
in the automotive and information technology (IT) sectors, and section 4.5 concludes with a 
restatement of the links among policies, institutions, and firm innovation patterns.  For each 
industry considered, I describe the innovative efforts of multinationals since 1990 and 
contemporary innovation patterns.  I link these patterns to institutional characteristics, using 





4.1.1 Potential spillovers from innovative FDI 
 Among the various forms FDI can take in developing countries, technology-intensive 
FDI or innovative FDI is generally considered to be the most advantageous for development.  
In some sectors, most notably the IT sector, the technological frontier is so distant that 
foreign firms represent one of the only sources of innovation spillovers available to 
developing countries.  Yet the exact mechanisms of this spillover process remain unclear, 
sometimes even for governments seeking to attract technology-intensive investment.  It is 
worthwhile, therefore, to define what is meant by innovation as well as the possible benefits 
of these kinds of investments. 
 Fagerberg (2004) and Hall (2005) divide innovation into three sub-components: 
invention (the idea for a new product or production process), innovation (the first attempt to 
carry out this idea), and diffusion (transferring the idea or process to a different context).  
This definition is useful because it moves the concept of overall innovation beyond a strict 
focus on a technological advancement to include new ways of producing goods, or perhaps 
even new managerial techniques.  Innovations need not be limited to a new computer part or 
gear assembly.  As Fagerberg (2004) points out, this broader concept of innovation is also 
more useful in Latin America and other developing regions, where innovation often involves 
the diffusion of ideas developed elsewhere in a process of catch-up.  The diffusion of new 
models of production can be considered innovative in the sense that it means introducing 
production processes that had not been available before.  This study, therefore, adopts this 
larger definition of innovation. 
 There are a number of potential positive spillovers from innovative activities carried 
out by multinational firms in developing countries, as well as a few potential negative 
150 
 
externalities.  The transfer of innovative products or practices to domestic partner firms, or to 
other local agents, is a potential benefit.  Often this does not require the assent of the 
multinational – the transfer can be unintentional.  Zanatta (2006) identifies other potential 
benefits from innovative investment.  Innovative firms may further integration with the 
international marketplace and strengthen competitiveness.  Multinationals may aid in the 
development of domestic clusters focused on innovation, and may reverse ‘brain drain’ 
pressures in developing countries.  Multinationals may bring additional supporting FDI. 
There are also some potential negative externalities, even from highly innovative 
FDI.  The crowding out pheonomenon, by which multinationals reduce or eliminate the 
potential of domestic firms to develop, is a possibility.  Innovative domestic firms may face 
greater competition for limited resources, such as highly skilled workers.  Innovative 
multinationals may function as ‘islands’, demonstrating little contact with domestic firms and 
resisting technology transfer for various reasons.  Finally, a reverse technology transfer 
process is possible, with local innovations being absorbed and perhaps patented by 
multinational firms, who may or may not have incentives to share this innovation.  While 
these negative consequences of innovative FDI are possible, the actions of developing 
country governments in past decades suggest that they have determined that the benefits 
offset the possible costs of innovation-intensive investments. 
4.2 Determinants of Global Innovation Networks 
 As FDI has increased in the developing world in the past three decades, the 
innovative activities of multinational firms have spread to these locations as well.  The extent 
and geographic dispersion of this innovation diffusion is debated, but it seems clear that 
multinational firms are seeking new locations for innovation as they pursue more integrated 
151 
 
and coordinated production models.  Developing countries can offer attractive advantages for 
local innovative activities, such as a low cost and/or well-qualified labor force.  According to 
a recent report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, approximately 
two-thirds of global R&D spending is accounted for by business enterprises.  The lion’s 
share of this spending is done in developed countries.  However, the developing world is 
increasing its share of global business R&D spending.  Developing countries accounted for 
$20 billion in business R&D spending in 1996, or 5.4 percent of global business R&D 
spending.  By 2002 that figure had reached $32 billion or 7.1 percent.  Most R&D spending 
in the developing world is concentrated in Asia.  In 2005, six of the top ten developing 
countries in terms of aggregate business R&D spending were located in South, Southeast, 
and East Asia (UNCTAD 2005a, 106).  Much of this enterprise R&D spending is done by 
large multinational enterprises.  The internationalization of R&D is especially pronounced in 
Asia, as global companies apply polycentric innovation models and market their products to 
growing consumer classes.  Companies in the Fortune 500 list now have 98 R&D facilities in 
China and 63 in India (Economist 2010).  Many firms in knowledge-intensive industries, 
such as IT, have increased the number of people they employ in developing countries.  This 
spread of global innovation contradicts preconceived notions about how firms 
internationalize.  According to the more or less traditional view, multinational firms from 
developed countries retain their R&D in the home country, and take advantage of lower labor 
costs in developing countries by locating manufacturing in these countries.  Such production 
patterns, while still important, are only one possibility for firm organization.   
Given these patterns, we can ask why companies choose to internationalize 
innovation.  Innovation often requires protection of tangible and intangible assets in order for 
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firms to maintain competitive edges.  Firms may therefore demonstrate a reluctance to spread 
these activities to other countries, even if innovation takes place within a strictly controlled 
firm hierarchy.  However, there are a variety of motivations for firms to innovate abroad.  
Multinationals may establish innovation abroad in order to absorb new products and practices 
generated in other countries.  Economies of scale may be attainable abroad, assuming a 
suitable number of trained personnel can be found.  Local centers of excellence in developing 
countries, most often centered on universities, may offer opportunities for firms to establish 
research partnerships.  Innovation abroad may be necessary for parent companies to adapt 
products to local conditions.  This may be especially true for durable goods, which often 
necessitate more R&D in order to adapt to local conditions and therefore generate incentives 
for decentralized innovation (Zanatta 2006).  Decentralized innovation may also reduce the 
need for royalty payments113
4.2.1 The global value chain approach to innovation and upgrading 
. 
The growing complexity of international production networks has generated a 
relatively new theoretical approach to the study of firm organization and motivation.  Known 
as the Global Value Chain (GVC) framework, it attempts to develop typologies for the ways 
in which economic agents participate in the global economy.  Multinational investment 
models in the developing and developed worlds are difficult to penetrate theoretically, but 
GVC analysis has reinvigorated old debates with new approaches to analyzing global 
                                                 
113One of the first studies to systematically investigate the incentives for multinational innovation was done by 
Pearce (1989), who outlined many of the incentives described above.  Pearce categorized incentives as either 
“centripetal” or “centrifugal”.  Centripetal motivations for innovation, such as the need to safeguard intangible 
assets, brought innovation closer to the head office of the firm. Centrifugal forces, such as the need to adapt 





At this point it is useful to address the concept of industrial upgrading.  In a value 
chain perspective, upgrading should be seen as distinct from innovation.  Here I use the 
simple definition of upgrading outlined in Kaplinsky and Morris (2001, 37-38).  Upgrading 
refers to the development of “dynamic capabilities” within a firm, arising from its internal 
processes which facilitate learning, its access to regional or national systems of innovation, 
and/or its path or trajectory.  Upgrading possibilities depend crucially on the ability of firms 
to move away from activities where value added is low
.  At its core, the GVC approach refers to the sequence of activities undertaken 
by firms as they produce goods or deliver services.  In today’s highly integrated global 
economy, this sequence rarely happens within a single firm in a single geographic location.  
With regard to innovation, the GVC approach seeks to identify how firms participate in 
innovative processes, and how much additional value firm units may add to the final product.  
The decentralization of innovation within larger multinational firms provides opportunities 
for firm subsidiaries and partners within developing countries to develop innovative 
activities.  GVC analysis is useful when considering these opportunities because it forces 
analysts to ask how a firm is participating in a sector with high technological dynamism.  In 
other words, the participation of a developing country firm (or subsidiary of a multinational) 
in an innovative sector is not a guarantee that the firm will realize spillovers.  This instead 
depends on the location of innovative activities within the larger multinational. 
115
                                                 
114For literature on GVC analysis, including broad overviews of the field, see Gereffi and Kaplinsky (2001), 
Sturgeon (2001), and Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005). 
.  If and when firms are able to 
engage in a sustainable pattern of upgrading through innovation, and if these firms enjoy 
 
115Giuliani, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2005) and Kosacoff et al. (2008) point out that little possibility for 
upgrading exists in industries where competition is based on cost and barriers to entry are low. 
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substantial linkages to the host country’s economy, the likelihood of developmental 
spillovers improves greatly. 
There are many factors which determine whether firms display innovative 
characteristics in developing countries.  According to the GVC framework, industries display 
variety along three different dimensions: “1) the geography or character of linkages between 
tasks, or stages, in the chain… 2)  how power is distributed and exerted among firms and 
other actors in the chain, and 3) the role that institutions play in structuring business 
relationships and industrial location” (Sturgeon et al. 2008, 2).  While the focus of this work 
is on the role of institutions in conditioning the investment behavior of firms (the third GVC 
dimension), the concept of ‘value chain governance’, which relates to the second point, must 
be acknowledged.  Multinational firms make decisions about locations of various chain 
activities based not only on the institutional environment, but also on power relations among 
different parts of the chain.  To illustrate this point, it is useful to consider how multinational 
firms may coordinate production.  In a simple dichotomy, value chain researchers have 
proposed that most multinational production networks are either ‘buyer driven’ or ‘producer 
driven’.  Buyer driven value chains, prominent in such industries as garment manufacturing, 
food and retail, allow large global buyers, which may have not manufacturing facilities 
themselves, to coordinate global production and distribution.  Producer driven chains, in 
contrast, are coordinated by large multinational corporations that retain more direct control 
over the production system.  Producer-driven chains are more common in technology and 
capital-intensive industries such as the automotive industry and computer/IT production.  
More recent GVC research has expanded and complicated this dichotomy to account for 
more complex firm governance structures.  Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005) propose 
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five typologies of value chain governance, ranging from market transactions characterized by 
arms’ length relationships between assemblers and suppliers to hierarchies, where different 
stages in the production chain are absorbed within and controlled by a single corporate 
structure.   
Taking into account the different possibilities for value chain governance, it seems 
likely that how a company organizes and governs its global value chain will have an impact 
on the potential for upgrading in developing countries.  Kosacoff et al. (2008) have suggested 
that it is difficult for firms in developing countries to develop more complex activities within 
the value chain when these firms are located in hierarchical structures.  This is because firms 
in these structures often issue specific requests to their suppliers, without exchanging 
intangible and other assets which might facilitate a learning process.  In less rigid value chain 
structures, suppliers are often given more freedom to participate in product development, and 
the parent company may develop a cooperative relationship with suppliers based on the 
exchange of new information about innovations. 
Thus it seems likely that the form GVC governance takes should impact the 
possibility of innovation and upgrading.  This underscores the point that political institutions 
in developing countries are not deterministic.  That is, encouraging innovation among 
multinational firms is not simply a matter of ‘getting the institutions right’ or putting in place 
the right policies.  Much will also depend on how a global value chain is organized and 
governed.  Firms translate comparative advantages into profit possibilities through their 
internal decision-making.  Host countries can have an important impact on this process, but 
the dominant models of organization in different sectors will impose limits on what 
institutional and policy fixes can accomplish in terms of incentivizing innovation and 
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spillovers.  Even with that caveat, however, the role institutions play in structuring innovative 
possibilities is an important one.  It is to this role that I now turn. 
4.2.2 Institutions and innovation-intensive development 
 The economic orthodoxy common in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s held that 
technological change would develop endogenously as countries of the region liberalized their 
economies and allowed foreign investment to penetrate sectors which had previously been 
off limits.  However, missing from this approach was the recognition of the serious obstacles 
facing the international transfer of technical knowledge.  Technological assets enjoyed by 
firms are subject to high uncertainty and intangible characteristics, and their diffusion 
through liberalization is not as automatic as other firm assets.  Challenges to the economic 
orthodoxy have often focused on this lack of attention to the mechanisms of technological 
change.  ‘Evolutionist’ approaches, drawing on neo-Schumpeterian ideas about the 
importance of continual ‘creative destruction’, have argued that countries cannot rely on the 
market mechanism alone but must be able to absorb and perpetuate new technologies116
                                                 
116For neo-Schumpterian approaches to political economy and innovation policy in Brazil specifically, see 
Gadelha (2001) and Suzigan and Furtado (2006). 
.  
According to this line of logic, the contribution of an open economy to technological change 
depends not only on a country’s comparative advantages but also on such diverse factors as 
the organizational quality of its bureaucracy to the intellectual property regime in place.  
Technological advancement and upgrading takes place only when the conditions for 
innovation are in place, and these conditions go far beyond the tariff rate.  As Cassiolato and 
Lastres (1999) point out, the conditions necessary for successful technology transfer are path-
dependent and deep-seated, therefore they take time to change and require active 
commitment of governments. 
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The record of FDI in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s suggests that this 
interpretation has some weight.  The dramatic increase in FDI in the region since the early 
1980s contributed much to domestic economies, but in many cases the contribution of these 
flows to processes of technological change were less than expected (Mortimore 2000).  The 
failure of the orthodox model to deliver a sustainable process of technological upgrading has 
reinvigorated the debate over industrial policy.  Notwithstanding the somewhat reduced 
‘policy space’ brought on by processes of globalization and WTO rules, many scholars have 
come to the conclusion that industrial policy can be effectively employed to generate inertial 
processes of technological change and development.  Adopting the evolutionary approach to 
technological change, Lall (2004) argued that industrial policy could build competitiveness in 
instances where market failures exist, and that this policy could be especially beneficial if 
applied selectively.  Schrank and Kurtz (2005) identify a form of industrial policy emerging 
in select Latin American countries, distinct from the kinds of industrial policy pursued during 
the ISI period, which combines support for select industries with outward orientation.  This 
open economy industrial policy challenges the traditional dichotomy between inward-
orientation/statism and outward-orientation/laissez-faire, arguing that industrial policies 
increasingly in vogue in Latin America combine support for select industries with an 
emphasis on external competitiveness.  The authors argue that this kind of industrial policy 
has the potential to move countries toward self-perpetuating cycles of innovation and 
development, while avoiding the rent-seeking tendencies of earlier ISI models. 
Implicit in these approaches is the recognition that state policies and institutions 
matter for paths of technological upgrading.  There is ample reason to apply these arguments 
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to the patterns of bargaining between states and multinational firms117
 When choosing among locations in which to initially locate R&D activities, the 
institutional environment in potential host countries is important.  Meyer (2001) notes that 
intellectual property rights may be weakened in countries with underdeveloped institutions, 
and this is a disincentive for R&D-intensive investments.  Innovation-intensive investment is 
risky, especially if the firm has proprietary rights over intangible assets.  Well-functioning 
institutions should help to reduce the risk for these kinds of investment.  Beyond the initial 
form of investment, well-functioning institutions may help attract R&D centers of already-
established companies.  I note in this chapter where large, established multinationals in the 
auto and IT industries have committed new resources to domestic R&D in Brazil, partly in 
response to changing institutional dynamics.  Innovation, and the possibility of upgrading it 
brings with it, is a product of firm priorities interacting with and being changed by host 
country priorities. 
.  As the GVC 
approach has shown, global patterns of production have become more complex and firms 
have adopted a variety of governance structures.  Firms have incentives to develop 
innovative networks abroad.  However, they may also have incentives to centralize these 
activities.  Whether firms do innovate in developing countries depends not only on the 
internal characteristics of the firm, but also on conditions in the host country.  Domestic 
institutions are among these factors, and can impact the R&D profiles of firms, both at the 
time of entry and in subsequent periods.  
                                                 
117There are few studies which have examined the impact of national policies and institutions on the R&D 
efforts of multinational firms. One such study, conducted in the United Kingdom (Pearce & Papanastassiou 
1999), asked multinationals from a variety of geographic locations to identify the most important factors leading 
to establishment of R&D centers abroad in open-ended questionnaires.  Financial support from the government 
and government policies were mentioned by 34.8 percent and 15.2 percent of responding firms, respectively.  In 




4.3 The National System of Innovation in Brazil 
 From a neo-Schumpeterian perspective, technology transfer is as much a function of 
policy and institutional settings in developing countries as it is a result of internal firm 
characteristics.  That is, analysts must pay attention to a diverse set of preconditions ranging 
from educational systems to intellectual property regimes.  Policies that impact innovation, 
and the institutions which create and promote them, form the basis for a national system of 
innovation (Nelson 1993).  Multinational firms can figure prominently in a national system 
of innovation, if institutions and policies exist that simultaneously draw attention to the 
country’s potential for innovation-intensive investment and increase the likelihood of 
technological spillovers from that investment.  Yet the institutional foundations for 
innovation in Latin America are weak.  In a 2008 ECLAC report entitled Trade, investment 
and fragmentation of the global market: Is Latin America lagging behind?, the authors point 
out that the “institutional fragility” of many countries in the region makes innovative 
spillovers from investment difficult (Kosacoff et al. 2008, 44). 
 In Brazil’s case, the market opening and economic stabilization of the early to mid-
1990s was, in general, not accompanied by an emphasis on innovation.  Though isolated 
elements of policy support for innovation existed in the early 1990s, such as the informatics 
law, the almost singular focus on macroeconomic stabilization crowded out any meaningful 
development of the country’s NSI in relation to multinational firms.  During this period, 
successive administrations focused on reducing barriers to investment.  In the absence of 
incentives for innovation and without strong institutions to channel those policies, firms 
reverted to market-seeking forms of investment.  The following two subsections illustrate 
these deficiencies, while also acknowledging isolated instances of policy efficacy.  I first 
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outline in broad terms the development of innovation policy since the Collor administration.  
In the following section I outline the primary institutions charged with encouraging 
innovation among firms operating in Brazil.  Although the state hesitated in the 1990s to 
implement an industrial policy that might have strengthened innovation, the Lula 
administration took steps to revive the focus on innovation and strengthen the NSI.  
Nevertheless, the lack of focus on innovation in the 1990s has created a strong competitive 
disadvantage for Brazil vis-à-vis its competitors, as section 4.3.3 demonstrates. 
4.3.1 Policies to encourage innovation, 1990-2010 
 Following Collor’s election in 1989, the Brazilian government embarked on a 
sustained liberal reform program that lasted through the end of the 1990s.  While the pace of 
the reforms varied from year to year, the overall direction stayed constant: privatization, 
eliminating protection for local industry (with some important exceptions), and increasing 
openness to international capital.  During this decade of liberalization, active policies to 
promote innovation were neglected, both for multinationals and domestic firms.  It was not 
until the second half of Cardoso’s second presidential term that a substantial focus on 
innovation appeared again in Brazilian industrial policy.  The 1991 Informatics Law 
(8248/91) established some incentives to preserve local R&D efforts among IT firms, which 
were largely taken over by multinationals following the end of the market reserve policy of 
the 1980s.  The influx of multinational IT companies in the 1990s dramatically reduced the 
number of Brazilian software and hardware firms, and those that were absorbed by 
multinationals had many of their local design components downgraded or replaced by 
imports (Tigre and Botelho 2001).  The informatics law did target IT firms specifically, but 
was initially designed not to encourage innovation among multinational firms but to preserve 
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local design competencies of Brazilian IT firms.  It was also designed with the Free Zone of 
Manaus (ZFM) firmly in mind, where firms enjoyed a different tax regime altogether (the 
Manaus zone is detailed in chapter five).  In 2001, 2004, and 2009 the law was amended and 
expanded, with more multinationals taking advantage of its incentives118.  The law allows a 
firm to reduce the tax on industrial products (IPI) by up to 70 percent initially, as long as the 
firm adheres to the principles established by the basic productive processes (PPB)119
 There is some substantial anecdotal evidence that the informatics law has generated 
innovative activity among multinational IT firms operating in Brazil.  Queiroz and Zanatta 
(2007) note that the informatics law has attracted a number of multinational IT companies to 
Brazil and influenced the investment models of firms already in country.  HP in 2006 
transferred its software assembly operation in Rio Grande do Sul to the Technological Park 
of the PUC-RS, known as the TecnoPuc.  Dell utilized the incentives of the informatics law 
to construct its Software Development Center (GDC) in Brazil, one of only four in the world.  
In 2002, this unit was also transferred to the TecnoPuc (Queiroz and Zanatta 2007).  Others 
.  Firms 
used to enjoy a deduction of up to 50 percent on sales tax for items used in R&D, though this 
was revoked in 1997.  In order to access these incentives, firms must also spend a minimum 
of 5 percent of sales on R&D activities (Stal and Campanário 2005), though this has been 
reduced to 4 percent for some firms.  As Koeller and Gordon (2010, 14) note, the levels of 
tax exemption within this law fluctuate from year to year, and this “produces great instability 
regarding the implementation of the law.” 
                                                 
118Queiroz et al. (2003) note that a number of multinational IT firms have taken advantage of the incentives 
offered by the informatics law. However, the authors also note that some of these companies have not increased 
their R&D activities in Brazil as they have in other countries.  Some of the Brazilian affiliates of these 
multinationals are spending only the 5% of total net sales on R&D activity, as required by the law. 
 
119The PPB are complex sourcing requirements which favor domestic procurement of inputs. 
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benefitted by the incentives include Motorola, Siemens, Lucent, and Nortel.  Motorola 
established the Instituto de Pesquisas Eldorado, which offered course on informatics and 
telecommunications, while using the incentives and subsidies of the informatics law. 
 At the end of the second Cardoso administration, a number of ‘sectoral funds’ were 
established within the Ministry of Science and Technology.  These funds were instruments 
designed to finance research, development, and innovation projects in Brazil, channeled 
through FINEP and the Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico, or 
CNPq (Pacheco 2003).  While these funds were not specifically designed to benefit 
multinational corporations, multinationals could access the funds if they were willing to 
partner with local universities or research centers.  There were 13 funds originally, though 
this was later expanded to 16 (14 focused on specific sectors and 2 cross-cutting or horizontal 
funds).  These funds transformed the way in which the federal government incentivized 
innovation, and did represent a move toward sectoral targeting and discriminating industrial 
policy120
 During the Lula administration, the Brazilian government became much more active 
in promoting an innovation-centered industrial policy, though it was hampered at times by 
.  In a more general sense, the sectoral funds and the informatics law represent the 
only substantial policy initiatives with a direct effect on the innovative activities of 
multinational firms in Brazil during the mid and late 1990s.  These effects were not 
necessarily indented, as both the informatics law and the sectoral funds were implemented in 
order to preserve innovation among domestic firms.  Most of the major sectoral policies of 
the 1990s, such as the automotive regime, ignored innovation altogether. 
                                                 
120The sectoral funds came to represent a substantial portion of the budget for the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MCT).  Between 1998 and 2004, the budget for the ministry grew by R$1.6 billion, of which 
roughly R$1.2 billion was from the sectoral funds.  By 2004, the sectoral funds represented about 40 percent of 
the MCT’s budget (Pacheco 2007, 17). 
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the legacies of both ISI and the more orthodox reform period of the 1990s.  In 2003, the 
government announced the Policy for Industry, Technology and Foreign Trade (PITCE) as 
the central industrial policy for the new administration.  The PITCE created the short-lived 
Sala do Investidor, or ‘investment room’ designed to attract investment.  However, the focus 
of the PITCE was directed toward the trade balance, and the effort to increase value-added 
exports.  Microelectronics was a focus sector for the PITCE, partly because the trade deficit 
in this sector had reached $US 7.4 billion in 2004 (Stal and Campanário 2005).  However, 
the PITCE suffered from a number of problems initially, including problems of inter-
institutional coordination and a lack of articulation of policies designed to boost target 
sectors121.  A newspaper report at the time of its inception cited a number of common 
complaints about the PITCE among firms and economists, including its “vague” nature and 
lack of specific instruments for implementation122
For these reasons and others, the PITCE was subsumed within the Production 
Development Plan (PDP) in 2008
.  The various bodies responsible for 
implementing this industrial policy were not able to work in concert, and at times differed on 
even fundamental components of the policy, such as how measures to increase investment in 
target sectors were to be implemented. 
123
                                                 
121For some of the problems in the implementation of the PITCE industrial policy, see Arbix and Martin (2010), 
Koeller and Gordon (2010), and Suzigan and Furtado (2006).  Also see chapter three in this volume. 
.  The PDP expanded the scope of the PITCE in terms of 
sectors of the economy targeted, while simultaneously streamlining the administration of the 
 
122There were also complaints about the lack of a body to coordinate the implementation of the industrial policy 
(“Política industrial ainda vai a debate” 2003). 
 
123At the end of 2009, the PDP had become the only industrial policy. This was part of an attempt to join many 
preexisting policies into a unified industrial framework. The PDP designates target sectors for federal research 
funding, and moves sectors which had not been covered by previous innovation policy, such as the automotive 




policy.  The PDP also set concrete targets for the expansion of fixed investment, the rate of 
private R&D expenditures, growth in Brazilian exports, and dynamization of micro and small 
enterprises.  Both of these policy initiatives were broad attempts at establishing a unified, 
innovation-centered program for Brazilian industrial development.  As Doctor (2009) notes, 
these initiatives were primarily designed to encourage continuous innovation in nationally-
owned enterprises.  However, the policy packages also attempted to incentivize innovative 
linkages between multinational corporations and domestic firms, the PDP more so than the 
PITCE. 
 Although the PITCE did not endure as an industrial policy, it was influential because 
during the PITCE framework two laws were passed with important implications for the 
innovative activities of foreign firms in Brazil.  The first was the Innovation Law 
(10,973/2004).  This law was organized around three axes: “the constitution of a favorable 
environment for strategic partnership between universities, technological institutes and 
companies; incentives for the participation of science and technology institutes in the 
innovation process; and incentives for innovation in companies”124.  The effort to increase 
connections between universities and firms was especially important, as these kinds of 
connections have been lacking in Brazil125
                                                 
124Ministry of Science and Technology (www.mct.gov.br) 
.  The innovation law was primarily oriented to 
micro and small companies, but it did help the Lula administration move the focus of 
industrial policy away from strict manufacturing and more toward innovation.  Importantly, 
the law guaranteed intellectual property rights to innovations that had commercial viability, 
 
125Pacheco (2007, 30) points out that the gap between public and private research activities was one of the 
primary bottlenecks identified at the national conference of science, technology, and innovation in September of 
2001.  This conference helped put in motion legislation which appeared as a preliminary version of the 




even if researchers did not register their innovative activities as patents immediately.  The 
innovation law did not offer fiscal incentives, only subsidies.  As such, it has not compared in 
size with the Lei do Bem and the informatics law in terms of outlays126
The second important piece of legislation was the Lei do Bem, or Law of the Public 
Good (11,196/2005), which established fiscal incentives to encourage innovation in firms.  
Of particular note are the incentives contained within the Lei do Bem which offered tax 
deductions on industrial products used for R&D, the accelerated depreciation of capital 
goods used for innovative purposes, the accelerated amortization of intangible goods used in 
innovation, and partial state remuneration of researchers with appropriate qualifications 
employed by firms.  The fiscal incentives provided by the Lei do Bem are increasingly 
utilized by firms
.  However, it is an 
important law in that it seeks to establish firm-university networks. 
127
The PDP corrected some faults of the PITCE by establishing more direct connections 
to the executive branch, but many of the Lula administration’s policy initiatives towards 
.  In 2006, the first year the incentives were available to firms, 130 firms 
took advantage of the incentives.  The incentives granted this year totaled approximately 
R$230 million.  In 2007, the number of benefitted enterprises increased to 321, and the 
incentives totaled R$ 884 million.  Moreover, the medium package of fiscal incentives per 
firm increased from R$1.77 million to around R$3 million, a more than 60% increase 
(ANPEI 2009, 32-36).  The incentives offered by the Lei do Bem appear to be more and more 
attractive, as awareness increases among firms. 
                                                 
126A recent study by the think tank Instituto de Estudos para o Desenvolvimento Industrial (IEDI) found that the 
Lei de Inovação had disbursed R$319 million in subsidies in 2008, which represented only 6 percent of total 
governmental fiscal incentives and subsidies for R&D in Brazil.  The Lei do Bem represented 30 percent and the 
informatics law represented 61 percent in that year (IEDI 2010, 10). 
 
127There was some initial confusion about the incentives offered by the Lei do Bem and the Innovation Law 
reported in the Brazilian press, and firms have petitioned the government for more specificity (Salgado 2007). 
However, firms increasingly recognize the potential benefits of incentives in these laws. 
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innovation ran up against an institutional framework that was often too fragmented to 
properly implement ambitious industrial policy.  The Lula administration moved towards a 
focus on developing innovation through active industrial policies.  In contrast to earlier 
periods of reform, the Lula administration also joined the focus on macroeconomic 
stabilization with a renewed emphasis on sectoral targeting.  The state has refocused its 
efforts on creating favorable conditions for innovation, competition, and development.  Table 
4.1 relays information about the increases in industrial policy funding since 2006, when the 
first disbursements from the innovation law and the Lei do Bem took place.  The industrial 
policy framework was strengthened under Lula, and the emphasis on innovation is apparent.  
Yet despite the best intentions of this new industrial framework, there are numerous 
institutional deficiencies which have made its implementation problematic.   
Table 4.1 Fiscal incentives and subsidies of R&D spending, 2006 to 2008, millions R$ 
 2006 2007 2008 
Fiscal Incentives    
Lei do Bem (Law 11,196/05) 229 883.9 1544.5 
Lei de Informática (Law  8248/91) 1990.1 2759 3183.6 
Economic Subsidies    
Lei de Inovação (Law 10,973/04) 40 344.8 319 
Interest Equalization (Law 10,332/02)  66.3 78.7 89.6 
Other Subsidies 32.6 32.4 49.5 
Total (Incentives and Subsidies) 2358 4098.8 5186.3 
Private Expenditure in R&D 11738.2 13422.8 15160.7 
Total Support/Private Expenditure in R&D (%) 20.1 30.5 34.2 
Fiscal Incentives/GDP (%) .09 .14 .16 
Subsidies/GDP (%) .01 .02 .02 
Total Support/GDP (%) .10 .16 .18 
Source: IEDI (2010, 10-11) 
 
4.3.2 The institutional framework for innovation 
 Brazil has had a strong developmental state at least since the Estado Novo of Vargas 
in the 1930s.  It makes theoretical sense, therefore, that state institutions would respond 
enthusiastically to the return to an activist industrial policy under the Lula administration, 
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after the decade-long flirtation with neoliberal orthodoxy.  Even as the macroeconomic 
stabilization program was put in place in the mid-1990s, many organizations within the 
Brazilian state apparatus remained committed to an activist role in development strategy.  
However, there are a number of reasons why Brazilian institutions have not fulfilled the 
requirements of innovation-based growth.  As outlined in chapter two, state institutions 
should display a number of characteristics in their interactions with multinational firms.  
First, to be effective the state must display a high degree of institutional coordination.  
Second, institutions must be consistent.  Third, institutions must have a close relationship 
with private actors, while simultaneously resisting rent-seeking behavior.  In many of these 
dimensions, Brazilian institutions have come up short.  Brazil has not yet been able to 
translate its broad constellation of state institutions into an effective conduit for a national 
system of innovation. 
 While Brazilian institutions have in general not facilitated the transition to a 
knowledge-based economy based on innovation, there have been a few success stories.  Here 
it is useful to remember Evans’ (1995) characterization of the Brazilian state apparatus as 
neither wholly ‘developmental’ nor entirely ‘predatory’.  That is, pockets of efficiency 
coexist with institutions dominated by clientelism and even corruption.  Effective institutions 
emerge through a distinct process.  In addition to satisfying the three conditions outlined 
above, these institutions also display some unique characteristics in the Brazilian context.  
Pockets of efficiency in Brazil tend to operate autonomously.  They take time to develop 
reputations for independence and apolitical operation.  They exhibit meritocratic hiring and 
promotion, and develop a strong sense of institutional identity and mission.  They are close to 
multinational firms and develop patterns of productive interaction with the private sector. 
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 One of the silver linings for executive power in the Brazilian presidential system has 
been the ability of politically strong presidents to create powerful institutions that can be 
developmentally catalytic.  Presidents can also independently channel resources to 
institutions with proven track records.  While the BNDES in suffered through periods of 
political manipulation before the 1980s, it has since then largely been able to maintain its 
autonomy and effectiveness as a source of funding for development projects.  The BNDES 
enjoys a reputation for meritocratic staffing and independence from political pressures, and it 
offers low interest loans to a variety of firms, most of which are apportioned regardless of the 
firm’s country of origin128
 Also influential in terms of innovation is another institution that began within the 
BNDES and has subsequently been successful in incentivizing innovative activity among 
.  The BNDES has recently designated innovation funding lines 
specifically to target large businesses and encourage local innovative activity.  A new line, 
created in 2008, is known as the Technological Innovation fund, which is designed to support 
innovation projects of over R$1 million.  The interest rate on this line of funding is 4.5 
percent annually.  A second funding line, known as Capital Inovador, was created in 2006 
and has a maximum support amount of R$200 million, renewable up to 12 years (ANPEI 
2009, 45-46).  The BNDES has another funding line, known as FUNTEC, which does not 
target firms directly but instead funds research centers that may or may not partner with 
multinational firms.  Nevertheless, this funding line has the potential to benefit innovative 
multinationals.  Finally, the program PROSOFT supports the development of the national 
software and IT industry, but is exclusively focused on Brazlian firms.  While the increased 
emphasis on innovation is relatively new dimension of BNDES funding, it is important. 
                                                 
128This is true since the 1988 amendment to the Brazilian Constitution, which did away with distinctions on 




multinationals in Brazil.  FINEP was founded in 1967 as a funding agency for scientific and 
technological research.  It now operates within the structure of the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MCT), and provides grants to universities and research centers.  The agency 
also loans money to companies that participate in innovative activities.  FINEP has largely 
followed the example set by the BNDES and has retained an emphasis on meritocratic 
staffing, independent financing, and independence from political pressures.  Its resources 
have expanded dramatically in the past decade.  In 1999, FINEP received support from the 
Sectoral Funds, and its financial resources multiplied by a factor of ten by the end of 2009129
                                                 
129Phone interview, Dr. Eduardo Costa, FINEP Director of Innovation, Rio de Janeiro, May 2008. 
.  
It now commands approximately R$2.8 billion in resources, roughly evenly divided between 
universities and firms (BNDES 2009).  Within FINEP, the Pró-Inovação program was an 
important source of finance for firms with sales of more than R$10.5 million.  This program 
allowed innovative firms to access FINEP funds at long term interest rates below the current 
6.25% rate.  This program expanded from 41 firms in 2005 to 47 in 2007, with an estimated 
value of R$558 million (ANPEI 2009, 37-38).  In 2008, this program was reformulated in 
accordance with the guidelines established by the PDP industrial policy, and renamed 
InovaBrasil.  The interest rate on projects funded by this program is set at a low 4.25% per 
year.  This program combines credit lines with other instruments such as vouchers, which can 
be used by firms to contract domestic research partners.  At the end of 2008, this program 
had signed contracts with 16 operations.  36 additional operations, worth approximately 
R$560 million, were approved and in the process of drawing up contracts.  The median value 
of support per firm was R$31 million, whereas in 2005 the Pró-Inovação program had a 




growing in scope.  FINEP also offers competitions for subsidy programs directly to firms 
since the innovation law was implemented, though these funds are increasingly directed to 
micro and small enterprises.  Finally, FINEP is now sponsoring incentives for the nascent 
Brazilian venture capital market, holding competitions for VC funds and establishing fiscal 
incentives130
 Beyond BNDES and FINEP, effective and autonomous institutions within the 
Brazilian bureaucracy are few.  While these organizations have managed to develop an 
institutional culture which marries an emphasis on institutional objectives over personal 
advancement with meritocratic staffing and independent financing, the rest of the 
institutional landscape does not display similar characteristics.  There are a number of other 
institutions which prioritize and support innovation among multinational firms, but none 
have the resources or independence of these two organizations.  The Ministry of Education 
operates the CNPq, which has among its aims the insertion of highly qualified workers into 
research positions in firms.  The Programa Nacional de Capacitação de Recursos Humanos 
para o Desenvolvimento Tecnológico (RHAE) sub-organization within CNPq is specifically 
designed to award financing to individuals with masters or doctorates, when they move to the 
private sector.  This program is designed to close the wide gap between the private sector in 
Brazil and academic institutions.  However, the RHAE funds are largely aimed at micro and 
small enterprises, and as such do not have a great impact on multinationals.  Moreover, the 
.  FINEP has been able to establish itself as an independent development 
organization focused on innovation.  Though its budget is much smaller than that of the 
BNDES, the organization has a growing track record for incentivizing innovation among 
cooperating firms.  This is true for large multinationals and small and medium enterprises. 
                                                 




budget for this organization is not great, the individual awards are not considered large, and 
its mission has changed often in the past twenty years131.  A recent evaluation of this 
organization found that both multinational and domestic firms were largely unfamiliar with 
the RHAE program, and those that were did not demonstrate enthusiasm132
 For multinational firms, there are few institutions that can serve as reliable partners 
for innovation, whether through incentives or requirements.  Those institutions that do exist 
to support firms do not typically induce innovation among firms, but rather serve as support 
networks for already-established innovative patterns.  For example, an institution known as 
SENAI has long existed within the framework of the Confederação Nacional da Indústria, a 
body which dates to the 1930s and has a long history of corporatism.  SENAI, created in 
1942, provides training for 2.3 million Brazilian workers, following the model of vocational 
training established in Germany.  The budget for SENAI is funded by a one percent payroll 
tax from the industrial sector of Brazil.  By all measures it is extremely effective in providing 
trained graduates for Brazilian and foreign companies.  Yet on the innovation frontier it is 
still largely responsive to company needs.  It often receives contracts from multinational 
.  CNPq maintains 
a larger emphasis on encouraging research and funding research in academia.  Its other grants 
to doctoral students in Brazil are plentiful.  However, it has not emphasized the potential 
linkages between firms and researchers until recently, and focused less on multinationals in 
Brazil than on small (mostly Brazilian) enterprises.  There are signs this is changing with the 
innovation law and the Lei do Bem.  However, the gap between support for innovation in 
education and applied commercial innovation remains large. 
                                                 
131Interview, Nizardi Michelini Queiroz, CNPq, Brasília, June 2009. 
 
132According to the study (ANPEI 2009, 89), firms were concerned about the fragility of the RHAE awards, and 
did not see how they could integrate awardees into their enterprises.  Firms regarded the scholarships offered by 
RHAE as relatively small, and not conducive to professional integration. 
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corporations, such as Microsoft and Volkswagen, to provide those companies with graduates 
trained in a number of in-demand skills.  Some of these skills may even be firm-specific.  
However, these contracts are done in response to firm requests.  As a representative of the 
organization indicated, SENAI in general “follows the industrial trends”133
 It is perhaps too soon to tell whether the new institutions established or renovated 
during the Lula administration, most prominently the ABDI, APEX, and CNDI, will serve as 
enduring catalysts for innovation among multinationals in Brazil.  As detailed in chapter 
three, these institutions are the cornerstones of Lula’s reinvigorated industrial policy, which 
aimed to increase the competitiveness of Brazilian products and develop key industries.  
Foreign capital played a prominent role in this policy, and the investment promotion efforts 
of APEX in particular emphasized the potential complementarities between firms’ goals and 
the strategic goals of the government
.  As a vocational 
education system, SENAI succeeds in providing low-cost courses to Brazilians, in many 
cases endowing workers with skills that they would not have had access to otherwise.  
However, SENAI has not functioned as an institution through which the government 
establishes a national innovation system, despite its potential to serve that role. 
134
                                                 
133Interview, Frederico Lamego, SENAI, Brasília, June 2009. 
.  These institutions, drawing on the incentives 
established by the Lei do Bem and the Lei do Inovação, made attraction of high technology 
investment a priority.  However, there are a number of potential stumbling blocks.  Most 
notably, the unwieldy governing structure of these institutions, in which no fewer than ten 
governmental ministries are taking part, means that rapid response and adaptability are more 
 
134APEX seemed like the logical successor to Investe Brasil, and some considered it the closest thing to a 
centralized investment promotion agency in Brazil. However, the potential of this agency has been undermined 




difficult.  Moreover, successive administrations have established institutions only to see them 
subsequently morph into venues for rent-seeking.  APEX has not been especially effective as 
an investment promotion body, notwithstanding its recent makeover.  Four interviewees (two 
peak organization representatives, one firm representative, and one governmental agency 
representative) were pessimistic about the organization’s ability to attract investment due to 
its unwieldy structure and lack of autonomy from the rest of the bureaucracy.  Moreover, 
there are fears that the newly created CNDI, which serves as a council of high representatives 
advising the president on investment policy, may morph into a rent-seeking body (Suzigan 
and Furtado 2006). 
 The institutional configuration in Brazil thus demonstrates some divergent tendencies 
with regard to support for innovation.  Institutions like the BNDES and FINEP manage to 
function relatively well in encouraging innovative practices and selectively incentivizing 
innovative activity.  They enjoy political support, yet are separate enough from congressional 
oversight to not be dependent on it.  They also operate with relative autonomy from the rest 
of the institutional mélange, while simultaneously accomplishing meritocratic staffing 
practices and consistent, effective conditionality for those companies which enjoy their 
support.  Based on interviews conducted for this study and other sources, both institutions are 
well-regarded and connected with multinational firms.  Yet these institutions are sometimes 
undermined by other characteristics of the Brazilian state.  In a seminar on Brazilian 
innovation policy at the University of São Paulo in November of 2007, the executive director 
of Votorantim Ventures, one of the largest private economic conglomerates in Brazil, argued 
that even though incentives of bodies like the BNDES and FINEP were generous, the 
“inconsistencies” and “contradictions” of the government dissuaded firms from asking for 
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these incentives.  For example, if an enterprise develops a new product it is often treated by 
some regulatory agencies as a “monopolist” (Sennes 2009, 28). 
Besides the examples of BNDES and FINEP, there are relatively few effective venues 
for state support of commercial innovation.  There is a severe disconnect between academic 
innovation and innovation in the private sector in Brazil.  Moreover, most of the institutional 
framework in places does not prioritize innovation in a consistent fashion, relying instead on 
market-following programs and sporadic, ad hoc attempts at institutional innovations which 
may not outlast their political sponsors.  Coordination problems, which helped derail the 
PITCE and Investe Brasil, remain important barriers to effective investment promotion.  
While APEX and ABDI enjoyed political support during the Lula administration, it remains 
to be seen whether the Rousseff administration will continue this trend. 
4.3.3 Empirical patterns of innovation in a comparative perspective 
 In the next section (4.4), I put forward empirical investment patterns to argue that 
innovation among multinationals in Brazil is not substantial, and connect these patterns to the 
institutional framework through firm interview responses, data, and reports.  Before doing so, 
however, it is useful to examine broad innovation indices in comparative perspective.  Table 
4.2 conveys Brazil’s (and Latin America’s) relative deficiencies on these innovation 
measures.  Other authors have pointed out the poor performance of the region on a number of 
innovation measures, including patents, low R&D expenditure, and so on (Katz 2006; Nelson 
1993).  These outcomes are partly an outgrowth of a developmental model that for too long 
focused on ‘economy as production’ rather than ‘economy as innovation’.  That is, Brazil and 
other countries in the region failed to prioritize innovation as a base for industrial growth, 






 Compared to other countries in Latin America, Brazil scores relatively well on 
measures of domestic patents, R&D expenditure, and science enrollments.  However, the 
‘tigers’ of East Asia demonstrate significantly higher innovation propensities on these points.  
The lack of private R&D effort is especially evident in Brazil compared to other countries.  
Roughly the same proportion of R&D is performed by businesses (40%) and higher 
education (38%).  In countries such as Korea and Singapore, as well as other more developed 
countries, the distribution is much more heavily weighted to business135
Kosacoff et al. (2008, 45) have characterized the innovation systems in Brazil, and 
Latin America as a whole, as “weak and disarticulated”, and in particular point to the lack of 
interaction between the productive sector and universities.  Zanatta and Queiroz (2007) and 
Suzigan and Furtado (2006) echo this point, arguing that there is comparatively little 
interaction in Brazil between academic laboratories, public universities, and research 
institutions and the private sector, despite ample production of highly trained individuals 
with substantial skill sets.  The data outlined above support this assessment, and demonstrate 
.  This is perhaps 
indicative of the lack of practical application of university-sponsored research in Brazil, or 
more probably the lack of substantial university-firm connections.  Another contrast is 
evident in the financing of R&D.  Most R&D effort in Brazil is financed by government, 
whereas a prominent financing role for business is evident in some of the East Asian 
countries.  While Brazil scores better than some of its Latin American peers on some of these 
indices, strong contrasts with some East Asian success stories are evident.  The primary 
sources of research and development spending in Brazil continue to be the state and 
universities, with comparatively low levels of firm innovation. 
                                                 
135Kosacoff et al. (2008) note, based on UNESCO data, that the distance between Sweden or Israel and 
Colombia in terms of private R&D spending as a percentage of GDP is 30 to 1.  Between Korea and Brazil the 
ratio is 5 to 1. Yet Korea only spends 25% more than Brazil in R&D in the public sector. 
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a national system of innovation which is still heavily dependent on state support.  In short, 
private industry does not participate in innovation at the same rate in Brazil as in countries 
like Korea, Singapore, and even China.  This is partly due to policy legacies and institutional 
environments that have not emphasized or incentivized private innovation. 
4.4 Innovation among Multinationals in Brazil 
 Thus far I have considered only the broad contours of innovation in Brazil.  However, 
the primary goal of this chapter is to consider the innovative effort of multinational firms in 
Brazil, and how that effort is impacted by domestic institutions.  In the following section, I 
consider the innovative activities of multinational firms specifically.  Toward this end, I 
employ data from a number of different governmental bodies, both in the United States and 
Brazil, which reveal the innovative effort of multinational firms.  I also utilize firm 
interviews in the automotive and information technology sectors to establish connections 
between innovation practices (or lack thereof) and the characteristics of Brazilian institutions.  
The firm interviews are particularly useful because they allow open-ended responses from 
firm directors and governmental liaisons within firms.  These individuals were asked a 
variety of questions about the institutional environment in Brazil, and their perceptions of 
institutional efficacy.  The responses of firms in both sectors were then aggregated, in order 
to indentify patterns among a variety of firms.   
In total, 27 firms were interviewed over two years.  These 27 can further be 
subdivided into four categories.  Four were flagship automotive manufacturers, and all of 
these have a substantial manufacturing presence in Brazil.  Nine were large multinational 
auto parts manufacturers.  Most of these companies entered Brazil during the liberalization 
and consolidation of the auto parts sector in the mid-1990s.  Nine others were flagship 
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multinational IT firms, sometimes referred to as original equipment manufacturers (OEMs).  
Some of these firms offer software exclusively, but most because of their size offer a variety 
of IT services, ranging from system integration to business process outsourcing.  The 
remaining five are contract manufacturing firms in the IT sector.  These are firms which 
provide mostly hardware for larger IT firms.  The CMs, as they are known, are not suppliers 
in the traditional sense, as they may have the capacity to develop complex production tasks 
on a global scale and often have independent design capabilities.  CMs in the IT industry in 
Brazil have often been drawn to the Free Economic Zone of Manaus, because of that area’s 
generous tax incentive structure. 
The firm interviews serve to establish connections between the innovative activity of 
firms and their perceptions about the institutional environment in Brazil.  The operating 
hypothesis is that the Brazilian state displays institutional characteristics which make 
innovation among multinationals less likely.  In section 4.4.1, I first provide an examination 
of empirical patterns of innovative effort among multinational firms, drawing on datasets 
from the US and Brazil.  I then examine the automotive and IT sector in turn, integrating 
interview responses into a discussion of the participation of multinational firms in the sector, 
overall innovation patterns, and existing incentives for innovation.  Section 4.5 synthesizes 
and contrasts both sectors. 
4.4.1 Patterns of multinational innovation: economy-wide patterns 
 There is some disagreement among analysts about the degree to which multinational 
firms engage in innovative activities in Brazil. A number of recent studies have come to 
divergent conclusions about whether foreign firms engage in innovation.  Arbix (2005) found 
that national firms were more innovative than multinational firms, with national firms 
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investing 80 percent more in R&D than transnational affiliates with similar size and 
characteristics136.  De Negri and Turchi (2007) echo these findings, arguing that transnational 
corporation subsidiaries in Brazil spend 62 percent less R&D related to turnover than 
national firms.  However, a number of other studies find the reverse relationship.  Braga and 
Willmore (1991), in their logit analysis of 4,342 firms in Brazil, find that foreign ownership 
increases the likelihood that a firm will engage in research and development.  A more recent 
study conducted by the ANPEI organization in Brazil on the basis of survey data collected by 
the Pintec 2005 study argues that the rate of innovation among multinational firms in the 
country is essentially double that of domestic firms (ANPEI 2009)137
 The authors mentioned above make use of different micro-level surveys carried out 
by different governmental organizations, which may contribute to the divergent findings.  For 
this chapter, I begin with the same survey data employed by Nonnenberg (2003), in his study 
of foreign investment in Brazil in the 1970s and 1990s.  These data are accessible at the 
Fundação Seade in São Paulo.  I employ data from firm surveys carried out by this 
organization’s extensive survey of economic activity in the state of São Paulo in 2001.  
While this survey is limited to one state in Brazil, it is a comprehensive survey of more than 
40,000 firms in the largest industrial state.  Most of the country’s productive capacity is 
located within São Paulo, and despite more recent movement away from the industrial 
heartland the plurality of FDI still comes to São Paulo.  Table 4.3 relays information about 
the innovative activities of multinational and national firms in the state of São Paulo. 
. 
                                                 
136Arbix argues that multinationals in Brazil are much more likely to use technology developed in the firm’s 
home country, most often for market-oriented investments. 
 
137The authors of this study are quick to point out, however, that when the sample is limited to those firms with 
500 or more employees, the gap in R&D activity between multinational firms (88.6%) and nationally owned 
firms (75.9%) is smaller than in the overall sample.  Moreover, innovative efforts of multinational firms were 
concentrated in the more ‘traditional’ sectors of basic metallurgy and food and beverage investments. 
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The survey separates firms according to their capital of origin, and it also separates 
firms according to whether or not they participate in innovation.  Unfortunately, the survey 
does not match the two, to indicate whether foreign firms are also innovative.  As may be 
expected, the IT sector demonstrates the highest percentage of innovative firms among those 
surveyed.  Among the total sample of innovative firms, the dominant source of innovation 
among firms is Brazilian in origin (1,245 of the 1,656 firms).  These 1,656 firms may be 
foreign or totally Brazilian owned.  In other words, Brazilian-owned firms probably dominate 
this sample of innovative firms, and therefore dominate the innovation source data.  
However, there are only 25 instances of primarily foreign-sponsored innovation (1.5% of all 
1,656 innovative firms), whereas firms with foreign investment represent 2.7% of the 41,206 
firms surveyed.  Admittedly, these are very rough tools to determine innovation origins.  
However, it does seem that foreign participation in innovation is lower than the population of 
foreign firms in the Brazilian economy might suggest. 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 represent data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
investment division, which chart the financial and operating activities of US investment 
abroad.  Again, this limits the scope of the analysis (in this case to American firms rather 
than the state of São Paulo).  These data, while incomplete, allow a temporal perspective on 
the innovative activities of American multinational firms in Brazil.  Figure 4.1 contains 
information on the R&D efforts of firms in the wholesale trade, information, professional, 
and manufacturing sectors, while Figure 4.2 only considers the sub-components of the 
manufacturing sector138
                                                 
138R&D expenditures as a percentage of value-added are used.  Value-added is used as opposed to sales, 
because it reveals “the portion of the goods and services sold or added to inventory or fixed investment by a 
firm that reflects the production of the firm itself”.  Compared to sales, value-added is a preferable measure of 













firms Source of Innovation 







TOTAL 41,206 1,092 (2.65%) 
1,656 
(4.02%) 1245 377 25 
Office Machines and 




Automation  563 21 (3.73) 
111 
(19.72) 77 31 1 
Electronics and 
Telecommunications  413 30 (7.26) 81 (19.61) 71 6 4 
Chemical Products  1,891 224 (11.84) 261 (13.8) 218 33 9 
Machinery and 
Equipment  2,995 241 (8.04) 
327 
(10.92) 240 84 4 
Electrical Equipment  1,196 63 (5.26) 103 (8.61) 91 11  
Other Transport 
Equipment  216 12 (5.55) 15 (6.94) 12 2 1 
Basic Metallurgy  1,207 24 (1.98) 52 (4.31) 40 12  
Textiles  1,804 25 (1.38) 76 (4.21) 60 15  
Automotive Parts 
and Assembly  1,145 92 (8.03) 48 (4.19) 36 12 1 
Rubber, Plastics 2,920 96 (3.28) 117 (4.01) 69 47 1 
Oil Refining, 
Alcohol  75   2 (2.67)  2  
Leather, Footwear  1,335   33 (2.47) 28 4  
Cellulose and Paper  883 20 (2.26) 21 (2.38) 11 9  
Metal Products  4,951 69 (1.39) 109 (2.2) 74 34 1 
Food and Beverage  4,064 67 (1.64) 79 (1.94) 58 18 1 
Printing  2,673 25 (0.93) 48 (1.8) 20 26 1 
Other Industries  4,612 65 (1.4) 80 (1.73) 64 16  
Mineral Products, 
Non-Metals  2,866 18 (0.62) 39 (1.36) 26 11 1 
Extractive Industry  574  4 (0.7) 4   
Clothing and 
Accessories  4,697   10 (0.21) 7 2  
Notes: Survey asked whether firm had introduced a product integrating new or significantly improved 
technologies in the period under consideration. 
Source: Fundação Seade. Pesquisa da Atividade Econômica Paulista. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
rather than from production that originates elsewhere, whereas sales data do not distinguish between these two 











There appears to be no broad evidence of a significant increase in the R&D activities 
of US multinational firms since 1999, with the possible exception of professional, scientific, 
and technical services.  In the category of computers and electronics products, the amount of 
innovative effort has decreased markedly in the past three years.  However, these data are not 
available after 2006 for this sector, which is when many of the new innovation incentives 
(through the Lei do Bem, for example) became available.  The lack of innovative effort 
among American firms in Brazil is also apparent when the BEA data are examined in 
comparative perspective, as in table 4.4.  Here, the R&D expenditures of majority-owned 
American firms in 2007 are contrasted with similar efforts of majority-owned American 
firms around the world.  In this table I adopt the approach used by Hiratuka (2009), in which 
the share of American R&D activity displayed by a given country is contrasted with that 
country’s share of overall value added (in ratio form)139
 Both the data from the São Paulo survey and the data from the US BEA suggest that 
the innovative efforts of multinational firms in Brazil are not substantial, in a temporal or 
comparative perspective.  These datasets reveal important dynamics of investment, both from 
Brazil’s largest investor and to its most important industrial state.  Having briefly examined 
the general contours of innovation among multinationals using existing governmental 
. The last column in table 4.4 
displays these data.  A higher ratio value demonstrates that a country exhibits more local 
R&D by American firms than its share of global American value-added would suggest.  
Brazil scores better than other Latin American countries on this measure, but lags behind 
countries such as China, India, and Korea.  Moreover, American firms in Brazil do not 
exhibit large R&D expenditures (as a percentage of value added) compared to American 
firms in these other countries, as indicated by the first column.  
                                                 
139Hiratuka used sales data, but I employ value-added for the reasons elaborated in footnote 138. 
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datasets, I now turn to sector-specific elaborations on the relationship between Brazilian 
institutions and firm innovation patterns in the automotive and IT sectors. 




expenditures as a 
percent of value-
added 
Share in total R&D 
expenditures of US 
multinationals 
Share in total 








0.90 3.39 11.54 0.29 
Brazil 1.91 1.76 2.83 0.62 
Chile 0.39 0.14 1.11 0.13 
Costa Rica 0.54 0.02 0.12 0.18 
Mexico 0.99 0.88 2.74 0.32 
         
China 5.47 3.41 1.91 1.78 
Hong Kong 0.73 0.27 1.13 0.24 
India 5.18 1.11 0.66 1.68 
Korea, 
Republic of 7.64 2.69 1.09 2.48 
Russia 1.43 0.29 0.62 0.46 
Singapore 2.82 1.59 1.74 0.92 
Taiwan 1.48 0.28 0.59 0.48 
         
Total of all US 
affiliates 3.08 100 100 1 
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, financial and operating database for US multinational investment.  
Adapted from Hiratuka (2009), author elaboration of BEA data. 
 
4.4.2 Innovation in the Brazilian automotive sector 
Multinational automotive assemblers have been active in Brazil since the 1950s, 
when the Kubitschek administration put in place a number of domestic content requirements 
and limited imports as part of a concerted effort to develop a Brazilian automotive industry.  
Between 1959 and 1974, annual output of automobiles in Brazil multiplied by a factor of ten, 
accounting for over 50 percent of all Latin American automotive production (ECLAC 2004, 
186 
 
118).  This production was almost entirely driven by multinational firms.  Ford, VW, Fiat, 
and GM, collectively known as the ‘big four’, continue to have multiple production facilities 
in the country, many of them located within the ‘ABC’ industrial region south of São Paulo.  
Since the macroeconomic stabilization of the 1990s, these firms have been joined by other 
assemblers, including Honda, Mercedes, Peugeot, and Renault.  Many of these more recent 
arrivals were induced to establish productive capacity in Brazil by the automotive regime put 
in place in 1995, which expired in 2000.   
The automotive regime, or RA, was decidedly illiberal in nature, in fact it represents 
the most prominent exception to the liberal stabilization reform measures so common in 
Brazil during this time.  It was not the first attempt at industrial policy in the automotive 
sector in the 1990s, but it was the most influential.  Growing domestic demand in Brazil for 
automobiles was driving up imports in the early 1990s and threatening a serious trade 
imbalance.  Argentina already enjoyed protective measures designed to increase domestic 
manufacturing, and the Brazilian administration feared losing investment opportunities 
within the context of Mercosul.  The RA was successful in attracting new investments, even 
among those companies which already had established presence in Brazil140
                                                 
140However, these successes have been qualified in a number of studies, which note the often excessive tax 
credits offered to companies and the crowding out of local parts manufacturers brought on by the RA.  Laplane 
and Sarti (2002) note that the automotive policies of the 1990s involved substantial transfers of social costs 
among consumers, government, and firms, not always with beneficial results.  De Negri (1999) estimated that 
the automotive regime, with its significant import duties and tax manipulation, cost Brazilian consumers 
approximately $33.9 billion in its period of operation, with a deadweight loss of $7 billion. 
.  Table 4.5 lists 
some of the most prominent investments undertaken by flagship automotive assemblers in 
the late 1990s.  Many of these investments were made in direct response to the incentives 
offered by the RA.  By 2000, the incentives of the automotive regime had been increasingly 
challenged by the WTO as they violated some key tenets of the developing Trade-Related 
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Investment Measures (TRIMs) legal framework (Quadros and Queiroz 2001).  However, by 
that time the regime had already succeeded in many of its goals. 
Table 4.5 Notable automotive assembler investments in Brazil, 1995-2005 (not including heavy trucks) 
Firm Date Plant Location Investment (millions US) Initial Capacity 
Fiat 1998/1999 
Betim, MG/ 
Belo Horizonte, MG 500/200 500,000a/100,000 
Ford 2001 Camaçari, BAb 500 60,000 
General Motors 1999 Gravatai, RS 600 120,000 
Honda 1997 Sumaré, SP 100 30,000 
Mercedes-Benz 1998-1999 Juiz da Fora, MG 820 70,000 
Mitsubishi 1998 Catalão, GO 35 8,000 
Peugeot-Citroën 2000 Porto Real, RJ 600 100,000 
Renault - Nissan 1999 São José dos Pinhais, PR 750 120,000 
Toyota 1999 Indaiatuba, SP 150 15,000 
Volkswagen/Audi 1999 São José dos Pinhais, PRc 600 120,000 
a Expansion of existing plant in Betim, engine production 
b Plant was initially to be built in Rio Grande do Sul, but political disagreement led to relocation. Data refer to 
initial projections for plant. 
c VW also expanded its engine production in São Carlos, SP in 1998 




At roughly the same time as flagship assemblers were establishing new plants in 
Brazil, the network of suppliers that had provided parts to these assemblers since the 1960s 
was undergoing a dramatic transformation.  New production methods in the global auto 
industry brought substantial reorganization to the auto parts sector.  The most prominent 
result of liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization in the 1990s was the thorough 
denationalization of the auto parts industry.  Companies such as Visteon, Dana, and Johnson 
Controls established or expanded their Brazilian operations in the 1990s, often through 
purchasing existing Brazilian parts companies.  Humphrey (2003) notes that in 1995, the 25 
largest auto component companies were split roughly evenly between Brazilian-owned and 
multinational companies.  By 2001, 8 of the 12 Brazilian-owned companies had been sold to 
multinationals and one had become a joint venture.  This process of denationalization was 
related to larger trends in the automotive industry, particularly the advent of follow sourcing. 
Also important is the increase in modular production within global automotive value 
chains.  Since the 1980s, supplier-driven value chains in the automotive industry have moved 
away from strict hierarchical relationships among suppliers and assemblers.  Increasingly, the 
largest suppliers (almost always multinational) are given greater responsibilities to develop 
entire vehicle subsystems, whether those are seats, A/C systems, or wire harnesses.  The 
flagship assemblers, in turn, delegate many of the design elements of these subsystems to the 
suppliers (Humphrey 2003; Humphrey and Memedovic 2003).  The largest assemblers have 
by now established worldwide production networks, and often work in close partnership with 
the flagship assemblers such as Ford and GM.  In Brazil, the arrival of large multinational 
auto suppliers has resulted in experimentation with other logistical models, most notably the 
industrial ‘condominiums’ wherein multinational suppliers have distinct facilities within 
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flagship assembly plants.  These new kinds of production practices are exemplified in Brazil 
by Ford’s new plant in Camaçari, Bahia and VW’s plant in Resende, Rio de Janeiro.  In these 
plants, large automotive suppliers seek to simultaneously minimize inventory and transaction 
costs in their relationships with the final assembler.  Though these new plants have returned 
mixed results, they represent dramatic departures from older, hierarchical relationships 
within the automotive value chain141
 The broad contours of innovation in the automotive industry since the 1990s can be 
summarized as follows: while there have been instances of innovation among multinational 
auto firms in Brazil, these innovations have not often been prompted by Brazilian policy or 
institutions designed to encourage innovation.  From the early 1990s to approximately the 
mid-2000s, industrial policy in Brazil all but ignored innovation incentives in the automotive 
sector.  Moreover, there is reason to suspect that the innovative activities of parts suppliers in 
Brazil have been downgraded since the denationalization process of the 1990s.  Innovation is 
concentrated in the largest multinational suppliers (often referred to as tier 1), but that 
innovation is often not carried out locally and instead done abroad.  Brazilian suppliers, 
where they still exist, are concentrated at lower tiers, where firms compete on price and little 
.  While the new firm structures are innovative in the 
sense that they integrate new production processes, the parts producers in these plants mostly 
use designs developed elsewhere.  In previous decades, automotive assemblers and Brazilian-
owned parts producers would operate in separate plants and sign long-term contracts.  These 
trends therefore represent a fundamental shift in models of production in the automotive 
sector in Brazil, and while they are new they do not necessarily generate much value-added. 
                                                 
141There have been some concerns about the lack of value-added activities in these new plants, with many of the 
inputs being imported or added as complete packages (ECLAC 2003, 125).  Moreover, in some of these 





innovation takes place.  This bifurcation, between multinational assemblers and suppliers 
with relatively high innovative activity (often done abroad) on the one hand and Brazilian-
owned firms with relatively low innovative activity on the other hand, remains a dominant 
feature of the Brazilian automotive industry today142
 In general, multinationals in the automotive sector in Brazil engage in comparatively 
little innovation or upgrading.  This is true of both assemblers and suppliers.  However, there 
are a few examples of innovation in the recent past.  This innovation has taken place not as a 
result of effectively-communicated governmental incentives, but rather because of changing 
production models in developing countries.  The sectoral chambers in the early 1990s 
prodded the government to reduce taxes for cars with smaller engines, in an attempt to meet 
growing domestic demand.  These cars (which have engines up to 1,000 cc) have 
subsequently expanded dramatically as a proportion of total vehicle sales
. 
143
 Quadros and Queiroz (2001) make an important distinction between automakers 
following a strategy of trans-regional or ‘world car’ production, exemplified in Brazil by 
Ford and to a lesser extent Renault, and those automakers sticking to a multi-regional 
.  These cars 
required some technological adaptation for driving conditions in Brazil and other developing 
countries, and as a result some multinational assemblers and parts suppliers established or 
strengthened the innovative efforts of their subsidiaries in Brazil.  This innovation would 
eventually become the basis for independent design capabilities for a select few Brazilian 
subsidiaries of multinational assemblers. 
                                                 
142One interviewee maintained that the Brazilian auto component industry was divided into two levels itself, 
with the multinationals dominating higher value-added goods and the Brazilian firms becoming smaller, family-
owned and spread out (Phone interview, Tom Rideg, Latin Business Chronicle & Tendencias Magazine, São 
Paulo, February 2008). 
 
143Salerno et al. (1998) note that the sales of small-engine cars in Brazil increased from 4.3 percent of all cars 
sold in 1990 to 64 percent in 1997. 
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strategy.  The implication for innovation of the world car model, in which a few core car 
models are produced by the parent company that can function in a variety of developing 
countries, is that R&D functions will be centralized as the automaker attempts to consolidate 
and streamline production for the core models.  The multi-regional production model, by 
contrast, continues the tradition of manufacturing slightly modified models in individual 
countries, making adaptations where necessary and maintaining independent design centers 
to cope with specific conditions in different developing country markets.  GM and Fiat, and 
until recently VW, have shown signs of maintaining this model in Brazil.  Both production 
models have profound implications for local design capabilities.  Ford after 1995 chose a 
strict policy of design centralization in an attempt to mount a world car production line.  
Accordingly, in the late 1990s Ford dismantled its Brazilian engineering team, reducing its 
engineering staff from more than 400 to a little more than 100 (Zanatta 2006).  GM, in 
contrast, has maintained a substantial R&D commitment in Brazil.  By the 1990s, GM do 
Brasil had developed the capability to substantially modify models developed abroad.  This 
led to the initiation of the Blue Macaw project, which used the existing Corsa platforms to 
develop the Celta model.  This was an important development because the Brazilian 
subsidiary of GM directed the design of the Celta model for the Brazilian market.  GM do 
Brasil was also able to play a key role in the development of the Meriva minivan, which was 
sold in Brazil and then in Europe. 
 Fiat, which like GM and Ford has a substantial (if slightly shorter) history in Brazil, 
has also demonstrated some independent design capabilities in its Brazilian subsidiary.  Its 
Palio model, developed in the mid-1990s for emerging markets, was designed through close 
cooperation of the Italian and Brazilian engineering teams.  As Queiroz et al. (2003) point 
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out, Fiat recently installed a new design center in Betim to continue developing new models 
for emerging markets.  Volkswagen shows signs of moving towards a consolidated world car 
production model, despite its history of independent design in Brazil.  The Gol model, which 
has sold millions of units in Brazil for decades, was partially designed and developed in 
Brazil.  However, VW shifted strategy in the 1990s and began to centralize its R&D 
activities.  The more recent Polo model was mostly developed in Germany, and the Brazilian 
R&D unit has recently been through a status downgrade. 
 Clearly there is a mixed picture in terms of the local innovative efforts of flagship 
automotive assemblers in Brazil.  The consolidation of innovative activities at the head 
offices of these companies is a real trend in the automotive industry.  Many manufacturers 
are seeking world car or trans-regional capabilities, and changes in global supply networks 
such as follow sourcing make it possible to produce similar models in a wide variety of 
developing countries.  However, as Quadros and Queiroz (2001) point out, it would be a 
mistake to assume that convergence around this production model is inevitable or universal.  
There are strong reasons for firms to continue adapting models to conditions in Brazil.  As 
the relatively small-scale Meriva example demonstrates, there is even some precedent for 
exporting locally-designed models from Brazil. 
 The incidence of local innovative effort among flagship automotive assemblers, while 
not pervasive, is still more than token.  This was corroborated by a number of interviews with 
high-ranking officials from four of the Brazilian subsidiaries of these firms.  In these 
interviews, executives emphasized some areas of R&D expansion while simultaneously 
pointing out the difficulties in further expansion of innovative effort in Brazil.  In one case, a 
divisional manager pointed out a substantial R&D commitment in Brazil, involving the 
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construction of a new research center currently underway.  This executive also pointed out 
the development of flex-fuel vehicles in cooperation with parts suppliers as an example of 
local innovation efforts144
 Based on these interviews and the histories of the major automakers active in Brazil, 
it becomes clear that while there are instances of innovation in Brazil, there are relatively few 
examples of innovation that are not geared toward adapting existing models to local 
conditions.  Both GM and Fiat have committed some resources to local innovation.  The Blue 
Macaw project has been successful, and Fiat’s Betim plant is demonstrating substantial 
design autonomy.  However, many of the new (since the 1990s) arrivals exhibit no local 
R&D effort at all.  More important for this analysis is the recognition that where firms have 
made substantial commitments to local innovation, they do so because of internal firm 
strategies (such as the choice between a world car and multi-regional strategy) and market 
conditions.  In other words, firms made decisions about where to locate R&D in their value 
chains based on firm strategy, not R&D incentives in the auto industry, which were 
.  However, this same executive noted that there were a number of 
barriers to further R&D investment, including the lack of English-speaking engineers and a 
pronounced lack of cooperation with local universities.  Another executive from a major 
assembler noted that their R&D facilities in Brazil were not operating at the cutting edge, and 
attributed this partly to the lack of sufficient credit lines for innovation.  Still another 
interviewee noted that the firm had entered into partnership with local universities, but that 
this partnership had so far only consisted of competitions for students to win internships at 
the company.  There were no joint development projects, which had already been put in place 
in other countries. 
                                                 
144It should be noted, however, that flex-fuel was largely developed in partnership with a multinational 
components firm (Bosch), though some of the design process did take place in Brazil (Interview, ANFAVEA, 
São Paulo, February 2008). 
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practically nonexistent in Brazil until the past five years.  Brazilian policy has largely 
neglected innovation incentives since the early 1990s, again with some exceptions since 
2004.  Both Quadros (2002) and Queiroz et al. (2003) fault the otherwise interventionist 
automotive regime for disregarding innovation incentives altogether.  Quadros (2002, 27) 
points out that multinational assemblers and parts producers were incentivized to export, but 
not to conduct local R&D or product design: 
Upgrading…is left to the market.  It does not receive proper federal or state level 
attention.  Unfortunately, the market does not seem to fill the gap either. 
 
While the RA did succeed in attracting new investments to Brazil and helped restore 
the current account balance by dramatically expanding local production, it omitted any 
reward or other incentive for firms conducting local R&D. 
 In the case of auto parts, there is further evidence of scaling back of innovative 
activities.  As mentioned above, the Brazilian auto parts sector has undergone a dramatic 
transformation since the market liberalization period of the early 1990s.  Unlike assemblers, 
parts companies did not enjoy a protective regime during this period.  As a result, many of 
the Brazilian auto suppliers which had been in place since the 1950s were purchased by large 
multinational parts manufacturers or driven out of business entirely.  The only part of the 
value chain where Brazilian firms maintain a significant presence today is in the lower tier 
manufacturers, where price competition is common and long-term contracts with assemblers 
or even other parts companies are rare.  In a study of more than 120 auto parts supplier firms 
in Brazil in 2001, Salerno et al. (2003) found that design activities were not distributed 
uniformly along the supply chain.  These kind of activities are concentrated in the first tier 
suppliers, which by now are almost entirely multinational.  Among these companies, the 
authors found that most of the significant phases of the design process are carried out abroad.  
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Fewer than one third of the transnational companies in their sample reported carrying out 
design activities in Brazil145.  In another study, Quadros (2002) found that even though 
Brazilian parts suppliers had significantly increased their quality certification rates, this had 
not led to increased design responsibilities in contracts with multinational firms higher up the 
production chain146
 These findings were corroborated by interviews with representatives of nine 
multinational parts producers with substantial Brazilian operations.  Most of these sampled 
firms had recently established operations in Brazil, as part of the wave of new investment in 
the 1990s.  Some of the larger firms interviewed did have local R&D units, and some had 
even established research relationships with local universities.  However, almost all of them 
claimed that their innovative effort could be more developed, and some respondents cited 
examples of other countries where R&D units of the same company had been more 
productive.  Three of the nine representatives interviewed were knowledgeable and 
enthusiastic about the innovation incentives offered by the recent Lei do Bem.  However, five 
of the representatives expressed subtle variations of the idea that representatives of state 
.  Instead, specifications for already designed parts are handed down from 
multinational parts producers.  There is little opportunity for co-design.  Quadros points out 
that this is in marked contrast to the situation in Germany, where small and medium suppliers 
are often involved in co-design.  Most Brazilian auto parts firms are now confined to arms-
length market relationships with multinationals higher up the production chain.  As for the 
multinational suppliers themselves, while they do participate in some innovative activities 
much of this is done outside Brazil in partnership with the flagship assemblers. 
                                                 
145The authors also note that long term contracts with assemblers are much more common among suppliers that 
are closer to the flagships in the production chain. 
 
146Suppliers in developing countries face increasing pressure to conform to internationally-recognized quality 
standards. In the automotive industry, the ISO 9000 certification process is most common.   
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institutions did not recognize the importance of innovation or did not even know how to 
incentivize innovation among multinational firms.  One respondent summarized this problem 
succinctly: “the BNDES loans are more for industrial buying; it (the BNDES) is still learning 
how to deal with intangible things, innovation projects.” 
 These opinions point to a connection between the characteristics of state institutions 
and investment promotion policies and patterns of innovation among multinational firms.  
Particularly in the auto components sector, the internationalization of production in Brazil 
following liberalization has been accompanied by a downgrading of local innovative 
activity147
                                                 
147In a 2002 study of 31 auto parts firms, Quadros found that multinational firms did not regularly assist lower-
tier Brazilian-owned suppliers in attaining ISO 9000 quality certification, and that this certification was not 
particularly useful for attracting business.  Quadros (2002, 21) also noted that even in the larger multinational 
companies, the share of design engineers in total employment was only approximately 3 percent, reflecting 
“their very limited design activity”. 
.  This is partly due to market forces, the consolidation of production chains, and 
other factors.  However, the link between low local innovative content and the characteristics 
of Brazilian industrial policy and state institutions is present.  Table 4.6 aggregates interview 
responses from the automotive and IT sectors.  On the automotive side, respondents often 
pointed out the lack of connections between Brazilian universities and firms as an 
impediment to local innovation.  Many respondents indicated that firms and universities 
operated in isolation from one another, with one even going so far as to say that involvement 
with the private sector was not considered “prestigious” at many Brazilian universities.  
Another commonly mentioned difficulty was the lack of coordination between governmental 
institutions designed to facilitate innovation.  Firm representatives complained of conflicting 




 Some institutions, in particular the BNDES and FINEP, were often singled out by 
firms as being particularly responsive and agile.  Moreover, there was an increasing 
recognition of the incentives for innovation offered by legislation such as the Lei do Bem and 
the Innovation Law, both of which are increasingly prominent as vehicles of Brazilian 
industrial policy.  One representative of a large multinational auto parts firm suggested that 
in the past two years he had heard increasing mention of the Lei do Bem, and that the 
management of the Brazilian subsidiary was spending a great deal of time investigating how 
the firm could qualify for more incentives such as the reduction of the CSLL (social 
contribution) tax, currently at 9% of taxable profits, for R&D expenditures.  Indeed, for this 
representative the “Bem” had become a kind of buzzword among the management, and had 
many people discussing its incentives.  The BNDES was praised by a number of firm 
representatives because it offered guaranteed funding lines and its follow-up procedures were 
thorough without being onerous.  The BNDES funding lines for innovation have been 
expanded in recent years, and based on these interviews it seems likely that large 
multinational firms are aware of the incentives and eager to take advantage of these credit 
lines148
                                                 
148The recent internationalization of the auto parts sector has made BNDES funding especially controversial, as 
most of the largest parts firms are now multinational and BNDES resources are in part collected from payroll 
taxes.  Salerno et al. (2003) point out that 74% of the automotive components companies financed by the 
BNDES are first tier companies (almost exclusively foreign owned). 
.  The increasing recognition of these state incentives in the past five years indicates 
that the more selective industrial policies of the Lula administration are beginning to produce 
results.  However, this should not obscure the fact that for most of the 1990s, Brazil lacked a 
coherent industrial policy for the automotive industry with a focus on innovation.  Incentives 
for innovation, where they existed, were applied in a relatively ad hoc fashion by various 
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institutions.  One representative of a large auto parts producer blamed this on a “lack of habit 
with innovation” and a continued focus on more tangible goals, such as the trade balance. 
 At first glance, the wave of new investments in the automotive sector in Brazil in the 
1990s would seem to point to a successful investment promotion strategy, based on 
developmental goals.  However, upon closer inspection the strategy pursued by the state 
suffered from some serious drawbacks.  In the automotive sector, the arrival of substantial 
FDI was not accompanied by significant technological upgrading processes.  During the Lula 
administration, the reinvigoration of industrial policy resulted in a number of laws 
(specifically the Lei de Inovação and the Lei do Bem), policy packages (the PITCE in 2004 
and PDP in 2008), and institutions (ABDI, CNDI) designed to promote innovation among 







4.4.3 Innovation in the Brazilian information technology sector 
 In the search for beneficial spillovers from FDI, developing countries have long 
looked to the global Information Technology industry as a likely source of developmental 
benefits.  This is quite natural.  The IT industry is, by its very nature, innovation-intensive.  
Multinational IT corporations are at the forefront of technological innovation, both in the 
developing world and in advanced industrialized countries.  Moreover, global IT companies 
have made significant contributions to the process of industrial change in countries such as 
Singapore and Ireland.  The global IT industry has at least the potential to provide developing 
countries with sources of high-skilled employment, high-tech skills, foreign exchange, and 
industry modernization. 
 At the same time as developing country governments have been pursuing investment 
from global IT firms, the industry itself has been changing so dramatically and thoroughly 
that governments have a difficult time keeping up with new developments.  IT has expanded 
into almost every manufacturing subsector – it is now difficult to find even moderately 
complicated manufactured goods without substantial IT content, from microcomputers in 
cars to the ever-increasing and complex data interlinkages of the telecommunications 
industry.  As IT becomes more and more interwoven with other sectors, it sometimes seems 
impossible to distinguish a distinct IT ‘sector’ at all.  It is also evident that multinational IT 
flagship companies have dramatically expanded their operations into more and more 
competencies.  Whereas in the 1980s it was still relatively common to divide ‘IT’ firms into 
those developing hardware and those developing software, or some combination of the two, 
nowadays it is often difficult to categorize firms according to old manufacturing categories.  
IT firms today may be significantly invested in service rather than pure manufacturing, 
201 
 
recruiting clients (often other companies) for activities such as offshore business process 
outsourcing (BPO), knowledge process outsourcing (KPO), or contact (call) centers for 
interaction with customers.  The lines between IT firms and consultancies begin to blur as 
global IT flagships expand their range of activities. 
 Given all of these changes in the IT industry, the role of developing country 
governments in generating innovation in their IT sector is often quite opaque.  Leaders and 
bureaucrats in developing countries desire cutting-edge IT investments.  But it is often 
difficult to determine where investment can best be exploited.  Pessimists assert that the 
technological frontier is moving further and further away from the reach of developing 
countries, and that even advanced industrialized countries have difficulties formulating 
coherent industrial policy for such a rapidly changing sector.  For these analysts, innovative 
IT investment is often seen as an impossibility for developing countries.  However, others 
point out the growing internationalization of R&D in the global IT industry as proof that 
countries do attract innovative IT investment.  While it is true that most R&D activities still 
take place in developed countries, there is an emerging trend whereby these activities are 
moved to subsidiaries in the developing world (UNCTAD 2005a)149
 As multinational IT firms conduct more of their R&D abroad, integrating more 
tightly with a whole host of manufacturing and service sectors, developing countries have an 
.  Firms are constantly 
seeking ways to exploit locational advantages in developing countries, whether these 
advantages are in cost or in the skill level of workers.  We should not expect that IT is 
immune from these pressures. 
                                                 
149Though R&D activities are concentrated in developed countries, the share of global R&D occurring in 
developing countries is rising (UNCTAD 2005a, 106).  However, Latin America’s share in global R&D actually 
shrunk from 1996 to 2002, as countries of East Asia were responsible for most of the increase. Brazil’s R&D 
expenditures actually declined in absolute dollar terms during this interval, the only country to exhibit an 
absolute decline in UNCTAD’s study. 
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opportunity to recruit highly innovative businesses and perhaps generate an intertial process 
of industrial upgrading.  Here the concept of a global value chain is once again useful.  As 
outlined earlier in this chapter, global value chain analysis conveys information about where 
firms locate a wide range of activities that go into a product, from initial design to production 
to after-sales follow up.  Links in the value chain are assigned geographically based on a 
whole host of factors, from host country labor characteristics to firm competitive strategy.  
The global IT industry is increasingly characterized by fragmentation and de-verticalization.  
Product design and development is often separate from physical production, which is 
separate from service.  Global IT flagships will often subcontract with smaller firms for each 
of these activities.  A recent study (ECLAC 2007) has noted the increased use of contract 
manufacturers (CMs) by global flagship IT companies.  The largest internationally active 
companies, such as Dell, HP and IBM, now distribute value chain tasks to CMs such as 
Foxconn, Jabil, and Elcoteq.  These tasks need not be labor-intensive or low value-added.  As 
is the case with auto parts suppliers, CMs may be responsible for developing complex 
production or service processes.  They frequently have R&D units, and the largest are quite 
active internationally.  The global IT industry, therefore, has become quite diversified, not 
only in the products offered by the flagship IT companies, but also in the productive 
processes of IT value chains and the division of labor among firms. 
 In Brazil, policy towards the IT industry changed dramatically in the early 1990s.  In 
the 1970s and 1980s, successive Brazilian administrations protected and financially 
supported domestic IT producers, allowing them to grow through what Evans (1995) has 
termed a ‘greenhouse’ strategy.  Linkages between local and foreign firms were not common, 
and high import tariffs and other quantitative restrictions were favorable to Brazilian 
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computer companies.  In 1991, before liberalization, tariffs on imported computer 
components were as high as 35% (Botelho et al. 1999, 15).  This was the era of the so-called 
‘market reserve’, a set of policies designed to protect and bolster the nascent Brazilian IT 
sector.  A body known as the Special Secretariat for Informatics (SEI) regulated joint 
ventures with multinational corporations and supervised the transfer of technology between 
national and foreign firms.  Brazil also employed a number of traditional ISI measures to 
limit foreign penetration, including required government purchasing and import restrictions.  
The supporters of this policy, a group of technocrats collectively referred to as the corpo 
técnico, were especially effective at using SEI to maintain privileges for domestic producers 
and resist reform plans, even into the 1990s (Nelson 1995).   
As Dedrick et al. (2001) and Tigre and Botelho (2001) note, the market reserve policy 
had a number of positive and negative effects on Brazil’s IT industry.  On the positive side, 
Brazil did develop a significant IT industry by 1990, along with a substantial supply of well-
trained computer engineers and technicians.  The internationalization that happened after 
1990 did place most of the developed segments of the Brazilian IT industry under foreign 
control.  However, as Evans (1995) notes, without the market reserve there would have been 
no IT sector to take over, nor would there have been the educated workforce or growing IT 
market to tempt foreign firms to invest.  Notwithstanding these qualifications, the market 
reserve policy also led to significant negative outcomes.  The reserve effectively isolated the 
Brazilian computer industry from the rapidly changing international IT market, and IT 
products from Brazil were not competitive internationally150
                                                 
150Fritsch (1992) notes that restrictions on imports meant that domestic firms had almost no contact with or 
competition from international IT innovators. 
.  The reserve raised the costs of 




substantial R&D effort among domestic IT firms151
While the elimination of the market reserve did mean greater internationalization for 
the Brazilian IT industry, it would be a mistake to characterize the post-1992 period as one of 
full liberalization.  As in the case of the auto assemblers, the Brazilian government did 
institute some selective industrial policies during the period of liberal reform in the 1990s.  
However, unlike the auto industry the industrial policies adopted during the mid-1990s for 
the IT industry directly incentivized innovation.  The legislation that replaced the market 
reserve eliminated restrictions on the participation of foreign capital in the IT industry.  
However, it also established a number of policies designed to encourage local manufacturing 
and R&D.  These incentives included waivers on taxes if firms invested in R&D in Brazil 
and favorable government procurement policies
.  There was an additional problem with 
smuggling, particularly in the Free Zone of Manaus.  The US government threatened Super 
301 trade sanctions against Brazil because of this smuggling, and also because of the 
perception that it was being kept out of a lucrative IT market (Dedrick et al. 2001, 1205).  
For these and other reasons, the market reserve was abandoned in 1992. 
152
                                                 
151Botelho et al. (1999) estimated that in 1997 the gray market was responsible for approximately half of 
Brazil’s 1.2 million unit PC market. 
.  Many of these policies were developed 
and expanded by the revisions of the informatics law.  After 2004, the Lei de Inovação and 
the Lei do Bem expanded support for innovative activities among multinational IT firms 
operating in Brazil.  These incentives included: reduction in the IPI tax (which could amount 
to 20 percent of value-added), accelerated depreciation and amortization of capital goods, 
 
152The initial incentives are detailed in Botelho et al. (1999, 10), and included a waiver on the IPI tax, a 50% 
income tax discount on all R&D expenditures, and procurement policies favoring domestic production.  In order 
to obtain these benefits, firms were obliged to invest at least 5% of a company’s revenues from IT products in 
R&D activities.  Firms were also required to have ISO 9000 certification, and invest in joint projects with 
Brazilian universities or research institutes.  Some of these incentives were only available until 1997, but others 




and a reduction or elimination of income taxes for firms engaged in activities that result in 
contractual technology transfers or the registry of patents (Zanatta 2006, 130).  The Softex 
program also targeted the IT industry, though its focus was directed more towards expanding 
the international participation of Brazilian software firms.  Softex, active from 1992 on, is 
detailed in the following chapter as it relates most directly to the trade balance of the IT 
industry.  However, the program did also contain provisions that encouraged interaction 
between firms and universities in Brazil.  Some have faulted the program for a lack of focus 
on the innovative activities of IT firms (Prochnik 1997), and it was certainly not successful in 
its export goals. 
The process of IT internationalization was thorough in the 1990s.  Market 
liberalization, combined with monetary stability and democratic consolidation, prompted a 
large influx of multinational IT firms, both global flagships and higher-tier suppliers.  Table 
4.7 shows some of the largest global IT companies active in Brazil, and their principal 
activities.  While some of these companies have long-standing operations in Brazil, many 
arrived after the 1992 liberalization.  Most of the Brazilian computer companies which had 
been supported by the market reserve were either absorbed by these multinationals or scaled 
back their operations to lower tiers of the IT supply chain.  As foreign firms entered the 
market, there is evidence that R&D activities decreased.  Evans (1995) chronicles the lack of 
widespread R&D effort among IT multinationals in Brazil after the liberalization of the early 
1990s.  Similarly, Tigre and Botelho (2001) argue that global IT flagships substituted imports 
for local design activities as soon as the internationalization process was underway.  
Cassiolato and Baptista (1996) argue that R&D teams within local companies were 
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disbanded after this process of internationalization, as Brazil’s specialization in the 
international division of labor was downgraded. 
For the purposes of this study, interviews were conducted with high representatives of 
fourteen multinational IT firms.  While these firms were quite heterogenous in terms of 
activities conducted in Brazil, a division can be drawn between nine global flagship IT 
company interviews and five contract manufacturers.  That is, nine of the firms interviewed 
were large, globally active companies with all the characteristics of flagship firms, also 
sometimes referred to as original equipment manufacturers (OEMs).  Five firms were 
contract manufacturers for the IT industry, though these firms were also internationally 
active and were at the higher tiers of the supply chain.  Based on these interviews, the general 
assertion that multinational IT companies do not engage in substantial local innovation is 
supported.  While firms did not divulge exact R&D spending levels, many respondents 
revealed little R&D effort was taking place in Brazil.  This is true for many of the largest 
multinational IT firms.  One large firm representative said that there had been R&D done in 
Brazil before 2000, but that this effort had been centralized since then.  Another respondent 
noted a token R&D effort had been in place since 1997, but that this unit did little more than 
offer suggestions for slight modifications of software service packages for Brazilian 
customers.  However, it is important to underscore that many firms did say they were 
planning to develop local innovation units or had put these in place recently.  A number of 
firms mentioned the changes in the Lei de Inovação and Lei do Bem initiatives and added 
incentives for local innovation.  In five of nine global flagships, expansion of local IT effort 
was planned or was underway.  In every one of these cases, this expansion happened during 




Table 4.7 Notable IT flagship investments in Brazil as of 2005 (not including contract manufacturers) 
Firm 
Country of 





Accenture USA Outsourcing, System Integration 227,619   
Computer 
Associates USA Infrastructure Software   98,368 
Diebold Procomp USA Outsourcing, BPO 173,998   
EDS USA Outsourcing, BPO 500,602   
HP USA Infrastructure Software   42,898 
IBM Brasil USA Infrastructure Software 799,101 273,830 
Microsoft USA 
Operating Systems and 
Applications   519,582 
Oracle USA Data Management, Back Office   221,048 
SAP Germany Back Office   122,746 
Siemens Germany Outsourcing 101,485   
Symantec USA Security Software   56,079 
Unisys USA Outsourcing 248,765   
Xerox USA Outsourcing, System Integration 174,185   
Source: Tigre and Marques (2006)
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The picture thus painted is not entirely bleak in terms of innovation among IT firms.  
It is important to recognize that there have been instances of success for Brazilian industrial 
policy in the IT sector.  A study conducted by Fundação Dom Cabral in 1997 demonstrated 
that innovation incentives did have a marked impact on the investment models of firms.  
Though this study included domestic and foreign IT firms, it reported that cooperation with 
university and research centers increased when incentives became available.  The study also 
reported that 95 percent of interviewed firms would consider reducing local R&D activities 
in the absence of incentives (Botelho et al. 1999).  While firms undoubtedly have incentives 
to answer this question positively, it nonetheless points to a role for innovation incentives.  
Similarly, De Negri et al. (2006) in a more recent study found that FINEP’s relatively small-
scale ADTEN program had a positive effect on R&D expenditures of industrial firms, though 
again this study mixed foreign and domestic companies.  An internal study undertaken by the 
BNDES (Gutierrez 2010) found that the informatics law in 2008 had supported the R&D 
activities of 23 IT multinationals, according to data provided by the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MCT).  The period since 2004 has witnessed a slight increase in local 
innovation.  After a period of substantial liberalization and innovation retrenchment in the 
1990s, multinational IT firms are committing new resources to R&D in Brazil, as in the rest 
of the developing world. 
To what degree, then, are these innovation patterns related to the policy and 
institutional framework in Brazil?  Here again, interview responses are useful in untangling 
the effects of industrial policy and the institutions through which these policies are 
channeled. Table 4.6 aggregates interview responses from nine global IT flagships and five 
multinational CMs.  There were a number of policies institutions commonly mentioned by 
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firms as being particularly helpful for their innovative efforts.  Many respondents mentioned 
the new innovation law and the recent revisions of the informatics law, and indicated that 
these policies had had an impact on local innovative activities, or at least made firms 
consider more local innovation. 
The most commonly mentioned governmental institution associated with innovation 
was FINEP.  It is important to underscore the near universal acclaim FINEP enjoyed among 
IT firms at all levels of the value chain.  Firm representatives would often rattle off a list of 
complaints about the investment environment in Brazil, from comparatively high labor costs 
to infrastructure bottlenecks, but would reserve praise for FINEP’s responsiveness.  FINEP 
primarily works with small to medium enterprises, but also incentivizes innovation among 
larger multinational firms.  There are a number of tools at FINEP’s disposal, but two of the 
most important are: first, a relatively recent program known as Inova Brasil which offers a 
full credit line plus a 10 percent R&D voucher, effectively offering companies the 
opportunity to repay 90 percent of the credit line if they invest in local R&D and partner with 
local companies or universities (ANPEI 2009).  Secondly, firms may be reimbursed for up to 
half the salary of an individual hired as a result of a university or research institute 
partnership153
Despite these endorsements, both flagship multinationals and first tier suppliers 
complained about many policy and institutional barriers to innovation in Brazil.  A number 
of the flagship IT firms complained that many of the incentives available were not applicable 
to their operations.  Some representatives said that they would like to take advantage and 
.  Some of the firms interviewed were aware of these new incentive lines.  
Many firms singled out FINEP as an institution which managed to convey incentives for 
innovation in a clear fashion. 
                                                 
153Phone interview, Dr. Eduardo Costa, FINEP Director of Innovation, Rio de Janeiro, April 2009 
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perhaps conduct more local R&D, but that incentives were designed to reward 
manufacturing.  For IT firms that offer IT services such as business process outsourcing or 
knowledge process outsourcing and not manufactured items like hardware, this can be 
problematic.  Indeed, one firm representative claimed that one branch of the firm had no 
physical sales, but that the incentives offered incentives based on reported sales.  One firm 
that conducted all of its R&D outside Brazil responded specifically that the incentives 
offered did not apply to services.  Another firm representative had a similar complaint, 
arguing that the government had not figured out how to incentivize IT services: 
This reflects an old mentality of government bureaucracy and political parties where 
 economic results in a society would all come from industry or agriculture.  The 
 mentality is slowly changing towards activities like IT. 
 
This focus on manufacturing and sales is somewhat understandable in a rapidly 
changing global industry like IT.  However, there were other complaints.  A number of firms 
responded that the patent protection legal framework was underdeveloped in Brazil.  One 
global flagship responded that it was much more cost-effective to apply for patent protection 
abroad and then have that patent recognized in Brazil than to go through the Brazilian patent 
process.  Four firms mentioned difficulties in bringing in foreign workers as an impediment 
to conducting local R&D.  When asked whether the firms participated in substantial 
innovation in cooperation with Brazilian firms or universities, many firms complained about 
the divide between the private sector and academia154
                                                 
154This is a barrier to innovative investment which has surfaced in other reports, and affects not only 
multinationals but Brazilian firms as well. In a study undertaken in July 2008 by the McLaughlin-Rotman 
Center for Global Health, 16 Brazilian biotech and pharmaceutical firms identified the most important barriers 
to innovation. According to this study, many firms complained that the interaction between firms and 





It is certainly possible that some of these firm responses are justifications for a low 
R&D presence, and some may be without merit.  However, it also seems clear that a part of a 
firm’s decision about whether or not to commit resources to innovation in Brazil is driven by 
the policy and institutional environment.  Moreover, while IT firms largely shy away from 
innovative activity in Brazil, there are isolated examples of local R&D and these efforts are 
increasing in number and intensity.  Where interviewed firms did commit resources to R&D, 
some noted that incentives were influential in their decisions.  A representative of a large 
multinational contract manufacturer active in Manaus stated that the local R&D activities 
present there would not have taken place without the incentives of the informatics law.  
Similarly, a large global IT flagship stated that federal incentives since 2004 jump-started a 
project which resulted in significant local R&D spending.  In recent years, there are a number 
of examples of large IT firms, such as HP, Dell, Siemens, and Ericsson, which have 
established research centers in Brazil.  Queiroz et al. (2003, 15) point out that Ericsson’s 
R&D lab in Indaiatuba, the only one of its kind in Latin America, is now being used to create 
globally applicable software programs.  This lab directly benefits from the fiscal incentives 
of the informatics law.  SAP has recently constructed one of its SAP labs in Brazil, a state of 
the art facility that offers a whole range of innovation-intensive business services to domestic 
and international clients.  Motorola in 2004 invested US$20 million in a cellular software 
development facility in Jaguariúna, and this investment benefited directly from the incentives 
of the informatics law155
                                                 
155According to Brazilian media at the time of investment, Motorola reduced its IPI (value-added on industrial 
products) tax from 15% to 3% through the informatics law, which required at least 4% of revenues be spent on 
domestic R&D (Moreira 2004). 
.  Therefore, while the general picture is one of limited innovation 
there are isolated instances of new R&D investments. 
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In sum, the IT industry in Brazil, while a priority industry for extracting innovative 
spillovers, demonstrates low but rising levels of innovation.  While it is certainly true that 
powerful industry and market forces have played a role in redefining global IT value chains, 
there has been a role for policy as well.  In Brazil, the end of the market reserve in the early 
1990s allowed a significant influx of foreign capital.  Most Brazilian IT firms were bought by 
multinational firms, and innovative activities were downgraded.  However, in contrast to the 
automotive sector there were some incentives for innovation retained even during the liberal 
reform period of the mid-1990s.  These incentives were strengthened during the first Lula 
administration, and others were added.  This has influenced a revival in local innovation, 
especially in the last five years.  Whether this pattern is maintained remains to be seen, but 
new industrial policies such as the PDP have made IT investment a priority. 
Nevertheless, significant policy and institutional challenges remain.  As revealed in 
interviews with firms, many of the existing innovation incentives for the IT industry are 
based on antiquated notions of physical manufacturing or sales, which may not be applicable 
in an industry increasingly based on services156
                                                 
156Evans (1995) notes that the excessive focus on computer hardware after the end of the market reserve made 
software development less of a priority, suggesting that this problem dates at least to the early 1990s. 
.  The increasing competition for R&D among 
developing countries means that Brazilian institutions must put forth a coordinated effort if 
they hope to influence value chain decisions of firms.  A number of firms noted the stark 
contrast in institutional readiness between Brazil and other BRIC countries like China.  In 
China, as one recent multinational IT entrant put it, government institutions “parted the Red 
Sea” to make the initial investment easier.  In Brazil, this same firm was met with a “raging 
river to swim across” before its investment process was complete. 
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Dedrick et al. (2001, 1206), in their analysis of the liberalization of the IT sector in 
Brazil and Mexico, suggest that Brazil retained a few industrial policies to promote the IT 
industry not out of a specific plan to develop this sector, but rather in an ad hoc fashion “with 
no guiding long term goals or coordination mechanisms to link production, use and creation 
of national capabilities”.  Based on the general patterns of FDI policy since 1990, this is not 
difficult to believe.  IT policy in Brazil has managed to coax some local innovation out of 
multinational IT firms since 1990, and especially in the last five years with the advent of the 
PITCE, PDP and attendant laws.  However, Brazil has not consistently engaged in an active, 
discriminating approach to the IT investment since the dismantling of the market reserve.  
While multinationals in the Brazilian IT sector display some innovative characteristics, the 
opening of the sector in the 1990s may be largely interpreted as a missed opportunity for 
innovative spillovers. 
4.5 Innovation, Policies, and Institutions in Brazil 
 Having considered the development of the automotive industry and the IT industry in 
Brazil since 1990, it is easy to identify some common experiences and trends.  In both sectors 
of the Brazilian economy, the economic liberalization of the 1990s brought about substantial 
internationalization of existing companies and a great deal of new FDI.  Successive Brazilian 
administrations dismantled many of the old ISI tools, and the macroeconomic and democratic 
stability no doubt enhanced the attractiveness of Brazil for foreign investors.  In both sectors, 
Brazilian-owned companies were either bought or transformed into lower-tier suppliers.  This 
is especially true in the auto parts industry and in the experience of Brazilian computer 
manufacturers since the end of the market reserve.  Changes brought about by domestic 
political developments were augmented by the rapidly changing nature of the industries 
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themselves.  The advent of modular production and follow sourcing in the auto industry is a 
continuing trend, as is the growing diversification and complexity of the global IT industry. 
 This chapter makes the claim that in addition to these other factors, policies and 
institutions matter for the models of investment pursued by multinational enterprises.  The 
links between state action and the innovative activities of firms are not deterministic, but they 
are nonetheless influential.  While acknowledging the broad forces acting on firms in both 
sectors and the dominant trends of the past two decades, this chapter has also identified 
subtle differences between the automotive and IT sectors.  In the automotive sector, policies 
designed to promote innovation were largely absent from investment-generating initiatives 
such as the automotive regime.  The RA was illiberal, yet it ignored innovation as an 
industrial policy priority.  While a select number of global flagship manufacturers have 
established R&D centers in Brazil, they have done so largely due to global competitive 
pressures and internal firm strategy, not in response to incentives or institutional efficacy.  In 
the auto parts industry, the internationalization of the 1990s was met with a significant 
downgrading of local innovation, as multinationals replaced Brazilian firms and often 
centralized their innovative activities.  Efforts to incentivize innovation among multinationals 
reappeared after 2004 in new laws and new industrial policies, and these have had some 
positive effects.  Interview responses indicated a growing awareness among firms of the 
possibilities offered by these laws. 
 In the IT sector, the opening of the Brazilian market in the 1990s offered substantial 
opportunities for foreign firms.  Yet the policies implemented by the Brazilian government 
were somewhat more targeted and discriminating than in the automotive sector.  The 
informatics law did incentivize innovation, and remained in place through the more or less 
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orthodox reform period of the mid-1990s.  These incentives were recognized by IT firms 
with established presence in Brazil, and by new arrivals.  Despite this approach, the 
innovative efforts of multinational IT firms in Brazil were not impressive and remained low 
in comparison to other developing countries.  This is the case despite a large supply of 
highly-skilled and educated IT workers, another legacy of the market reserve.  In recent 
years, there are examples of flagship IT companies with new research parks and growing 
innovation networks in Brazil.  Almost all of these firms take advantage of new innovation 
incentives offered by the Lei do Bem, and some have long used the incentives of the 
informatics law.  However, the sector has not been the source of technological upgrading 
hoped for in the early 1990s.  While the last five years have witnessed substantial innovation 
activities, the overall record since liberalization is disappointing. 
 As new developments in global value chain analysis have shown, multinational firms 
are adopting ever more complex production networks, with a wide variety of governance 
models.  The location of specific activities like R&D within these production networks 
depends on many factors, but developing countries all over the world are increasingly 
recognized as potential locations for innovation.  As innovation clusters pop up in places like 
Bangalore and San Jose, it is important to consider how countries can best leverage their 
comparative advantages into intertial processes of technological upgrading and local 
spillovers.  In Brazil’s case, the experience of the IT and automotive sectors, as well as 
economy-wide patterns, suggest that there is much unrealized potential. 
 As noted in other chapters, Brazilian administrations in the 1990s adopted a largely 
passive and indirect approach to FDI since democratization.  The somewhat isolated attempts 
to incentivize innovation, even when strongly supported as in the case of the informatics law, 
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were undercut by the characteristics of Brazilian institutions.  To some degree, this is still the 
case today.  A newspaper article in the Folha de São Paulo in 2007 lamented the continued 
lack of a central investment promotion organ, integrated with the newly ambitious industrial 
policies and able to coordinate various agencies157
                                                 
157The article also pointed out the lack of “active” strategy to attract investment (Barros 2007). 
.  The ambitious industrial policy 
initiatives since 2004 have run into a number of institutional roadblocks.  The PITCE and 
PDP have been more specific about innovation incentives, and the Innovation Law and Lei 
do Bem have been popular and are praised for turning the focus toward innovation and 
demonstrating results.  However, these policy changes take place in an institutional 
environment which presents numerous challenges to effective implementation.  Chief among 
these are: the lack of consistency among various investment promotion bodies, a lack of 
inter-institutional coordination, the lack of state-firm networks, and perhaps we can add in 
the specific context of innovation a demonstrated focus on manufactures as opposed to 
intangible goods.  To be sure, there are isolated examples of institutional efficiency, and the 
increasing successes of bodies like BNDES and FINEP are well known.  These ‘pockets of 
efficiency’ have managed to incentivize innovation in select sectors in a consistent fashion.  
The remainder of the institutional framework makes it difficult to implement an ambitious 
innovation agenda like that contained in the PDP.  In Brazil’s case, a recent policy focus on 
innovation and a new set of industrial policies have generated some significant achievements.  
These successes demonstrate that state policies and institutions do matter for paths of 
technological upgrading, and that market mechanisms may be insufficient to generate the 
kind of technological spillovers prioritized by developing countries.  Innovation, and the 
possibility of upgrading it brings with it, is partly a product of firm priorities interacting with 




Export-Oriented Investment: Global Integration and Domestic Institutions 
5.1 Introduction 
Multinational production is transforming global trade patterns.  Multinational firms 
increasingly turn to developing countries as sources of productive efficiencies, and integrate 
these countries into their global production networks.  According to the UN Conference on 
Trade and Development, developing countries absorbed half of all FDI flows in 2009.  Much 
of this FDI is efficiency-oriented.  The exports of foreign affiliates of multinational firms 
grew 14.8 percent from 2001 to 2005 (UNCTAD 2010).  In Latin America, FDI has in the 
past been predominantly natural resource-seeking and market-seeking as opposed to 
efficiency-seeking.  However, in countries like Costa Rica and Mexico firms have developed 
extensive export operations in the last twenty years.  These countries have often employed 
strategies to attract multinational firms interested in exporting to third markets, and have 
reduced barriers to intrafirm trade.  For its part, Brazil has also realized some efficiency-
seeking investment.  The establishment of Mercosul generated strong incentives for 
multinational firms to integrate production networks in the context of that common market.  
Moreover, the increasingly complex production processes of global value chains have 
contributed to growing trade from multinationals operating in Brazil.  Fritsch and Franco 
(1991) estimated that multinationals were responsible for 38 percent of Brazil’s 
manufactured exports in 1980; by 1990 that figure had increased to 44 percent.  According to 
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the two censuses conducted by the Brazilian central bank in 1995 and 2000, exports from 
firms with foreign participation were 46.8 and 60.4 percent of Brazil’s total exports, 
respectively.  Intrafirm exports grew as well, responsible for 19.5 percent of Brazil’s exports 
in 1995 and 38.2 percent in 2000 (Corrêa de Lacerda 2003, 190).  Intrafirm trade accounts 
for an increasing share of multinational firms’ exports158
Despite these increases, however, most FDI in Brazil (both incoming and already 
established) continues to be oriented toward the domestic market.  This is understandable 
given the country’s size and growing consumer class.  However, unlike other large emerging 
countries such as China and India, Brazil has not exhibited extensive exports from 
multinational firms in manufacturing and services.  There are some exceptions to this pattern.  
In the automotive industry, Mercosul has prompted both assemblers and multinational auto 
parts firms to develop extensive linkages among their Brazilian and Argentinian subsidiaries, 
prompting a large increase in intrafirm trade.  However, the automotive industry is one of a 
handful where exports can be consistently linked to the operations of multinational firms.  IT 
exports from multinationals in Brazil are low, notwithstanding the efforts of various 
administrations to establish a software export base in Brazil.  Overall efforts to diversify 
Brazil’s export base beyond primary products and a select few manufacturing sectors have 
achieved mixed results.  The dominant rationale for multinationals to establish Brazilian 
operations continues to be to sell to the Brazilian population. 
. 
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with market-seeking FDI.  However, it usually 
ranks below efficiency-seeking and especially innovative FDI as a form of investment likely 
to lead to developmental spillovers in the host economy.  Bodies such as ECLAC have long 
                                                 
158Intrafirm exports as a percentage of all imports and exports of multinational firms in Brazil grew from 41.7 
percent in 1995 to 58.8 percent in 2000 (Corrêa de Lacerda 2003). 
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championed innovation- and export-intensive FDI as more desirable forms of investment.  
Some developing country governments and their investment promotion agencies have 
adopted this perspective, and increasingly target these other forms of investment.  Why then, 
given these FDI hierarchies, has Brazil failed to insert itself more forcefully into international 
production networks?  This chapter contends that the policy and institutional environment in 
Brazil bears part of the responsibility.  While there are numerous influences on firms’ global 
trade patterns, I contend in this chapter that host country institutions and policies have a not-
insignificant impact.  The institutional and policy environment in Brazil has not been 
conducive to widespread insertion in global value chains. 
As noted in previous chapters, the passive, non-discriminating approach to FDI is 
changing.  During the Lula administration, Brazil adopted increasingly specific industrial 
policies designed to increase innovation and global insertion.  Multinational firms in Brazil 
have responded to these incentives, though they remain a work in progress.  There are now 
isolated examples of relatively innovation-intensive export growth linked to FDI.  In the cell 
phone industry in Brazil, the innovation and export-incentivizing industrial policies, 
channeled through institutions like the BNDES, have begun to bear fruit.  However, broader 
insertion into global markets is not yet evident beyond these few examples.  Brazil’s recent 
export booms have largely been driven by primary products.  Importantly, domestic political 
institutions have diluted the effectiveness of some of the more ambitious industrial policies 
of the Lula administration.  The change in approach to FDI since 2004 may move Brazil 
towards spillover-rich investment profiles.  However, this process is slow. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. I first outline the potential benefits of hosting 
multinational firms engaged in export activities, while acknowledging the ways in which 
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these kinds of benefits can be diluted by other attributes of efficiency-seeking FDI.  I then 
briefly outline the types of policies employed by developing countries seeking to attract 
efficiency-oriented FDI.  Section 5.2 examines the established determinants of multinational 
exports, and proposes theoretic linkages between institutional settings in developing 
countries and the international activities of multinational firms. The next section briefly 
examines the history of export-promotion policies in Brazil, focusing on the period after 
1990 and in particular on how export promotion policies have applied to multinationals.  
Section 5.4 considers the commercial balance in the IT and automotive industries.  I pay 
special attention to the role of Mercosul as an example of indirect investment promotion 
policy in the automotive industry.  I also examine the role of the Manaus Free Zone in the 
Brazilian IT industry, and the Softex software export promotion program of the 1990s.  
Finally, section 5.5 concludes with a synthesis of the two sectors and a brief examination of 
the innovative intensity of multinational exports from Brazil. 
5.1.1 Benefits and drawbacks of efficiency-oriented FDI 
 Export-oriented FDI is viewed as advantageous for developing countries for a variety 
of reasons.  First and perhaps foremost, this kind of investment is supposed to increase the 
competitiveness of a country’s exports in world markets.  When a multinational firm and its 
domestic partners are exposed to international competition, the discipline of the international 
market should force firms to develop new skills and products in order to survive.  Increased 
competitiveness generates more foreign exchange for the host country, which can then be 
transformed into needed imports.  Export-oriented multinationals may lead developing 
countries away from dependence on primary products and toward a diversified 
manufacturing base.  Large export-capable multinational enterprises may enjoy economies of 
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scale, leading to more efficient use of resources.  Export-oriented multinationals may engage 
in a consistent process of technological upgrading as they move from lower value-added 
activities to more complex and potentially innovative activities in order to compete.  For all 
these reasons, developing country governments have often established special incentives to 
encourage multinationals to use their countries’ sources of efficiency to enter and compete in 
international markets.  This is especially important for developing countries where a lack of 
resources prevent indigenous development of export-oriented industries.  In industries where 
startup costs are high or the technological frontier is distant, FDI may represent the only 
means through which developing countries can enter competitive international markets. 
 These incentives partly explain why competition for efficiency-seeking FDI is so 
fierce.  However, there are many ways in which this kind of FDI may fail to generate the 
hoped-for developmental benefits.  First, export-oriented FDI does not necessarily carry with 
it a high value-added component.  Many export operations of multinationals in developing 
countries amount to little more than ‘screwdriver’ operations, where firms take advantage of 
low wage environments to assemble and export products.  In this case, the potential for 
extensive developmental spillovers from the investment is low.  Some analyses have 
characterized this situation as generating a “low-value-added trap”, where emphasis is placed 
on wage rates and other static advantages (ECLAC 2004, 102).  Many argue that 
multinational investments in Latin America have generated exactly this type of dynamic, 
despite the hopes of host governments159
                                                 
159Sklair (1993) applies this argument to the maquilas in Mexico, claiming that because the majority of inputs 
are imported, these factories do not stimulate development.  However, subsequent analyses have argued that 
maquilas display greater diversity, and some have moved on to more complex production models with more 




 Secondly, export-oriented multinationals may not establish backward linkages with 
domestic firms.  They may instead function as isolated entities, enjoying the export 
incentives and labor efficiencies of the host country without contributing much to 
competitiveness.  While isolated multinationals who export extensively may generate a great 
deal of foreign exchange, they do not present as many developmental spillovers as those 
firms which are tightly integrated into both international markets and domestic supplier 
networks. 
 Finally, the benefits of multinational exports can be offset by the imports of those 
same multinational firms.  Imported inputs often increase substantially as a multinational 
expands its operations and develops its global value chain.  Therefore, net foreign exchange 
earnings can drop even if the firm is export-intensive.  I examine the commercial balance of 
foreign firms in Brazil in this chapter, while acknowledging the limitations of the data in this 
regard.  The results indicate that many multinational firms in Brazil are import-intensive, 
despite the recent growth in exports.  In many cases in Brazil, the substantial growth of 
imports in multinational-dominated industries stands in sharp contrast to the investment 
models pursued by multinationals in countries like China. 
5.1.2 Policies used to promote efficiency-oriented FDI 
The potential benefits of export-oriented FDI are often sufficient to risk the costs 
outlined here.  Developing countries have therefore adopted a series of policy mechanisms to 
attract these kinds of investments, and encourage exports among firms already in country.  
Though these instruments have often been unsuccessful, they represent a set of tools 
commonly employed by governments.  I outline a typology of possible policy categories 
here, all of which have been utilized by Brazilian administrations at one point or another.  
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After a general categorization of policy options, I describe the particular strategies pursued 
by Brazil in section 5.3. 
Policy measures to promote exports from multinational firms can generally be 
divided into four categories.  First, there are trade agreements concluded by the host 
countries.  These agreements, such as Mercosul, allow multinationals to access third 
countries or regional blocs which would be inaccessible on the same terms from the 
multinational’s home country.  These agreements can be quite influential for firms’ decision-
making processes.  Much of the current export-oriented FDI in Brazil is directed towards the 
Mercosul market.  Firms take advantage of the lack of internal tariffs to make regional 
production more efficient or simply sell their products in other regional markets.  The second 
category of policy is general (not region-specific) trade liberalization and facilitation.  
Intrafirm trade, and the costs thereof, is an important consideration for large multinational 
firms.  Developing countries often grant special exemptions on tariffs for multinationals with 
the aim of increasing exports.  Duty drawback schemes, which refund part or all of the duties 
on imported inputs upon proof of re-export, are often used by governments to reduce the 
costs of multinational production.  Similarly, tariff exemptions for specific firms may be put 
in place.  Countries may also attempt to eliminate onerous documentation requirements for 
international trade, or delays in customs.  The third category of policy is export financing.  
Instead of facilitating trade by drawing down tariffs, a country may choose to provide grants 
or loans to exporting firms.  These incentives can be targeted at specific industries or can be 
general in nature.  While WTO rulings have limited the scope of export financing and since 
2003 prohibited the use of export requirements, other kinds of incentives are still popular 
among developed and developing countries. 
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The final category of policy available to a developing country government is the 
export processing zone (EPZ).  These zones are a popular option among governments 
specifically seeking to attract already export-oriented FDI.  These zones come in a variety of 
forms, but share an emphasis on manufacturing exports under liberal trading conditions and 
often decreased regulation (UNCTAD 2002, 214).  EPZs are typically created by developing 
countries in the hopes that they will attract a great deal of foreign-exchange generating 
investment, and perhaps some industrial upgrading.  It is difficult to generalize about the 
success of this policy instrument.  Some countries, such as China, have created special 
economic zones that have exhibited near continuous industrial upgrading and export growth.  
Other countries’ EPZs have devolved into assembly operations with very few linkages to the 
domestic economy or firms of the host country.  Nevertheless, EPZs continue to be one of the 
most commonly employed policy tools to attract export-oriented multinationals.  In Brazil’s 
case, the free zone of Manaus has returned a mixed bag of results from resident multinational 
firms. 
5.2 The Determinants of Export Orientation among Multinational Firms 
 While this study argues that host country policies and institutions can and do have an 
effect on the export behavior of multinational firms, it is important to emphasize the wide 
variety of factors that can substantially alter export patterns of multinationals in developing 
countries.  Even more so than local innovative activities, multinational export patterns can be 
decisively influenced by such diverse factors such as exchange rate movements or 
international economic crises.  The level of the exchange rate, in particular, can be a decisive 
influence on multinational exports.  An overvalued currency, for example, may be a 
counterweight to any policy or institutional factors favorable to exports.  Therefore, while the 
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impact of host country policies and institutions can be substantial, their influence may be 
greatly compounded or overcome by these other determinants. 
 Bearing this qualification in mind, researchers have nonetheless attempted to 
establish connections between economic and political variables in host countries and export 
patterns of multinational firms.  Economists have sought to integrate explanations of export 
patterns among multinationals into existing theories of foreign direct investment.  John 
Dunning’s (1980) influential ‘eclectic’ framework outlining the incentives for overseas 
production claimed that firms were motivated to establish international production because of 
differences in organizational patterns, and because of location and internalization advantages.  
Organizational advantages refer to firms’ control over products or processes that other firms 
do not have access to, such as patents or trademarks.  Analysts of FDI in the developing 
world have often gravitated to questions surrounding locational advantages, as these are 
easily evaluated in cross-national studies.  There have been some attempts to pair specific 
locational advantages with exports of multinational firms.  Earlier large-n studies of (usually 
US) multinationals in the developing world claimed that export-oriented investments are 
heavily influenced by labor costs (Nakani 1979; Reuber et al. 1973)160
                                                 
160For a good overview of the economic literature on the determinants of FDI in the developing world (both 
exporting and non-exporting), see Caves (1996), chapter nine. 
.  Wage costs are more 
influential for export-intensive investments than for those prioritizing domestic sales or 
natural resources.  Kumar (1994), in an analysis of US benchmark surveys of foreign 
investment, affirms the advantages enjoyed by countries with a pool of low-cost labor.  
However, he adds that countries with already established infrastructure and ‘domestic 
capability’ enjoy added advantages in attracting export-oriented US FDI.  There is a 




Some studies have examined the role of tax competition in attracting different kinds of FDI 
(Mutti 2003).  In other studies, knowledge-intensity measures have been significant 
predictors of intrafirm trade within US multinationals (Cho 1990)161
5.2.1 Global value chains and firm exports 
. 
 Beyond the locational advantages outlined by Dunning, firms are also induced to 
establish production abroad by organizational and internalization advantages.  These 
advantages have less to do with the characteristics of the host country and more to do with 
the characteristics of the firm itself.  For example, if a firm has concerns about the protection 
of intangible assets, it may opt for a tightly controlled and directly owned production 
network, which would presumably increase intrafirm trade as inputs are shipped from the 
multinational’s home country.  Another firm with fewer concerns over intangible assets may 
opt for a contract with a local supplier in a developing country, which may in turn decrease 
inputs from abroad.  The model of production a firm chooses is influenced by a variety of 
factors internal to the firm, but can have profound implications for its commercial balance. 
 As the complexity of international production networks has increased, so too have the 
analytic typologies for interpreting these networks.  A simple distinction is between 
horizontal and vertical models of investment.  At first glance, the vertical model of 
production would seem to offer the greatest chances of increasing exports and global 
competitiveness.  However, the relationship is not so straightforward.  Though horizontal 
investments are often designed to produce goods and services for sale on the local market, 
they can also produce goods that are then exported to third markets, as is often the case in 
regional trade blocs.  Moreover, vertical models of investment are not guarantees of a 
                                                 
161See Navaretti and Venables (2004, ch.2) for a recent discussion of theory and empirical findings on 




positive trade balance.  A vertically-integrated plant location in a developing country may 
serve as little more than an assembly operation, with a great deal of imported inputs and little 
value-added.  In order to accommodate the diverse models of production pursued by firms 
and to understand how trade has evolved alongside these new forms of production, the global 
value chain perspective is once again useful.  According to Gereffi et al. (2005), there are 
five ideal types of value chain governance, ranging from market transactions characterized 
by arms’ length relationships between assemblers and suppliers to hierarchies, where 
different stages in the production chain are absorbed within and controlled by a single 
corporate structure.  Extensive trade networks are possible in all of these governance 
structures.  In market-driven value chains, coordination by the multinational is less evident 
and suppliers compete on price, but large amounts of trade can persist.  However, the 
products traded tend to be less complex.  In modular and relational value chains, highly 
competent suppliers provide often complex production processes to flagship firms.  In 
hierarchical models of value chain governance, trade between units of the value chain 
happens as intrafirm trade, as the units are part of the same corporate structure.  The rise in 
intrafirm trade as a proportion of total trade in many developing countries may indicate a 
greater reliance on hierarchical models among multinationals.  However, other forms of 
trade, particularly trade from multinational, modular suppliers to flagship companies, are on 
the rise as well. 
 The different models of value chain organization do have important implications for 
the nature of trade from multinational corporations.  While all forms are possibly trade-
intensive, it is less likely that market-based transactions between multinational firms and 
suppliers will result in trade that involves increasing backward linkages for supplier firms.  
228 
 
Because price competition is paramount, exports produced by market-based value chains 
tend to offer few possibilities for upgrading.  Hierarchically-organized chains may offer 
possibilities for export competitiveness. However, their hierarchical nature may allow for 
fewer spillovers or even connections with local firms, as subsidiaries are tightly controlled.  
Perhaps the best hope for a combination of high export intensity and the benefits thereof 
comes from modular patterns of firm organization, where suppliers operate independently 
and engage in more complex transactions with other multinationals.  Humphrey and Schmitz 
(2000) have suggested that export-based upgrading is less likely in hierarchically-organized 
multinationals, and more so in horizontally organized value chains. 
To sum up, the benefits of export-intensive investment will depend on the model of 
value chain governance in addition to other factors outlined in this chapter.  In general, firms 
have been hypothesized to desire greater control over globally integrated production models, 
particularly if those products have a high technological content or intangible qualities 
(Gatignon and Anderson 1988).  However, the increase in FDI-linked trade in Latin America 
does not necessarily indicate an efficient trade promotion policy or increased spillovers.  The 
purpose of this section has been to demonstrate that microeconomic factors, including firm 
production models, have important effects on multinational trade patterns. 
5.2.2 The impact of policies and institutions on FDI-linked exports 
 The preceding section argues that participation in a global value chain is not, in and 
of itself, enough to derive export benefits from FDI.  So what does increase the likelihood of 
spillovers from efficiency-oriented FDI?  Among the various determinants of the export 
behavior of firms, both those already in country and those considering investment, the policy 
and institutional environment in host countries should also be influential.  This goes beyond 
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policies designed to ensure macroeconomic stability, and includes targeted export promotion 
policies.  While policies and institutions are not always sufficient to generate spillovers from 
efficiency-oriented FDI, they can have a substantial impact. 
 Much inward FDI in Latin America during the ISI period was tariff-hopping FDI.  
That is, companies responded to trade-prohibiting tariffs and other non-tariff barriers by 
setting up productive facilities in Latin American countries162.  This satisfied the industrial 
diversification goals of ISI-promoting governments in the region while also making firms 
happy, as they often had privileged access to growing markets.  In Latin America’s largest 
economies, FDI remained largely-market seeking throughout the ISI period.  Latin American 
governments, with a few exceptions, did not encourage multinationals to use their territories 
as export platforms until later in the ISI period163
                                                 
162Biglaiser and DeRouen (2006) point out that in larger countries such as Brazil, firms invested directly in 
order to avoid high tariffs, encouraged as well by the potential to reap benefits in a protected market.  However, 
the authors find that on balance lower tariffs are associated with greater FDI inflows, particularly for export-
oriented investors. 
.  This added to stresses on the balance of 
payments, as firms imported capital goods and other inputs while ignoring exports.  The 
liberalization process of the 1980s and 1990s did lead to increases in efficiency-seeking FDI, 
especially in the countries of the Caribbean Basin and Mexico.  However, in other countries 
such the movement away from market-seeking FDI did not occur as hoped.  In Brazil, most 
of the investments after 1994 were market-oriented.  Mercosul generated some export-
oriented FDI as multinationals sought export platforms for the regional market.  However, 
the levels of efficiency-seeking FDI were below what was expected.  Even the largest 
privatizations of the 1990s, such as that of the telecommunications firm Telebrás, were 
largely in services for the domestic market. 
 
163As Gereffi and Wyman (1990) note, Latin America did not adopt diversified export promotion until the 
1970s, whereas countries in East Asia had prioritized exports in the 1960s. 
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 Why then did liberalization fail to generate large amounts of export-oriented FDI?  A 
possible explanation lies in trade theories based on factor endowments.  Factor-based 
theories on the effects of openness divide societies among land, labor, and capital.  The 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem argues that freer trade will lead to increasing incomes for locally 
abundant factors, while the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem holds that this will lead to 
specialization and export in goods that use those factors intensively.  These models are most 
commonly used to explain international trade patterns, but they have some applicability for 
FDI as well.  Indeed, efficiency-seeking investment is predicated on the notion that cost 
efficiencies can be had where specific inputs (labor, for example) are abundant and perhaps 
inexpensive.  The FDI pattern that resulted in Brazil, however, combined some labor 
intensity with little export production among multinationals.  Indeed, the main effect of 
liberalization of FDI flows has been an entrenchment of market-seeking models with 
moderately higher local labor intensity compared to what might have been possible with 
trade. 
 There are various explanations as to why this is the case.  First, Dunning’s OLI 
framework outlines the ways in which multinational firms have different motivating factors 
than firms engaged in simple trade.  Multinationals often have incentives to keep innovations 
or intangible assets under company control.  Market access, or selling a proprietary good in 
an emerging market, may be more important than export possibilities.  Along these lines, I 
have already mentioned the wide variety of multinational production motivations and 
sectoral distinctions.  Multinational flagship IT firms, for example, are capital rather than 
labor intensive, and therefore the Heckscher-Ohlin logic would not predict export from 
relatively capital-poor developing countries. 
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 Another possible explanation for the lack of efficiency-oriented investment concerns 
international wage competition.  According to this explanation, where labor costs are the 
primary consideration for export-oriented firms a ‘race to the bottom’ develops.  Countries 
engage in a competition to attract export-oriented FDI by maintaining low wages or perhaps 
cutting back on unionization or other labor rights, which tend to increase wage levels 
(Flanagan 2006).  By this interpretation, Latin America’s lack of export-oriented FDI is a 
result of its losing investment to lower-cost locations in East Asia.  This is a somewhat 
plausible explanation, though again the tremendous heterogeneity of FDI must be 
emphasized.  It is not the case that all efficiency-oriented FDI targets low-wage 
environments.  In many sectors, the availability of well-educated and well-compensated 
workers may be a source of efficiency.  While it is certainly true that countries like Brazil 
display comparatively high wage rates among middle income countries, there are other 
sources of potential efficiencies, such as the abundant supply of engineers and other high-
skill workers.  Moreover, Brazil enjoys additional cost advantages, such as proximity to 
North American and European markets that East Asian countries do not.  While relative labor 
costs are important, it seems unlikely that the lack of export-oriented FDI in Brazil is solely 
due to wage competition. 
I argue here that a third explanation is more convincing.  As elsewhere in Latin 
America, the attributes of domestic institutions in Brazil have made it very difficult for the 
state to efficiently exert leverage on already present multinationals and press for integration 
into global value chains.  By the same token, the same institutional characteristics make the 
attraction of new export-oriented FDI unlikely.  The instability of the ‘rules of the game’ in 
Latin America makes it less likely that multinational firms will pursue tight integration into 
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complex global production networks.  Multinational firms considering countries as export 
platforms must consider institutional characteristics to a greater degree than those firms 
considering pure market-seeking strategies.  Increases in intrafirm trade signal the growing 
integration of global value chains, and that FDI is an essential part of efficiency-seeking 
strategies for firms.  Disruptions to complex value chains can cause serious problems.  
Efficiency-oriented investments must also deal with institutions when paying duties or 
engaging with regional trade blocs.  Efficiency-oriented investments, by virtue of their 
complexity, are more seriously impacted by host country institutions than other forms of 
investment.  Consistent implementation of policies by well-functioning institutions should 
mitigate these risks for firms.   
Despite its size and pervasiveness, the Brazilian state displayed signs of institutional 
fragility since the 1990s.  This lack of effective capacity was exacerbated by the debt crises 
of the 1980s and subsequent neoliberal reform period.  There are institutional exceptions to 
this pattern.  The BNDES has been especially effective at incentivizing exports from 
multinational firms, and has been instrumental in the export success stories since 2004.  
However, in Brazil’s case we must acknowledge the role of domestic institutions in the 
largely market-oriented investment profiles of multinational firms.  Coupled with 
institutional weaknesses, the characteristics of investment promotion policy since the 1980s 
have reinforced the market-seeking model of FDI in Brazil.   
The significant investments achieved since 1990 have not generated substantial 
positive trade balances among multinational firms in Brazil.  According to a 2004 study of 
218 large multinational and Brazilian-owned firms undertaken by the Instituto de Estudos 
para o Desenvolvimento Industrial (IEDI), multinational firms displayed a lower propensity 
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to export (17.4% in 2003) than large national firms (24%), though exports were growing in 
both categories.  Moreover, while multinationals’ exports were concentrated in medium to 
high technology-intensive sectors, these exports were more than offset by imported inputs, 
creating large trade deficits.  Nationally-owned firms, dominant in commodities and low 
technology-intensive sectors, demonstrated consistent positive trade balances from 2000 to 
2003 (IEDI 2004). 
 It might be tempting to draw the conclusion that efficiency-oriented firms are simply 
not interested in using Brazil as an export platform, and that the country simply ‘took what it 
could get’.  However, there are examples of other countries which have successfully 
employed discriminating policy, channeled through sound institutions, to discriminate among 
interested firms.  As a representative case drawn from the East Asian success stories, 
consider the situation of Taiwan in the 1970s.  While Taiwan is small and now quite open, in 
the 1970s it displayed characteristics not unlike other developing countries.  As Wade (1990, 
149) points out, foreign investment as a source of capital accounted for only 3 to 10 percent 
of domestic capital formation in the 1970s, which was in line with Brazil and Mexico.  Only 
20 to 25 percent of manufacturing exports came from foreign firms in the 1970s.  Taiwan 
developed a number of investment incentives during that decade, including tax holidays, 
accelerated depreciation for capital goods, and guarantees against expropriation.  More 
importantly, Taiwan became increasingly discriminating about what kind of foreign 
investment was allowed in over the course of the 1970s.  While it is true that Taiwan’s 
limited domestic market prompted many proposals for export-oriented FDI, almost all 
investments were met with strict export requirements and/or local content requirements.  The 
export requirements were consistent, and as Wade (1990, 152) points out, remained in place 
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even during the 1980s, when foreign exchange surpluses were quite large.  The 1960 “Statute 
for the Encouragement of Investment” provided, along with other incentives, income tax 
exemption on two percent of export profits and business/commodity tax exemptions on 
exports (Riedel 1975).  In 1966, the first export processing zone in Taiwan was established, 
which eliminated all quantitative import and export restrictions.  In 1973, labor-intensive 
industries such as textiles were excluded from the EPZs altogether, as the government placed 
more emphasis on capital and skill-intensive industry (Riedel 1975).  In 1983, policymakers 
even contemplated a blanket requirement that foreign investors should be required to export 
no less than 50 percent of their production.  Individual firms were often confronted with 
these demands.  While some multinationals walked away from negotiations, others decided 
investment in Taiwan was worth the concessions.  The tough bargaining between the 
government and firms continued into the 1990s, as Taiwan sought to extract concessions 
from firms regarding local content and export operations (Amsden and Chu 2003). 
 While export requirements and other tools used by Taiwan in the 1970s are no longer 
available to developing countries because of the WTO’s Trade Related Investment Measures 
agreements, the priority placed on export-oriented investment presents a contrast with 
Brazilian policy and practices.  Taiwan managed to condition its incoming FDI to suit 
developmental objectives, in many cases over the objections of firms.  It was aided in this 
effort by a set of effective governmental institutions, including the Council for Economic 
Planning and Development (CEPD) and especially the Industrial Development Bureau 
(IDB).  The IDB was the key agency for investment policy in Taiwan, also responsible for 
trade and industrial policy.  Wade (1990) notes that Taiwanese institutions displayed a 
number of “organizational advantages” which led to efficient economic governance, 
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including the centralization of industrial policy within these institutions (which helps 
coherence and coordination), a centralized approach to FDI screening, a core of well-trained 
and stable bureaucrats, and hierarchical organizations with clearly defined responsibilities.  
The active, discriminating policies employed by the Taiwanese government, as well as the 
institutional framework for investment promotion, have had undeniable effects on the 
composition of FDI. 
5.3 Brazilian Export Promotion Policies and Institutions, 1990-2010 
 The election of Fernando Collor in 1989 ushered in dramatic changes in export 
promotion policies in Brazil.  In the late 1980s, much of the ISI framework remained in 
place.  Many tariff rates remained unchanged since the 1950s, and the average tariff rate in 
1990 remained a high 52% (Manzetti 1993, 113).  The anti-export bias of the ISI policy 
framework in Brazil is well documented, though as Shapiro (1997) points out, ISI did 
diversify the Brazilian economy in ways that laid the foundation for future export growth in 
manufactured goods. Moreover, despite the high tariffs export growth was actually quite 
substantial in the early 1980s, and somewhat less so in the latter part of the decade.  Brazilian 
exports rose from 0.71% of total world trade in 1979 to 1.27% in 1984, and then back down 
to 1.05% in 1989164
                                                 
164In constant 2000 prices (Bonelli and Pinheiro 2008). 
.  The growth rate of Brazilian exports was often high in the 1980s, 
despite the stagnation of the domestic economy during the ‘lost decade’.  Shapiro (1997) and 
Bonelli (2000) attribute this to firms using exports as a relief valve to compensate for weak 
domestic demand due to the recession.  In terms of export composition, most goods during 





 The primary institution charged with export promotion before 1990 was the Carteira 
de Comercio Exterior, or CACEX.  This institution had, in previous decades, gained a 
reputation as an autonomous, meritocratically staffed organization.  However, by the late 
1980s a series of scandals had undermined the institution’s credibility, and it was dismantled 
by Collor165
 In 1990, however, the Collor administration implemented a dramatic liberalization of 
Brazilian trade policy, and developed a new set of institutions to oversee export promotion.  
Collor lifted many restrictions on imports, and put in place a gradual program of tariff 
reductions from 1990 to 1994.  By 1994, the modal import tariff had been reduced to 20%, 
from 40% in 1990 (Bonelli 2000).  In addition to these tariff reductions, the Collor 
government set up two organizations which would focus on export financing: FINAMEX (a 
capital goods export financing plan through the BNDES) and Proex (export credit lines 
backed by the Banco do Brasil).  Proex offered credit to companies which could demonstrate 
domestic content and confirmed exports, while FINAMEX targeted small exporters for 
support.  However, both bodies suffered almost immediately from a number of problems.  As 
Shapiro (1997) notes, Proex had inconsistent and uncertain funding levels from year to year.  
Firms also faced a drawn-out approval process for loans, and many potential beneficiaries 
.  The other export promotion arrangement of note during the 1980s was the 
program Beneficios Fiscais as Programas Especiais de Exportação (BEFIEX).  This 
program, also ended in 1990, allowed firms to exempt themselves from tariffs and taxes if 
they could credibly commit to long term export plans.  This program was especially utilized 
by automotive companies and parts manufacturers in the 1980s, and was able to shield some 
of these firms from the effects of an appreciating currency. 
                                                 
165CACEX controlled the entry of foreign goods through the disbursement of import licenses. These were often 
subject to bribes, and the paperwork of non-payers was simply engavetado, or “put in a drawer” (“Malandragem 
no Mercosul” 2010). 
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were simply unaware of the program’s existence.  Similarly, FINAMEX during the Cardoso 
administration only distributed between 60 and 80 percent of its budget, due to a lack of 
applicants.  Most of its clients were small exporters, so multinationals were not often the 
beneficiaries of this program.  Bonelli (2000) noted that the FINAMEX program suffered 
from uncertainty over budget allocations, and that Proex had numerous governmental 
agencies overseeing its credit lines.  This dispersion of authority was interpreted negatively 
by firms he interviewed, as were the less-than-attractive lending rates offered by these 
programs. 
 While the Collor, Franco, and Cardoso governments focused on export financing, 
they also made occasional attempts at export promotion with the other tools at their disposal.  
General trade liberalization was a natural bedfellow to the process of macroeconomic 
stabilization, and attempts were made to facilitate trade by reducing the so-called Custo 
Brasil, or Brazil cost.  This includes a wide range of factors which increase the cost of doing 
business in Brazil, from delays at ports (and other infrastructure deficiencies) to high taxes 
and other nonwage costs which can reach 100 percent of workers’ salaries.  While progress 
in combating these entrenched obstacles was partial and slow, the campaign to lessen the 
regulatory and infrastructure burden on firms was ongoing during the 1990s166
 Cardoso’s administration in particular was interested in reducing these trade barriers 
in the second half of the 1990s, as it was unwilling to undermine the hard-won stability of the 
Real.  The overvaluation of the Real had become a big problem for the current account 
already in 1995, and the government became increasingly concerned about growing trade 
deficits.  In response, Cardoso adopted a series of directly illiberal support mechanisms, 
. 
                                                 




including the automotive regime, to encourage export among multinationals and domestic 
firms.  These included, but were not limited to, duty drawback systems, increased export 
financing, and reduction of taxes for production of export goods.  In 1996, the BNDES 
announced a number of new credit lines to select industries, capped at R$10 million per 
company and with a base interest rate of 5.5% (Shapiro 1997, 80).  These policies were 
designed to generate exports in important industries. 
 Beyond export financing and general trade liberalization measures, Brazil did of 
course help construct a major regional trade agreement in the early 1990s.  While the goals of 
Mercosul were many, the trade agreement did have a substantial effect on the exports of 
multinational companies in Brazil, particularly in the automotive sector.  The trade 
agreement eventually created large trade flows of auto parts and finished automobiles, 
particularly between Argentina and Brazil167.  Multinational auto companies were able to 
rationalize their production processes within the context of Mercosul.  Some degree of 
specialization became evident, with Argentina producing higher priced models and Brazil 
concentrating on two or four door “popular” cars (Chudnovsky and Lopez 2002).  However, 
the process of trade liberalization within Mercosul was not smooth during the 1990s.  At the 
end of the decade, the devaluation of the Brazilian Real in 1999 and the Argentinian peso’s 
link to the appreciating dollar caused severe stress to the trade agreement168
                                                 
167Exports of cars and trucks from Brazil to Mercosul countries increased from $76 million in 1990 to $1,296 
million in 1997.  Auto parts exports increased from $148 million to $1,467 million during that same period 
(Quadros and Carvalho 1999, 70). 
.  Even after the 
major economic crisis in Argentina in 2002-2003 and the resumption of growth in 2003, 
 
168Cardoso (2009, 26) points out that intra-Mercosul trade grew steadily from 4 billion dollars in 1990 to 20 





there were periodic trade disputes between Argentina and Brazil over the commercial balance 
in specific sectors. 
 While there is no doubt that Mercosul’s development has been influential for the 
investment models of multinational corporations operating in Brazil, in many respects it is an 
unfinished trade agreement.  Cardoso (2009) notes that the common external tariff is subject 
to continuous revision as Brazil and Argentina seek to ensure advantages for particular 
sectors.  Although Mercosul has prompted additional exports among sectors dominated by 
multinational firms, this dynamic is limited to only a few industries, including automotive.  
While this is an important industry for the Brazilian economy, the value chain possibilities of 
Mercosul are not yet realized by many multinational firms.  This view was corroborated in a 
number of interviews with policymakers and academics.  One interviewee plainly asserted 
that Mercosul was underutilized by foreign firms with the potential to develop trade among 
member countries169
Other export promotion policies in the 1990s lacked a strategic and consistent vision, 
operating instead in a reactive fashion.  While political support for attracting export-oriented 
investments was more common throughout the 1990s than support for innovation-oriented 
.  A study on investment policy undertaken in 2005 noted that the 
attraction of some efficiency-oriented FDI to Brazil was due to the deterioration of 
investment conditions in other Mercosul countries, and not due to Brazilian policy efforts 
(UNCTAD 2005b).  All in all, it seems Mercosul offers an attractive regional context for 
export-oriented FDI, but many potential efficiency-oriented investments have not been 
realized.  Certainly the chronic appearance of trade disputes and the lack of effective dispute 
resolution mechanisms do not help. 
                                                 




investments, that support often sprung from concern over trade imbalances and not from a 
strategic vision of the role of efficiency-oriented FDI in Brazil’s economy.  The 
overvaluation of the Real in 1995 and resulting trade imbalances generated a plethora of 
policy activity to incentivize exports, including the automotive regime.  These incentives 
were temporary, partly to discourage rent-seeking.  However, the lack of a systematic and 
enduring strategy to encourage exports among multinationals is notable, even during the 
more favorable post-1999 period.  Corrêa de Lacerda (2003, 144) notes the passivity and 
reactive nature of policy towards multinational exports.  It is one thing to put out balance of 
payments fires from time to time, it is quite another to develop a systematic strategy for 
promoting multinational exports in a way that will contribute to participation in global 
production networks. 
 After the devaluation of 1999, Brazilian exports resumed rapid and sustained growth.  
By 2005, Brazilian exports represented 1.14% of world trade, up from 0.85% in 1999 
(Bonelli and Pinheiro 2008, 14).  The export growth was diversified moderately, with 
significant portions coming from manufactured goods.  The Lula administration continued to 
support export activity on a variety of fronts, including export financing and trade 
liberalization.  As part of the return to a more active industrial policy, Lula did expand 
funding lines for exports in specific sectors of the economy.  The BNDES, through its 
foreign trade and capital goods funding branch FINAME, increased its export financing 
disbursements from US$3.9 billion in 2002 to US$6.6 billion in 2008170
                                                 
170Interview, BNDES, Brasília, June 2009 
.  Importantly, Lula 
emphasized south-south trade expansion much more than his predecessors.  The flagship 




expansion of Brazilian exports into other South American markets, but also farther afield in 
places like South Africa and India171
The dramatic expansion of exports during the first Lula administration seemed to 
vindicate the approach taken by the government.  However, as section 5.4.1 demonstrates, 
the role played by multinational corporations in this export expansion was offset by the 
increases in multinational imports, rendering their overall impact on the balance of payments 
neutral or negative.  Before the economic crisis of 2008, primary products and manufactured 
goods were the primary drivers of export expansion.  In a study conducted in 2007 which 
separated exports into low technology intensive goods, medium-low, medium-high, and high, 
the Instituto de Estudos para o Desenvolvimento Industrial (IEDI 2007, 9) demonstrated that 
Brazil’s trade surplus in 2006 came from low technology intensive goods ($31.8 billion 
FOB) and medium-low ($10.5 billion).  Medium-high and high technology intensive goods 
were responsible for $1 billion and $11.8 billion deficits, respectively.  High-tech intensive 
exports, while growing, did not increase at the same pace as other more traditional forms of 
Brazilian exports
.   
172
 Although the Cardoso administration had not neglected export incentives during the 
1990s to the same degree that innovation incentives were neglected, the Lula administration 
increased export incentives further in the industrial policy frameworks of the PITCE and 
PDP.  As has been mentioned, the PITCE displayed considerable focus on trade imbalances.  
.  Multinational firms operating in high technology intensive sectors were 
responsible for large trade deficits (IEDI 2004). 
                                                 
171The PDP made specific reference to Brazil’s potential presence in Africa, noting that Brazilian investment on 
the continent amounted to $535 million from 2003 to 2006, whereas the Sino-African investment surpassed $60 
billion in 2006 (PDP 2008). 
 
172Bonelli (2000, 93) argues that high tech exports did not grow quickly in the 1990s: “Roughly speaking, the 
higher the technological content, the slower the growth of exports.” 
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Beyond the aforementioned expansion of export financing lines and the creation of ABDI, 
the PITCE established four specific target sectors for development: software, 
semiconductors, capital goods, and pharmaceuticals.  In addition, the PITCE established 
broad ‘horizontal’ actions, including industrial modernization and expansion of trade.  
However, the PITCE quickly ran into oversight coordination problems, as mentioned in 
previous chapters.  Moreover, despite the emphasis on exports and specific identification of 
target sectors, the mechanisms by which these targets would be achieved were left vague.  
An article in the Latin American business magazine Tendencias in 2005 lamented the then 
year-old industrial policy’s lack of “coordination of strategies between the involved public 
organs”, and pointed out that the PITCE had not generated significant activity in the target 
sectors (Oliveira 2005). 
 The legal changes which accompanied the PITCE, most importantly the Innovation 
Law and the Lei do Bem, have been influential for patterns of FDI.  With regard to export 
profiles of multinational firms, the Lei do Bem is the more important change.  The Lei do 
Bem expanded export financing.  The legislation established a special regime for the 
acquisition of capital goods for exporting companies, known as RECAP.  This regime 
allowed companies that export 70% or more of sales to purchase or import capital goods with 
the suspension of the PIS and COFINS taxes.  Another tax regime (REPES) was made 
available for firms exporting technology services, which similarly suspended the PIS and 
COFINS taxes (RENAI 2009).  Both the REPES and RECAP measures are available to 
multinational firms.  As an indirect incentive to export, the Lei do Bem also implemented tax 
exemptions to compensate firms for the costs of registering and maintaining patents abroad. 
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 Partly in response to the criticisms of the PITCE and the incentives contained in the 
new industrial policy framework, the Lula administration re-launched its industrial policy in 
2008 under the Plano de Desenvolvimento da Produção/PDP label.  The PDP promoted the 
expansion of Brazilian exports as one of its four main action areas, seeking to increase the 
share of Brazil’s exports in worldwide exports from 1.18 percent in 2007 to 1.25 percent in 
2010.  There were a variety of mechanisms put in place to achieve this goal.  The Proex 
program was changed to allow companies with sales of up to R$150 million to participate.  
The limit had previously been R$60 million.  This benefited larger firms, and was done 
partially in response to criticisms that Proex only targeted small firms and therefore did not 
have much impact.  The upward limit of individual financing packages was increased to 
US$20 million from US$10 million.  Interest rates on loans from the BNDES in target 
sectors (capital goods, software) were also lowered and harmonized at 7 percent (PDP 2008).  
Finally, sales taxes were eliminated for services related to export and commercial promotion 
of exported goods173
 The export promotion policies outlined here are an integral part of the ‘open 
economy’ industrial policies pursued by the Lula administration.  While the Collor and 
Cardoso governments periodically supported exports in response to trade deficits, Lula 
established a more enduring, consistent policy platform for export promotion.  Existing and 
potential FDI, while not the only focus of industrial policy, was not excluded from these 
incentives.  As was the case with innovation, however, some of the more active and 
discriminating investment promotion policies of the Lula administration were undercut by 
governmental institutions.  The PITCE struggled in part because it was governed by a wide 
. 
                                                 
173While the incentives outlined here were greeted warmly by exporting firms, some analyses have suggested 




range of ministries and agencies (Suzigan and Furtado 2005), and these bodies could not 
coordinate their efforts. 
5.3.1 The institutional framework for export promotion 
 The export promotion policies enacted by the Brazilian government in the 1990s and 
2000s were channeled through an uneven collection of export promotion bodies, widely 
dispersed among the various government ministries.  There was no unified approach to 
export promotion, especially as applied to multinational firms.  The newly created ABDI and 
its renovated export-promoting partner APEX have been attempting to unify export 
promotion and assume institutional primacy, but there are signs that these institutions may 
simply evolve into additional agencies with export promotion mandates.  In their studies of 
export promotion in Brazil, Shapiro (1997, 82) Bonelli (2000, 108) and Corrêa de Lacerda 
(2003, ch. 6) all note the proliferation of export promotion bodies within the Brazilian state.  
Bonelli’s study, which includes firm interviews, noted that firms often complained about the 
proliferation of government agencies among the various ministries, and argued for a more 
unified institutional framework.  Shapiro notes that despite the BNDES’s central role in 
export financing, there are numerous other agencies with small funds and different priorities.  
In an interview at the BNDES, one respondent for this study noted that every ministry even 
remotely connected to exports had an organization charged with export promotion, and that 
these bodies could become very territorial.  This made the prospects of unification, while 
desirable, somewhat distant174
                                                 
174Interview, Victor Burns, BNDES, Brasília, May 2009 
.  These various bodies do not necessarily compete with one 
another for the attention of multinationals, nor do they consciously work at cross-purposes.  




conducive to active, discriminating policy or a strategic vision of FDI’s role in generating 
spillovers.  Without institutional coordination, state leverage on firm investment models is 
diminished. 
 The institutional changes that took place during the Lula administration offer a fresh 
start, but there are worrying signals.  I have already noted in chapter three the number of 
ministries charged with oversight of the ABDI and CNDI.  This makes agility and 
coordination of export promotion policy especially difficult to achieve.  Though APEX 
would seem to be the natural institutional home for export promotion (as its acronym 
implies), this agency has not been especially effective thus far at generating exports among 
multinational firms.  Investment promotion was subsumed within APEX after 2003, but the 
agency retains a primary focus on promoting Brazilian firm exports.  The investment 
promotion and export promotion divisions operate separately.  Various interviewees in Brazil 
were pessimistic about the agency’s ability to deliver export-oriented investments.  A former 
director of the Central Bank claimed that APEX had thus far not been particularly 
effective175.  The director of the American Chamber of Commerce noted that while some 
multinationals had been induced to expand export projects, there had been very few 
greenfield export-oriented projects in recent years176
                                                 
175Interview, Gustavo Franco, former Central Bank director, São Paulo, March 2008 
.  Despite its renewed sense of purpose, 
APEX’s dual role lends it a certain amount of ambiguity.  According to a 2007 article in 
Gazeta Mercantil, the investment promotion division in APEX uses the very same system 
initially constructed to find partners and business for Brazilian exporters. In the same article, 
the then-director of APEX characterized the institution as “one more instrument of the 
 





government with the objective of attracting foreign investment” (Exman 2007, emphasis 
added). 
 In addition to APEX and the ABDI itself, there are numerous other institutional 
locations for export promotion.  The ministry of development, industry, and trade operates 
the Chamber of Foreign Trade (CAMEX), which itself is comprised of various bodies 
responsible for export promotion in different sectors.  The National Confederation of 
Industry (CNI) has an export support division, and another organization known as SEBRAE 
assists micro and small businesses in their export activities.  This is in addition to the other 
important institutions already mentioned.  The proliferation of export-promoting units makes 
it difficult to consistently communicate to firms the incentives available for exporting 
activities. 
 The variability in funding levels disbursed to financing organizations like the BNDES 
is also a problem.  While both FINEP and BNDES currently enjoy large resources to 
encourage exports, these funding lines have fluctuated in the past.  Shapiro (1997) suggests 
that uncertainty over funding lines such as FINAMEX and Proex contributed to their low 
disbursement rates in the 1990s177
 Despite periodic uncertainty about funding resources, the BNDES continues to be the 
most important institutional ‘pocket of efficiency’ in Brazil’s export promotion framework.  
.  It is also possible that many firms were unaware of the 
export financing available to them.  Bonelli (2000, 107) suggests that the loan rates offered 
were simply not attractive enough to offset the bureaucratic costs of application and therefore 
guarantee participation.  Political changes have sometimes resulted in one agency being 
favored over another, and variable funding levels. 
                                                 




As FINEP is more focused on innovation, the BNDES assumes greater prominence in 
promoting exports (though there are a few export incentives offered by FINEP, as detailed in 
section 5.4.5).  The BNDES divides its export credit lines into two categories: pre-shipment 
and post-shipment.  Pre-shipment funds finance the production of goods for export, while 
post-shipment provides funds for the commercialization of goods and services in foreign 
countries.  The funding lines for exports have been growing.  The BNDES disbursed $2.1 
billion in export financing in 1999.  By 2008, the bank disbursed $6.6 billion (BNDES 2009).  
The BNDES maintains strict conditionality on its loans; as of 2005 over 80 percent of 
supported firms had met their export goals (Catermol 2005, 17).  The bank also displays a 
discriminating approach in its lending practices; firms in high value-added sectors such as 
capital goods, electronics, and telecommunications are more likely to receive export 
financing than commodities, all else equal (Catermol 2005).  As this chapter demonstrates, 
BNDES support was instrumental in the expansion of cell phone exports from Brazil in the 
last five years.  Finally, the BNDES is one of very few institutions to create innovative export 
funding lines for intangible goods, important in the IT sector.  The BNDES has begun in 
recent years to fund IT service exports with substantial intellectual property components, but 
no manufacturing.  This necessitated adaptations of older loan models, which required 
physical collateral guarantees for banks.  In 1994, these types of IT service loans amounted 
to just $84 million.  By 2007, the BNDES was loaning $665 million in service sectors 
through its BNDES-exim program (Galvão and Catermol 2008, 95).  Again, we must point to 
its established networks among multinational firms and consistent political support as 
essential ingredients for the success of the BNDES. 
248 
 
The institutional framework in Brazil for export promotion is disarticulated and 
inconsistent, despite the autonomous activities of the BNDES.  Even Lula’s renewed 
emphasis on sectorally discriminating industrial policy did not carry with it a unified 
institutional framework for its implementation.  While there are isolated examples of 
successful export promotion, even among multinational firms, the general trend has not been 
one of institutional efficacy.  Many of the reasons for this state of affairs are deep-seated.  As 
Helen Shapiro explains in her study of export promotion policies in the 1980s and 1990s: 
 Targeting strategic export sectors a la South Korea would have required a capacity to 
 plan and to discipline the private sector that was lacking in the Brazilian state 
 (Shapiro 1997, 77). 
 
 Export promotion policy is not deterministic.  Even the most carefully constructed 
and implemented policies can fail to generate beneficial export patterns in the face of an 
overvalued currency or worldwide economic crisis.  However, the nature of policy and the 
capacity of state institutions can have a profound impact on the nature of exports.  Indeed, 
during firm interviews conducted for this study it was remarkable how often comments on 
state capacity and policy would precede exchange rate considerations when the subject of 
exports came up.  Multinationals do consider institutional efficacy in host countries when 
making decisions about their participation in global production networks. 
5.4 The Commercial Balance of Multinationals in Brazil 
 In order to connect policy initiatives and institutional settings with the export activity 
of multinational firms, I employ a number of databases from numerous Brazilian 
governmental agencies.  I supplement these data with responses of firms in the automotive 
and IT sectors, as in chapter four.  Firm representatives were asked about the most important 
factors affecting their export and import decisions, as well as questions about their 
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relationships with state institutions and incentives they may or may not have used in their 
international activities.  Firms were also asked about institutional efficacy and their reactions 
to policy initiatives designed to increase exports.  All told, 27 firms from the automotive and 
IT sectors were interviewed.  Four were flagship automotive manufacturers; nine were large 
multinational auto parts manufacturers.  Nine others were flagship multinational IT firms, 
and the remaining five are contract manufacturing firms in the IT sector.  The operating 
hypothesis is that Brazil’s export promotion institutions and policies have contributed to 
negative commercial balances in sectors dominated by multinational firms.  The firm 
interviews are especially helpful, as they allow firm representatives to distinguish among the 
different host country factors that increase or decrease the potential for export-oriented 
production. 
 As noted previously, both the IT sector and the automotive sector are marked by a 
high degree of multinational penetration.  After the liberalization of investment flows in the 
1990s, both sectors were inundated by multinationals.  Moreover, both sectors are important 
for the Brazilian economy, and represent a possible source of export growth.  While auto 
exports and auto parts exports have increased, especially within the context of Mercosul, 
Brazilian IT exports have not been substantial save for a few sectors (such as cell phones).  
This is despite substantial government effort to create IT exports.  In both sectors, the periods 
of export expansion in the last two decades must be tempered with an acknowledgment of the 
simultaneous increase in imports by multinationals.  In the next section, I examine 
commercial balance patterns among multinational firms, drawing on Brazilian central bank 
census data.  I then examine the automotive and IT sector in turn, integrating interview 
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responses with further datasets on sector-specific trade patterns.  Section 5.5 contrasts both 
sectors, and considers the technological content of multinational exports. 
5.4.1 Economy-wide trade patterns 
 One of the earliest systematic studies of multinational investment profiles in Latin 
America was conducted by Newfarmer (1979), who argued that multinationals in Latin 
America had higher import propensities than local firms.  Renato Baumann (1993) conducted 
an analysis of the composition of Brazilian trade, and found that intrafirm trade had increased 
by 16.5 percent per year, on average, from 1980 to 1990, as firms sought to establish 
productive capacity in order to sell to Brazil’s population.  Nonnenberg (2003), using data 
from the state of Sâo Paulo, found that foreign firms increased their imported inputs from 
1994 to 1996 at a greater rate than national firms, and that this was especially true for 
technology-intensive sectors.  Laplane and Sarti (1999), in a sample of 74 firms, found that 
while exports had increased 91 percent between 1989 and 1997, imports had increased 395 
percent in the same period.  De Negri (2004), using firm-level data compiled from various 
governmental agencies in Brazil, conducted an econometric analysis of the determinants of 
firm exports and imports in the 1990s.  While she found that foreign firms were much more 
likely than domestic ones to engage in global production networks, this insertion was 
asymmetric: foreign ownership increased the likelihood of a negative trade balance, despite 
the competitive international advantages enjoyed by multinational firms.  Finally, Corrêa de 
Lacerda (2003) utilized data from the two censuses of foreign capital to argue that imports of 
multinationals had grown more quickly during that period than exports from the same firms.  
Most of the studies mentioned here contained the implicit or explicit recognition that 
multinationals had higher export propensities than national firms, and that much of the export 
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growth exhibited by multinationals had taken the form of intrafirm trade.  There seems little 
reason to doubt that multinationals in Brazil are becoming more enmeshed in global value 
chains, as evidenced by the growth of imports, exports, and intrafirm trade.  However, it is 
apparent that multinational firms do not often display positive trade balances. 
 Tables 5.1 and 5.2 reproduce data from the Brazilian central bank’s censuses of 
foreign capital in 1995 and 2000, reported in Corrêa de Lacerda (2003) and rearranged for 
interpretation.  Regrettably, the results of the 2005 census are not yet available.  However, 
these surveys represent the most complete picture of the activities of multinational firms 
available to researchers.  While the data are not disaggregated by specific industrial sectors, 
they are divided by category of ownership and into general primary, secondary, and tertiary 
categories.  There are some important conclusions to be drawn from these data.  First, it is 
not surprising that firms have increased both importing and exporting activities between 1995 
and 2000.  Intrafirm trade has also increased across the board.  However, the data confirm the 
growth of imports in relation to exports in Brazil.  While both exhibit substantial growth, 
imports of multinational firms increased 63 percent from 1995 to 2000 whereas exports 
increased by 53 percent.  Also interesting is the revelation that this trend is driven mainly by 
firms with majority foreign participation.  In the primary and secondary sectors, and for this 
group of firms as a whole, imports increased faster than exports during this period of FDI 
liberalization.  In the case of minority foreign control, the pattern is reversed.  This suggests 
that majority foreign control brings with it a propensity for a negative trade balance.  Firms 
with minority foreign participation have much less impact on overall trade patterns in 2000 






Firms with foreign participation are responsible for an increasing share of Brazil’s 
exports and imports during this period, as the bottom of table 5.1 indicates.  While they are 
responsible for a greater share of exports than imports, the gap between the two closes 
between 1995 and 2000. This appears to be driven by majority-controlled firms, who exhibit 
stronger import propensities than minority-controlled firms.  Firms with majority foreign 
ownership are responsible for 43 percent of Brazil’s imports in 2000 but only 41 percent of 
its exports in the same year.  Finally, it is important to note the growth of Brazil’s overall 
exports (18 percent) from 1995 to 2000 compared to its imports (12 percent).  Brazil’s 
negative trade balance in both years diminishes somewhat between 1995 and 2000.  While 
overall these firms display a positive trade balance in both years, imports increase faster than 
exports.  Again, this appears to be driven by firms with majority foreign ownership. 
These dynamics are largely limited to manufacturing and service sectors.  As table 
5.1 indicates, multinational firms in primary products are export intensive.  This stands to 
reason, as natural resource-seeking multinationals are in country for the purpose of extracting 
minerals or agricultural goods.  Foreign investment in natural resources displays a positive 
trade balance, regardless of the degree of control a parent company enjoys over its 
subsidiary.  Indeed, natural resources have been a big part of Brazil’s export boom in the last 
decade.  De Negri and Kubota (2008) find that Brazil's commodities exports to the world 
increased from 37% to 43% of total exports from 2000 to 2008, while those of high tech 
goods decreased from 18% to 11%.  As noted in chapter two, this work does not address 




Table 5.2 indicates that within multinational trade patterns, intrafirm trade is 
becoming more and more important.  That is, firms are increasingly integrating their 
production networks, and an increasing share of multinational subsidiaries’ trade is destined 
for its parent company.  By 2000, intrafirm trade represents the majority of trade for all 
multinational firms, regardless of sector.  Intrafirm exports grew quickly between 1995 and 
2000, indicating that when multinationals did export it was often within their own production 
network.  Intrafirm exports outpaced intrafirm imports between 1995 and 2000 in all 
categories save primary products and capital goods.  While these exports may indicate some 
efficiency-seeking motivations, they also represent opportunities for transfer pricing.  Also, 
intrafirm trade may indicate hierarchical models of value chain governance, which is 
regarded as less conducive to value chain upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz 2000). 
Table 5.2 Intrafirm trade, as a percentage of all imports and exports of multinational firms, by sectors of 




















Primary Sector 18.9 52.8 8.8 50.1 33.9 41.3 
Secondary Sector 44.6 64.6 42.3 56.0 20.0 13.7 
Machinery and Equipment 47.5 63.6 54.0 72.5 16.1 18.5 
Appliances and Electric 
Materials 31.0 67.4 43.3 72.7 36.4 29.4 
Electronic Material 50.1 81.1 35.0 57.0 31.0 22.0 
Automotive Vehicles, Trailers 
etc 57.7 73.8 46.0 61.8 16.1 15.8 
Tertiary Sector 41.1 59.9 56.1 64.0 18.8 7.9 
TOTAL 41.7 58.8 44.0 57.8 17.1 13.8 
Sources: Corrêa de Lacerda (2003) and the Central Bank’s Census of Foreign Capital (1995 and 2000) 
5.4.2 The commercial balance of the Brazilian automotive sector 
 In the 1950s, the Brazilian government presented multinational automakers with a 
choice: either produce vehicles in Brazil with 90 to 95 percent Brazilian content, or desert the 
Brazilian market altogether.  The restrictions on imported automobiles remained an important 
component of the industrial policy through most of the postwar period.  The Brazilian auto 
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industry only developed substantial efficiency seeking characteristics in the 1980s and 
particularly in the 1990s with the advent of Mercosul.  Even after 1990, domestic production 
of autos was primarily oriented toward satisfying domestic demand.  When exports did take 
place, they mostly took place between Brazil and Argentina, as the twin poles of the 
Mercosul automotive production network and its largest markets178
 In the auto parts industry, the elimination of controls on FDI in the 1990s resulted in 
an almost total denationalization of domestic production.  This was especially true of larger 
plants with high technology intensity, which were bought by multinationals or competed out 
of business.  Brazilian auto parts companies such as Metal Leve (acquired by the German 
firm Mahle) and Varga (bought by American and British firms) did not survive liberalization.  
In 1994, the value of investments in the auto parts sector controlled by foreign capital was 48 
percent.  By 2009, that figure had increased to 73.2 percent (Sindipeças 2010).  Foreign firms 
in the auto parts industry have increased their exports, again with a primary emphasis on the 
Mercosul regional trade network.  There are numerous examples of auto parts firms 
restructuring their production chains within Brazil and Argentina to better realize locational 
advantages.  However, the simultaneous rise of imports in the auto parts industry has resulted 
.  The expansion of 
exports, for both assemblers and auto parts companies, has been impressive.  However, 
imports have also increased substantially in the auto industry, especially after the 
liberalization process of the early 1990s.  Many of these imports come from Europe, Japan, 
and the US, as automakers import inputs and assemble in Brazil for domestic sales or export 
to other Mercosul countries.  This has led to periodic concerns about the trade balance of the 
industry, and a set of policy changes through the 1990s and 2000s. 
                                                 
178Queiroz and Carvalho (1999, 70) show that the process of regional integration has been the “main driving 
force” of expansion in automotive trade from Brazil, accounting for just 8% of exports of cars and trucks in 
1990 but 52% by 1997.  In auto parts, the same expansion is from 6% to 32%. 
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in a trade deficit in the industry.  As is the case with assemblers, most of these imported 
inputs come from outside Mercosul. 



















1990 975 220 701 1897 733 1164 
1991 1042 205 667 1915 849 1066 
1992 1993 196 821 3012 1079 1933 
1993 1758 196 705 2660 1809 851 
1994 1758 147 778 2684 2550 134 
1995 1357 97 959 2415 4795 -2380 
1996 1905 175 931 3012 4882 -1870 
1997 2651 137 1139 3929 5105 -1176 
1998 3035 98 1129 4263 4692 -429 
1999 1951 152 974 3078 3873 -795 
2000 2692 57 738 3487 3764 -277 
2001 2684 72 857 3613 3717 -104 
2002 2649 106 622 3378 2910 468 
2003 3529 226 923 4678 3246 1432 
2004 5354 285 976 6615 3653 2962 
2005 7862 538 989 9391 5257 4134 
2006 7935 688 1643 10268 6126 4142 
2007 8661 495 1726 10884 8690 2194 
2008 8492 462 2008 10963 13754 -2791 
Sources: ANFAVEA (2010), based on information from SECEX/MDIC 
Notes: Table refers to vehicles/parts exported and imported by ANFAVEA member companies. Table reflects 
values, not vehicle units. 
 
Brazilian administrations have, since the 1990s, put in place various support 
mechanisms for the auto industry.  Indeed, in the mid-1990s the auto industry was one of the 
very few sectors where actively interventionist industrial policies remained in an otherwise 
liberalizing policy environment.  The export incentives contained in the automotive regime 
of 1995 did generate an increase in exports beginning in 1997 (Queiroz and Carvalho 
1999)179
                                                 
179Exports of cars and trucks and of auto parts took off between 1996 and 1997, increasing from $3 billion to 
almost $4 billion.  However, the effect of the automotive regime on the trade balance was much more prominent 
.  However, there are a number of ways in which the export promotion policies 
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implemented since 1990 have been less effective at establishing a continuing precedent for 
export-led growth.  First, Brazil’s exports in the automotive industry have been increasingly 
concentrated on Mercosul.  While this is a positive development in some ways, the types of 
cars and parts being produced have limited market appeal beyond Mercosul.  Export growth 
outside the region has been modest.  Secondly, export promotion policies have been mostly 
reactive.  That is, they have been put in place to respond to imbalances.  However, they have 
not in general been implemented in a way that reflects a coherent, consistent strategy for 
supporting export expansion.  Finally, domestic institutions have limited the applicability and 
appeal of export promotion policies. 
In 1993, the Brazilian government established a set of incentives for the production of 
small cars with up to 1,000 cc engines, known as the Carro Popular regime.  These 
incentives, which mostly consisted of lowering the tax burden on these vehicles, aimed to 
generate domestic demand.  The plan did succeed in generating additional production despite 
objections voiced by the automakers, who were not as interested in producing small cars with 
low profit margins180
                                                                                                                                                       
in its restriction of imports. The automotive regime raised tariffs on car imports from 32 percent in February 
1995 to 70 percent in March (Queiroz and Carvalho 1999, 67).   
.  The policy did not, however, succeed in attracting much new FDI, and 
had only limited success in generating exports among firms already in country.  The 
component imports needed for such an increase in production, coupled with the flood of 
imports induced by tariff reduction in the early 1990s, had by 1995 produced a large trade 
deficit in the automotive industry (see table 5.3).  The Carro Popular policy initiative did 
help to expand domestic production and put vehicles into the hands of more Brazilians.  The 
legacies of this program are still felt today, as Brazil has often specialized, within the context 
 




of Mercosul, in the production of compact cars.  While these low-cost cars are now exported 
in significant quantities, studies have pointed out the limited export potential beyond 
Mercosul of this type of vehicle (ECLAC 2003, 131). 
 The introduction of the stable and perhaps already overvalued Real in 1995 
contributed to the flood of car imports that year, as did the tariff reductions and the 
consumption boom brought on by the end of inflation.  But also important was the lack of an 
efficiency-oriented investment policy.  At the end of 1995, the Brazilian government rectified 
this situation and implemented the automotive regime (RA) to combat these imbalances.  The 
RA, greeted warmly by existing manufacturers, supported domestic auto production with 
heavy tariff protection, and included a number of incentives for new entrants to the domestic 
market181
                                                 
181The implementation of the RA was due to many factors beyond the trade imbalance, such as the existence of 
a discriminatory auto regime in Argentina, the Mexican peso crisis and resulting imports, and the difficulties 
encountered during the liberalization process.  However, the trade imbalance was an immediate pressure and in 
many ways forced the issue on the Cardoso government. 
.  The RA did succeed in attracting a great deal of new automotive FDI, as outlined 
in chapter four.  The primary goal of the regime was to limit vehicle imports and encourage 
assemblers to set up factories to serve the domestic market.  However, firms could also 
receive tariff reductions if the exported a certain amount of their product.  As a representative 
example, in 1996 a firm exporting $1 billion could receive tariff reductions on up to $350 
million on imported capital goods and up to $1.27 billion on imported auto parts, as long as 
the firm respected the 60% national content rules (Bedê 1997, 382).  While exports did not 
respond to these indirect incentives immediately, by 1997 they began to rebound even in the 




(Quadros 2002), and were abandoned in 2000, it nevertheless succeeded in generating 
investment, some of which was efficiency-oriented182
After the devaluation of 1999, exports of both parts and finished vehicles increased, 
and then sped up even more after the resolution of Argentina’s profound economic and 
political crises in 2002-2003.  While the high level of the exchange rate dampened the 
growth of exports a bit after 2005, it did not reverse the upward trend.  Imports increased 
apace, however, and even before the economic crisis of 2008 there was evidence of 
commercial deficits in both parts and finished autos. 
. 
The policies of the Lula administration, in keeping with the renewed emphasis on 
industrial policy, actively supported the auto industry with a variety of tax incentives.  The 
PDP in 2008 had as one of its objectives the export of 930,000 vehicles in 2010.  Though that 
goal was not reached, the changes in export financing did generate increases in exports.  The 
Proex financing award limits were increased from $10 million to $20 million per firm, and 
financing for Proex was increased to R$1.3 billion (Ferraz 2009).  Also important was the 
changes in the drawback program, which allowed the suspension of payment for the 
PIS/COFINS taxes on inputs used in products that would eventually be exported.  In 
conjunction with the PDP, the BNDES has also expanded its funding lines for the industry, 
designed to increase productive capacity.  In 2008, BNDES provided US $420 million to 
finance engineering costs for new product development (ECLAC 2009, 87).  Many of the 
firms interviewed in this study cited the BNDES as an important source of funding for their 
export activities, and claimed that this funding had increased recently. 
                                                 
182There were also a number of negative outcomes from the automotive regime. The opening of the Brazilian 
economy, coupled with the stabilization of the domestic currency, allowed states to compete for automotive 
investments with excessive incentive packages (Rodríguez-Pose and Arbix 2001). The federal government 
lacked the resources (and, initially, the will) to control this kind of perverse completion among states, and only 
belatedly put in place mechanisms designed to reduce its likelihood. 
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During the automotive regime of the mid-1990s, tariffs on imported vehicles were 
raised to near 70 percent (Queiroz and Carvalho 1999).  However, the auto parts industry 
received no such protection.  The internationalization of the Brazilian auto parts sector is 
partly due to changes in the global automotive industry, such as modular production and 
follow-sourcing.  This had a number of important effects for the trade balance of auto parts.  
First, exports of the large multinational parts suppliers increased, especially to other 
Mercosul countries.  This increased the overall level of exports of the Brazilian auto parts 
sector.  Secondly, the level of imported inputs also increased.  Multinational auto parts firms 
received more of their inputs from abroad than did national firms.  This is demonstrated in 
figure 5.1.  This has led to some concerns that many of the imported inputs are high value-
added, given that many of these multinational auto parts producers have centralized R&D 
facilities.  Most wholly Brazilian-owned parts producers are now located in lower tiers of the 
supply chain. 
The second effect of denationalization concerns the production networks established 
by the multinational auto parts firms.  Given the economies of scale enjoyed by 
multinationals, expansion of exports within the Mercosul framework made sense.  Many of 
the largest parts producers have expanded exports to Mercosul countries.  Much of this trade 
is to Argentina, where Brazilian parts imports are used in assembly plants.  The same pattern 
happens in the opposite direction.  This expansion in exports, while encouraging, does not 
indicate great competitiveness of the Brazilian auto parts industry outside the Mercosul 
framework.  Queiroz and Carvalho (2003) point out that when sales to Mercosul are 
excluded, export performance is modest.  Table 5.4 points to this dynamic, as it breaks down 
auto parts exports into destination categories and imports according to countries of origin.  
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While exports expanded between 2000 and 2009, the percentage of those exports going to 
other countries in South America expanded as well, going from 28 to 48 percent.  
Meanwhile, the share of exports going to the North American market shrank from 44 to 22 
percent.  This reflects the importance of Mercosul as an export destination.  By the same 
token, the share of imports from Asia has dramatically increased in that period. 














Africa 1.6 4.3 0.1 0.8 
Asia and Oceania 3.9 3.9 15.0 32.6 
Central America and 
West Indies 1.5 1.0 0.1 0.1 
Europe 20.6 20.8 47.6 39.9 
North America 44.1 21.9 23.5 14.4 
South America 28.3 48.1 13.7 12.2 
Sources: MDIC – Secex/Depla (www.desenvolvimento.gov.br), Sindipeças (2010). 
 
 Elements of Brazil’s auto industry industrial policies have not reinforced export-led 
models of multinational investment.  First, export promotion policies in this sector have been 
mostly reactive.  That is, they tend to surface when trade balance problems appear.  The RA 
is a good example of this.  While this approach increases exports, its inconsistent character 
does not provide the foundation for firm commitment to long-term export production.  
Indeed, based on firm interviews many flagship auto firms in Brazil seem to export as a kind 
of ‘release valve’ when domestic demand slacks off, and do not regard production for export 
as a primary objective183
                                                 
183Bonelli (2000) finds that many of the periods in which overall exports grew considerably were also periods of 
reduced domestic demand, providing support for this argument. 
.  Secondly, as Queiroz and Carvalho (2003) point out, the policies 
to promote compact car production may have stimulated domestic demand in Brazil but these 
types of cars have limited export potential outside Mercosul and a few other developing 
countries.  If Brazil is serious about becoming a substantial automotive export platform 
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beyond the Mercosul context, other strategies will be necessary.  In sum, while Brazilian 
policy has generated export activity from automotive multinationals at specific moments, it 
has not incentivized a continuing positive trade balance in the sector.  Brazilian 
administrations have not generated a great deal of export promotion policies that persevere 
through favorable exchange rates or unstable macroeconomic conditions. 
5.4.3 Auto exports and domestic institutions 
 Thirteen multinational firms in the Brazilian automotive industry were interviewed 
for this study: nine multinational auto parts companies and four flagship assemblers.  Among 
these established firms, representatives frequently mentioned a number of factors which 
increased their export propensity.  Certainly, the level of the exchange rate was mentioned 
often as a decisive factor.  However, many firms acknowledged that export promotion 
policies could induce them to export more even in the face of an appreciating currency.  In 
fact, a number of firms said that export financing had been influential since 2006, even with a 
strong Real.   
In terms of specific policies, three of the flagship manufacturers said that they had 
used drawback schemes to support their export activities.  These policies allow firms to 
suspend taxes on imports when the final product is exported.  The drawback regime has 
proven to be especially influential with multinational auto assemblers.  In a study conducted 
in 2001, the Ministerio da Fazenda evaluated the use of the drawback mechanism for export 
promotion and found it to be the most used tax relief mechanism for imports, responsible for 
29 percent of the total fiscal waivers tied to imports.  Auto manufacturers were the largest 
sectoral users of drawback.  Exports from automotive assemblers were responsible for 
approximately 19 percent of the total drawback regime use, larger than any other sector.  
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Also in this study, the specific usage of drawback in Volkswagen do Brasil (then the third 
largest exporter in percentage terms of the ‘big four’) was analyzed.  VW exported 
approximately $960 million FOB tied to the drawback regime, 96 percent of which was 
between affiliates (mostly in Argentina).  Approximately $137 million in parts imports were 
tied to the drawback regime, 66 percent of which came from VW’s head office (Receita 
Federal 2001).  Clearly flagship auto manufacturers in Brazil have found the drawback 
scheme a useful way to lower the costs of inputs.  The requirement that firms then export the 
finished product is accomplished in the context of Mercosul.  It is doubtful that firms would 
export in the same amounts in the absence of these incentives.  The PIS/COFINS has a 
statutory tax rate of 9.3 percent of value added, which is significant (Doing Business 2009).  
Suspension of this tax provides a powerful incentive for export rather than domestic sales. 
Other export incentives were utilized as well, on a smaller scale.  Many of the firms 
had used the available BNDES export financing lines in the past, such as the FINAME line 
for capital goods and the pré-embarque program.  However, a representative of one flagship 
assembler mentioned that the interest rates on these lines were becoming uncompetitive, and 
that more favorable financing could be procured abroad.  Moreover, some of the BNDES 
export financing lines had requirements that firms export 60% of their sales, which was not 
the case for large auto manufacturers in Brazil.  Nevertheless, the existence of export 
incentives did seem to matter for firms.  One flagship assembler even claimed that they were 






 As would be expected, firms had complaints about the tax burden and excessive costs 
of complying with tax code, claiming that these costs migrate to exports.  The additional 
taxes on labor create situations where actual wage costs are often doubled, and this generates 
uncompetitive conditions for exports.  Many firms mentioned high relative wage costs as a 
powerful disincentive for exports.  As efficiency-oriented investment is often built on wage 
advantages, this perhaps explains a great deal about the market-seeking strategies of auto 
multinationals. 
 On the institutional side, the BNDES once again surfaced as a governmental 
institution with a solid reputation for competence and responsiveness among firms.  Many 
firms mentioned the BNDES immediately when queried about the most helpful and efficient 
government institutions.  Firms again had complaints about redundancies and duplication 
among government agencies charged with export promotion, but these were somewhat less 
pronounced than with respect to innovation.  Very few of the interviewed firms had heard of 
the new governmental institutions such as ABDI, and none accorded any influence to APEX.  
Most of the complaints surrounding governmental institutions centered on the lack of clarity 
in communicating export incentives, and the rapidly changing regulations and incentive 
structure.  Many of the largest auto parts producers were simply unaware of newer export 
incentives currently available, such as the changes in the Proex eligibility requirements 
brought on by the PDP, which make the incentives accessible to larger firms.  However, it 
should be pointed out that these changes happened since 2008 and are still too small in scale 





Table 5.5 Aggregated interview responses on export incentives, multinational firms active in the Brazilian 
IT and automotive sectors 
 Flagship Automotive 
Assemblers and Parts 
Manufacturers – 13 firms 
Flagship IT Firms with 
IT service activity (BPO, 
KPO, etc.) – 7 firms 
IT Manufacturing 
(Contract Manufacturers 
and Flagships) – 11 firms 
Primary obstacles to 
export activity or 
internationalization of 
client base 
• Tax burden 
(specifically the lack 
of refunds for export 
credits) 
• Port infrastructure 
 
• Excessive focus 
on manufacturing 
exports in IT 
industry 
• Labor costs, 
regulation 
• PPB requirements 
often difficult to 
meet 
• Labor costs, 
regulation 
• Local content 
costs 
Existing incentives for 
export activity or 
internationalization of 
client base 
• BNDES export loans 
at semi-competitive 
rates (often to offset 
high Real) 
• Drawback & 
RECOF: suspend 
taxes applied to 
imported inputs 
when final product is 
exported 
• Other incentives 
when 60% of 
production exported 
(does not apply 
often) 
• Few incentives 
available, mostly 
focused on sales  
• Multiple export 
incentives offered 
by Manaus Free 
Trade Zone 
• PPB tax credits 
















• Changing incentive 
structure, lack of 
communication 
• Rigid focus on 
manufacturing 
exports    





Source: Author Interviews, 2008-2010.  
 
Firms did comment on the cyclical nature of export promotion policies.  One auto 
parts representative said that the firm could count on export incentives when the Real 
appreciates: “Last year the Real was high. So, the government offered lines for loans, linked 
to exports.”  However, firms did not mention sustained export promotion schemes, other than 
drawback.  One firm representative mentioned that export promotion seemed to be 
inconsistent.  Despite these and other complaints, firm interviews revealed that many auto 
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firms had taken part in incentives designed to boost exports, and these incentives had in a 
few cases been decisive.  At times, the Brazilian state had pursued a strategy of promoting 
international insertion among multinational auto firms.  The RA, with all of its problems, did 
succeed in generating export activity among assemblers at a time when industrial policy was 
out of vogue.  Though exports of autos and auto parts are still centered on Mercosul, the 
Brazilian state has displayed some limited efficacy in encouraging exports and integrating its 
automotive industry into global supply chains.  While there are numerous questions about the 
amount of value-added activities in the Brazilian auto industry and the overall trade balance, 
the international insertion is nonetheless substantial.  This stands in sharp contrast to the IT 
industry, where limited efforts to generate IT exports have achieved very limited success. 
5.4.4 The commercial balance of the Brazilian IT industry 
 At the beginning of the 1990s, the market reserve was still in place in the Brazilian IT 
sector.  The market reserve policies placed large tariffs on imported IT goods and services.  
As pointed out in chapter four, the liberalization of IT in the 1990s generated a relatively 
quick process of denationalization.  However, while most restrictions on foreign capital 
participation were lifted and import tariffs reduced, the Brazilian state did implement a 
number of industrial policies designed to retain some local IT competencies.  Among these 
policies was export promotion – the state sought to boost IT exports soon after the end of the 
market reserve.  There were a variety of mechanisms put in place to do this, the most 
prominent of which was the Softex-2000 program.  This program had the ambitious goal of 
increasing Brazilian software exports to achieve a 1-2 percent worldwide market share, 
which would have been worth approximately US$2 billion (Prochnik 1997).  This goal was 
not achieved.  Since 1990 there have been very few instances of IT exports from Brazil, and 
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it remains a sector plagued by trade balance problems.  This has been compounded by the 
arrival of large amounts of market-oriented FDI, as multinationals in the sector have high 
import propensities. 
 While the market reserve had succeeded in generating a domestic IT industry with 
several large and profitable computer firms, these firms were almost entirely focused on the 
domestic market.  Moreover, the products and services offered by these firms were 
overpriced and undercompetitive compared to their equivalents in the international 
marketplace, resulting in a large gray market and substantial smuggling activities.  At the end 
of the market reserve, import tariffs were dramatically reduced184
                                                 
184Botelho et al. (1999) note that the external tariff for IT goods and services in Mercosul was reduced 
substantially, as countries in the bloc agreed to converge tariffs on the 16% mark by 2006.  Previously, tariffs 
on goods such as printers and computers had been as high as 32%. 
.  The Brazilian government 
established the Softex-2000 program in 1992 in order to assist Brazilian firms to make the 
transition from protection to international competition.  CNPq, the organization designed to 
promote research within the Ministry of Education, was intricately linked with the 
development of Softex.  The program initially had a budget of US$38 million, partially 
funded by the UNDP (Correa 1996, 175).  The strategy employed by this organization was to 
support the formation of various regional ‘nuclei’ around Brazil, to serve as focal points for 
cooperation among small software firms.  The program also established a number of offices 
abroad, in places like Miami, in order to market small firms and support their export 
activities.  Additional offices abroad were planned, but never implemented.  The program 
only remained under governmental control until December 1996, when a private non-profit 
foundation took control (Prochnik 1997).  In addition to export incentives, the program also 
provided financial incentives for the training of professionals within IT firms. 
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 As Veloso et al. (2003, 11) point out, the Softex program succeeded in creating 
software entrepreneurship in various cities in Brazil, and it also generated a sense of 
community in the IT industry.  However, it failed to generate even modest IT exports from 
Brazil.  There are a variety of reasons for this failure.  First, the program lacked sufficient 
financial support.  It received funds from the informatics law in 1991 and subsequent 
revisions, but it received only approximately US$100 million over three years.  As Prochnik 
(1997) points out, this is a very small amount for a program with the scale and ambitions of 
Softex.  One of the former directors of Softex pointed out in an interview that while the 
program succeeded in raising the visibility of the Brazilian software industry, it never 
received the levels of support from the government necessary for an ambitious industrial 
policy185.  Related to the issue of underfunding, the Softex program initially did not have any 
provisions for the establishment of venture capital funds.  Considering the high startup costs 
in the global IT industry, this omission was especially devastating.  FINEP has since started a 
venture capital competition, and there are a few VC funds now operating in Brazil186
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the Brazilian IT industry, the entire Softex 
effort was effectively focused on small firms, most of which were Brazilian-owned.  While 
support for small firms is important, these firms are typically not the export powerhouses that 
larger multinational firms can be.  By the mid-1990s, the denationalization of the Brazilian 
IT sector was already well underway.  Given that large IT multinationals have a higher 
export propensity, an industrial policy designed to increase IT exports such as Softex might 
. 
                                                 
185Phone interview, Dr. Eduardo Costa, FINEP Director of Innovation, Rio de Janeiro, May 2008. 
 
186A representative of a VC firm interviewed for this study argued that Brazil was particularly late in 
establishing VC funding opportunities in the IT sector.  Though now there are some funds which are supported 




have concentrated on incentivizing exports from these potential investors.  As Prochnik 
(1997, 22) explained in his evaluation of the Softex program, “if the objective was to give 
priority to exports, industrial policy should seek to stimulate the largest companies in the 
sector proportionally more.” 
 For these reasons, Softex was unable to generate a large IT export effort.  
Nevertheless, since 2000 a number of governmental organizations have augmented their 
efforts to provide export financing and other incentives to firms.  FINEP, in particular, has 
created new programs to incentivize IT exports, and some of these efforts have been more 
successful.  If 80 percent of an IT firm’s sales are from export activities, the firm is eligible 
to deduct payroll expenses from taxes187
                                                 
187Phone interview, Dr. Eduardo Costa, FINEP Director of Innovation, Rio de Janeiro, May 2008. 
.  Under the industrial policies of the Lula 
administration, IT exports received a number of new incentives.  The PITCE industrial policy 
designated the software industry as one of its four target sectors.  The continuing trade 
balance problems of the IT sector in Brazil were recognized as a problem, and the PITCE 
augmented BNDES and other sources of funding to generate more international insertion 
(Mendes and Guimarães 2006).  The Lei do Bem in 2005 established a program called 
REPES, which was a special tax regime for technology service export platforms.  This 
regime suspends the PIS/COFINS if the beneficiary company commits to exporting 60 
percent of its production (RENAI 2009).  An IPEA study carried out in 2006 (the first year of 
this incentive) noted that this incentive excluded the large majority of Brazilian software 
firms, which are almost all oriented toward the domestic market (Roselino 2006).  However, 




domestic sales.  The requirement for export was originally 80 percent, and was lowered to 60 
in 2008 by provisional remedy 428, in response to low utilization of the measure. 
 The PDP in 2008 expanded the fiscal incentives to export for IT firms in Brazil.  
Besides the expansion and modification of general export incentives such as Proex, the PDP 
also increased sector-specific funding for IT firms.  The Prosoft program, administered by 
the BNDES, underwent a number of important changes after the installment of the PITCE 
and again during the PDP.  Two changes were especially important.  First, the BNDES 
realized that it must support IT service exports and not only physical production of IT goods 
for export.  Secondly, the BNDES eliminated the restrictions on Prosoft, which before 2004 
had been only available to small and medium firms.  Multinational firms were more able to 
take advantage of the Prosoft incentives after this change (Gutierrez 2007).  In terms of 
disbursements, the Prosoft program is still weighted towards small firms.  However, 
participation in the program was growing.  As of 2007, 132 agreements with firms were 
approved or contracted.  The program disbursed approximately R$680 million, of which 
R$218 million was designated for export support (Guiterrez 2007, 55).  This is a dramatic 
expansion since 2004, when the program had only 30 projects worth approximately R$50 
million.  The new industrial policies were responsible for this increase in support to IT export 
finance. 
 IT industry exports from Brazil have been unimpressive throughout the 1990s and 
2000s, though there have been a couple recent success stories.  The entry of large 
multinational flagship IT firms and multinational contract manufacturers during those two 
decades was motivated by a large domestic market.  Botelho et al. (1999) and Tigre and 
Botelho (2001) both present trade data from the IT industry in the 1990s, and find 
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discouraging results.  Exports did not grow in appreciable amounts between 1991 and 1996, 
while imports increased 250 percent.  Tigre and Botelho (2001) note that under the market 
reserve, foreign firms were required to maintain a positive trade balance.  When this 
requirement disappeared, multinationals began using imported inputs to a greater extent.  IT 
exports, where they do exist, are mainly directed toward the Mercosul market.  Table 5.6 
presents IT industry trade data from more recent years, and it is immediately apparent that 
the trade deficit persists despite government efforts to diminish it.  Among the IT subsectors, 
only telecommunications is able to post a brief trade surplus in 2005.  
The commercial deficit of the IT sector is well-known in Brazil.  In a 2010 column in 
O Estado de São Paulo, various academics and others connected to the IT industry lamented 
this state of affairs.  One commentator asserted that the government bore its share of blame 
for the imbalance, as it had ignored incentives to develop technology and instead had focused 
on the Manaus Free Zone, which despite its design “has always been a zone for assembling 
imported inputs.”  Another contributor praised the establishment of an institute in Porto 
Alegre (CEITEC) which would develop integrated circuits.  However, this contributor also 
noted that this kind of establishment should have begun in the 1980s, and that Brazil had 
“lost 30 years” (Tamer 2010). 
Table 5.6 focuses on material exports and imports in the IT sector.  Of course, the IT 
industry is much broader than this, and encompasses services as well as hardware 
manufacturing.  Though service activities are more difficult to classify as ‘exports’ or 
‘imports’, they can serve as an important link to the international IT market.  Moreover, IT 
services such as business process outsourcing (BPO) have become more internationalized, as 
global flagship IT firms seek out cost efficiencies in developing countries.  For this reason, 
273 
 
many IT firms now use their developing country subsidiaries as locations for servicing 
international clients with everything from financial consulting to customer service call 
centers188
Table 5.6 Commercial balance of the Brazilian IT manufacturing sector, 2003-2009. $US millions 
.  While data on international IT services in Brazil are difficult to come by, Softex 
(now a non-profit institution) recently conducted a study on the internationalization of the IT 
service industry.  Table 5.7 presents the results of this survey, and Softex’s attempt to 
subdivide IT services into activities such as software consulting, online distribution of 
content, and so on.  This table divides foreign revenue of these activities from total net 
revenue and also the number of ‘exporting’ firms that provide these services to international 
clients.  While this is a rudimentary tool for capturing the international dimension of IT 
service firms in Brazil, it does help illuminate the evolution of this growing IT subsector. 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Imports 5986.8 8486.6 10632.5 13529.1 15158.3 20124.0 14987.7 
Informatics (data 
processing) 1250.8 1500.8 1948.8 2654.7 2886.3 3611.4 3102.0 
Consumer Electronics 320.7 507.6 736.7 985.4 1137.0 1342.3 1158.1 
Telecommunications 1574.2 2450.0 3055.4 4061.3 4906.9 7500.2 5040.1 
Components 2841.1 4028.2 4891.6 5827.7 6228.1 7670.1 5687.5 
Exports 2439.1 2472.2 4248.6 4677.9 3776.1 3962.8 2936.0 
Informatics (data 
processing) 233.7 312.3 460.0 486.9 422.0 379.7 370.0 
Consumer Electronics 258.6 264.6 199.1 197.7 231.4 240.8 194.9 
Telecommunications 1553.6 1469.9 3188.4 3562.6 2739.9 2953.8 2080.8 
Components 393.2 425.4 401.1 430.7 382.8 388.5 290.3 
Balance -3547.7 -6014.4 -6383.9 -8851.2 -11382.2 -16161.2 -12051.7 
Informatics (data 
processing) -1017.1 -1188.5 -1488.8 -2167.8 -2464.3 -3231.7 -2732.0 
Consumer Electronics -62.1 -243.0 -537.6 -787.7 -905.6 -1101.5 -963.2 
Telecommunications -20.6 -980.1 133.0 -498.7 -2167.0 -4546.4 -2959.3 
Components -2447.9 -3602.8 -4490.5 -5397.0 -5845.3 -7281.6 -5397.2 
Sources: SECEX data compiled by BNDES, Gutierrez (2010) 
                                                 
188ECLAC, in its series of reports on FDI in Latin America, recently recognized the importance of this 
phenomenon for both developing countries and the global IT sector and put out a special report on offshore 





 These data were only collected for two years, 2004 and 2005.  However, the data 
again point to a relatively low internationalization of IT services.  Foreign revenue as a 
percentage of total net revenue for these activities averages to 3.4 percent.  Only the 
suspiciously vague category “other computer-related activities” displays a substantial 
international client base189
Thus far I have only discussed Brazilian policy as it relates to three of the four policy 
categories outlined at the beginning of the chapter: trade agreements, trade liberalization, and 
export incentives.  The last category of incentive is export processing zones.  In Brazil’s case, 
the export processing zone strategy merits separate consideration, given the importance of 
Brazil’s main EPZ to the IT industry in Brazil.  The Free Zone of Manaus (ZFM) was 
established in 1957 to spur the development of the remote Amazon region and increase 
exports, through the attraction of domestic and foreign firms.  Ten years later, the ZFM was 
greatly expanded in both physical terms and in government resources.  The Superintendência 
da Zona Franca de Manaus (Suframa) was created to supervise the operations of the 
industrial park.  Since the 1960s, numerous firms have set up factories in the ZFM, where 
.  Very few firms even have international clients, as evidenced by 
the exporter rates that hover mostly below 5 percent.  These figures do not change in any 
significant way between 2004 and 2005, though of course a longer timeframe would lead to 
stronger conclusions about the growth of internationalization.  However, based on these 
preliminary results it does not appear that IT services are well integrated into global 
networks.  More likely, the firms active in IT services (mostly multinationals) have 
established these Brazilian locations in order to serve the domestic market and the growing 
IT consumer market. 
                                                 
189Note also that this category only contains 43 firms in 2004, of which only one is an exporter.  This one 
observation is likely to have undue influence, causing the large proportion of foreign revenue. 
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they can enjoy numerous tax advantages and other incentives190
Contract manufacturers have become increasingly important for the Brazilian IT 
sector, as well as for global IT value chains.  These firms provide needed components to 
flagship IT companies, essentially serving as the IT industry’s supplier network.  Many of 
these firms have extensive independent design capabilities and substantial design autonomy 
within their IT supply chains
.  Recently, many of these 
firms have been multinational IT firms, especially contract manufacturers.  This occurred 
because of the increasing IT element in consumer electronics, which have always been a 
staple of the ZFM.  The penetration of IT contract manufacturers in the ZFM is such that one 
can consider the ZFM and Campinas, in São Paulo state, to be the two poles of the IT 
industry in Brazil. 
191
                                                 
190These incentives are too numerous to cover comprehensively here, however a few of the most important for 
export activity are as follows: firms enjoy an 88% reduction in the tax on imported inputs, machines, and 
equipment; a total exemption from the tax on industrial products (IPI); a zero rate of PIS/COFINS on selected 
items used for industrialization in the zone; suspension of PIS/COFINS for raw material imports; exemption of 
ALL taxes and fees (including those of Suframa) for inputs and products intended for export abroad (Suframa 
2009). 
.  These firms (and many others) assemble motherboards, 
integrate memory into electronics, and perform numerous other functions in the IT value 
chain.  Firms related to the IT industry, broadly defined, dominate the ZFM.  While there are 
other assembly operations in the ZFM (most notably motorcycles), IT goods make up 
approximately 45 percent of the ZFM’s output. 
 






 The ZFM has been operating for a long time, and through its unique tax status the 
Brazilian government has succeeded in attracting a number of contract manufacturers and 
even a few global IT flagships to a remote region.  However, the zone was originally 
intended to serve as an important export base.  This goal was eventually abandoned, due to 
uncontrolled smuggling and firms’ desires to access the lucrative internal market (McIntyre 
et al. 1996).  Since 1990, the zone has in fact demonstrated large trade deficits.  During the 
period of liberalization in the early 1990s, the government made it easier for firms to satisfy 
local content requirements and lowered tariffs in the zone for firms serving the domestic 
market.  When this resulted in trade deficits, the government in 1997 reduced incentives in an 
effort to promote exports from the zone.  This effort failed, in part because the state of 
Amazonas reversed the suspension of the subsidies due to concerns about the reduction in 
revenue (ECLAC 1999, 189).  Since that time, the trade deficit of the ZFM has worsened.  
Table 5.8 demonstrates the consistent growth of foreign inputs in the ZFM since 1990, along 
with the low proportion of foreign sales over the same time period.  The ZFM has been 
operating for some time now as essentially an assembly platform for imported inputs.  In 
addition, most of the high value-added components, such as semiconductors, are imported.  




Table 5.8 Import and export patterns for the consumer electronics and IT industry in the Free Zone of 
Manaus, 1990 to 2009 














1990 41.16 42.34 16.5 20.16 79.71 0.13 
1991 38.69 36.77 24.54 22.06 77.76 0.18 
1992 33.62 31.73 34.64 16.77 82.83 0.4 
1993 22.82 33.08 44.1 13.72 85.94 0.34 
1994 24.75 27 48.25 15.16 84.47 0.38 
1995 24.69 24.03 51.28 17.88 81.85 0.26 
1996 27.42 10.04 62.54 16.91 82.94 0.15 
1997 21.31 20.08 58.61 13.12 86.69 0.19 
1998 19.39 24.97 55.64 11.05 88.14 0.81 
1999 16.1 19.87 64.03 11.31 85.41 3.28 
2000 19.78 16.66 63.56 14.99 79.84 5.17 
2001 21.95 15.06 62.99 15.53 74.86 9.62 
2002 25.27 11.99 62.73 12.08 72.15 15.77 
2003 26.13 7.02 66.85 12.62 72.41 14.97 
2004 31.5 7.37 61.14 15.08 77.43 7.49 
2005 31.66 7.39 60.95 16.62 69.74 13.64 
2006 30.45 6.1 63.45 16.55 76.12 7.33 
2007 25.15 7.62 67.23 12.47 83.84 3.69 
2008 19.02 8.61 72.37 10.5 84.96 4.55 
2009 19.13 6.21 74.66 8.84 87.61 3.54 
Sources: Superintendência da Zona Franca de Manaus (SUFRAMA 2011). Indicadores de Desempenho do Pólo 
Industrial de Manaus. 
 
 While this section has painted a relatively bleak picture of the multinational IT trade 
balance, it would be a mistake not to acknowledge the few bright spots, some recent, in the 
industry.  Bonelli and Pinheiro (2008) recently detailed the dramatic expansion of cell phone 
exports from Brazil.  Exports in this sector increased from US$ 0.3 billion in 1994 to US$ 2.7 
billion in 2006.  These exports are not limited to the Mercosul market, with significant 
portion of exports destined for the United States192
                                                 
192Exports of cell phones to the US reached 85 percent of all exports in 2002 (Bonelli and Pinheiro 2008, 62). 
.  Numerous multinational cell phone 
makers, including Nokia, Motorola, and Ericsson had established manufacturing facilities in 
prior years and expanded exports in response to recent policy initiatives.  This expansion of 
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cell phone production is a positive development, and constitutes an important foray into 
‘non-traditional’ exports for Brazil.  As Gutierrez (2010) points out, no other device or piece 
of electronic equipment is currently produced in as large a scale in Brazil.  Brazil has in 
effect assumed a position as a leading global manufacturing center for cell phones.  
Moreover, as Bonelli and Pinheiro (2008) and Gutierrez and Crossetti (2003) detail, public 
policy was influential in encouraging these exports.  The role of institutions such as the 
BNDES in supporting cell phone exports is discussed in the next section.  While firm 
characteristics and strategies were certainly important in generating this export boom, public 
policies and efficient institutions played a role as well. 
 There are a few other examples of IT exports as well.  Botelho et al. (1999) noted that 
in the late 1990s a few large multinationals began to expand their export operations.  
Compaq, for example, became the leading exporter of PCs at the end of the decade, and used 
its facilities in Brazil as an export base for all of Latin America.  Other firms followed the 
same strategy, mostly focused on Mercosul.  Finally, while exports from IT firms in Brazil 
were modest overall, the conditions for export-oriented production do exist in Brazil.  
Specifically, the abundance of well-trained computer engineers bodes well for future export 
initiatives.  The supply of English-speaking workers in the IT industry is also substantial.  
These are partly legacies of the market reserve policy of the 1980s, which though not 
oriented to international competitiveness did succeed in creating an IT industry in Brazil and 
the accompanying skill sets among IT workers. 
5.4.5 IT exports and domestic institutions 
 The export potential of the IT industry in Brazil, coupled with poor export 
performance, begs explanation.  Why do IT multinationals not use Brazil as a location for 
efficiency-seeking investment, given the country’s advantages?  Those firms that do export 
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from Brazil primarily target the Mercosul market and other countries in Latin America.  
However, this exporting is not substantial given to the number and diversity of multinational 
firms active in Brazil.  The IT industry’s substantial trade deficit is a problem, and this 
problem derives from a failure to export in significant amounts.  During interviews with 14 
multinational firms in the Brazilian IT sector (9 global flagships and 5 contract 
manufacturers), numerous explanations for low export performance were offered193
However, firms also revealed other more interesting insights about export promotion.  
A number of contract manufacturers active in the ZFM commented on the basic productive 
processes (PPB), which were put in place to guarantee a certain amount of local production 
and value-added.  These requirements, according to firms, were difficult to satisfy and 
imposed a constraint.  At the same time, the PPB requirements did not necessarily induce 
firms to do anything in Brazil more than assembly.  In other words, they did not act as an 
incentive to locate high value-added activities in Brazil.  Most of the CMs interviewed 
claimed that the inputs with the highest technological content in their production chains were 
imported.  Firms would then assemble in Brazil and ship mostly to other multinationals in 
Brazil, which would then sell these components to Brazilians.  A representative of one CM 
.  Many 
of these explanations centered on firm strategy or macroeconomic conditions in the 
international economy.  However, the firms also pinpointed a number of problems in the 
policies and institutions designed to promote exports.  Predictably, many firms identified 
high exchange rates as a significant disincentive for exports.  Firms also frequently cited high 
labor costs in Brazil as an impediment to exports. 
                                                 
193Seven of the nine flagships had significant IT service activity, and table 5.5 reflects this smaller group.  Also 
in table 5.5, those flagships and contract manufacturers with significant manufacturing activity were grouped 
together in the last column, producing 11 firms. 
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operating in Manaus claimed that incentives of the ZFM combined with labor law restrictions 
and other factors to keep exporting unappealing. 
 A few firms also reinforced the point that export promotion policy in Brazil was still 
focused on small firms, mostly Brazilian-owned.  While enhancing exports among small and 
medium IT firms is an understandable priority for Brazilian administrations, it does little to 
impact the trade balance problems in the Brazilian IT sector.  The IT industry is now 
dominated by large multinational firms, not only in the top tiers of value chains but also in 
supplier networks of contract manufacturers.  While programs like Prosoft (before its 
revision) may succeed in supporting smaller firms, they are unlikely to generate significant 
export activity.  One firm representative of an IT flagship suspected that Brazilian politicians 
were still attempting to create national champions in the IT industry, and that export 
incentives were more widely available for these firms because of this desire. 
 Among IT firms engaged in IT services, such as consulting and outsourcing, many 
identified a specific barrier to expansion of their international client base.  These firms 
complained that Brazilian export promotion policy had been exclusively focused on 
hardware exports, to the exclusion of both software and services.  That is, Brazilian policy 
had prioritized IT manufacturing (printers, PCs, etc.) and had neglected incentives for less 
tangible products.  This is similar to the complaint raised by firms about R&D incentives 
linked only to manufacturing, detailed in chapter four.  Firms claimed that Brazil had not yet 
managed to effectively incentivize the diverse ways in which the IT industry is 
internationally integrated today.  For example, one flagship IT company representative with 
an established research lab in Brazil claimed that 100 percent of its ‘product’ was exported, 
in the sense that it provided services for international clients exclusively.  This firm had no 
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reported sales, but the export incentives offered by the government were exclusively focused 
on sales of IT hardware.  This sentiment was echoed by another multinational firm with 
extensive R&D facilities and no manufacturing output.  As this firm is entirely focused on 
R&D in Brazil, it is unable to take advantage of export incentives.  According to the firm 
representative: 
There are few incentives to attract international customers that are not centered on 
local manufacture of goods or agribusiness production. As our major activity is R&D 
in the country, and without manufacture, we have received no local incentives and 
there are almost none available.  Existing ones for pure play R&D are quite limited 
and difficult to apply for. 
 
This manufacturing focus is perhaps understandable for export incentives, but it fails 
to take into account the diverse ways in which IT firms ‘export’ in the current economy.  The 
lack of export promotion policy mechanisms for these intangible elements of the IT industry 
in Brazil constitutes a serious barrier to its further integration into global production 
networks. 
IT firms had praise for FINEP as a responsive, agile institution.  A number of firms 
mentioned that FINEP had been easy to work with, especially since its resources were 
expanded in 2005.  The export-promoting activities of the BNDES did not receive as 
universal acclaim as its innovation-promoting activities.  Interestingly, some of the contract 
manufacturers had praise for two government ministries: the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MCT) and the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Trade (MDIC).  The 
MDIC oversees Suframa in Manaus, which is probably why the institution was mentioned.  
The MCT is intricately linked to the IT industry in Brazil, and serves as an important 
advocate within the government.  Interestingly, one firm respondent claimed that the MCT 
was fully aware of the problems in export promotion policy applied to IT, particularly the 
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disconnect between primarily manufacturing-based incentives and IT firms engaging in IT 
service activities.  According to this respondent, other ministries and agencies in the 
government were not listening to the MCT.  This respondent characterized this as “very odd 
and out of sync with a modern society, as Brazil actually is.” 
IT firms identified other institutional deficiencies which prevented the emergence of a 
coherent, sustained export promotion policy.  Despite the creation of ABDI and the change in 
the role of APEX, some firms claimed that it was still not clear where the responsibility lay 
for IT industry promotion.  Given the large number of institutions and agencies, this is 
understandable.  Lula’s two industrial policy frameworks, the PITCE and then the PDP, 
accomplished some inter-institutional coordination based on a strategic vision.  However, 
firms did identify incentives which seemed to be applied on an ad hoc basis by different 
institutions.  One firm representative claimed that the approach towards export promotion 
was uncoordinated, and demonstrated a lack of strategic thinking by the country’s leadership 
about Brazil’s “IT potential”. 
Export promotion in IT has been largely unsuccessful in Brazil.  In a recent report on 
the IT industry in Latin America, ECLAC (2007, 100) characterized the Brazilian IT 
hardware industry as follows: “an industry based on the local assembly of imported 
components, mainly targeting the local market, and, secondly, exports generally confined to 
Latin American markets.”  This section has outlined the interlocking elements of industrial 
policy in the IT industry, almost all of which reinforce this market-based investment model.  
Brazil may yet become an export platform for multinational IT firms.  However, current and 
past elements of policy and institutional characteristics make this less likely. 
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As a contrast to these negative examples of institutional inconsistency and 
uncoordinated promotion policies, we can consider the case of Brazil’s cell phone exports.  
The success of this sector in generating a positive trade balance deserves explanation.  What 
was different about cell phones?  What role did domestic institutions play in generating this 
export boom?  There are a number of elements which came together to generate this 
outcome, and they illustrate the importance of active policies and efficient institutions.  First, 
it must be noted that the privatization of Telebrás in 1998 allowed multinational cell phone 
manufacturers, and their CM partners such as Flextronics and Jabil, to enter the Brazilian 
market.  The cell phone sector in Brazil was dominated by multinational assemblers and 
contract manufacturers by the early 2000s.  Privatization as a passive policy measure 
encouraged new FDI in the sector and market-seeking strategies, but it was not until the 
revival of industrial policies that exports really took off.  The informatics law encouraged a 
number of cell phone manufacturers to establish local R&D centers.  Among these were 
Motorola’s Instituto Eldorado, the R&D centers for Motorola in Jaguariúna (a $20 million 
development center was launched in 2004), Ericsson’s R&D center in Indaiatuba 
(inaugurated in 2001), and Siemens’ and Nokia’s R&D centers in Manaus (Bonelli and 
Pinheiro 2008; Gutierrez and Crossetti 2003).  All of these centers were incentivized by the 
informatics law.  As Bonelli and Pinheiro (2008, 77-78) point out, several software programs 
created in these centers, developed in close connection with local universities, were 
subsequently exported. 
State incentives for production and export were important in the case of cell phones.  
The incentive structure was closely coordinated by the BNDES, which worked with the firms 
to satisfy their export requirements while also encouraging domestic technological effort.  
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Among the incentives negotiated between the government and cell phone manufacturers (and 
CMs) were the following, as identified by Gutierrez and Crossetti (2003): 
- Drawback: this exempted exporting firms from paying taxes on imported goods 
used to manufacture exports 
- The Blue Line: this was a special duty process established which allowed goods to 
go through customs quickly, sometimes at the firm itself (as was the case with 
Motorola) 
- RECOF: similar to drawback, this allowed firms to avoid the tax on imports and the 
tax on industrialized products, dependent on a promise to reach a predetermined 
export goal 
The BNDES helped coordinate negotiations with federal tax authorities to ensure the 
cell phone manufacturers had access to these incentives and could fulfill the requirements.  
The BNDES also offered the firms substantial investment loans, especially after 2000194
The example of cell phones provides a useful counterpoint to broader trends in the IT 
sector in Brazil.  Cell phone manufacturing is dominated by multinationals, yet the R&D 
efforts and exporting efforts of these firms have increased, especially in the last six years.  
Net exports of telecom equipment (mostly phones) went from negative $1.5 billion in 1998 
to positive $1 billion in 2005 (Bonelli and Pinheiro 2008, 81).  The role of the state was 
crucial in this transformation.  The informatics law was influential in establishing local 
innovative effort in the late 1990s, and was reinforced by the measures contained in the 
PITCE and PDP industrial policies.  Moreover, the export incentives coordinated by the 
BNDES helped move firms from market-based manufacturing (which was dominant before 
. 
                                                 
194Disbursements to telecommunications firms increased from $26.1 million in 1990 to $2.5 billion in 2000 
(Gutierrez and Crossetti 2003, 47). 
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2005) to export orientation.  We also see in the BNDES relationship two important 
institutional characteristics which I argue are important to increasing state leverage: 
coordination and close firm-state networks.  The BNDES and federal tax authorities worked 
with the firms to create the special tax regimes for the manufacturers.  Bonelli and Pinheiro 
(2008) also point out the close connections between these firms and local universities, 
encouraged by institutions like CNPq. 
5.5 Institutions and the Commercial Balance of Multinational Firms: A Synthesis 
 Given the record levels of exports attained by Brazil in the early 2000s and the 
relative resilience of Brazil’s economy to the global financial crisis, it may seem incongruous 
to focus on the failings of Brazil’s export promotion policies.  The purpose of this chapter is 
not to paint a negative picture of Brazil’s prospects for trade-based growth, but rather to 
detail the ways in which export promotion policies and institutions impact the models of 
investment pursued by multinational firms active in Brazil.  The conclusion reached is that 
on balance the institutional characteristics in Brazil have significant negative impacts on the 
trade balance of multinational firms.  Multinationals in both the auto and IT industries have 
not been consistently encouraged to prioritize export-oriented production.  This is less true in 
the auto sector, where export incentives have a longer history, than in the IT sector.  In 
Brazil, indirect and non-discriminating investment promotion, channeled through multiple 
institutions, has contributed to negative trade balances. 
 Given these broad trends, it is important to emphasize the differences between the IT 
and automotive industries.  In the case of automotive, the emergence of integrated value 
chains in Brazil and Argentina, along with Mercosul-based trade networks for finished cars, 
qualifies the conclusion somewhat.  Auto assemblers like GM, Ford, and especially VW 
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export from Brazil in large amounts and have been incentivized to do so.  However, these 
exports consist mainly of vehicles with limited export potential outside the Mercosul 
framework.  It is also important to note that many of these export markets grew considerably 
after the imposition of a highly illiberal and sector-specific incentive package, the automotive 
regime of the mid-1990s.  The declining automotive trade balance helped generate this set of 
interventionist policies, but the plants that established local operations in response to the RA 
have remained active exporters.  There were a number of serious problems with the RA, 
including unsustainable incentives and uncontrolled interstate competition.  Moreover, many 
of its requirements are illegal under current WTO rules.  However, the RA did succeed in 
attracting a number of new automotive assembler plants in the 1990s.  Many of these plants 
now export. 
 In the case of auto parts, the internationalization of the industry in the 1990s was 
thorough and rapid.  Most of the higher tier suppliers in Brazil are now multinational, and 
Brazilian-owned firms are concentrated on the lower rungs of the supply chain.  Many of the 
multinational parts companies followed the flagship assemblers to Brazil, where they 
continue to experiment with different forms of modular production.  Multinational auto parts 
companies generated significant increases in auto parts exports, but they also relied heavily 
on imported inputs.  While the rapidly evolving nature of the global automotive industry 
undoubtedly has had a large impact on trade patterns, the largely passive approach to export 
promotion from the 1990s forward has also played a role.  The auto parts network in Brazil 
did not have anything resembling the RA to guarantee protection and incentivize exports.  
The plurality of auto parts exports are to the Mercosul market, suggesting the deepening of 
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value chains in that regional market.  However, auto parts imports come mostly from Europe 
and Japan, and much of the high value-added work is done abroad. 
 In IT, the industry’s large trade deficit is a problem.  Brazil has not been able to 
generate a sizeable IT export market, despite some attempts since the end of the market 
reserve.  Multinational IT hardware firms active in Brazil are import-intensive.  This is true 
for IT services as well, where IT firms concentrate on serving domestic clients.  This is 
especially striking given other large developing countries’ successes in establishing 
international IT service industries.  The EPZ in Manaus serves as an assembly location for 
many contract manufacturers, but exports from this location are not substantial in 
comparison.  This is despite significant tax breaks inside the zone and favorable export 
financing. 
 I have argued in this chapter that it is important to account for different models of 
global value chain governance, fluctuating exchange rates, and differences in factor 
endowments when explaining export patterns.  However, I also argue that the capacity of 
state institutions for the implementation of discriminating investment promotion policy has 
an impact.  Based on firm interviews, in which respondents often brought up the quality of 
governance as often as they did the exchange rate, this conclusion is warranted.  In Brazil’s 
case, there are a number of obstacles to effective investment promotion.  In a study 
conducted in 2008 by the World Economic Forum, elaborated in partnership with Fundação 
Dom Cabral, Brazil ranked relatively well among 134 countries on various competitiveness 
scores.  However, on the subject of institutions Brazil ranked 91st.  The report noted the 
“institutional fragility” present in Brazil, and highlighted a number of problems with 
institutional efficacy.  Among these were an “excess of public regulatory agencies not 
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completely disassociated from political parties” and “frequent legislative changes that affect 
the private sector and increase the risks associated with investment” (Grabois 2009). 
The proliferation of export-promotion bodies within the bureaucracy undercuts a 
unified strategy for export promotion.  In interviews with representatives of various 
governmental bodies, including the MDIC, the BNDES, the Central Bank, and the MCT, the 
lack of coordination among investment promotion bodies was invariably mentioned as an 
impediment to coordinated, effective export promotion.  However, many of the 
representatives of these bodies were pessimistic about the possibilities for change, as many 
institutions were “territorial” about their mandates.   
While some institutions remain ‘islands of efficiency’, others work with differing 
priorities.  Many of the export-promotion initiatives during the last two decades have been 
undercut by lack of financial support, as was the case with Softex.  Those that do have 
adequate funding levels, such as the BNDES, sometimes deal with fluctuations in those 
resources.  In the case of IT, the focus on small firms may have rescued some Brazilian-
owned software companies, but it did little to address growing trade balance problems 
brought on by large multinationals’ investment models.  Also in IT, the disconnect between 
the growing intangibles of the global IT industry and the manufacturing-based export 
incentives hurt export performance.  This lack of focus on intangibles stems partly from 
undeveloped networks between state institutions and IT firms, and a resulting lack of 
understanding.  Finally, the inconsistencies and reactive nature of Brazilian export promotion 
policy must be emphasized.  Successful export promotion policies must adopt a long view, 
geared toward international competitiveness and continual industrial upgrading.  They should 
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not be implemented solely to correct trade balance problems or to compensate manufacturers 
for a strong currency. 
 Brazilian administrations have had successes in export promotion policy since the 
1990s.  The establishment of Mercosul represented a momentous, if indirect, incentive for 
export-oriented FDI.  Recent niche export markets, such as the one in cell phones, are 
encouraging and partly the result of focused investment promotion.  However, the general 
trend since the 1990s has been one of passive and indiscriminate investment promotion, 
resulting in a primarily market-oriented model of FDI.  The unique characteristics of 
institutions within the Brazilian state have contributed to this state of affairs. 
5.5.1 Combining export orientation and innovation in Brazil  
 In this chapter, I have argued that the trade balance of multinational corporations 
operating in Brazil has been unimpressive, despite a few bright spots.  This indicates 
primarily market-oriented investment models, which although valuable are viewed as less 
conducive to industrial upgrading and developmental spillovers.  In the previous chapter, I 
analyzed the innovative contributions of multinationals in Brazil, and argued that Brazil had 
not yet realized a great deal of innovation-intensive FDI.  By way of conclusion, I examine 
the two dimensions of FDI in conjunction.  Is there any evidence of investment models in 
Brazil which are simultaneously export- and innovation-intensive?  In much of the literature 
surrounding FDI, this type of investment is the gold standard for developing countries.  I 
have periodically alluded to this combination throughout the chapter.  While the lack of 
comprehensive firm-level data on both dimensions makes definitive claims difficult, a 
provisional examination is presented here.  Figure 5.2 relays data from a small-sample survey 
conducted by Investe Brasil in 2003, in conjunction with the Investment Climate Survey 
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operated by the World Bank.  Eighty five firms with foreign controlling interest from diverse 
sectors agreed to hand over operating data, on the condition that they remain anonymous.  
While this is a small sample, the extensive survey data allow a comparison of export activity, 
measured by exports as a percentage of sales, and innovative activity, measured by R&D 
spending as a percentage of sales. 
Figure 5.2. R&D and export propensity among 85 multinationals operating in Brazil 
 
Source: Investment Climate Survey, 2003 undertaken by Sebrae, CNI, and Investe Brasil, in partnership with 
the World Bank. Based on confidential interviews with heads of 85 corporations with foreign controlling 
interest. 
Note: Firms weighted by number of employees. Larger circles represent larger numbers of employees. 
 This figure reveals some interesting possibilities.  First, note the large number of 
firms that congregate at low levels of both measures.  This is consistent with the data 
presented in this chapter and the previous.  Second, those firms which score highly on the 
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not particularly export-intensive.  This would be consistent with the following propositions: 
that export-oriented firms operating in Brazil are not conducting local innovation, and that 
firms with local innovation are primarily oriented toward the domestic market.  This is also 
consistent with many of the conclusions about the dominant patterns of FDI in Brazil and to 
some extent, Latin America. 
 While these data are too limited to form firm conclusions, they suggest that FDI in 
Brazil may not be characterized by high spillover potential.  In this chapter and the 
preceding, I have analyzed the ways in which the forms of investment since 1990 have been 
conditioned by Brazilian investment promotion policy and the characteristics of state 
institutions.  I have argued that firms do not operate in a vacuum – that the conditions present 
in the host country have an important impact on the ultimate form of investment.  Moreover, 
firm judgments about institutional efficacy have important implications for FDI-related 
benefits.  In the next chapter, I apply these ideas in comparative context.  I conduct an 
econometric analysis of firm-level data in numerous developing countries, and then compare 





State Institutions and Models of Investment: Beyond Brazil 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I have elaborated on the importance of state institutions in 
determining not only the composition of aggregate foreign investment inflows but also the 
investment models pursued by individual firms.  Brazil’s policy and institutional framework 
towards FDI has often been disjointed and uncoordinated, with isolated periods and 
institutions of efficacy.  Throughout the preceding chapters, I have argued that during the 
periods in which the Brazilian state was able to exert its existing leverage on multinational 
corporations and thereby increase the chances of developmental spillovers, the institutions 
responsible for this leverage were well-coordinated, closely networked with firms, and 
consistent.  In the current chapter I extend the argument on the importance of state 
institutions beyond Brazil.  I do this along two different tracks.  First, I develop an 
econometric test which links measures of institutional efficacy and quality with firm profiles 
using large-n surveys of multinational firms in the developing world.  This section asks 
whether domestic political institutions matter to the investment profiles of firms, specifically 
whether well-regarded institutions increase the likelihood that countries attract R&D and 
export-intensive forms of investment.  In another part of this chapter (section 6.5), I move 
beyond the firm surveys to consider the institutional context for FDI in three other Latin 
American countries: Chile, Costa Rica, and Mexico.  These countries, like Brazil, have seen 
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a dramatic increase in FDI since the 1980s.  However, the countries display differing 
investment profiles.  I argue that these differences are partly the result of varying institutional 
settings.  The case studies provide more contextual depth to already elaborated arguments 
about the importance of institutions.  The case studies also serve as a regional contrast to the 
Brazilian experience with foreign investment, and illustrate in a more specific way the 
mechanisms through which institutional variation contributes to differing firm profiles.  The 
results of both parts of the analysis fortify the broad conclusion that the institutional 
characteristics have an impact firm investment profiles. 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to briefly consider the meaning of institutions in 
the context of the current chapter.  In previous chapters, I have opted for a more restricted 
definition of institutions, similar to that of Williamson (2000), who concentrates on formal 
and organizational aspects of institutions.  In previous chapters, I have used institutions to 
refer to organized, formal state bodies.  I have separated institutions from state policies and 
strategies, in order to analytically separate and isolate the effects of policies from institutions.  
Neither Williamson nor I deal with normative or belief systems, culture, or other informal 
elements of institutions that vary from country to country.  North (1990; 1994) adopts a more 
expansive definition of institutions, defining institutions as formal rules (constitutions, laws 
and regulations) and informal constraints (norms, conventions, and codes of conduct).  While 
I continue to avoid the inclusion of cultural characteristics in the institutional framework, in 
this chapter I include rules, regulations, and policies in the context of institutions.  Whereas 
in previous chapters I limited institutions to state bodies and agencies and developed 
theoretical linkages between institutional characteristics and firm investment models, in this 
chapter I expand the definition of institutions to accommodate rules and regulations affecting 
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multinational firms.  I retain the emphasis on formality.  North refers to formal institutions as 
determining the ‘rules of the game’, which of course encompasses a great deal of potential 
influences, including policy initiatives and changes in legal frameworks.  This degree of 
“conceptual stretching” (Sartori 1970) is necessary in the context of cross-national 
comparisons of institutional efficacy and associations with firm investment models. 
6.1.1 Cross-national literature on firm entry models and the determinants of FDI 
 This chapter poses the question: do host country institutions impact the export and 
innovation characteristics of FDI in developing countries?  As such, it necessarily 
contemplates a number of diverse literatures from international business studies and 
international political economy.  In the field of international business studies, scholars have 
long debated the reasons why firms adopt the investment models they do.  Naturally, much of 
this literature concentrates on factors internal to firms which determine firm strategy.  The 
decision to invest abroad rather than export or license is determined by a number of 
variables, from the size of the firm to the presence of intangible assets (Wolf 1975, Grubaugh 
1987).  Dunning’s (1980) influential ownership, location, and internalization (OLI) 
framework is an enduring taxonomy of investment motivations, and has informed much 
subsequent research on why firms invest abroad. 
 Beyond the decision to invest abroad, however, the determinants of the specific forms 
of direct investment have also occupied international business theorists.  Much of this work 
considers the initial ‘mode of entry’ for foreign firms.  Traditionally, international business 
scholars have concentrated on ownership control.  That is, they have asked what determines 
whether multinationals engage in joint ventures or wholly-owned subsidiaries (Gatignon and 
Anderson 1988, Kogut and Singh 1988, Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992, Hill et al. 1990).  
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Others have investigated why firms choose greenfield investments or opt for mergers and 
acquisitions (Dikova and Witteloostuijn 2007, Meyer et al. 2009, Meyer and Nguyen 2005).  
Though these and other studies come to varying conclusions about what determines the mode 
of entry of foreign firms, the independent variables they emphasize can be divided into three 
rough categories.  On the one hand, there are those who, absorbing the main conclusions of 
Hymer (1976), emphasize internal firm characteristics, not host country characteristics, as 
determinants of firm investment models.  These analysts tend to rely on transaction cost 
explanations for firm investment models, which propose that firms internalize operations 
abroad in order to minimize transaction costs which may be too high in a market transaction 
context.  Scholars have proposed different relationships between transaction cost strategies 
and resulting firm ownership patterns (Gatignon and Anderson 1988, Meyer 2001, Brouthers 
2002)195
 The final category of explanations for firm entry modes considers the role of formal 
institutions in host countries.  The institutional perspective establishes links between 
institutional characteristics in host countries and modes of entry, most often the choice 
between joint venture and wholly-owned subsidiary (Kogut et al. 2002, Smarzynska and Wei 
2000, Meyer et al. 2009, Meyer and Nguyen 2005).  These works claim that firm entry 
.  The second broad category of entry mode analysis asserts that national cultural 
characteristics have a more important impact on firm strategies (Agarwal 1994, Hennart and 
Larimo 1998).  Kogut and Singh (1988) argue that cultural distance and attitudes about 
uncertainty avoidance impact firm ownership patterns.  Brouthers (2002) also considered 
cultural influence on entry modes, ultimately deciding that transaction cost explanations were 
more convincing. 
                                                 
195Other firm-centric analysts have suggested it is not transaction costs in individual countries but global firm 




modes depend crucially on host country institutions such as infrastructure quality (Wheeler 
and Moody 1992), the rule of law and government policy (Asiedu and Esfahani 1998), and 
political hazards (Henisz 2000).  In some ways institutional explanations for firm entry 
modes are not new.  Kobrin (1976) asked about the political determinants of manufacturing 
FDI long ago.  However, institutionalist explanations have enjoyed a notable resurgence in 
recent years in the entry mode literature.  Early in this resurgence, Meyer (2001) argued that 
institutional reforms in developing countries made wholly-owned subsidiaries more likely.  
Recent studies have considered how institutional environments in host countries determine 
the likelihood of greenfield investments (Dikova and Witteloostuijn 2007) and foreign 
control (Slangen and Tulder 2009; Meyer et al. 2009).  Dunning and Lundan (2008, 580) 
expressed enthusiasm for the revival of institutionalist arguments within the eclectic (OLI) 
paradigm for multinational enterprises: “We think that there is no reason why this kind of 
institutional reasoning should not be extended to analysing the cognition, motives and 
behaviour of MNEs.”  Similarly, Dikova and Witteloostuijn (2007, 1014) noted that 
institutionalist arguments were “long-neglected” in the mode of entry literature, and that new 
research in this vein was welcome. 
While international business scholars have (re)discovered institutions as important 
predictors of firm investment strategies, the application of these ideas to specific investment 
outcomes has been somewhat limited in scope.  There are a handful of analyses which link 
firm diversification and product differentiation to institutional variables (Peng and Delios 
2006, Peng et al. 2005).  However, most studies in the entry mode literature still use the joint 
venture versus wholly-owned subsidiary or greenfield versus M&A as the primary dependent 
variables.  If, as Dunning and Lundan (2008) suggest, there are numerous other potential 
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linkages between institutions and aspects of MNE behavior it seems logical to extend 
institutional analysis to other kinds of investment model variation.  In this dissertation, I have 
focused on institutional links with innovation and efficiency-oriented investments.  By 
extending the entry mode logic to these other kinds of investment model variation, new 
associations between institutional characteristics and investment models may be uncovered. 
 There are very few works in the extant international business literature which link 
institutional configurations to innovation patterns among firms, perhaps because the 
internationalization of R&D in the developing world is a relatively new phenomenon.  In an 
early attempt at linking institutional attributes with R&D outcomes, Davidson and 
McFetridge (1985) argued that cultural and geographic proximity increases the chances of 
internal technology transfer to subsidiaries of multinational firms, and that policy initiatives 
such as equity controls decreased the probability of transfer.  Oxley (1999) argued that 
technology-intensive firms adopted hierarchichal models when intellectual property 
protection was weak in host countries.  More recently, Álvarez and Marín (2010) argue that 
both institutional ‘stability’ and the consolidation of national systems of innovation are 
important drivers of inward FDI.  However, more often than not innovation has appeared on 
the right hand side of works in the mode of entry literature.  That is, analysts have used 
innovation in multinational firms (most often measured as the R&D spending to sales ratio) 
as an important predictor, sometimes alongside institutional variables, that may predict 
ownership patterns (Gatignon and Anderson 1988, Smarzynska and Wei 2000) or the 
decision to invest abroad itself (Kimura 1989). 
 Beyond the international business and mode of entry literature, which take firm-level 
approaches, there are some works that examine institutional effects on multinational 
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investment patterns in broader context.  As mentioned in previous chapters, much recent 
work on the institutional determinants of FDI flows has examined political variables as 
potentially important predictors. Work on state corruption (Wei 1997, Wei 2006) 
demonstrates a link between corrupt political institutions and decreased foreign investment.  
There are numerous studies on the linkages between institutional characteristics such as 
regime type or number of veto points and investment patterns.  Yet these studies mostly link 
national-level institutional variables with levels of investment, not dominant characteristics 
of investment models.  Pauly and Reich (1997) established linkages between firm investment 
strategies (including R&D spending) and institutional characteristics in the home country of 
multinationals, but do not consider the same characteristics in the host country.  In sum, both 
IPE literature and international business literature have not adequately addressed potential 
linkages between institutions and specific activities of multinational firms beyond ownership 
patterns and greenfield/M&A dichotomies. 
6.1.2 Theoretical argument and hypotheses 
Multinational firms make decisions about where to locate the specific activities of 
their value chains based on a wide variety of factors.  Among the largest multinationals, the 
potential location options for where to locate an R&D center, for example, might include 
countries on every continent.  These decisions are made based partly on internal firm 
characteristics.  However, we should not discount the influence of host country institutional 
environments.  Dunning and Lundan (2008) point out that institutions in host countries 
should be considered an important component of ‘locational’ incentives in the OLI 
framework.  That is, variations in institutional structures should, alongside other traditional 
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locational advantages such as wage rates and worker skill levels, present both benefits and 
drawbacks for firm investment models. 
Among the works considering the impact of domestic institutions on firm entry mode, 
many have pointed out that institutions can serve an important role in reducing risk and 
uncertainty for overseas investments.  Slangen and Tulder (2009), for example, argue that 
low institutional quality in host countries drives firms toward joint venture models of 
investment, as firms in these environments are concerned about a variety of expropriation 
risks and policy instabilities, therefore preferring to partner with local firms.  Limited legal 
infrastructures, corruption, and inconsistently applied policy serve to increase uncertainty, 
and therefore impact firm decisions.  Meyer (2001, 358) argues that institutional weakness 
means that firms must “negotiate with agents inexperienced in business negotiations; they 
face unclear regulatory frameworks, inexperienced bureaucracies, underdeveloped court 
systems, and corruption.”  These characteristics of weak institutions necessarily increase 
transaction costs for foreign firms, and affect not only ownership structures but other 
investment characteristics.  Other works in the entry mode literature refer to more narrow 
‘political risk’, defined as an unfavorable change in regime or policy, as affecting firm 
investment models (Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992, Henisz 2000).  However, this kind of 
risk can derive from the characteristics of host country institutions, even if institutions are not 
explicitly acknowledged. 
Beyond the firm entry mode literature, much work on the political determinants of 
FDI revolves around uncertainty-minimization strategies of firms.  The debate about whether 
democracies or authoritarian regimes attract more FDI (Jensen 2003, Li and Resnick 2003, 
Oneal 1994, Kenyon and Naoi 2010) asks which form of government lowers uncertainty for 
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firms.  Busse and Hefeker (2007) argue that among other factors, governmental stability and 
the absence of internal political conflict are associated with more investment from abroad.  
Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weber (1998) and Schneider and Frey (1985) echo these findings, 
showing that political instability can scare off investors by threatening the predictability of 
the business environment.  According to these studies, it is the consistency and stability of 
governments that gives potential investors the assurance that their long term investments will 
not be threatened. 
Taken together, these two strands of literature suggest that firms are interested in 
lowering uncertainty, and that strong institutions send a positive signal to firms interested in 
consistency and predictability.  As FDI is a substantial commitment, with longer time 
horizons than other forms of investment, this makes intuitive sense.  I contend that increases 
in institutional quality are perceived positively by firms, as they reduce uncertainties 
associated with foreign investment and associated transaction costs. 
Beyond general associations, however, there are additional reasons to believe that 
increases in institutional quality may be associated with specific activities of firms.  Both 
export and R&D intensity are more likely in environments of higher institutional quality. 
Within the field of economics, researchers have often attempted to identify the determinants 
of export orientation among multinational firms.  Kumar (1994) finds that economic factors 
such as wage rates and industrial capability are important determinants of export-oriented 
production among multinationals in developing countries.  Other economists have identified 
factors that lead to increased local innovative activity among multinationals196
                                                 
196See Cohen (1995) for a review of the literature on multinational innovation in developing countries.  Also see 
Kumar and Siddarthan (1994) on innovation in India and Braga and Willmore (1991) for an economic case 
study on innovation among multinational firms in Brazil. 
.  These 
studies all adopt a micro-level approach to innovation and exporting, using firm case studies 
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and country-specific data to show the economic determinants of firm investment profiles.  
However, few of them consider political/institutional variables. 
Multinational firms considering countries as export platforms must consider 
institutional characteristics to a greater degree than those firms considering pure market-
seeking strategies.  As noted in the introduction and the previous chapter, intrafirm trade is 
increasing in Brazil (Corrêa de Lacerda 2003) and other developing countries (UNCTAD 
2002), both as a share of FDI-related trade and of total trade levels.  This suggests that firms 
are integrating their global value chains to a greater degree, and relying on FDI more in the 
search for productive efficiencies.  However, this integration can also bring risk.  As value 
chains become more complex, disruptions to any part of the chain can cause serious 
repercussions for the entire chain.  Efficiency-oriented investments, therefore, must ensure 
stability.  Furthermore, efficiency-oriented investments must contend with institutions when 
paying duties or engaging with regional trade blocs.  Even in Export Processing Zones, the 
stability and quality of the various ‘rules of the game’ must be taken into consideration.  This 
suggests that export-oriented investments, by virtue of their complexity, are often more 
seriously impacted by host country institutions than other forms of investment.  Consistent 
implementation of policies by well-functioning institutions should mitigate these risks for 
firms.   
The same can be said for innovation-intensive investments.  As I have noted 
previously, R&D is increasingly conducted away from the home offices of multinational 
enterprises, and often in the developing world (UNCTAD 2005b).  When confronted with 
choices for where to locate R&D activities, the institutional environment in potential host 
countries looms especially large.  Meyer (2001) notes that a poor institutional framework in 
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developing countries may not provide adequate protection for intellectual property rights.  If 
a judicial system is corrupt, or property rights are not consistently enforced, a technology-
intensive firm may not be able to effectively transfer intellectual property (Oxley 1999).  
Furthermore, as Dikova and Witteloostuijn (2007) point out, R&D-intensive firms are likely 
to benefit from well-administered labor markets, which strong institutions can provide.  The 
bottom line is that innovation-intensive investment is risky, especially if the firm has 
proprietary rights over intangible assets.  Well-functioning institutions should help to reduce 
the risk for these kinds of investment, and may facilitate technology transfer without the 
danger of unauthorized diffusion of intellectual property. 
Based on these propositions, it seems likely that strong institutions in host countries 
serve to reduce risk and uncertainty, leading to not only higher levels of FDI but also varying 
forms of FDI.  As multinationals consider where to locate export operations or R&D 
activities, they must consider a wide variety of factors both internal and external to the firm.  
However, the institutional setting in the host country can be an important locational 
determinant of investment strategy. 
If we move from the perspective of the firm considering investment to the perspective 
of the country attempting to attract investment, there are yet more reasons to suppose that 
institutional quality matters.  Developmentally-minded governments have long prioritized 
export and technology-intensive forms of investment.  Exporting is beneficial for the balance 
of payments in developing countries; it brings in foreign exchange and can increase the 
international competitiveness of domestic firms that have partnered with multinationals.  
Export-led development, while not always successful, is a consistent priority of developing 
country governments, especially in the time since the collapse of import-substitution 
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industrialization.  The same may be said for innovative activity.  Changes in worldwide 
production networks have increased the importance of innovation as a catalyst for 
development.  The location of innovative activities within multinational firms is subject to 
many of the factor-price pressures previously associated with labor.  Developing countries 
may now compete to attract innovation centers as strongly as they competed on the basis of 
unskilled labor price in the past.  Developing countries may realize significant benefits from 
local innovative activities.  Multinational firms engaging in local research and development, 
for example, often generate spillovers in the form of new production methods, new products, 
and increased linkages with domestic supplier firms.  Firms may move to higher value-added 
products, and engage in a virtuous cycle of technological upgrading. 
Both exporting and research and development activities in developing countries carry 
some risks for firms.  These activities move the firm away from what may be a basic 
horizontal approach to investment: reproduction of a product for sale in a domestic market.  
Firms that choose to export from developing countries may confront difficulties in navigating 
customs regulations or integrating global value chains.  Similarly, firms choosing to locate 
innovative activity outside their headquarters must contemplate the possibility that their 
innovations may not be protected from theft, or that foreign regulations may reduce their 
capacity for commercial application of innovations.  In all of these cases, the characteristics 
of domestic institutions will have important implications for investment models.  Therefore, 
the two complimentary hypotheses of the cross-national analysis may be specified as follows: 
H1: Export-intensive FDI is more likely when host country institutions are evaluated 
(either by outside observers or the firms themselves) as well functioning. 
 
H2: R&D-intensive FDI is more likely when host country institutions are evaluated 




6.2 Testing the Argument: Country-Level Analysis 
The analysis makes use of firm survey data to test the hypotheses on institutions and 
firm investment models.  The hypotheses I propose separate perceptions of institutional 
coherence among outside experts and among the firms themselves.  I test both in this 
analysis.  For the first test, I conduct country-level regressions of aggregated firm investment 
models and governance indicators established by outside observers.  In the sections that 
follow, I detail the data chosen for the dependent variable, independent variable of interest, 
and the control variables.  I then elaborate the model used for the estimation, and after a short 
discussion of methodological concerns I relay the results of the analysis. 
6.2.1 Dependent variables 
Various analysts have pointed out that aggregate yearly FDI data used in many 
existing studies are often used to test what are essentially firm-level hypotheses (Haggard 
1989, Jensen 2006).  Yet this is far from ideal.  Firms make individual decisions about, for 
example, whether a democratic country is more enticing as a location than an autocratic 
alternative.  Many of the decisions about specific modes of investment, in fact, are based on 
firm perceptions of the investment climate in host countries.  Therefore it seems appropriate 
to not only look at overall FDI levels in countries from year to year, but also to examine 
available individual firm surveys.  These surveys can reveal common modes of investment in 
different country contexts.  Although there are numerous problems with the design of many 
firm surveys, the problems can be circumvented with appropriate precautions197
                                                 
197Kurtz and Schrank (2007) take issue with a number of the measurement mechanisms used in surveys of firms 
by international organizations such as the World Bank.  They argue that the supposed ‘good governance’ 
indicator questions in these surveys are often biased to precondition answers from their respondents.  Also see 
Jensen, Li, and Rahman (2010) on the problems of nonresponse and false response in cross-national firm 
surveys.  The indicators used in this analysis are not as politically problematic as the ones considered by Jensen 
et al., and therefore would not exhibit dramatic nonresponse and false response rates. 
.  I employ 
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two sets of these surveys to link operationalizations of institutional variables in developing 
countries with corresponding investment activities of individual firms. 
The surveys I use here are the World Bank Group’s Enterprise Surveys.  These 
surveys provide comprehensive data on over 85,000 firms in 106 countries.  The surveys 
measure firm perceptions of business environments, while also collecting important 
operating data for each firm.  The surveys are not available every year for countries, but were 
periodically implemented in a large number of developing countries between 2002 and 2009.  
I first eliminated all firms in these surveys that fell below the 10% foreign controlling interest 
criterion established by UNCTAD, in order to only consider those firms that could be 
classified as multinational.  I also eliminated firms operating in those countries that could not 
be classified as developing countries.  This left 5,881 firms in 65 countries in the 2002-2005 
surveys.  The World Bank instituted a simpler, condensed questionnaire for its surveys after 
2005, so these surveys are treated in separate models.  I have noted where changes in 
questions and omission of other questions impact the analysis. 
I use as dependent variables two indicators of firm investment models: R&D effort 
and export effort.  To operationalize these activities, I follow the approach advocated by 
Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2008) in their study of export promotion policies in Peru.  I 
include both the decision to export as a binary variable and the intensity of exporting as a 
percentage of sales.  These results were then aggregated to indicate the percentage of 
exporting firms in a country sample and the average export effort of exporting firms in that 
sample.  The same variables were constructed for Research and Development effort.  The 
coverage on the R&D indicator is not as broad as the exporting indicator, partly because the 
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question was not as prominent in the lengthy questionnaire198
6.2.2 Independent variables 
.  The R&D question was 
included in the surveys taken from 2002 to 2005, however it was omitted from subsequent 
surveys. 
Studies that consider the characteristics of state institutions in the developing world 
inevitably face tough questions about how to define ‘well-functioning institutions’.  There 
are, however, some measures of institutional coherence and efficacy that manage to convey 
important information about the responsiveness and coherence of the state.  This study 
utilizes the government effectiveness measure contained within the World Governance 
Indicators (WGI), published by the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009).  
These measures are formed by aggregating a large number of independent assessments of 
institutional quality and other aspects of governance, most of which come from expert 
surveys.  Though there are a number of possible objections to the WGI data, they do enjoy 
support as one of the few reliable and transparent attempts to compare governance across 
countries199
                                                 
198The R&D variable also had to be constructed from two survey responses: sales in the previous year 
(measured in thousands of local currency units) and R&D spending in the previous year (measured on the same 
scale). The export variable directly asked respondents to reveal exports as a percentage of sales. This, coupled 
with the relative lack of prominence of the R&D question in the surveys, reduced the sample size. 
.  The WGI are based exclusively on “perceptions-based data on governance 
reflecting the views of a diverse range of informed stakeholders, including tens of thousands 
of household and firm survey respondents, as well as thousands of experts working for the 
private sector, NGOs, and public sector agencies” (Kaufmann, Kray, and Mastruzzi 2009, 4). 
 
199These measures are often used in the mode of entry literature to convey institutional quality.  Both Dikova 
and Witteloostuijn (2007) and Slangen and Tulder (2009) have recently used these indicators to predict 




For this portion of the analysis, the government effectiveness component of the WGI 
serves as the primary independent variable of interest.  Kaufmann, Kray, and Mastruzzi 
(2009) define the government effectiveness measure as follows: 
The quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. 
 
This measure is well suited to the objectives of this chapter, and offers a satisfactory 
operationalization of institutional characteristics that can be applied broadly.  Moreover, 
these elements of institutional quality have been extensively discussed in preceding chapters.  
The government effectiveness measure is constructed by gathering together indicators of 
government quality from a variety of expert surveys, which come from government, NGO, 
and commercial providers.  These expert surveys are complemented by popular surveys, such 
as the Gallup world poll200
                                                 
200For the government effectiveness measure, the specific sources used are the following: the Global Insight 
Global Risk Service, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness 
Report, the Gallup World Poll, the Institutional Profiles Database, The Political Risk Services International 
Country Risk Guide, and the Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators.  For the specific elements 
from each of these sources used in the construction of the variable, see www.govindicators.org 
.  The indicators from each of these sources are then combined 
into a single variable using Unobserved Components Models.  These models work through 
the following three step process: (1) standardizing the data into comparable units, (2) 
constructing an aggregate indicator as a weighted average of the underlying source variables, 
and (3) constructing margins of error that “reflect the unavoidable imprecision in measuring 
governance” (Kaufmann, Kray, and Mastruzzi 2010, 2).  The scale of the indicator conforms 
to a standard normal distribution in each year, with higher values indicating better quality 
governance.  The Worldwide Governance Indicators have been criticized recently on a 




governance201.  However, the measures are useful in that they provide very broad country 
coverage and because they average many different information sources and thus 
simultaneously summarize much existing knowledge on governance and reduce the dangers 
of relying on any one source.  Even critics of the measures have acknowledged that the WGI 
are “probably the most carefully constructed governance indicators” (Arndt and Oman 
2006)202
I also collected the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Analysis measures 
and Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index as additional robustness check 
for the WGI indicator.  The coverage of the CPIA indicator was too spotty to use this 
measure as an additional independent variable.  In addition to having a relatively small set of 
countries with data, the CPIA indicator was only available after 2004, making it unusable for 
the 2002 base year surveys.  The Corruption Perception Index was available for all country 
years.  The correlation between this index and the WGI index for the 2002-2005 country-year 
surveys was .807.  Table 6.1 presents the correlation matrix for the WGI and the other two 
governance indicators for the 2006-2009 country-year surveys. While there are other possible 
and imperfect proxies for institutional characteristics, the WGI indicator best captures the 
goals of this cross-national analysis. 
. 
                                                 
201The WGI have been criticized for not adequately comparing values over time (Langbein and Knack 2010). 
As this is not a dynamic analysis, this criticism matters less in the present context.  The measures have been 
criticized also for potentially relaying expert judgments on past economic growth instead of present governance 
assessment (Kurtz and Schrank 2007).  The architects of the measure have found little evidence of this so-called 
‘halo effect’.  Finally, and most importantly for this analysis, some have faulted the measure for relying too 
heavily on business opinions, which may introduce bias (see the exchange between Kurtz and Schrank and 
Kaufmann et al. in the Journal of Politics, 2007).  Kaufmann et al. counter that the empirical sources for the 
indicators are much broader than the business community, integrating popular opinion polling and other 
sources.  They also contend that there is little evidence of systematic bias among business responses or within 
the risk assessment community.  The Kurtz and Schrank (2007) criticisms are especially relevant to this study, 
as they focus on the government effectiveness component of the WGI used here. 
 




Table 6.1 Correlation matrix: indicators of governance for country-level analyses, 2006 base year 






1   
World Bank Country Policy 
and Insitutional Analysis 
(CPIA): public sector 
management and institutions 
cluster average 
0.908 1  
Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index 
.652 .611 1 
 
6.2.3 Other variables 
Within the context of the country-level models, there are a number of host country 
characteristics that can impact investment profiles, including R&D effort and export activity.  
Characteristics such as level of economic development and the rate of economic growth have 
been found influential in previous studies of FDI inflows.  It is important, therefore, to 
control for these characteristics. From the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, I 
include GDP per capita, GDP growth, and population of the host country.  I include GDP per 
capita, measured in constant 2000 US dollars, as a proxy for level of development. This 
indicator is logged to accommodate its large scale.  The population measure, also logged, is 
an indicator of market size.  We might expect that richer countries attract more innovation-
intensive investments, and that countries with larger populations will attract less export-
oriented investment (because it will primarily be market-seeking investment).  The GDP 
growth predictor is measured as an annual percentage.  The mean levels and other descriptive 
statistics for the independent and dependent variables can be found in the appendix to this 
chapter. 
In addition to these baseline economic indicators, I have included a number of other variables 
that may function as important predictors and/or controls in the model. The first of these is a general 
measure of democratic longevity. Established democracies may provide foreign interests with 
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assurances that their investments will be subject to consistent regulations through time, perhaps 
incentivizing local R&D or export activity.  To account for these potential effects of democratic 
longevity on risk assessments, I include the length of democratic governance in years, based on the 
dichotomous measure of democracy first introduced by Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, and Przewroski 
(1996).  The agedem variable in their dataset, which has been subsequently modified by Cheibub, 
Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), simply records the number of years democracy has been in place.  The 
score on this variable is zero if a democracy does not exist. I expect that established democracies will 
exhibit more research-intensive and export-intensive FDI, though as noted in previous chapters the 
literature exhibits contradictory findings on the relationship between democracy and 
aggregate levels of FDI. 
The incidence of violent conflict within the states under consideration, while rare, 
does need to be accounted for in the model.  I therefore include a measure of conflict taken 
from the Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002).  This measure is coded as a dummy 
variable where a score of one indicates the presence of conflict within the state.  I only 
include conflicts of type three and four in the original database (internal and internationalized 
internal). Extrasystemic or ‘colonial’ conflicts are not included unless they take place within 
the country in the database. I expect that a score of one on this variable will be associated 
with a decrease in export and R&D intensity. 
A country’s overall openness to trade has been shown to be an important predictor of 
FDI.  FDI and trade are often (but not always) complements, and trade liberalization often 
accompanies FDI liberalization in developing countries.  Chakrabati (2001) and Jun and 
Singh (1996) both identify export orientation as a significant predictor of FDI flows.  
However, the relationship between trade openness and export/R&D activity of multinationals 
is potentially complex.  It seems natural to conclude that openness to trade should be 
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associated with export-intensive FDI.  However, trade and FDI can serve as substitutes for 
one another.  Some extremely open economies have relatively less FDI, partly because firms 
find it easier to trade than to set up productive capacity.  Moreover, during the period of ISI 
much FDI in Latin America and elsewhere took the form of tariff-hopping FDI, precisely 
because importing was prohibitively expensive.  To determine whether a country’s overall 
trade openness is a significant predictor of export-oriented FDI, I include imports plus 
exports as a percentage of GDP.  I include this predictor in a separate model from the 
baseline model, because the data coverage of the export measure in the World Development 
Indicators is not as extensive as that of the other economic predictors, which reduces the 
sample size. 
Finally, I include in another model a measure of natural resource intensity in the 
economies under consideration.  Natural resource intensity is important control variable, 
because especially in developing countries natural resource industries are often highly export 
intensive.  Moreover, natural resource intensity may have a crowding-out effect on local 
R&D activity, as hypothesized by Sachs and Warner (2001).  Finally, it is likely that the 
institutional variables in this analysis will matter less for natural resource-oriented 
investments, which are almost always export intensive.  It is therefore an important control 
variable.  Natural resource intensity is proxied by the level of ores and metals exports and 
fuel exports as a percentage of overall merchandise exports (World Development Indicators), 
similar to the approach used by Jensen (2003) and Archer et al. (2007). While this measure 
does not give a full accounting of the importance of natural resources for a given economy, it 
does convey important information about the country’s external profile.  The coverage for 
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this particular indicator was also not extensive; therefore it is implemented in a separate 
model. 
6.2.4 Country-level analysis: estimation methods 
For the country-level analyses, the dependent variables are the percentage of 
exporting firms in the country sample and the percentage of firms engaging in domestic 
R&D.  Another dependent variable was formed by taking the average export effort among 
exporting multinational firms in the country sample, and the average R&D effort of 
innovative multinational firms, both measured as a percentage of sales203.  Outliers for the 
R&D intensity effort were identified as indicating measurement error (i.e. when the R&D 
intensity was above 1000 percent of sales), and these firms were eliminated from the mean 
construction204
For the exporting measures, the data in the more recent 2006-2009 surveys 
demonstrated excellent coverage.  On average, 97 percent of firms in a country sample group 
answered the export question in the survey.  However, the research and development 
question was not included in these more recent surveys.  I therefore utilize the older 2002-
2005 surveys for the analysis of innovation among multinationals.  The R&D question 
demonstrates diluted coverage, with many firms in the sample either unwilling or unable to 
answer this question.  The average response rate to the R&D question overall was 64 percent.  
The response rate varies by country, such that some countries did not contain enough 
.  The primary independent variable of interest is the government effectiveness 
indicator of the WGI.  The values provided by all independent variables were matched to the 
year of the survey.   
                                                 
203This reduced the sample further, as it eliminates multinational firms that do not export in one model, and 
multinational firms that do not conduct innovation in the other model. 
 




observations on this variable to construct country averages205
                                                 
205If more than two observations were not available for any country-year survey, country averages were not 
constructed and the country was dropped from the analysis. 
.  Therefore, the n in the R&D 
regression is smaller (only 66 countries).  The problem of nonresponse in firm survey data is 
a serious one, and can lead to bias and incorrect inferences.  In a recent article addressing this 
issue, Jensen et al. (2010) argue that firms sometimes fail to respond in systematic ways.  
The nonresponse rate for the R&D question in this analysis is potentially problematic.  
However, the problem is somewhat limited.  There is some evidence that increased firm size 
leads to a higher response rate.  Within country samples, the correlation between the 
percentage of respondent firms with 50 or more employees and the percentage of firms 
responding to the R&D question is .263.  The correlation between the percentage of firms 
with 100 or more employees and the R&D response rate is .271.  Thus it does appear that 
larger firms are more likely to provide responses to the R&D question.  This stands to reason.  
Larger firms have more personnel who can answer surveys, and may have more detailed data 
on R&D expenditures.  However, even if we assume that larger firms are disproportionally 
represented in the analysis, this is not necessarily problematic to the theory.  Multinational 
firms are usually larger than their domestic counterparts.  Moreover, larger multinationals do 
not necessarily conduct more R&D than smaller multinational firms, as the results of the 
analyses indicate.  Therefore, it is unlikely that the potential overrepresentation of larger 
firms would lead to a false positive, or type 1, error.  More worrisome would be an 
association between response rates and the quality of institutions.  This would indicate a 
possible connection between poor institutions and nonresponse, perhaps based on a fear of 
government retaliation.  This would result in biased inferences.  However, the correlation 
between the WGI measure and the R&D response rate is only .069. 
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Jensen et al. (2010) suggest a number of remedies for nonresponse in firm surveys.  
The first of these remedies is already built into the present analysis.  The authors suggest 
using only multinational firms, as they presumably feel freer to answer politically sensitive 
questions.  They also suggest the use of analytic weighting schemes, which account for the 
number of observations through various means.  This is also accomplished in the present 
analysis through the use of analytic weights in the OLS regressions on R&D and export 
intensity.  Finally, the authors suggest comparing response rates on benign questions in the 
survey to response rates for politically sensitive questions.  In the case of this analysis, the 
potentially sensitive questions in the survey do not appear to be significantly related to 
nonresponse, as detailed in section 6.3.2. 
The dependent variables in all of the country-level models were bounded between 0 
and 100.  In theory, the R&D intensity measure could go higher than 100 if enough firms in 
the country were incredibly research-intensive.  Individual firm responses on the R&D 
intensity measure did exceed 100.  However, none of the country averages did so.  Therefore, 
a tobit model is appropriate for each of these models, with limits at 0 and 100.  The models 
which use average export and R&D intensity as their dependent variables were weighted by 
the number of observations used to form the country averages.  As there was significant 
variation on this dimension, the inclusion of weights was necessary.  This was done using 
using OLS regression, with stata’s aweight command. 
6.2.5 Results and discussion 
 Tables 6.2 and 6.3 present the results of the various analyses.  The results are 
consistent with the two hypotheses linking evaluations of institutional quality with firm 
investment models.  In the more recent surveys, increases in the government effectiveness 
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indicator are associated with a higher propensity to export and a higher export intensity 
among exporting firms. 
The impact of the government effectiveness variable on the average exporting level of 
multinational firms is substantial.  A unit deviation in the WGI indicator is predicted to raise 
the percentage of exporting firms in the country sample by almost ten points, according to 
model 1.  This effect is independent of the country’s size or relative level of development, 
two factors that have been identified as consistent predictors of firm export activity 
(Chakrabarti 2001; Jun and Singh 1996).  A higher assessment of institutional quality has a 
similar effect on the intensity of exporting among all exporting firms.  Higher WGI scores 
are associated with higher export intensity (model 4). 
The effects of the other predictors in table 6.2 also merit discussion.  Wealthier 
developing countries appear to be associated with greater propensity to export among 
multinationals.  The relationship between population and export orientation is indeterminate, 
though there is reason to suspect that firms in populous countries adopt export-intensive 
models.  High rates of GDP growth appear to be negatively associated with export 
propensity.  This is likely due to the fact that fast-growing countries represent attractive 
targets for market-oriented investors, rather than export-oriented FDI.  The existence of a 
long-established democracy appears to be positively associated with export-orientation, but 
this relationship is not significant.  The presence of conflict has no reliable impact on export-
orientation, though the relatively small sample size meant that only ten of the 89 countries 
displayed a score of one for this indicator. 
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Exporting Firms in 
country sample 
 (Model 2) 
Percentage of 
Exporting Firms in 
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 (Model 3) 
Average Export 
intensity of 
exporting firms in 
country sample, 
percentage of sales 
(Model 4) 
Model Used: Tobit Tobit Tobit OLS 




















































































0.044 0.045 0.044 .391t 
Observations 89 73 68 68 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, analysis weighted by frequency of firm 
samples used to construct average within each country in model 4. Countries with two or fewer observations for 
construction of averages in model 4 were dropped. Other predictors dropped due to multicollinearity (VIF 
greater than 7). t OLS R-squared. 
 
Models 2 and 3 introduce variables with limited coverage to the baseline model 
(model 1).  In model 2, overall trade openness does not appear to be a significant predictor of 
export propensity among multinationals.  Though this may appear confounding, it should be 
remembered that high import tariffs have in the past prompted tariff-hopping FDI in 
developing countries.  These firms may serve regional markets through exports as well.  The 
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introduction of the natural resource measure in model 3 reduces the sample size to 68 
countries, but as expected the increase in natural resource intensity is associated with an 
increase in export propensity and intensity among multinational firms.  It is important to 
point out that in models 2 and 3 the WGI variable, while still positive, loses significance.  
The coefficient associated with the natural resource variable is highly significant, which 
makes sense as the presence of raw materials should generate strong export incentives for 
export activity among multinational firms.  However, the coefficient associated with the WGI 
measure is significant in, model 4, which considers average export intensity.  This is true 
even with a reduced sample size and in the presence of the natural resource control variable.  
As I have noted in previous chapters, natural resource-oriented investment is different, and 
there are reasons to suspect the institutionalist argument may not apply in the context of 
extractive industry. 
As indicated above, the country-level analysis for the R&D variable suffered from a 
low response rate among firms for whether or not domestic R&D occurred.  Only 66 country 
averages could be constructed.  This small sample size did reduce the potential for 
significance and introduced problems of multicollinearity.  However, the tobit models did 
return interesting results, even with a small sample size.  The WGI appears to positively 
impact the R&D incidence among multinational firms, as shown in table 6.3.  While the 
effect of the government effectiveness variable does not attain significance in the model 
which predicts the intensity of local R&D, it remains positive.  The impact of this indicator, 
in the context of a small sample, is noteworthy.  In both models 5 and 6, a unit increase in the 
WGI indicator is associated with an 8.5% and 10.5% jump in the percentage of innovative 
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firms, respectively.  This is larger than the increase associated with any of the other 
predictors, including the presence of conflict (in a negative direction). 
 The other predictors in the model behave largely as predicted.  Larger countries tend 
to display more innovation among multinationals, perhaps because firms are seeking to adapt 
to the large internal market.  A surprising result of this analysis is the negative effect of the 
income variable.  According to these results, richer developing countries are no more likely 
to display innovative firms than poorer developing countries.  This may indicate the growing 
pressures of comparative advantage for location of R&D in developing countries, perhaps 
based on labor costs.  However, other investigations have returned different results.  GDP 
growth does not appear to be reliably associated with R&D incidence. 
The structure of the more detailed 2002-2005 surveys allowed the inclusion of 
sectoral variables based on a simple two-way division between service firms and 
manufacturing firms.  The percentage of manufacturing firms represented in each country 
sample and the percentage of service firms are thus added as additional predictors in models 
5 and 6.  However, the addition of the natural resource variable in the context of models 7 
and 8 resulted in problems of multicollinearity (variance inflation factor greater than 7), and 
the sectoral variables were dropped.  Nevertheless, these controls are important, and sectoral 
distinctions are continued in the firm-level analysis in section 6.3.  The length of democracy 
did not have a reliably positive impact on R&D incidence, and while negative the impact of 
conflict on R&D incidence was not statistically significant.  The negative impact of natural 
resource intensity on R&D propensity is understandable, given that many extractive 
operations in the developing world are not particularly innovative.  The negative relationship 




Table 6.3 Country-level analysis, 2002-2005 firm surveys 
Dependent 
Variable:  
Percentage of Firms 
with R&D spending 
in country sample 
(Model 5) 
Percentage of Firms 
with R&D spending 
in country sample 
 (Model 6) 
Percentage of Firms 
with R&D spending 
in country sample 
 (Model 7) 
Average R&D 
intensity of 
innovative firms in 
country sample, 
percentage of sales 
(Model 8) 
Model Used: Tobit Tobit Tobit OLS 



































































































0.038 0.044 0.033 .309t 
Observations 66 61 62 52 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, analysis weighted by frequency of firm 
samples used to construct average within each country in model 4. Countries with two or fewer observations for 
construction of averages in model 4 were dropped. Other predictors dropped due to multicollinearity (VIF 
greater than 7). t OLS R-squared. 
 
The consistently positive impact of the government effectiveness indicator, 
independent of common economic and demographic explanations for R&D and export 
activity, is important.  It suggests that firms not only take into account economic factors 
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when deciding the form and function of their activities in developing countries, but that these 
countries’ governmental institutions matter as well.  According to the results of this analysis, 
countries displaying these institutional characteristics do not attract more export and R&D-
intensive investments. 
6.3 Testing the Argument: Firm-Level Analysis 
Matching country-level data on export and R&D activity with assessments of 
institutional quality allows for a broad assessment of the relationship between institutions and 
common investment models.  However, the question of whether a firm exports or innovates 
in a developing country is at its heart a firm-level question.  While country-level analyses 
allow the inclusion of control variables that have consistently proven influential in 
influencing exporting and other activities, these models do not completely capture the firm-
level decision-making process.  However, the firm surveys used here do allow this 
theoretically more proximate approach. 
6.3.1 Firm-level variables 
The WGI are inadequate for firm-level analysis.  I therefore use a question in the 
surveys themselves as a proxy for institutional coherence, the primary independent variable 
for this analysis.  Though the governmental relations portion of the Enterprise Surveys 
primarily deals with legal dimensions of investment governance, there are a small number of 
questions that can serve as proxies for institutional effectiveness.  For the purposes of this 
analysis, I selected a question that best approximated ideas about the strength of state 
institutions, broadly defined.  The wording of the question is as follows:  
In general, government officials’ interpretations of regulations affecting my 




The six possible responses in the 2002-2005 surveys range from ‘fully disagree’ to ‘fully 
agree’. The four possible responses in the surveys administered after 2005 range from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’.  The wording of the question is identical in both 
surveys.  A positive response to this question can be broadly interpreted as a perception of 
competent institutions by the firm. 
The dependent variable in the firm-level analysis again comes in two forms: the 
intensity of exporting by an individual firm (measured as a percentage of sales) and the 
intensity of R&D spending (again as a percentage of sales).  Only exporting and innovative 
firms were used in these samples206
The firm-level approach allows the inclusion of other variables which were 
unavailable in the country-level analysis.  The industry or sector of each firm should be quite 
influential in determining whether that firm exports or does R&D.  I therefore included 
industry dummy variables to isolate the effect of industry norms.  The 2002-2005 surveys 
included a five-way sectoral division, while the 2006-2009 surveys only included four 
categories.  The education level of the workforce in individual firms is an important control 
variable for the level of local innovative activity.  This variable is measured as the percentage 
of the firm’s workforce with postsecondary education, and was available only in the 2002-
2005 surveys.  Much of the mode of entry literature in international business studies 
examines ownership patterns of multinational firms, and finds that R&D intensity can 
.  The 2002-2005 surveys were used for the model with 
R&D intensity as the dependent variable, and the 2006-2009 surveys were used for the model 
with export intensity as the dependent variable. 
                                                 
206This introduces bias, in the sense that non-exporting firms and non-innovative firms are excluded.  However, 
the binary question of whether to innovate or export is addressed in the country-level analysis and the firm-level 




influence whether an investment is undertaken as a wholly-owned subsidiary or a joint 
venture (Gatignon and Anderson 1988, Smarzynska and Wei 2000).  Other studies have 
considered the effects of firm size on investment patterns (Kimura 1989).  Therefore, the size 
and degree of foreign control for each individual firm are also controlled in this regression207
6.3.2 Firm-level analysis: estimation methods 
. 
 As referenced in the country-level analysis, the nonresponse rates for the R&D 
question are potentially problematic.  In the context of firm-level analysis, it is important to 
ensure that patterns of nonresponse are not correlated with the variables of interest, especially 
the politically sensitive government effectiveness question.  In this case, however, there 
appears to be no strong association between response rates and government characteristics.  
Firms responded to the government effectiveness question in large numbers: the response 
rate in the 2002-2005 surveys was 97 percent, and the response rate in the 2006-2009 surveys 
was 96 percent.  The correlation between the dichotomous democracy measure from Cheibub, 
Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) and a country’s response rate average to the government effectiveness 
question was .018 in the 2006-2009 surveys and .012 in the 2002-2005 surveys, suggesting that non-
democracies did not have significantly different response rates than democracies.  Comparing country 
average response rates for the government effectiveness question with the WGI indicator, we see 
correlations of -.082 for the 2006-2009 surveys and .068 for the 2002-2005 surveys.  Thus it appears 
that assessments of institutional quality have little association with response rates.  Finally, it seems 
that firm size is not strongly correlated with response to the government effectiveness question.  The 
correlation between hundreds of employees and response to the government effectiveness question (at 
the firm level) is only .012 for the 2006-2009 surveys and .015 for the 2002-2005 surveys.  All told, 
                                                 
207For firm size, I attempted to create a size variable based on the log of annual sales.  However, this variable 
was difficult to construct due to the fact that sales were reported in the surveys in local currency units and 
therefore not comparable across countries.  I constructed ratios based on average sales figures for country 
groups, but opted for the more easily interpretable employee figures.  However, the sales indicators did not 
return results inconsistent with the employees measure in other regressions. 
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the response rates to the government effectiveness question in the survey do not present the same 
problems that exist for the R&D response rates.  Firms almost always answered the government 
effectiveness question, and whether they did or not appears to have little to do with the quality of 
institutions, democracy, or firm size. 
The use of individual firm surveys allows a much larger estimation sample than the 
country-level analysis.  However, the observations are not completely independent.  Because 
the responses are grouped into country surveys, OLS methods are not appropriate and may 
introduce bias into the estimators.  Country effects, in this case, introduce idiosyncratic 
influences on the data within these groups.  Surveys are often implemented differently from 
country to country, and different patterns of responses which correlate within the groups can 
pose a serious threat to inference.  These differences can be the result of measurement error, 
differences in implementation, or even cultural differences in survey responses that cluster 
within countries.  These errors will be serially correlated in the error term and may lead to 
false inference.  This analysis therefore adopts a Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) 
model for the firm-level analysis.  This model in effect imposes country dummy variables on 
the model (not reported), which can in turn capture some of the distortions generated by this 
kind of panel data.  This reduces bias in the estimators, but eliminates the possibility of 
including country-level variables in the model.  According to the two hypotheses, I expect 
higher assessments of governmental effectiveness among firms to be associated with higher 
levels of local innovative activity and higher levels of export activity. 
6.3.3 Results and discussion 
The results of the firm-level analysis are presented in table 6.4. The measure of 
institutional consistency is positively related to both indicators of firm strategy.  Firms that 
perceive host country institutions to be consistent and predictable are more likely to adopt 
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R&D and export-intensive investment models.  If a firm moves one unit on the six-point 
question used in the 2002-2005 surveys, for example from “tend to agree” to “agree in most 
cases”, this should be associated with an almost 4 percent jump in R&D intensity.  A unit 
increase in the question used in the 2006-2009 surveys is associated with an almost 2 percent 
jump in export intensity.  This is comparable to the effect of a ten percent increase in foreign 
ownership.  If a firm were to move from “strongly disagree” (the minimum value) to 
“strongly agree” (the maximum), export intensity would increase by 5.5%.  Perceptions of 
stable, consistent institutions are associated with these two dimensions of firm investment 
profiles. This seems logical.  Firms operate under the shadow of the future.  They prize future 
stability, and are unlikely to establish R&D operations in countries that do not exhibit these 
institutional qualities.  It seems entirely likely that the quality of domestic institutions is 
important to firms’ investment profiles. 
The other predictors in the model relay some interesting and sometimes 
counterintuitive information.  We might expect that the education level of workers in firms 
would be associated with an increase in R&D intensity, but this does not appear to be the 
case208
                                                 
208However, it should be noted that the standard errors are large enough to call even the sign of the coefficient 
into question.  Moreover, the relationship between domestic innovation among multinationals and employee 
education may be endogenous. 
.  It stands to reason that larger and foreign-dominated firms would be more likely 
engage intensively in exporting.  The relationship between size, foreign ownership, and R&D 
intensity is also interesting.  Smaller and foreign-dominated firms seem to use R&D more 
intensively, though the lack of significance begs caution.  Firms in the service sector display 
lower export intensity, as would be expected.  Moving from the manufacturing sector to the 
agroindustry sector seems to reduce export intensity and R&D intensity, but these effects are 
not statistically significant and the signage is called into question by the standard errors.  In 
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sum, the effects of sector, while important to control, are not especially pronounced in these 
models. 
Table 6.4 Firm-level analysis, 2002-2005 firm surveys (R&D Intensity) and 2006-2009 firm surveys 
(Export Intensity) 
Dependent Variable: Export Intensity 
(Percentage of Sales) 
R&D Intensity (Percentage of 
Sales) 
Model Used: LSDV(fixed effects) LSDV(fixed effects) 
     
Consistent and Predictable 
Interpretations of Government 
Regulations 
1.823* 3.744** 
 (1.080) (1.742) 
Education of Workforce  -.029 
  (.111) 
Degree of foreign ownership (%) .152*** .110 
 (.034) (.079) 
Size of firm (hundreds of employees) 3.352 -0.263 
 (2.169) (.274) 
Service sector -11.635*** -.348 
 (2.986) (9.544) 
Agroindustry sector -.393 -3.432 
 (3.051) (11.507) 
Construction sector  -2.195 
  (17.615) 
Other sector 4.710 -4.792 
 (6.097) (21.050) 
Constant 32.582*** -12.246 
 (4.073) (9.306) 
Observations 1,203 451 
R-squared 0.239 0.092 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country dummies not reported. 
Stata’s areg command used for fixed effects, absorbing country as the panel identifier. Manufacturing sector is 





6.4 Implications of Country-Level and Firm-Level Analysis 
 
Academics and policymakers alike have long understood that politics does impact 
multinational firms’ investment decisions.  Firms do not consider only economic conditions 
in potential host countries, but also the political stability of the country and many other 
factors, including institutional characteristics.  Recent work in international political 
economy and in the institutional business literature has begun to unravel the complex 
relationship between host country institutional characteristics and FDI.  However, political 
scientists have not asked many questions about the types of activities pursued by 
multinational firms, or the ways in which the policies and institutions of the host country may 
affect these investment models.  International business studies have preferred to concentrate 
on the determinants of firm ownership and greenfield/M&A entry models.  Other economic 
studies have sought to determine the economic motivations for various models of investment, 
including export and innovation intensity.  However, the links between institutional variables 
and these investment outcomes remain underspecified.  This chapter seeks to fill a small part 
of this gap in understanding.  Given the limitations of the surveys used in this analysis, the 
hypotheses advanced here may be investigated in the future with more detailed data. 
Multinational firms attempt to minimize risk in developing countries.  Though the 
incidence of outright expropriation has declined (Minor 1994), investing abroad is still 
subject to many uncertainties.  Local research and development, or the construction of export 
networks, can increase the risk for firms.  Firms using developing countries as export 
platforms are exposed to exchange rate uncertainty and the vagaries of host country trade 
policy, and local R&D activity exposes firms to potential theft of intellectual property, or 
domestic patent regulations that may adversely affect the firm.  Based on the results of this 
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analysis, the host country’s institutional setting is one area where this risk may be reduced.  
In addition to the incentives offered by a whole host of economic pressures, firm investment 
models should also be affected by the characteristics of state institutions in host countries. 
This study is subject to a number of limitations.  Much of the work in previous 
chapters, based on firm interviews and Brazilian data and reports, traced the development of 
firms’ R&D and export activities through time, proposing links between institutional settings 
and changes and evolving firm investment models.  Because the firm-level data employed in 
this study are cross-sectional, the dynamic interaction between firms and institutions is not 
measured.  Ideally, to counteract this problem we would be able to access a survey that tracks 
individual firms both across countries and through time.  Unfortunately these data are not 
available in a cross-national context.  As a potential complicating factor, the firm entry mode 
literature ostensibly deals with initial models of investment, and the firm survey data used 
here include interviews with firms that have been active in developing countries for years.  
The present analysis captures both initial entrants and established firms, but the positive 
associations between institutional quality and specific activities of firms should be additive in 
both groups.  In other words, the hypothesized relationship between institutional quality and 
export/R&D activities would not vary based on how long a firm has been in country.  The 
lack of time-series firm-level data is a common problem for most studies, and most adopt a 
static specification for their models.  In the firm entry literature, various studies have boosted 
the n of econometric analysis by considering firms that are active in countries, without 
dwelling on when the investment was made (Meyer 2001, Asiedu and Esfahani 1998)209
                                                 
209As another example, Meyer et al. (2009), in their ambitious entry mode study, collect ownership data on 
firms registered between 1990 and 2000 and acknowledge the bias that may exist based on surveying firms that 





Cross-national studies of the economic determinants of export orientation and innovation 
among multinationals (Kumar 1994, Kumar 2001) have also adopted a static approach due to 
data limitations.  Neither approach is entirely satisfactory, but the lack of time-series, cross-
national data on firm activities necessitates tradeoffs. 
Another possible objection to this study is the possibility of correlation between the 
country-level indicators of institutional quality and the firm-level survey responses.  I have 
proposed in the theory section that institutional quality matters for aggregate investment 
patterns and for individual firm action.  Within countries, there is a great deal of variation in 
firm perceptions of institutional effectiveness and consistency.  When country averages of 
responses to the government effectiveness question are compared to the WGI measure, the 
correlation is .304210
6.5 State Institutions and Multinational Investment in Latin America 
.  While this correlation is significant, it is not deterministic.  That is, 
firm perceptions vary even in countries with well-regarded institutional frameworks.  More 
importantly, these perceptions are related to differences in firm profiles in significant ways.  
The analysis presented here demonstrates that firms with a more favorable perception of state 
institutions are more likely to export and innovate locally.  This occurs within countries that 
receive a high WGI score and those that do not. 
The statistical analysis presented above supports the idea that institutions in host 
countries have impacts on specific investment activities of multinational enterprises.  Firms 
decide on particular investment models based partly on considerations of institutional quality 
in host countries.  However, the process by which state institutions impact firm activities can 
only be inferred.  Case studies in individual countries present opportunities for more subtle 
                                                 
210This refers to the 2006-2009 surveys. The correlations of these averages with the CPIA and Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index are .261 and .295, respectively. 
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and contextually-rich analysis of the relationships between institutions and investment 
profiles.  This section of the chapter details the institutional context for foreign investment in 
three Latin American countries, in an effort to give more fine-grained analysis to the 
conclusions outlined above.  The cases illustrate in a more specific way the mechanisms by 
which institutional variation contributes to differing firm profiles. 
As it did in many other parts of the globe, FDI in Latin America boomed during the 
1990s and 2000s.  The inflow of investment was boosted by the wave of liberal reforms in 
Latin America, which dismantled the import-substituting models and eliminated restrictions 
on FDI and trade.  However, governments often neglected to examine the institutional 
foundations that would best allow states to take advantage of FDI inflows to encourage 
domestic development.  The analysis presented here suggests that variations in institutional 
structure and coherence had impacts on the activities of firms and thus the potential 
spillovers offered by foreign firms in transition economies. 
The case studies of Chile, Costa Rica, and Mexico serve as illustrations of the 
relationship between varying domestic institutions and investment profiles in developing 
countries.  I selected these three Latin American countries for a number of specific reasons.  
As all three countries displayed high degrees of penetration by multinational firms in the 
1990s, they represent likely cases for institutional leverage (or lack thereof) on investment 
profiles.  They are among the Latin American countries with the highest levels of FDI 
relative to their size.  I chose to concentrate only on Latin American countries because in 
doing so, potentially confounding cross-regional idiosyncrasies can be avoided.  In other 
words, while these three countries (and Brazil) are certainly different in size, wealth, and 
other characteristics, they share the common qualities of being Latin American countries 
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heavily influenced by foreign investment since the 1980s.  They are ‘most similar’ cases in 
this limited sense. 
The countries under consideration do differ on the dimensions outlined in the 
econometric analysis above. Unfortunately, Mexico did not participate in the 2002-2005 
surveys, so data on the R&D efforts of multinationals in that country are not available.  
However, we can compare the export propensity and intensity of multinational firms in the 
three countries (plus Brazil), using export data from Costa Rica’s 2005 survey211
                                                 
211Costa Rica did not participate in the 2006-2009 surveys.  However, the export questions were included in the 
earlier surveys. Variables for average export intensity and the number of exporting firms were constructed for 
Costa Rica from the earlier survey and included in the data used to produce figures 6.1 and 6.2. 
.  In the 
2006 surveys, 125 multinational firms responded in Mexico and 75 responded in Chile.  In 
2009, a survey was conducted in Brazil that realized responses from 68 multinationals.  
Including the data from the 2005 survey in Costa Rica, which had 30 multinational 
respondents, we can compare scores on the WGI governance measure with export propensity 
and intensity of firms.  Figures 6.1 and 6.2 relay this information as scatterplots.  A couple of 
important conclusions may be drawn from these figures.  First, the positive relationship 
between the WGI measure of government effectiveness and export propensity/intensity is 
clear.  Second, the four Latin American cases under consideration vary in their scores.  
Brazil’s governance score is the lowest of the four, and while many of the 68 interviewed 
firms export they do not export intensively compared to the other three cases.  Costa Rica is 
an interesting case, as its export incidence and intensity are high.  Mexico hews to the 
bivariate regression line in both cases, and Chile demonstrates the highest scores on the WGI 
indicator with somewhat lower than predicted export intensity.  These results are not 
unexpected.  Costa Rica has a small, open economy and has been increasingly used as an 
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export base for multinational firms.  Mexico and Brazil have large internal markets that 
tempt firms toward market-oriented strategies.  




Beyond these structural factors, however, can we connect the export profiles of 
multinational firms in these countries with institutional characteristics?  I contend that 
institutional characteristics have impacted the export and R&D proclivities of firms in these 
countries in different ways.  In the following section, I adopt an historical perspective to 
argue that institutions have had an impact on dominant firm profiles in these three countries.  
There are a number of advantages in comparative case studies as a method of analysis.  The 
case studies also allow investigation of causal mechanisms and country-level characteristics 
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comparison with the Brazilian investment promotion experience, outlined in previous 
chapters. 
Figure 6.2: Scatterplot of average export intensity of exporting multinational firms in developing 
countries, World Bank enterprise surveys 
 
The countries considered differ on the R&D intensity of resident multinationals, as 
well as export patterns.  Table 6.5 presents a comparison of the technological intensity of 
FDI flows in 2009 and the prominence of R&D efforts among foreign firms in each of the 
cases considered (plus Brazil), from 2003 to 2009.  These statistics, gathered from ECLAC, 
measure recent FDI flows by their sectoral composition.  The first indicator is formed by 
taking the ratio of incoming manufacturing FDI, divided into four divisions of declining 
technological intensity according to industry ISIC codes, to the share of a country’s GDP 
within a group of Latin American countries.  For example, Brazil in 2009 attracted 51.18 
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the Latin American countries sampled. Its GDP represented 47.20 percent of the same group.  
The ratio between the two is 1.084.  Higher values of this ratio therefore indicate a greater 
inflow of FDI in that category than the country’s GDP share would predict.  
Table 6.5 Technological intensity of FDI in comparative perspective 
FDI flows in Manufacturing by Technological Intensity, 2009 
Ratio of percentage of FDI received in each category to 
weight of GDP in group of countries surveyed. 
Higher values indicate disproportionate share of FDI in  
that category relative to GDP. 
Brazil Chile Costa 
Rica 
Mexico 
High 0.532 0.207 3.652 2.472 
Medium High 1.084 1.657 0.011 0.672 
Medium Low 1.260 .008 6.819 0.516 
Low 0.336 .016 - 2.560 
Destination of FDI R&D Projects, 2003-2009 
Ratio of percentage of R&D projects received in each country to 
weight of GDP in group of countries surveyed over a seven year period.  
Higher values indicate disproportionate share of R&D-intensive  
FDI relative to GDP. 
0.913 1.986 3.786 0.944 
Notes: Classification of manufacturing industries according to technological intensity according to principles of 
OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard. For ISIC codes for each category, see OECD (2009). 
Raw data gathered from ECLAC (2010), based on “fDi markets”, Financial Times. GDP data are from World 
Development Indicators. Author elaboration.  
 
Costa Rica demonstrates a significant share of high technological intensity FDI, while 
attracting no low technological intensity FDI in 2009.  Brazil’s share of high technological 
intensity FDI is not particularly substantial.  Mexico, meanwhile, has a pronounced 
bifurcation between high and low technological intensity in its FDI flows in 2009.  It is 
noteworthy that Mexico attracted more in both categories than its economic size would 
predict. 
The bottom half of table 6.5 gives perhaps a more complete picture of the 
technological intensity of recent FDI flows in these countries.  Rather than measuring FDI in 
one year, this indicator aggregates FDI shares over seven years, from 2003 to 2009.  The data 
used to construct this indicator divide FDI R&D projects by country.  Rather than using 
industry classification, the indicator simply relays whether the multinational is conducting 
R&D locally.  Whereas the first indicator measured the technological intensity of the 
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industry, the second measures announced R&D projects linked to FDI.  According to this 
aggregate indicator, Costa Rica displays a much higher incidence of local R&D activity than 
its GDP would predict.  Chile scores highly on this measure as well, whereas both Brazil and 
Mexico exhibit less local R&D than their economic size would predict (a score of 1 would be 
a perfect match between share of FDI R&D and share of overall GDP for the region). 
The divergence in FDI profiles seems evident.  The purpose of this case study 
comparison is to emphasize the ways in which institutional configurations have contributed 
to this divergence.  There are of course numerous economic, geographic, and other variables 
that influence firm decisions and overall investment profiles.  Institutional characteristics are 
not deterministic.  However, they can and often do influence the composition of FDI and the 
investment strategies of individual firms.  For each country, I first consider the evolution of 
FDI flows since the debt crisis, and in particular the dominant models of investment 
exhibited by firms in these countries.  I connect these profiles to factors such as geography 
and economic openness, but also to variations in the countries’ institutional structures for 
promoting FDI.  In each case, I analyze the institutional setting for investment promotion, 
paying special attention to the coherence and consistency of institutions.  Last, I integrate the 
individual cases with the institutionalist theoretic perspective. 
6.5.1 Chile: an evolving program for FDI 
In the mid-1980s, Chile began to loosen restrictions on foreign participation in 
mining operations in the country, which had been in place since the Allende period.  The 
Pinochet regime had found it useful to maintain control over copper and other mineral 
production in Chile, but embarked on a privatization program partly as a way to restructure 
the debts incurred during the economic crisis of the early 1980s.  The mining sector, which 
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had been the focus of so much foreign investment in the middle of the twentieth century, 
continued in the mid to late 1980s as the primary investment vehicle.  Investment outside 
mining was mostly drawn to other natural resources, such as forestry. 
The transition to democracy in 1990 prompted a surge in FDI.  Chilean FDI stock as a 
percentage of GDP increased from 48.1 percent in 1990 to 59.6 percent in 2008 (UNCTAD 
2009).  Most FDI in the early 1990s revolved around the processing of Chile’s significant 
natural resources for export.  Mining accounted for 58 percent of total FDI flows in the 
period from 1990 to 1995 (ECLAC 2000, 92).  The Aylwin administration (1990-1994) left 
many of the Pinochet privatization programs in place, as part of an effort to provide some 
continuity in a still fragile political environment.  Restrictions diminished on foreign 
participation in mining ventures with the state copper company, CODELCO.  The Chilean 
airline, LAN, was fully privatized in 1994.  A number of mining mega-projects were 
established in the north of the country by Australian, British, and American consortia.  These 
investments produced for export, but did little to break the tradition patterns of resource 
extraction that had defined Chilean FDI for a century. 
However, in the latter half of the 1990s new patterns of investment emerged.  As in 
other Latin American countries, the privatization of services such as telecommunications and 
energy brought a wave of new investment to Chile212
                                                 
212Unlike previous patterns of investment, which had been dominated by North America firms, the service FDI 
was primarily European in origin. Spain accounted for around a third of FDI inflows in the second half of the 
1990s (ECLAC 2000). 
.  In the latter part of the 1990s, the Frei 
administration began a concerted effort to permanently move Chile beyond its traditional 
profile of natural resource investment.  The transition to a more active, sustained, and 
discriminating investment promotion program gained momentum in 2000 and afterward, and 
has brought a number of nontraditional investments to Chile. 
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Before 2000, foreign firms had established operations in salmon farming operations, 
wineries, and fruit for export as the result of an initial attempt to diversify Chile’s export 
base.  Though some of these sectors exhibited more value-added characteristics than mining, 
they still belonged to the domain of natural resources.  Chilean administrations eventually 
realized that investment even in these industries would not necessarily move development 
forward, considering the limits of existing resources, already high multinational penetration, 
and the price volatility inherent in primary products.  Therefore, they committed state 
resources to attracting different forms of investment and moving existing investments 
towards R&D activity. 
The primary institutional vehicle for this effort was the Corporación de Fomento de 
la Producción, or CORFO.  This government agency had been Chile’s primary economic 
development agency since its inception in 1939, but its mission and character evolved over 
time.  During the Alessandri administration (1958-64), fragile coalition politics encouraged 
the administration to use CORFO as a means for distributing political patronage through 
investment concessions.  This continued during the Allende administration (1970-73), when 
CORFO was used as a state holding company for recently nationalized private firms (Nelson 
2007).  After the military coup, CORFO did not achieve technocratic independence until re-
democratization in 1990.  The military used CORFO as a venue for its own ends.  Schamis 
(1999) details how the military regime used CORFO to grant preferential loans to foreign 
companies during the privatization efforts, and in a particularly dubious business practice 
would use the assets of the firm being purchased as collateral for the purchase itself.   
After the democratic transition, CORFO’s mission changed yet again.  It was already 
apparent by 1990 that investment promotion would be a substantial part of CORFO’s 
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mandate.  But the Concertación was unable to create an efficient investment promotion 
agency due to the legacies of the authoritarian regime and the unfamiliarity with many 
investment promotion practices among the staff at CORFO.  As a result, during the 1990s 
CORFO employed a very general and non-discriminating approach to FDI.  Little effort was 
made to specifically target sectors, or to encourage activities among foreign firms that might 
assist Chile’s economic environment.  However, during this period CORFO reinvigorated 
meritocratic hiring practices and moved away from its previous role as an investment bank to 
more of an advisory body and important source of information for potential investors.  
Although service privatization brought in a good deal of new investment, there was not much 
in the way of technology-intensive investment during the 1990s. 
This changed in 2000.  The incoming Lagos administration strengthened the High 
Technology Investment Program within CORFO, and moved the organization to a tighter 
focus on technology-intensive investments.  The organization also adopted a more active 
approach to investment promotion, and began to undertake studies designed to pinpoint 
Chile’s comparative advantages in attracting this kind of investment.  The high technology 
program within CORFO became well-funded venue for active FDI promotion.  After 2000, a 
number of multinational companies in the IT sector established technical support/call centers 
in Chile, and a few established software development subsidiaries213
                                                 
213These companies included Banco Santander, BBva Bank, and Citigroup (Nelson 2007). 
.  Call centers and shared 
services were forms of investment that CORFO had specifically targeted as uniquely well-
suited to Chile’s economic characteristics.  CORFO also established a branch office in 
Silicon Valley, California (Nelson 2007).  The focus on high-tech investments continued into 




established a medium term strategy to promote innovation among foreign firms in Chile and 
in partnership with domestic firms.  The budget for the High Technology Investment 
Program doubled that year, partly funded by a tax on the mining industry214
CORFO is now more closely networked with firms and consistent in its investment 
promotion activities.  Whereas during the politically fragile environment of the 1960s and 
through the military regime the agency had been manipulated by those in power, it has since 
1990 become more independent and effective.  This transformation is especially evident after 
2000.  There is ample evidence that the strengthening of CORFO has had an impact on the 
quality of foreign investment.  Nelson (2009, 150) notes that by 2005 CORFO had managed 
to attract at least twenty technology-intensive investments totaling just under US$100 million 
and employing approximately 2,180 people.  Though these investments do not rival the size 
of Intel in Costa Rica, for example, they do represent a substantial increase.  By 2009, 
CORFO had shifted away from the call center model, especially for the Santiago region, and 
had begun exploring options for attracting biotech companies in the north and south
. 
215
Paola Perez-Aleman, in her article on state-firm relations in Chile, argues that state 
institutions have been important in facilitating learning and improving the performance of 
domestic firms (2000).  CORFO was an important part of the governmental mechanism for 
sparking the learning process among Chilean firms, enabling them to compete in the 
international marketplace in the 1990s.  While the international investment division of 
CORFO did not develop a strong institutional coherence until after 2000, it did have a similar 
effect on investment profiles in Chile.  The High Technology Investment Program 
represented an evolving effort by the Chilean state to attract investment outside the normal 
. 
                                                 
214Phone interview, Mario Castillo, Head of Investment and Development Division, CORFO, February 2010. 
 
215Phone interview, Mario Castillo, Head of Investment and Development Division, CORFO, February 2010. 
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pattern of FDI in Latin America.  Nelson (2007, 2009) argues that CORFO’s objectives in 
the early stages after democratization were to recruit vague “high technology” investments.  
However, the agency was able to refocus and attract a number of call centers and software 
development plants to Chile after 2000.  It is unlikely that these investments would have 
happened in the absence of CORFO’s efforts. 
Chile’s experience upholds the idea that state institutions can have a substantial 
impact on investment profiles of firms operating in developing countries.  It is especially 
noteworthy that Chile was able to attract the call centers and software development centers 
only after CORFO had strengthened the High Technology Investment Program.  Chile 
eventually endowed a strong, well-funded, and insulated agency with the power to condition 
investment within the country.  CORFO established a consistent set of incentives for 
nontraditional FDI, and provided a central venue for firm-state interaction216
6.5.2 Costa Rica: agile adaptation? 
.  Between 1990 
and 2000, the agency was constrained by many of the legacies of the authoritarian past, when 
it had been manipulated by the military regime.  While it engaged in investment promotion, it 
did not display a great deal of consistency or active policy in the early years after the 
democratic transition.  High-tech investments were targeted, but only in a vague fashion.  
CORFO did eventually, however, move toward greater institutional efficacy. 
Costa Rica, like most other Latin American countries, was hit hard by the debt crisis 
of the early 1980s.  Partly in response to the crisis, and partly in response to pressure from 
the US Agency for International Development (USAID), Costa Rica began a process of 
                                                 
216It is noteworthy that, unlike in other Latin American countries, very few of the special incentives established 
for FDI were tax-based.  Instead, CORFO concentrated on offering training incentives for prospective 




liberalization and diversification of its economy217.  Multinational corporations, particularly 
those from the US, played a prominent role in this transformation.  Costa Rica’s initial 
strategy was to concentrate on the textile industry, but this was deemphasized when it 
became apparent that the country could not keep up with low wage competitors already 
included within the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) framework (Spar 1998)218
As part of its effort to transform its economy, Costa Rica established a number of 
Export Processing Zones.  These zones allowed multinational companies to import all of 
their inputs tax free and avoid paying income tax for eight years, with reduced tax for four 
years thereafter.  The EPZs also enjoyed generous subsidies from the government, sometimes 
equal to 10 percent of exported value (Rodríguez-Clare 2001).  Though this initiative was 
designed to help domestic companies become internationally competitive, it quickly attracted 
.  The country 
shifted from apparel to electronics, while maintaining an emphasis on liberalization and 
foreign participation.  A number of factors worked in Costa Rica’s favor in this initiative: the 
country already enjoyed high literacy rates and a relatively low-wage, well educated 
workforce.  For these and other reasons, Costa Rica began to attract the attention of a number 
of technology-intensive multinationals in the 1990s.  From 1990 to 2000, FDI in Costa Rica 
represented 16.6 percent of gross fixed capital formation (yearly average), compared to 14.7 
percent as a regional average for Latin America and the Caribbean.  In 2006, 2007, and 2008, 
that figure stood at 32, 33, and 28 percent compared to 15, 15, and 17 for the region 
respectively (UNCTAD 2009). 
                                                 
217See Clark (1997, 1995) for a discussion of the geopolitical and transnational alliances which led to heavy 
USAID involvement in Costa Rica in the 1980s, and the economy’s subsequent transformation. 
 
218Costa Rica was subsequently disadvantaged in relation to Mexico by the terms of the NAFTA agreement.  
However, the passage of the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act in the US in 2000 and CAFTA in 2005 
moved countries in the region back into “NAFTA parity”, with some exceptions (Bair and Dussel Peters 2006). 
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the attention of multinationals.  A number of firms established assembly operations in the 
zones, including DSC, Motorola, Connair, and Baxter Healthcare.  But the largest investment 
by far occurred in 1996, when Intel announced it would invest somewhere between $300 and 
$500 million in a manufacturing facility in the country.  By 1999 and with the plant 
established, Intel represented more than 40 percent of all of Costa Rica’s exports (Rodríguez-
Clare 2001).  Intel suppliers followed the company to Costa Rica, as did a number of 
international logistics and transportation companies.  Evidence suggests that the Intel 
investment served as a catalyst for subsequent IT investments, serving as a ‘stamp of 
approval’ for other firms (Nelson 2009).  Costa Rica has been more successful than other 
countries in Latin America in attracting export and technology intensive investments219
Before the debt crisis, Costa Rica operated an investment and export promotion body 
known as CENPRO (Centro de Promoción de Exportaciones e Inversiones).  However, this 
organization was widely viewed as a failure by 1981.  CENPRO was eventually replaced by 
a number of more responsive organizations.  Among these was the highly influential 
Coalición Costariccense de Iniciativas para el Desarrollo, or CINDE.  Intel and a number of 
other firms would very likely not have considered investing in Costa Rica had it not been for 
the efforts of CINDE.  The group was founded in 1982 by a dozen prominent businesspeople.  
While the organization has remained a private, non-profit organization, it has worked very 
.  
What role, then, have domestic institutions played in this process? 
                                                 
219Some important questions have been asked about the contributions these firms are making to the country’s 
economy.  The substantial concessions within the EPZs have raised politically sensitive concerns about the 
firms’ overall trade balances and tax contributions (or lack thereof).  Cordero and Paus (2010) have claimed that 
the backward and forward spillovers of these large IT firms are small, and that they tend to function as islands 
without substantial connections to the local economy.  The authors note that few of these firms use local 
suppliers, and that the local firms used in the value chains tend to be concentrated in packaging and shipping.  
Mosley (2008) notes the impact of solidarismo in Costa Rica, whereby traditional labor unions are supplanted 
by company-organized worker groups.  She notes that this can make the enforcement of core labor standards 




closely with the Costa Rican government to promote development and investment.  Despite 
its private origin, it is regarded as Costa Rica’s main investment promotion agency.  During 
the 1980s, the agency received a great deal of funding from USAID, and engaged in a 
number of programs designed to support Costa Rican firms and attract investment.  When 
USAID funding was reduced in the 1990s, the agency narrowed its focus to FDI attraction220
CINDE played a central role in the recruitment of Intel in the 1990s, managing to 
attract the enormous investment even though Costa Rica was initially not on the shortlist of 
countries considered
.  
By 2000, CINDE was almost completely focused on attracting technology-intensive FDI. 
221
                                                 
220Telephone interview, Angela Galva, CINDE Director of Legal Affairs, February 2010. 
.  While Intel was not the only example of successful investment 
attraction for CINDE, the qualities displayed by CINDE during that period reveal much 
about the impact institutions can have on investment patterns.  CINDE targeted Intel directly, 
and displayed a high degree of institutional coherence during the negotiating process.  
CINDE representatives worked in direct consultation with then-president Figueres to 
coordinate the negotiations, and responded quickly to Intel’s requests for information.  
Nelson (2009) and Spar (1998) note that CINDE displayed a high degree of consistency as 
well.  When the subject of special deals and incentives surfaced, CINDE communicated that 
the incentives offered to Intel must also be available to any potentially interested firm.  
Rather than dissuade Intel, this reluctance to offer special deals actually increased the 
attractiveness of the country, as it indicated adherence to the rule of law and the absence of 
 
221Details of the negotiating process between CINDE and Intel are beyond the scope of this chapter.  See 




corruption.  The other countries under consideration did not display similar attention to the 
company’s needs222
CINDE was not the only Costa Rican institution involved in the negotiations with 
Intel. Organizations such as PROCOMER (the trade promotion agency) and the foreign trade 
ministry were also involved in the process, and have been influential in subsequent efforts to 
attract FDI.  However, what is significant about the Costa Rican case is the unified and 
streamlined approach to investment promotion.  This is undoubtedly made easier in a country 
of Costa Rica’s size, but the coordination among various bodies is notable nonetheless.  As a 
non-governmental organization tied to private interests, CINDE was insulated from political 
pressures.  At the same time, it was deeply integrated with the governmental effort to attract 
IT investment.  This characteristic of being ‘with’ the state but not ‘of’ the state seems to 
have worked in Costa Rica’s favor. 
.   
Both the center-left PLN and the center-right PUSC have, when in power, pursued 
largely liberal reforms since 1982223
                                                 
222Nelson (2009, 67) notes the lack of a proactive, systematic approach in the Brazilian investment promotion 
framework during the Intel negotiations. 
.  Even with the general liberal reform efforts of 
successive governments, the Costa Rican state remains an active partner in conditioning FDI.  
It has devoted significant resources to investment attraction through strengthening the 
institutions involved in investment promotion.  Governments from the right and left have 
continued to support a coordinated and responsive effort to attract technology-intensive 
investments to Costa Rica.  The establishment of EPZs attracted a number of export-oriented 
multinationals, and these zones are generally regarded to be well-functioning (Rodríguez-
 
223Wilson (1999) notes that the leftist PLN was able to implement these policies and still succeed at the ballot 
box by employing a number of strategies, including obfuscation, compensation, and providing attractive 
variations on liberal reform. 
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Clare 2001). Rather than adopting an indiscriminate, passive policy for FDI, Costa Rica 
adopted a model that involved targeted, well-funded, and consistent investment promotion.  
The state supported agile institutions, which not only served as important information points 
for foreign investors but also acted as de facto government liaisons.  These organizations 
moved Costa Rica’s entire investment profile into new sectors.  State and parastate 
institutions were instrumental in making the shift from textile investment to IT investment in 
the 1990s. 
In Costa Rica’s case, it seems probable that the qualities of domestic institutions were 
favorable to exporting and innovative activity.  Most of the IT sector firms investing in Costa 
Rica since 1995 have exhibited both exporting and local R&D.  However, there are those 
who argue that Costa Rica has lost an opportunity to promote innovative linkages with local 
firms, and that many of the high tech multinationals operating in country do little besides 
assembly.  Paus (2005) and Cordero and Paus (2010) argue that most of the high-tech FDI in 
Costa Rica displays this characteristic, though they acknowledge that assembly and testing of 
semiconductors and microchips is quite involved.  The authors fault CINDE and the Costa 
Rican government for not developing local supplier firms that could adequately meet Intel’s 
needs.  However, the authors do note that with the establishment of institutions like Costa 
Rica Provee (CRP), which attempts to match multinationals with domestic suppliers, the 
country has the potential to create more spillovers in the local economy.  Indeed, CINDE is 
now concentrating many of its efforts on incentivizing backward and forward linkages 
between multinationals and domestic firms. 
When drawing lessons from Costa Rica’s experience with FDI promotion, it is 
important to acknowledge some key differences from the other countries in the region.  It is 
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true that Costa Rica is a small, relatively open economy, and that the country benefited from 
its proximity to the United States.  Costa Rica’s small size may have allowed a more 
coherent and cohesive development policy to emerge.  However, there are important 
qualitative differences in the strategies and characteristics of Costa Rican institutions.  These 
differences seem to have impacted the type of FDI coming into Costa Rica, even controlling 
for advantageous structural factors.  While other countries in the region are still dominated 
by textile manufacturing and have fallen to different degrees into a kind of low value-added 
trap, Costa Rica has managed to create a different investment profile.  This is partly due to 
institutional variation. 
6.5.3 Mexico: manufacturing for export 
Mexico engaged in a fast-paced process of liberalization beginning in the late 1980s, 
and especially under the Salinas administration from 1988 to 1994.  In many respects, 
Mexico’s experience with FDI is unique, owing to the country’s proximity to the region’s 
largest source of investment and progressively deeper economic integration with the large 
American market.  During the 1990s, Mexico eliminated many of the restrictions on foreign 
capital that had been in place since 1973.  As in other Latin American countries, the Mexican 
state sold off many of the largest state owned enterprises in the 1990s, particularly in 
services.  There are still a number of natural resource industries under partial control of the 
state, but there are relatively few restrictions on the operations of multinationals in Mexico in 
most sectors.   
During the 1990s, Mexico continuously modified its Foreign Investment Law (FIL) to 
reduce the barriers for FDI in the country, which had been substantial prior to the debt crisis.  
In 1993, changes to the law reduced the number of industries in which foreign investment 
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was prohibited, and established new limits for foreign participation in other sectors.  In 
addition, the revisions in 1993 and afterward allowed the establishment of “export models”, 
through which individual firms could import higher levels of inputs from abroad224.  In 1999, 
another revision of the law allowed full foreign participation in the financial sector (Pacheco-
Lopéz 2005).  These changes, along with the passage of NAFTA, contributed to a dramatic 
increase in FDI in the 1990s.  Inward FDI stock accounted for 8.6 percent of GDP in 1990, 
but increased to 16.7 percent in 2000 and 27.1 percent in 2008225
The Comisión Nacional de Inversiones Extranjeras (CNIE) was the most prominent 
agency and driving force behind investment incentives, which established duty exemptions 
for manufacturing firms that produced for export (ECLAC 1999).  American firms 
established numerous manufacturing plants in what became known as the maquila program, 
particularly in apparel and consumer electronics
.  Many of these 
investments were export-intensive.  Exports increased 173 percent from $60.8 billion in 1994 
to $166.5 billion in 2000 (Bair and Dussel Peters 2006), and it is certain that a large majority 
of the increase in exports was linked to inward FDI. 
226
                                                 
224In the automotive sector, for example, export models were allowed to import up to 70 percent of their inputs, 
while models for the domestic market were restricted to 40 percent (Mortimore 2000). 
.  The passage of NAFTA further 
increased the incentives for multinational firms to locate production sites in Mexico.  These 
investments, which increased significantly in the latter half of the 1990s, boosted Mexico’s 
 
225Based on data from UNCTAD’s 2009 FDI country profile for Mexico. 
 
226There is of course a long standing debate about the benefits of maquila investment, with opponents asserting 
that the factories exploit low wage advantages, consist of low value-added assembly operations of imported 
components, and suppress worker organization.  Bair and Gereffi (2001) point out the tremendous variety 
among maquiladoras, and argue that some have evolved into more tightly integrated and complex production 




export performance considerably.  Multinationals are dominant in most of the major growth 
areas of the Mexican economy, and devote considerable energies to export. 
There can be no doubt that FDI has improved export performance in Mexico.  
Morevoer, domestic institutions such as CNIE have since at least the mid-1980s made 
attracting export-oriented investment a priority.  Export performance among incoming 
multinationals has remained strong, even overcoming periodic overvaluations of the Mexican 
peso.  Given the exporting successes of multinationals, it is broadly accurate to claim that 
state institutions have been successful in attracting higher-quality FDI.  However, there are a 
number of dimensions to export-oriented FDI in Mexico that suggest the state has not been as 
successful at absorbing the benefits of the foreign investment boom as it might first appear.   
First, as Paus and Gallagher (2008) and Pacheco-Lopéz (2005) have argued, many of 
the export-oriented multinationals in Mexico also import intensively.  Second, there seems to 
be a pronounced disconnect between the firms operating under the maquila framework 
(mostly American in origin) and indigenous Mexican industry (Dussel Peters 2010).  
Spillovers from multinational firms to domestic firms have not been as extensive as 
originally hoped, as many of the multinationals operate in relative isolation.  This has also 
contributed to a regional polarization in Mexico, with multinationals concentrated in the 
north having little connection to southern Mexico, where domestic firms are more active 
(Dussel Peters 2000).  Third, Pacheco-Lopéz (2005) has noted the constraints NAFTA has 
placed on the ability of the Mexican government to implement sectorally-discriminating 
industrial policies.  These aspects of FDI in Mexico suggest the absence of a truly 




It is of course difficult to disentangle the effects of state institutions on firm export 
profiles from the effects of NAFTA and the structural and geographic characteristics of the 
North American market.  However, it seems likely that firm export intensity is based more on 
the latter than the former.  Mexico did not display a great deal of institutional consistency 
with relation to FDI.  While the state did incentivize export activity among multinationals, 
through NAFTA and other means, it did not put in place an institutional structure that 
integrated FDI into development policy.  When we consider the patterns of innovative 
activity among multinationals, this pattern becomes more apparent.  While tax concessions 
and other initiatives have attracted a great deal of export-oriented FDI, comparatively few 
firms have established R&D intensive operations in Mexico. 
Mexico identified IT as an important part of its development strategy in the 1980s.  
Still operating under import substitution principles leftover from the 1970s, the country 
attempted to develop an indigenous computer industry with the Programma de Computadores 
(PC), which allowed foreign firms to own no more than 49 percent of computer producers 
operating in country.  Nevertheless, the policy succeeded in attracting a number of market-
hungry multinationals, including IBM, HP, Digital, NCR, Tandem, and others.  By 1990, 
however, the PC program was dismantled as Mexico pushed its rapid liberalization program.  
The Salinas administration liberalized FDI flows in the run-up to NAFTA, and eliminated PC 
special incentives as part of a market-oriented approach to investment.  Zedillo once 
attempted to selectively incentivize high tech FDI, but funds were never allocated to this 
inititative. 
The country had initial success in attracting IT investment to the Guadalajara region, 
which was to become the Mexican Silicon Valley.  From 1994 to 1999, exports from the 
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electronics sector in Mexico rose from US$46 billion to US$1.5 billion.  Almost all of these 
exports by 1999 originated from multinational firms.  Mexico’s share of world IT exports 
increased from 0.8 percent in 1985 to 3 percent in 2000 (Dussel Peters 2003).  Many of the 
multinationals that invested during this time brought suppliers with them, and most domestic 
IT firms were either put out of business or absorbed by these new arrivals.  It seemed that 
Jalisco would take advantage of its geographic advantages and become a FDI-intensive, 
export-oriented high tech cluster for Mexico. 
By 2005, however, most multinationals had left the area and Mexico had declined 
precipitously as a destination for high tech FDI.  The reasons for this exodus are well known.  
The bursting of the IT bubble in 2001 certainly had an impact, as many firms scaled back 
both in the US and abroad.  Also influential was China’s accession to the WTO.  Many of the 
IT firms that left Guadalajara relocated to China (Gallagher and Zarsky 2007).  New 
investment dropped off, and massive layoffs throughout the industry resulted in a much 
reduced IT profile.  Although a few large foreign firms remain in Guadalajara at present, they 
conduct relatively little domestic R&D227
Unlike in Costa Rica, Mexico experienced few spillovers as a result of FDI flows.  
Rivera Vargas (2002) found that only 8 of 60 firms in the electronics industry in Guadalajara 
had established partnerships with local universities, and those that did were not interested in 
developing new products but refining assembly operations.  Most of the firms still in 
.  Gallagher and Zarsky (2007, 144) characterize the 
industry in the region as a “foreign enclave dependent on imported inputs”. 
                                                 
227Romo Murillo (2002) found little evidence of technology spillovers from FDI, and argues that while foreign 
FDI has generated modern capabilities and new investments, it has also displaced a large number of Mexican 
firms.  Gallagher and Zarsky (2007) note that specific Mexican policies contribute to the lack of innovative 
spillovers.  The PITEX program, for example, grants duty-free status to imports if 65 percent of the final 
product is exported.  This in effect encourages firms to use imported inputs rather than partner with domestic 
firms or locate innovative activity in Mexico. 
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Guadalajara employ workers with comparatively low education and skill levels, and 
concentrate on assembly operations.  Most innovation is done in the US and imported as 
inputs.  Interestingly, one of the few innovation success stories, the Centro de Technologia de 
Semicontuctores (CTS) was formed as a result of bargaining between the Mexican state and 
IBM in the 1980s, when IBM conceded to establishing a training center in exchange for full 
control over its operations in country (Gallagher and Zarsky 2007). 
There are a host of reasons why multinationals in the IT industry left Mexico and why 
the industry as a whole did not sustain the momentum of the late 1990s.  Yet it is also 
important to point out institutional inadequacies during this period.  After all, Mexico 
enjoyed significant geographic advantages that could conceivably have overcome China’s 
labor price advantages.  While domestic institutions may not have been deterministic, they 
did matter.  There was no centralized investment promotion agency that might have 
coordinated the effort to coax innovative activity from the multinationals.  The Camara 
Nacional de la Industria, Electronica, de Telecomunicaciones e Informatica (CANIETI), or 
the national chamber of commerce for the IT industry, could have filled this role.  The state 
of Jalisco also established a body to link domestic suppliers with multinationals and 
encourage innovation, CADELEC (Cadena Productiva de la Electronica).  However, neither 
of these organizations was especially effective.  Both suffered from coordination problems 
and a lack of funding. 
In more general terms, institutions did not mediate or intervene in investments, 
preferring instead to allow both domestic firms and multinationals alike to simply react to the 
pressures of NAFTA.  There were precious few initiatives to support innovation, and those 
that did exist were channeled through weak and ineffective institutions.  As in Brazil, 
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strategic industrial policy was ignored, especially in the late 1990s.  Successive governments 
did not place emphasis on institutional linkages to firms, and adopted largely passive 
approaches to FDI228
There are some signs that Mexico is changing its approach to FDI.  The Fox 
administration shifted emphasis away from assembly operations and towards higher value-
added activities.  The Calderón administration has revived the prospects of a unified 
investment promotion framework with the establishment of ProMexico by presidential decree 
in 2007.  This organization was conceived as a centralized body for the promotion of FDI, 
and its technical committee reports directly to the president
.  Gallagher and Zarsky (2007) claim that this approach stems from 
what they call a “maquila mindset” among Mexican policymakers: that FDI should be 
viewed as an end rather than a means to an end.  Without active and discriminating policy, 
FDI took on some of the more negative characteristics associated with the maquila model: 
low-wage, low-tax, low-innovation and low value-added products for export. 
229
Despite the economic crisis of 1994-1996, the growth in manufacturing exports has 
continued to serve as a validation of sorts for the FDI promotion strategies of successive 
Mexican administrations, both before and after democratization.  However, there are reasons 
.  ProMexico is part of the 
government’s National Development Plan for 2007-2012.  While this plan continues the 
government’s emphasis on FDI, it contains little in the way of sector specific industrial 
policy.  As Dussel Peters (2010, 74) notes, the NDP “views macroeconomic stabilization as 
the sole basis for competitiveness, while ignoring trade, industrial, regional and sectoral 
policies”.   
                                                 
228Dedrick et al. (2001) argue that the collapse of the IT sector was caused primarily by this absence of a 
coherent industrial policy.  State institutions did not cooperate to interact with firms in ways that might bring 
about local innovation, and were generally perceived as weak and ineffectual. 
 
229Telephone Interview, Maria Trespalacios, Business Representative – ProMexico, March 2010. 
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to doubt the upgrading potential of many of these investments. Thus Mexico presents a 
mixed picture for the institutional analysis presented in this chapter.  While state institutions 
did incentivize high tech investment in Guadalajara, Mexico was not able to keep many of 
these investments.  The integration of foreign firms into local production networks is often 
spotty.  Mexico has thus far not been able to consistently extract benefits from its 
international production network other than the substantial export contributions.  The lack of 
a coordinated institutional framework has played a part in this turn of events. 
6.5.4 Synthesizing the cases 
The countries presented in the three case studies varied considerably in the strategies 
and coherence of institutions charged with managing FDI.  There are, however, some 
common threads that can be identified.  On the heels of the debt crisis, all of the states 
initially pursued a largely general, indirect approach to attracting FDI (mostly through 
privatization programs).  However, some countries also looked for ways to attract FDI 
beyond privatization programs.  During the period of liberalization, some countries moved 
towards active investment promotion strategies, and began differentiating between more and 
less desirable and/or attainable forms of FDI.  Those countries that did differentiate were also 
the ones who put in place stronger institutional frameworks for FDI promotion.  The point at 
which these transformations occurred varied from state to state.  In Chile and Costa Rica, 
investment promotion agencies have been established which demonstrate autonomy from 
political pressures, and consistently deliver R&D-intensive investment.  This happened 
earliest in Costa Rica, but by 2000 Chile had adopted a similar approach.  In Mexico, R&D-
intensive investment was more rare.  The strategies adopted by these governments and the 
institutions employed had direct impacts on the composition of incoming FDI. 
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The analysis presented in the individual case studies suggests that state institutions do 
have an impact on firm profiles.  In some of the cases presented here, active and coherent 
institutions were able to impact the form of incoming investment.  In Chile, the gradual 
transformation of CORFO from a rent-seeking venue to an independent and coherent 
investment promotion agency has generated substantial nontraditional investment in Chile, 
and bolstered the IT industry there.  This transition did not really get underway until after 
2000, yet it seems already to have had an impact.  In Costa Rica, it is difficult to imagine the 
Intel investment (and others) without a unified approach to investment promotion and well-
coordinated institutions.  In Mexico, the export intensity of investments there may be more 
the result of structural factors than the efforts of state institutions, although the two were 
reinforcing.  The lack of innovative effort on the part of foreign firms and the collapse of the 
IT industry may have been aided by outside factors, but there was little institutional 
coherence in evidence which might have slowed or reversed this process.  In all three cases, 
the divergence in institutional configurations can be connected to the divergence in FDI 
profiles. 
What, then, are the qualities of institutions that endow states with the leverage to 
condition FDI?  Consistent with the econometric analysis presented in the first half of this 
chapter and with earlier chapters, there are some characteristics that stand out.  First, 
institutions must be coordinated and insulated from rent-seeking behavior.  This was 
accomplished in Costa Rica, where CINDE and other organizations were established as 
autonomous organizations.  In Chile, CORFO gradually made the transition from a venue for 
rent-seeking to a meritocratically-staffed, independent organization.  In Mexico, the 
introduction of electoral competition for the PRI may have diminished opportunities for rent-
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seeking, though the lack of a central investment promotion agency or coordinated investment 
policy has not been helpful.  Secondly, a consistent approach to FDI promotion seems to 
result in firm and overall investment profiles with more local innovative activity and outward 
orientation.  Firms are interested in reducing uncertainty and risk.  Risk-mitigating 
institutions were established early on in Costa Rica.  In Chile and Mexico, political 
transitions have only recently introduced a greater degree of institutional stability and 
consistency.  Third, state institutions must be networked with firms.  The state must give 
institutions the power (through funding and other measures) to offer incentives and bargain 
effectively with firms.  If institutions demonstrate these qualities, it is much more likely that 
governments will realize their goals to condition the composition of overall FDI and the 
behavior of individual firms. 
6.6 Conclusions: FDI Profiles and Institutions 
As a corollary of the neoclassical paradigm dominant during the 1980s, assessment of 
state institutions and FDI until recently concerned the barriers that state intervention posed to 
the effective operation of firms.  Consistent with the prevailing wisdom that industrial policy 
represented a threat to the efficient allocation of resources, some countries in Latin America 
abandoned tentative attempts to route FDI to sectors of the economy where if might be most 
beneficial.  Thus the reduction of barriers to FDI was often wholesale – because the state 
would, in this view, divert resources away from productive developmental pathways, the 
most appropriate action was to eliminate barriers to all types of FDI and allow multinationals 
to operate unimpeded.  Positive spillovers for local firms would occur naturally, as firms 
entrenched their production networks in the host economy.  Industrial upgrading would 
surface as states lowered barriers to investment. 
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The historical record in Latin America does not corroborate this prediction.  States 
that have simply eliminated barriers to FDI have not demonstrated FDI profiles with 
extensive spillovers, such as exporting and innovation.  Instead, state institutions have 
conditioned FDI flows in more complex ways.  In the past quarter of a century, the impulse 
to trim the excesses from the Latin American public sector has in many instances been turned 
into an indiscriminate and unsubtle reduction in state capacity.  In some contexts, this has 
had deleterious effects on the potential for effective economic governance.  The desire to 
create a lean, effective state apparatus has sometimes instead resulted in an eviscerated and 
altogether ineffective set of institutions.  As this analysis argues, some level of institutional 
coherence is beneficial for taking full advantage of the possibilities offered by global 
economic integration.  Firms do not solely react to economic developments, but also consider 
the political context for investment projects.  For multinationals, institutions are the focal 
points for interaction with host country governments.  As such, the characteristics of these 
institutions can have a substantial impact on firm decision-making. 
This analysis provides strong support for comparative institutionalist notions about 
the importance of the state in explaining investment outcomes.  State institutions should not 
be ‘black-boxed’ or dismissed as unimportant.  While contending societal groups are 
important, the form and function of the state is also consequential for investment patterns.  
Both the cross-national investigation of firm survey responses and the case studies of three 
Latin American countries corroborate this point.  Firms are more likely to commit resources 
to innovation in host countries and engage in export activity when institutions in those 
countries are perceived to be well functioning, consistent, and credible, by the firms 
themselves or by outside observers.
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6.7 Appendix: Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics, Country-level Analysis, 2002-2005 firm surveys 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Percentage of Firms with R&D  
spending in country sample 
66 22.654 14.190 3.703 58.823 
Average R&D intensity of 
innovative firms in country 
sample (percentage of sales) 
59 5.039 7.558 0.045 39.453 
Government Effectiveness (WGI) 103 -0.179 0.638 -1.178 1.245 
Log GDP per capita 80 7.269 1.148 4.861 9.533 
Log Population 80 16.572 1.534 13.544 20.976 
GDP growth 80 5.019 2.606 -.175 13.9 
Percentage of manufacturing 
firms 
104 60.628 29.373 10.909 100 
Percentage of service firms 104 31.170 28.106 0 83.636 
Age of democracy (years) 66 10.227 11.619 0 56 
Conflict (dummy) 80 0.15 0.359 0 1 
Trade [(IMP+EXP)/ 
GDP]*100 
74 85.790 36.909 26.643 196.491 
Natural resources 
(percent of merchandise exports) 
76 18.552 21.703 0.021 97.28 
 
Descriptive Statistics, Country-level Analysis, 2006-2009 firm surveys
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Percentage of Exporting Firms in 
country sample  
90 40.338 23.165 0 100 
Average export intensity of 
exporting firms in country sample 
(percentage of sales) 
90 21.264 14.791 0 63.370 
Government Effectiveness (WGI) 90 -0.391 0.669 -1.803 1.162 
Log GDP per capita 89 7.031 1.242 4.508 9.438 
Log Population 90 15.843 1.505 11.606 19.202 
GDP growth 90 6.427 4.662 -5.762 34.5 
Age of democracy (years) 90 9.733 11.054 0 49 
Conflict (dummy) 90 .111 .316 0 1 
Trade [(IMP+EXP)/ 
GDP]*100 
73 96.330 48.286 25.502 360.682 
Natural resources 
(percent of merchandise exports) 
68 25.419 25.846 .251 94.649 
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Descriptive Statistics, Firm-level Analysis, 2006-2009 firm surveys 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Exports as a 
percentage of 
sales 





3076 2.362 .976 1 4 
Degree of foreign 
ownership (%) 
5368 80.756 27.494 10 100 
Size of firm 
(hundreds of 
employees) 
5835 2.431 9.494 0.01 378 
Manufacturing 
Sector Dummy 
2704     
Service Sector 
Dummy 
2160     
Agroindustry 
Dummy 
695     
Other Sector 
Dummy 
317     
 
Descriptive Statistics, Firm-level Analysis, 2002-2005 firm surveys 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
R&D spending as a 
percentage of sales 





4844 3.347 1.376 1 6 
Worker Education 
Level (percentage 
of employees with 
postsecondary 
schooling) 
4305 32.553 30.378 0 100 
Degree of foreign 
ownership (%) 
5771 74.899 27.821 10 100 
Size of firm 
(hundreds of 
employees) 
5821 3.817 9.316 0.01 195 
Manufacturing 
Sector Dummy 
4056     
Service Sector 
Dummy 
1473     
Agroindustry 
Sector Dummy 
153     
Construction Sector 
Dummy 
171     
Other Sector 
Dummy 








Foreign investment is potentially an important contributor to development.  
Multinational enterprises have access to tangible and intangible resources that domestic firms 
in developing countries often cannot attain.  Multinational firms are, by their nature, 
integrated into global production chains.  They often possess advantages in innovation, 
economies of scale and experience, and other potential resources.  For these reasons 
developing country governments have courted FDI in recent decades.  Yet all FDI is not 
created equal.  From a host country government’s perspective, some forms of FDI are more 
advantageous than others.  Firms are profit-making enterprises. They are not in the 
development business.  Yet developmental spillovers from investment sometimes occur, and 
they occur more often in specific contexts.  The objective of developmental states, then, is to 
tempt forms of FDI that exhibit these spillovers, and to increase the frequency of spillovers 
from firms already in country.  This dissertation analyzes the characteristics of state 
institutions which allow governments to extract these kinds of activities from firms.  I argue 
that the form and the function of the state matters for investment profiles. 
I argue that states adopt differing policy strategies for attracting investment, and that 
these strategies have impacts on the nature of investment.  States may adopt passive 
strategies, involving the removal of barriers to investment, or they may actively commit 
resources to attracting investment.  Investment strategy may be general or discriminating.  I 
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argue that active, discriminating investment policies have the greatest chance of attracting 
high quality investment.  I also argue that the characteristics of domestic institutions matter, 
not only as venues for interaction between states and firms during the initial bargaining 
period, but also as bodies which refract and condition policy to produce investment outcomes 
through time.  The elements I identify which increase institutional leverage on firm 
investment profiles are: consistency, coordination, and strong networking.  Some of these 
elements may be present in specific institutions, while others are not.  Their effect is additive, 
in that the absence of any decreases the institutional leverage a state may enjoy.  In Brazil’s 
case, I have noted where select institutions have displayed these characteristics, and where 
they have not.  I have also noted that while Brazilian governments have moved toward 
active, discriminating investment policy in recent years, the institutional framework for 
investment promotion remains disarticulated.  I argue that the relatively low innovation, low 
international insertion profiles of firms in Brazil are partly the result of policy and 
institutional characteristics. 
Brazilian institutions are typically not well-integrated with international production 
networks.  While connections between multinational firms and individual legislators may be 
close, official institutions do not often have close ties to multinational firms.  This reinforces 
personalistic implementation of policy, and does not help institutions understand what firms 
need and are willing to accept.  This is illustrated in the lack of connections between firms 
and universities in Brazil, and the evolving incentive structures contained in Brazilian 
industrial policy.  The Lula administration was not able to take advantage of public-private 
partnerships partly because a lack of state-firm networks, and struggled to find incentives that 
firms consider worthwhile.  Secondly, the lack of consistency undermines investment 
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promotion.  When institutions such as Investe Brasil come and go, or when institutions serve 
as focal points during one administration and decline in influence in the subsequent 
administration, leverage suffers.  The multiplicity of channels through which investment 
promotion policy passes generates opportunities for differing priorities from institution to 
institution.  The difficulties surrounding the implementation of industrial policies after 2004 
illustrate the coordination problems endemic to Brazil.  Multiple interviewees corroborated 
the lack of institutional coordination, and the problems generated by the absence of a unified 
investment promotion framework integrated with a strategic vision for the role of foreign 
investment in development. 
I have supported my arguments in a variety of ways.  I have examined the dominant 
characteristics of investment policy in different time periods, and inferred linkages between 
policy and investment outcomes.  I have also established characteristics of institutions which 
also influence investment outcomes, and separated their effects from those of other 
influences on investment profiles.  My conclusions were drawn from 78 original interviews 
with policymakers, NGO representatives, academics, business reporters, and especially 
government agency representatives and firm representatives.  I also employed large datasets 
from Brazilian government agencies, US agencies, and numerous nongovernmental 
organizations and think-tanks to convey trade balances, innovation indices, and international 
comparisons.  I conducted an econometric examination of the links between institutional 
quality and firm profiles, and expanded the qualitative analysis beyond Brazil to other Latin 
American countries.  I have also relied on secondary sources, governmental and 
nongovernmental reports, and third party evaluations.  The cumulative weight of all of these 
sources informs my conclusions and arguments. 
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In the automotive sector, the incentives established by Mercosul ensured that 
multinational automakers would expand their operations in the regional market.  The 
Cardoso government intervened to correct balance of payments problems and support 
assemblers, but neither Cardoso nor Lula put in place a broadly successful strategy to expand 
exports beyond Mercosul.  The auto parts industry, which underwent dramatic 
internationalization in the 1990s, exhibits trade balance problems as modular parts companies 
use high value-added imported inputs and rely on lower tier Brazilian suppliers for basic 
material inputs.  Local innovation is rare among multinational parts producers, and less rare 
among the flagship assemblers.  However, innovation is done mostly because of firm 
production strategies, and there is some evidence that the large multinational manufacturers 
are moving to global car production models, with unified and centralized R&D centers in 
developed countries.  Innovation incentives for the auto industry in Brazilian policy were 
almost nonexistent in the 1990s, though they reappeared during the Lula administration. 
Brazil’s IT industry is in transition.  The attraction of a number of R&D centers, 
along with the expansion in cell phone exports, is cause for optimism.  Brazil made some 
efforts to encourage software and hardware exports in the 1990s, but these efforts did not 
bear fruit.  The local innovative efforts of IT firms in Brazil are not yet substantial.  I have 
argued that the lack of applied research at Brazilian universities, or more generally the lack 
of connections between universities and firms, contributed to this.  I also argue that Brazilian 
incentives display a focus on tangible goods, neglecting needed incentives for intangible 
products and IT services.  Finally, IT promotion policies displayed a focus on developing 
indigenous software and exports, mostly among small and medium-sized firms.  While this 
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was perhaps a useful approach during the market reserve of the 1980s, it did not generate 
expected results after liberalization. 
I have also identified the policy and institutional determinants of the success stories in 
Brazilian investment promotion.  Institutions such as FINEP and the BNDES have 
established reputations among multinational firms as effective conduits for industrial policy.  
These institutions manage to operate relatively autonomously from domestic political 
interference, and have consistently returned results.  I have also noted the more focused, 
discriminating policies towards FDI put in place since 2004.  The Innovation Law and Lei do 
Bem, along with their industrial policy frameworks the PITCE and the PDP, have succeeded 
in generating increasing amounts of non-traditional FDI, along with their positive effects on 
domestic firms.  Though these policies and institutions have experienced difficulties in 
implementation, they represent departures from passive, indiscriminate approaches of the 
past. 
Finally, I have extended the analysis beyond Brazil, in order to demonstrate the broad 
applicability of my findings.  In the cross-national tests in chapter 6, I demonstrate that 
assessments of institutional quality do have associations with different firm profiles, 
independent of factors such as economy size or level of development.  Firms that evaluate 
domestic institutions as consistent and effective appear more likely, ceteris paribus, to 
commit resources to domestic R&D and/or export platforms.  This makes intuitive sense; 
innovation is often risky, and firms want guarantees that their investments will be treated in a 
predictable fashion.  When comparing Brazil with countries like Costa Rica and Chile, it 
becomes apparent that investment promotion strategies and institutions can have impacts, 
even considering differences in market size, education systems, and other factors. 
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The choice of Brazil as a case study for this dissertation is justified by the significant 
penetration of its economy by multinational corporations.  In both the sectors I consider, the 
1990s witnessed an influx of FDI.  This investment radically changed the models of 
production in each sector, and subjected the Brazilian economy to greater international 
influences.  Brazilian governments must now contend with thoroughly internationalized auto 
and IT industries.  In this context, institutions as the points of contact between the state and 
multinationals become even more important.  Brazil, as a large and complex country, 
presents ample variation.  The institutional analysis presented here considers institutional 
variation through time and in various locations within the sprawling Brazilian bureaucracy.  
There are pockets of efficiency, and there are institutional changes which have an impact on 
firm profiles.  Therefore, even though Brazil is a single ‘case’, it presents great diversity and 
opportunities for comparative analysis. 
I have concentrated on international insertion patterns among multinational firms and 
innovative activity because these are two areas where multinationals may make contributions 
toward development.  As such, these characteristics of FDI have been pursued by developing 
country governments, and have been used by international financial institutions as 
justification for investment openness.  The examination of the commercial balance and 
innovative activities of multinationals in Brazil relays tangible and quantifiable dimensions 
to ideas about positive spillovers from multinational production.  Access to cutting edge 
technology is one of the potential positive externalities of multinational investment.  Export-
oriented investment may lead countries to a diversified manufacturing base, and increase 
competitiveness in world markets.  I have argued, however, that these kinds of investment 
activities are not automatic. 
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I have advocated and adopted a firm-level approach to analysis of investment policy 
and state institutions.  While I have considered economy-wide investment patterns 
periodically throughout this dissertation, I argue that aggregate statistics on FDI stocks and 
flows do not allow us to thoroughly understand the interaction between states and firms.  For 
this reason, I have attempted whenever possible to examine specific firm investment profiles, 
while acknowledging data limitations.  This is accomplished through anectodal evidence of 
firm investment strategy, through interviews with firm representatives, and through the use of 
large-n firm level data.  The resulting analysis represents improvements over existing studies 
of FDI, as specific connections may be made between firm investment strategies and the 
characteristics of state institutions and policy. 
This dissertation contributes to two broad literatures.  The first concerns the 
determinants of FDI in developing countries.  Scholars of political economy have long been 
interested in how politics in host countries affects foreign investment patterns.  Recently, 
cross-national and region-specific work on the determinants of FDI has proliferated as new 
data have become available230
The other important literature concerns the role of the state in development.  This 
literature has a long history drawing from all areas of social science, but a number of 
comparative institutionalist works of consequence have surfaced in recent decades which 
.  Yet these works more often than not concentrate on flows 
and stocks of incoming FDI.  This study connects institutional characteristics in developing 
countries not only with amounts of FDI, but with specific kinds of investment.  FDI is quite 
diverse.  I argue here that the political determinants of innovation-intensive FDI and 
efficiency-seeking FDI are unique and deserve further investigation.   
                                                 
230On the political determinants of FDI, Jun and Singh (1996), Henisz (2000), Oneal (1994), Jensen (2003), and 
Li and Resnick (2003) are just a few examples.  For region-specific examinations, there are a number of recent 
works, including: Asiedu (2002), Montero (2008), Biglaiser and DeRouen (2006). 
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have been especially influential for this field (Amsden 1989, Wade 1990, Evans 1995, 
Gereffi and Wyman 1990).  This study shares their concern with the determinants of 
development and the role of state policies and institutions in this process.  However, I also 
argue that the expansion of foreign investment in the 1990s and the last decade creates a new 
context for institutionalist theories of development.  While not powerless, states do not have 
the same options for infant industry protection or promoting national champions in a post-
reform era.  State relationships with foreign firms and global production networks assume 
more importance.  In many respects, this analysis resurrects themes prominent in earlier 
literature on firm-state bargaining (Evans 1979, Bennett and Sharpe 1979, Moran 1974).  
Foreign firms were important in Latin America during the ISI period, but they are even more 
influential now.  Yet firm-state bargaining literature is relatively scarce today.  Institutionalist 
arguments must adapt to the greater internationalization of production evident since the 
1990s. 
The conclusions of this dissertation lend support to the argument that political 
institutions matter not only for the models of investment pursued by foreign firms in the 
developing world, but also for how firms change their investment models over time.  This is 
significant because foreign investment is a potential source of spillovers, and identifying the 
determinants of those spillovers is essential for academics and policymakers alike.  From an 
academic point of view, explaining divergent investment outcomes has long been the domain 
of economics.  However, most scholars recognize that political developments in host 
countries have significant impacts on firm decisions about investment.  I have attempted to 
explain these divergent outcomes by pointing to institutional configurations in Brazil and 
elsewhere, arguing that institutional leverage on investment models can be increased under 
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specific circumstances.  I combine institutional analysis with a consideration of policy 
changes, separating the two analytically but also arguing that they have an interactive effect 
on investment models. 
As I have acknowledged numerous times throughout this dissertation, it is difficult to 
separate the effects of institutions and policies from those of other factors, such as 
international economic conditions or internal firm strategy.  All of these factors are acting on 
firms at all times, and all may be powerful determinants of investment models.  Moreover, 
they may be working in opposite directions.  Strong direct export incentives, channeled 
through efficient institutions in a stable international economic climate may not generate 
significant exports in the face of an overvalued currency.  Yet the recognition that 
institutional coordination, for example, is one of the factors that can impact firm investment 
models is important from a theoretical standpoint.  The variation in institutional 
characteristics may help to explain why firms do not respond to favorable macroeconomic 
conditions the same way in different countries.  Similarly, the recognition that institutions 
can be more effective when closely networked with multinational firms may help to explain 
why a firm chooses one countries over another for its R&D center, despite otherwise 
favorable conditions in both countries.  Furthermore, the institutional argument should help 
to explain why firms begin innovation in a country at a certain point in time. 
The conclusions of this study also have implications for policy, and other practical 
consequences.  Most obviously, the implication of the study for policymakers is that they 
concentrate not only on reducing barriers to investment, but also recognize what kind of 
investment is entering and how it is being integrated into developmental processes.  I argue 
that distinctions between high quality and low quality FDI were missing in the reform 
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process of the 1990s in Brazil, and in other countries in Latin America.  A discriminating 
approach to FDI can lead to greater spillovers if implemented correctly.  Firms have more 
flexibility in their production models than imagined.  Moreover, firms are interested in 
investing in developing countries for important reasons.  The locational advantages of 
developing countries, whether they take the shape of large consumer markets or high-skill, 
low-wage workers, endow states with bargaining leverage.  And while WTO rules now 
prohibit various tools such as domestic content requirements, states still have plenty of 
‘policy space’ with which to influence investment profiles.  But attention to policy is not 
enough.  The other implication of this study is that domestic institutions should receive a 
great deal of attention in order to increase the chances of developmental spillovers.  As the 
example of Brazil in 2004 has shown, relatively well-conceived policy can lose some of its 
impact when it is channeled through uncoordinated institutions.  Active, discriminating 
policy without strong institutions can deliver disappointing results.  Therefore policymakers 
must examine the institutions charged with investment promotion.  In Brazil and other 
developing countries, building up institutional coherence may be just as important as the 
nature of investment incentives.  Pockets of efficiency, while helpful, are not enough to 
ensure a continuous process of FDI-based upgrading.  Too often in Latin America, generous 
incentives for investment have been implemented in an uncoordinated fashion.  This can lead 
to race to the bottom dynamics, and reduce the backward and forward linkages firms have 
with domestic economic actors.  Institutional characteristics are recognized by firms 
alongside specific policy outcomes.  Just as the stability of an exchange rate may be more 
important to firms than its level, the consistency of institutions may be as or even more 
important than the incentives they deliver. 
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Dunning’s (1980) OLI framework elaborated on a number of locational advantages 
important to firms as they consider multinational investment.  Yet alongside wage rates and 
access to markets, institutions may be considered another form of locational advantage.  Who 
would blame a firm for choosing to locate its R&D facility in a country with a long history of 
intellectual property protection, or strong universities with applied research centers?  It is 
certainly true that some of the characteristics of strong institutions take time to develop.  
National systems of innovation do not emerge quickly.  However, there are areas where rapid 
progress can be made.  Schrank and Kurtz (2005) have rightly challenged the traditional 
dichotomy between inward-orientation/statism and outward-orientation/laissez-faire, which 
had saddled industrial policy with the legacies of failed economic models of the past.  They 
argue that Latin American governments in recent years have adopted more effective 
industrial policies designed to increase international insertion.  I argue in this dissertation that 
industrial policy has a role to play in incentivizing specific activities of multinational firms 
and therefore shaping their contribution to domestic development.  Industrial policy may be 
implemented badly, of course, generating rent-seeking behavior and sub-optimal outcomes.  
However, industrial policies may also play an important role in shaping investment models, 
leading to beneficial outcomes for both firms and developing countries.  To deny its ability to 
do so is unwise. 
This dissertation considers many of the questions surrounding the role of the state in 
an era of international production.  However, it also leaves many questions unanswered.  
There are a number of ways that the findings of this work can be expanded or applied to 
other contexts.  This is largely a case study of Brazil, and while I have at times sacrificed 
theoretical breadth for contextual depth, the arguments of this work can be applied to other 
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countries as well.  While chapter six applies institutionalist arguments in a comparative 
context, it would be worthwhile to concentrate on other institutional questions and associated 
investment models.  There has been much debate over whether unified investment promotion 
frameworks have advantages over federal arrangements, where states can engage in beggar-
thy-neighbor competition for FDI.  To my knowledge no cross-national study exists that links 
spillover-intensive investments with federal or unitary forms of government.  There are other 
political characteristics that might be linked with different forms of FDI in a cross-national 
setting, such as the number of veto points. 
Another potentially fruitful avenue of research concerns the disaggregation of overall 
FDI flows and stocks.  The heterogeneity of FDI is one of the primary justifications for this 
work.  Yet I have only considered innovation-intensive FDI and the commercial balance of 
multinational firms.  There are other ways to subdivide foreign investment.  Mosley (2010) 
recently unpacked FDI into directly owned foreign investment versus subcontracting, and 
demonstrates that these different forms of investment have different outcomes for labor rights 
in developing countries.  Vertical vs. horizontal FDI may have important political 
implications and determinants.  The global value chain perspective should inform more 
political science research, as it highlights the great diversity of global investment patterns.  
Yet links between this literature and political economy are underdeveloped. 
As a political scientist, I have approached the question of institutional impact from 
the side of politics.  However, different approaches are possible as well.  While my focus has 
been on institutional arrangements in Brazil, scholars in international business studies have 
conducted firm case studies which address locational incentives for investment and link them 
to firm organizational models.  However, many of these studies concentrate on economic 
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conditions in host countries as potential motivating factors, and do not often consider the role 
of political institutions.  A consideration of these factors would benefit firm case studies. 
I have advocated and employed an institutionalist framework for interpreting the 
relationships between states and firms in Brazil.  However, arguments which emphasize 
societal forces are also possible.  It may be useful to consider the role political parties or 
social classes play in determining investment policy.  Foreign investment is controversial, 
and different societal groups have much to win and/or lose upon the entry of foreign 
investors.  I have made periodic reference to instances where protectionist groups have allied 
with multinational firms to campaign for privileges, such as the automotive regime.  
However, my focus has been on the institutional configuration, as I believe the state is an 
important, independent intermediary between societal forces and multinational firms.  
However, societal interpretations can contribute to our understanding of the relationships 
between politics in developing countries and international investment. 
Finally, this project has made almost no mention of a very important and relatively 
new phenomenon in Latin America – the rise of Latin American multinationals.  Outward 
investment is booming, particularly in natural resource sectors but also in such diversified 
manufacturing sectors as aircraft and machinery.  Outward FDI from Latin America 
contradicts long-held notions about the direction of capital flows in the global system, and 
has provided analysts with new possibilities for research.  These so-called Translatin 
corporations231
                                                 
231This label, employed by organizations like ECLAC, is somewhat misleading as it carries the connotation that 
these multinational corporations are only involved in other Latin American countries.  In fact, Brazilian-based 
mining companies have made investments in Canada and elsewhere in the developed world. 
 often spring from extensive state support, and research on the political 
determinants of outward oriented FDI is linked to very old debates about infant industry 
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protection and state subsidy.  Nevertheless, the political spark for outward investment from 
developing countries is a fascinating subject for political economy. 
To conclude, this dissertation has analyzed the institutional determinants of different 
forms of FDI in Brazil and elsewhere.  I have explained differing investment profiles as 
consequences of varying institutional configurations and policy prerogatives.  I find that 
specific policy and institutional characteristics increase the leverage governments enjoy over 
firm investment models.  More specifically, I argue that Brazil has pursued largely passive 
and indiscriminating approaches to foreign investment, and this partly explains the largely 
market-seeking profiles of multinational firms already established in Brazil as well as the 
market-seeking profiles of entrants in the 1990s.  I also argue, however, that this approach 
has changed over time.  Brazil has adopted a more active and discriminating approach to FDI 
in recent years, as part of the general reinvigoration of industrial policy.  I also argue that 
specific institutional characteristics, such as lack of coordination and consistency, have 
impacted investment models.  Foreign investors in Brazil do not in general display innovative 
profiles, and in many sectors the commercial balance of investment is decidedly negative.  
While many factors have influenced this state of affairs, the contribution of institutions 
cannot be ignored.  The results of this dissertation have important implications for the fields 
of international political economy, where foreign investment has largely been treated as 
homogenous, and for development theory, which is coming to terms with the growing 
internationalization of production and the impact this has on state agency. 
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